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“Aristippus, the Socratic philosopher, shipwrecked on the coast of Rhodes and
having noticed sketches of geometric figures, it is said may have spoken thus to his
companions: ‘We can hope for the best, for I see the signs of men.’ (Vitruvius,
De architectura, Book 6, Preface)” Frontispiece to (Euclid, 1703). Translation by
H. J. Santecchia. Reproduced from (Heilbron, 2000).
To Markku, who showed me the rare art
of flying keeping one’s feet on the ground
Do space and time exist alone and
As part and parcel of the world,
Or are they merely illusions
Our minds create and set unfurled?
The very products of our brain
Like, say, the feeling of disdain?
Three hundred years of bitter history
Have failed this issue to resolve:
Cartesian vortices and whirlpools,
Around which corpuscles revolve;
Contraptions built out of material
Not once upgraded from ethereal.
Today the ether has not left us;
It lives in new, geometric modes:
As loops and foams, as fancy networks,
As strings and membranes, links and nodes;
For are these objects, say, these strings,
The seat of any real things?
Are even spacetime points ethereal?
An argument about a hole:
So wide to charm most varied thinkers,
But deep enough to lose your soul;
Of which philosophers are fond,
But which it’s time to step beyond.
Forgo the hole, the points, the ether.
Instead use things you can detect;
The simplest things than Man can think of,
With sources Man can clearly affect.
Find answers past the older helm
Within a non-geometric realm.
A basic secret of the cosmos
It is our goal to better grasp.
A highly ambitious undertaking;
Might even make the Reader gasp,
Or utter apprehensive shrieks:
“A task to daunt the Ancient Greeks!”
—Or utter cries of disbelief
And hope this thesis to be brief.
A wish that we cannot concede:
Of much soul-searching there is need.
Preface
The prologue is the most emotive moment, where the tension
accumulated during a year of work is released like a gunshot.
Miguel Indurain, Cycle Sport Magazine
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the elucidation of an elemental,
age-old problem, namely, the physical nature of space and time. The words
of my supervisor, Dr. Markku Lehto, to whom I owe countless hours of
illuminating revelations, perhaps describe the spirit of this thesis better
than no other:
We participate in one of mankind’s most challenging intellectual
efforts. The goal is to understand the biggest secrets of the
cosmos: the structure of space and time as well as the connection
of this structure with that of matter. One may even hold these
secrets to be “greater than life,” when one thinks that life can
be explained as an emergent phenomenon, i.e. a phenomenon
which arises (probably very complicatedly) via evolution from
the primitive structure of space and time and its interaction with
matter.
The first step is to explain whether space and time can have in
general an own structure. Or are space and time in the end only
human sensations like, for example, the feeling “happy”?1
In the study of this problem, like in that of all problems enduring obsti-
nately through the ages, it soon dawned on me that the question to focus
on was not the immediately expected, “How do we go about finding a solu-
tion?” but rather the more careful and measured, “What is the problem?”
Moreover, it eventually became apparent that these two questions were one
and the same; that an understanding of the essence of a problem was quite
apt to reveal ill-founded attempts at solving it, as well as point implicitly
to the path of a methodical resolution.
This realization, together with mounting weariness of hackneyed, indul-
gent accounts of the nature and prospects of quantum gravity—the discipline
which currently occupies itself with the issue of space and time—made an
1Private communication, 2001.
vi Preface
unsympathetic, bare-bones analysis of this field of research as indispens-
able as it was enlightening. It allowed me to disentangle few facts from a
surfeit of cliche´d beliefs (including even the occasional extravaganza) that
populate the quantum-gravitational world—a referent-orphaned no-man’s-
land of theoretical research. In particular, I learnt from this analysis that
the present work can be considered part of quantum gravity only in a very
shallow, conventional sense, since it does not share with this field its stan-
dard motivations, methods of enquiry, or desired destination. If quantum
gravity is to be reached by either one of the three geometric roads currently
envisioned, this work treads none of them.
After two and a half millennia of bitter and fruitless struggle—the last
three and a half centuries of which within the context of modern science—the
problem of the physical nature of space and time continues to be nothing
short of an opinionated battlefield, a vicious display of parry and repost,
a twisted labyrinth with no exit anywhere to be seen. We believe that
unravelling this age-old problem requires a return to a physics based on ob-
servations, together with the conceptual overthrow of the geometric notions
in terms of which the philosophically and mathematically minded debate
continues exclusively to rage, i.e. via a thorough departure from all forms of
geometric thought and language, an idea we condense in the name “meta-
geometry.”
Focused on metageometry, however, we notice with disquiet the omi-
nous fact that human beings carry with them an innate craving for geo-
metric modes of thought and expression. This is not only revealed by an
overview of physical theories, or even of scientific theories, but, without fear
of overstatement, one may even say of all human endeavour. Human beings’
fascination for geometry easily grows to the point of enslavement; and some-
times even to the epitomical extreme of having Geometry become a modern
religion—physicists’ incarnation of God.
While a solution to the ontological spacetime problem cannot be found
through philosophically minded, labyrinthine discussions void of fresh phys-
ical content, neither can it be found through the hit-and-miss invention of
new spacetime structures off the top of one’s head; and especially not when
these procedures are based solely, or mostly, on pure mathematical insight.
In physics, mathematics is a good servant but a bad master. Because it
is a physical question that we have in our hands, its clarification requires
strong physical intuition, the identification of relevant physical principles,
and a firm anchorage in observations and experiments as an unconditional
starting point.
It is in view of all this that this work deals with the question, “What do
observations, quantum principles, and metageometric thought have to say
about space and time?” It consists primarily in the development of new, ele-
mental physical ideas and concepts and, therefore, does not need to abound
in complicated technicalities. Obstinate problems require conceptually fresh
starts.
✸ ✸ ✸
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Literally speaking, this work would have been impossible without the
wisdom and extraordinary guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Markku Lehto.
Not only did he gently and unselfishly show me the way through the maze-
like passageways of quantum-gravity research, unobtrusively fostering at all
times the independent development and expression of my own thoughts, but
also showed me the difference between physics, mathematics, and philoso-
phy. In so doing, he taught me by example (the one truly effective teaching
method) the meaning of genuine physical thinking—a surprisingly difficult
activity rarely witnessed in frontier theoretical physics. To him go my infi-
nite gratitude and admiration.
From a financial point of view, the making of this thesis was assisted by
the support of different organizations. I thank the Centre for International
Mobility (CIMO) for sponsoring the beginning of my Ph.D. studies; and the
Ellen and Artturi Nyysso¨nen Foundation, the Finnish Cultural Foundation,
and the Department of Physics, University of Jyva¨skyla¨, for allowing their
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The research leading to this thesis was carried out during the period
September 2001–July 2007 within the context of the last-mentioned Depart-
ment, where I found ample freedom of action and better working conditions
than I could have dreamt of. I particularly want to thank its administra-
tive staff for its efficiency and helpfulness and my roommates, Ari Peltola,
Johanna Piilonen, and Antti Tolvanen for pondering and assaying with me,
sometimes lightheartedly, sometimes in all seriousness, the exactions of life
in the brave new world of academia.
Last but not least, the actual material creation of this thesis was made
not only possible but, moreover, enjoyable by the typesetting system LATEX—
an essential tool, almost on a par with the differential calculus, of the mod-
ern man of science; a tool which deserves more attention in our typeset-it-
yourself world of amateur desktop publishing than is usually paid to it in
the sciences and humanities curricula.
Man does not live by bread alone. I would also like to thank other
people who have indirectly contributed to the fulfillment of this project;
they are: my parents, Stella Maris and Omar, for bringing me up within the
framework of an excellent family life and education—therein lie the seeds
of all other achievements; Kaisuliina, for her companionship and warmth in
the joys and commonplaces of everyday life alike; and Ulla and Teuvo, for
unconditionally furnishing the context of a second family in a foreign, yet
marvellous, land.
I bring this prelude to a close with some hope-ridden words2 to the
reader: if you should find this work simply readable, I shall be pleased; if
it should give you a background on which to think new thoughts, I shall be
delighted.
Diego Meschini
Jyva¨skyla¨, July 2007.
2Paraphrase of Foss’s (2000, p. xiii).
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Chapter 1
Quantum gravity unobserved
If you don’t know where you are going, any road will take
you there.
Lewis Carroll, Alice’s adventures in Wonderland
The study of the physical nature of space and time falls currently under
the conventional sphere of quantum gravity—a field of physics that has been
abundantly described as an attempt to combine the clashing worldviews of
general relativity and quantummechanics, as though pieces of a faulty jigsaw
puzzle.1 It is not the intention of this thesis to go into yet one more of these
stale descriptions. We are instead interested in analysing critically the mode
of working and assumptions of quantum gravity, thereby to understand why
it is not yet possible to know even superficially the answer to the question,
“What is quantum gravity?”
Paraphrasing Hardin (1969, p. vii) on population, the emerging history
of quantum gravity is a story of confusion and denial—confusion experi-
enced, but confusion psychologically denied. Quantum gravity is a field of
physics whose subject matter has not been identified at the time of writing
of this work. What is quantum gravity about? This question has no real
answer owing to the fact that no-one has as yet identified any relevant ob-
servations that could act to guide physics’ next leap forward: either new,
unaccounted-for observations involving interactions of some sort between
gravitation and quantum systems or well-known ones that, when analysed
from a new perspective, reveal previously hidden features of the natural
world (cf. Einstein’s analysis of time measurements as a source of special
relativity). Because of this indefiniteness, there are, to varying degrees, al-
most as many meanings attached to quantum gravity as there are research
groups of it. In other words, ignorance about what quantum gravity is about
leads to uncertainty about what quantum gravity is.
In practice, however, this state of utter disorientation is not perceived
to be as gloomy as all that. In quantum gravity’s ivory tower, not only
has research happily become highly speculative and ruled by matters of
1See e.g. (Butterfield & Isham, 2000).
2 Quantum gravity unobserved
internal nature, but, much more worryingly, has to a large extent begun to
display fictional features. In the self-assured expositions of quantum gravity,
speculation is not only apt to supplant missing facts but is also capable
of becoming fact itself: assumptions originally proposed as possibilities or
beliefs have now, through concerted repetition, acquired the status of facts
irrespective of the question of their unattested physical truth. As a result
of this process, quantum gravity has become a cliche´-ridden field.
The most general of these cliche´s holds quantum gravity to be basically
the joint consideration of “quantum” and “gravity.” In other words, it
holds quantum gravity to be essentially a mechanical theory of something
physical (but for the moment unknown) of a certain typical size and energy
evolving in time in typical periods (cf. the Planck scale). This unwarranted
conclusion is either simply read off the label “quantum gravity,” or is based
on a stronger, mostly unconscious human affinity to mechanical concepts to
the detriment of other ideas farther removed from the mechanical sphere.
In truth, however, one cannot tell at this stage what combination of known
physics may be needed for a theory of quantum gravity; even less whether
new, unforeseen physical ideas may be necessary instead.
Another cliche´ involves the belief that a theory of quantum gravity will
(or worse, that it must2) solve certain, most, or all of what are presently
considered important open problems in frontier physics. For example, that
quantum gravity will (or must) give a solution to the divergences of quan-
tum field theory, unify the four forces of nature, explain the dimensionality
of space, the value of the cosmological constant, the nature of quantum
non-locality and of singularities, including black holes and the origin of the
universe, recover general relativity as a low-energy limit, possibly rewrite
the rules of quantum mechanics, etc. Such an almighty characterization of
quantum gravity, however, seems to have more in common with expectations
and desires than with physics realistically achievable at one fell swoop.
Among these problems awaiting solution, the various forms of gravita-
tional collapse predicted by general relativity and the confirmed existence of
quantum-mechanical correlations figure most notably.3 To be sure, Misner,
Thorne, and Wheeler (1973) called gravitational collapse “the greatest crisis
in physics of all time” (p. 1196), while Stapp (1975) called Bell’s theorem
“the most profound discovery of science” (p. 271). Although one must not
necessarily discard spacetime singularities or non-local correlations as moti-
vations for the search for better theories, do we really need to increase our
knowledge of these issues as a conditional part of a theory of quantum grav-
ity? This may or may not be the case. The case of Newtonian singularities,
for example, was certainly not relevant to the invention of relativistic or
quantum theories, while, on the other hand, the problem of electromagnetic
singularities was relevant to the development of quantum mechanics, as ev-
idenced by Bohr’s efforts to solve the problem of the collapse of the atom.
The same can be said of quantum non-locality. Here again one cannot tell
2See (Smolin, 2003, pp. 10–11).
3See e.g. (Monk, 1997, pp. 3–9).
3whether our knowledge of these correlations that defy the ideas of spatial
locality should be increased by a theory that will supersede the current ones,
or whether they simply are a trouble-free characteristic of quantum theory
whose expounding is irrelevant to any future developments. We simply do
not know what current problems quantum gravity will solve, which it will
declare non-issues, and which it will not even touch upon. What is certain,
however, is that any future theory that may be called physical will explain
the origin and nature of the observables it refers to.
A related cliche´ results from stretching the previous one beyond all mea-
sure. It involves the belief that a theory of quantum gravity will not only
be a theory of gravitation and quantum phenomena, but a “theory of every-
thing” that will put an end to research in elemental physics. This dubious
idea, although nowadays not necessarily restricted to the particle-physics
perspective, is presumably inspired in the worldview offered by this field of
physics, according to which microscopic particles and their particle-mediated
interactions are the most basic constituents of nature.4 On this basis, it is
believed that to account for all (known and presumed) basic microscopic
constituents (particles, strings, or suchlike) and their mutual interactions
is tantamount to accounting in principle for “everything” in the physical
world.
To say the least, this conception is at odds with another well-established
field of physics, general relativity, from which we know that the matter-
dependent geometric properties of spacetime are as physical and basic as
the particles found embedded in its geometric network. If, as it seems to
be, the suspect idea of a “theory of everything” was originally inspired by
the optimistic prospect of a unification of the four known interactions on
the basis of string-theory considerations,5 then a cursory glance at general
relativity leaves us wondering, And what about space and time? In the
last analysis, the particle-physics worldview originally inspiring a “theory of
4For approches from this direction, see e.g. (Greene, 1999; Weinberg, 1993); for ap-
proaches from a general direction, see e.g. (Barrow, 1992; Breuer, 1997; Hartle, 2003;
Laughlin & Pines, 2000; Tegmark, 1998; Tegmark & Wheeler, 2001).
5The origin of claims regarding a “theory of everything” can be traced to a talk
by Michael Green advertised at Oxford University in the mid-1980s. It is told that
Brian Greene “[w]alking home one winter day. . . saw a poster for a lecture explain-
ing a new-found ‘theory of everything.’ ” “It made it sound dramatic,” Greene adds.
Dramatic, indeed, but to what purpose drama in science? (Columbia College To-
day, http://www.college.columbia.edu/cct/sep99/12a.html. With variations also at Ency-
clopedia of World Biography, http://www.notablebiographies.com/news/Ge-La/Greene-
Brian.html) In truth, however, we can trace the origin of the phrase “theory of everything”
farther back in time. In a short story first published in 1966, Stanis law Lem introduced the
concept—as could not be otherwise—as part of harsh satire. His space-faring character
Ijon Tichy relates that his grandfather
at the age of nine. . . decided to create a General Theory of Everything and
nothing could divert him from that goal. The tremendous difficulty he expe-
rienced, from the earliest years on, in formulating concepts, only intensified
after a disastrous street accident (a steamroller flattened his head). (Lem,
1985, p. 258)
This is an origin that does not bode well for the idea in question.
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everything” is based on the presumption that to be more elemental means
to be smaller; but whence should the elemental concepts of our most basic
theories refer to small entities? This is also the presumption behind the
Planck-scale considerations underlying quantum gravity.
Deeper reasons to doubt any claim about a “theory of everything” con-
cern epistemological and ontological considerations. From an epistemolog-
ical perspective, physical theories are the products of the human intellect,
built with the conceptual tools of the mind. This, for one, entails that the-
ories are built from limited experience out of the conventional (overwhelm-
ingly geometric), volatile concepts of the physical tradition they belong to,
and also that one can never be certain whether all aspects of nature—known
and unforeseeable alike—can even in principle be reduced to those of any ex-
isting theory. As Stanis law Lem (1984a), that great discerner of the human
spirit, put it, “One has to look through the history of science to reach the
most probable conclusion: that the shape of things to come is determined
by what we do not know today and by what is unforeseeable” (p. 124).
But much more profoundly, the fact that our theories are nothing but
conceptual tools of thought precludes the belief that a “theory of every-
thing” is a reasonable or even meaningful human goal to pursue (or, worse
still, just around the corner), because a tool of thought is a filter that se-
lects according to a built-in bias. This must necessarily be so, because the
jumble of impressions that make up the inner and outer world of conscious
experience cannot be made sense of as an indivisible whole. Heed the perti-
nent words from a different context of another great discerner of the human
spirit, biologist-ecologist Garrett Hardin:
We need to be acutely aware of the virtues and shortcomings
of the tools of the mind. In the light of that awareness, many
public controversies can be resolved.
[. . . ] Our intellectual tools are filters for reducing reality to a
manageable simplicity. To assert that we have ever completely
captured reality in an equation or a string of words would be
extremely arrogant. Each filter captures only part of reality.
Most expertise is single-filter expertise. We come closer to the
truth when we compensate for the bias of one filter by using
others (which have different biases). (Hardin, 1985, pp. 20–21)
Any physical theory is such a filter, its mesh currently built out of geometry;
indeed, a physical theory, as North (1990) put it with a degree of modesty
currently in short supply,6 is “merely an instrument of what passes for un-
derstanding” (p. 407). “Everything” cannot be understood. Ultimately,
the belief in a “theory of everything” is based on what Lem (1984a) has
called “the myth of our [and our scientific language’s] cognitive universal-
ity” (pp. 26–27)—in other words, on human folly.
6In a world where scientific theories have become marketable consumer goods, modesty
is a luxury we cannot afford. This explains why drama is needed in science. For related
ideas, see (Lagendijk, 2005).
5In connection with his quotation above, to better grasp the reality of
a finite overpopulated world, Hardin proposed the application of a combi-
nation of several filters: literacy, numeracy, and ecolacy. Hardin’s various
filters, because of being many and different, are filters against folly—the
folly of single-filter expertise. The single-filter explain-all schemes proposed
by the advocates of a “theory of everything,” on the other hand, are then
of necessity filters of folly.
The only positive thing—yet far-fetched and, at any rate, of limited
scope—that can be said for a “theory of everything” comes from the onto-
logical perspective; in other words, from a differentiation between human
knowledge and truth. Turning a blind eye to the built-in limitations of
theories as filters for understanding, some have argued for a “theory of ev-
erything” as follows. As much as physical theories may change, what is
true of them as expressed in their laws never changes beyond the degree of
accuracy with which these laws have been corroborated. For example, as
mechanical theories were successively improved from Galilei, through Kepler
and Newton, to Einstein and the fathers of quantum mechanics, the laws
of inertia, of equivalence between rest and gravitational mass, the inverse-
square law of gravitation, etc., either remained untouched or were modified
for new physical domains but never banished. What is once known is, as
it were, known forever. Thus, a “theory of everything” could conceivably
contain laws that are absolutely and perfectly true—whether we know it or
not—of those aspects of nature, both known and to be disclosed in the fu-
ture, that it as a filter manages to capture—not, however, of every aspect
of nature, which escapes any chosen mesh. This is the most a “theory of
everything” could be.
Ontologically speaking, then, we see that a “theory of everything” in this
severely restricted one-filter sense is not a logical impossibility, but only an
utterly unreasonable expectation judging from the constant turmoil science
has lived in during all of its history, including especially the (psychologi-
cally denied) utter disorientation of the present epoch. As Peacock (2006)
enquires with regard to string theory, “If the search for a unique and in-
evitable explanation of nature has proved illusory at every step, is it really
plausible that suddenly string theory can make everything right at the last?”
(p. 170).
Since when do scientists seriously concern themselves with the study
of utter implausibilities? (Perpetual-motion machines and astrology come
most readily to mind.) Is the enterprise of natural science about claiming
non-impossibilities and asking others to demonstrate a “no-go theorem” to
prove one to be logically wrong? This is, at any rate, the turf of mathematics
or professional philosophy, but not a game that physics is ready to play. Or
to borrow Hardin’s (1993, pp. 40–43) words, in science (as in ecology; but
unlike in professional philosophy, as in economics) the “default status” is
“guilty until proven innocent,” which means that the “burden of proof” lies
on the proponent of extravagant claims (or “progressive developments”),
not on the receiver. Hardin asks, “Aren’t scientists supposed to be open-
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What is quantum gravity?
Cliche´ #1: Quantum gravity is
quantum ∩ gravity.
Answer #1: Quantum gravity is
known physics ∪ unforeseeable new
physics.
Cliche´ #2: Quantum gravity to
solve definite problems of current
physics.
Answer #2: Quantum gravity to
explain origin and nature of its ob-
servables.
Cliche´ #3: Quantum gravity is the
“theory of everything.”
Answer #3: A “theory of every-
thing” is single-filter folly.
Cliche´ #4: Quantum gravity ap-
plies at the Planck scale.
Answer #4: Quantum gravity ap-
plies at the scale of its observables.
Table 1.1: Contrast between the typical and our own views regarding the nature
of quantum gravity. The symbol ∩ represents the logical operation AND, while the
symbol ∪ represents the logical operation OR.
minded? Does not science progress by examining every possibility?” And
forthrightly replies, “The answer to the second question is no. As for being
open-minded, how much open-mindedness can we afford?” (p. 40).
A fourth and final cliche´ to be mentioned here consists in the general-
ized belief—regardless of research approach or investigator—that the Planck
scale will be relevant to quantum gravity. This notion is without doubt the
most cherished, overarching theme of quantum gravity. It goes unchallenged
in virtually all researches, and has become such a central, yet worryingly lit-
tle examined, assumption that we shall analyse it in detail in the following
chapter. As we separate fact from belief in connection with the Planck scale,
we give a new look at some of the other issues mentioned above.
Quantum-gravity cliche´s, summarized in Table 1.1, are fictional beliefs
that have become facts through sheer repetition, in line with a reigning
politics of publication that, as Lawrence (2003) has remarked, uncritically
favours fashionable ideas. This situation is fuelled by the fact that the stan-
dard accounts of quantum gravity are capable of offering alluring vistas to
the human imagination, which are, in turn, invigorated by colourful pop-
ularizations in magazines, books, and visual media, for which the making
of profit sets the main standard of action. Ultimately, these beliefs remain
unchallenged due to the lack of a referent of quantum gravity in the natural
world. Only the recognition of relevant observables, whether new ones yet
unaccounted-for or old ones seen in a new light, will provide the clue as
to what quantum gravity is about. And only knowledge of what quantum
gravity is about will spell out what quantum gravity is. For this reason, the
question one should worry about is not what quantum gravity is, but what
are the relevant observables on which to build a quantum theory of space
and time.
Chapter 2
The myth of Planck-scale
physics
There was a time when educated men supposed that myths
were something of the past—quaint, irrational fairy tales be-
lieved in by our credulous and superstitious ancestors, but
not by us, oh dear no!
Garrett Hardin, Nature and Man’s fate
An overview of the current confident status of so-called Planck-scale
physics is enough to perplex. Research on quantum gravity has abundantly
become synonymous with it, with the Planck length lP , time tP , and mass
mP being unquestionably hailed as the scales of physical processes or things
directly relevant to a theory of quantum gravity. And yet, in the last anal-
ysis, the only linking threads between Planck’s natural units, lP , tP , and
mP , and quantum gravity ideas are (i) generally and predominantly, dimen-
sional analysis—with all its vices and virtues—and, specific to some research
programmes, (ii) joint considerations of gravitational (relativistic) and quan-
tum theories, such as ad hoc considerations about microscopic, Planck-sized
black holes or the quantization of gravity—arenas in which the effects of
both quantum theory and general relativity are to be relevant together.
Dimensional analysis is a surprisingly powerful method capable of pro-
viding great insight into physical situations without needing to work out
or know the detailed principles underlying the problem in question. This
(apparently) suits research on quantum gravity extremely well at present,
since the physical mechanisms to be involved in such a theory are unknown.
However, dimensional analysis is not an all-powerful discipline: unless very
judiciously used, the results it produces are not necessarily meaningful and,
therefore, they should be interpreted with caution. So should, too, argu-
ments concerning Planck-sized black holes or the quantization of gravity,
considering, as we shall see, their suspect character.
In this chapter, we put forward several cautionary observations against
the role uncritically bestowed currently on the Planck units as meaningful
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scales in a future physical theory of space and time. One remark consists in
questioning the extent of the capabilities of dimensional analysis: although
it possesses an almost miraculous ability to produce correct orders of magni-
tude for quantities from dimensionally appropriate combinations of physical
constants and variables, it is not by itself a necessarily enlightening proce-
dure. A conceptually deeper remark has to do with the fact that, despite its
name, a theory of quantum gravity need not be the outcome of “quantum”
(h) and “gravity” (G, c): it may be required that one or more presently
unknown natural constants be discovered and taken into account in order
to picture1 the new physics correctly; or yet more unexpectedly, it may also
turn out that quantum gravity has nothing to do with one or more of the
above-mentioned constants. The meaning of these observations will be illus-
trated in the following with the help, where possible, of physical examples,
through which we will cast doubt on the mostly undisputed significance of
Planck-scale physics. We will argue that quantum gravity scholars, eager to
embark on the details of their investigations, overlook the question of the
likelihood of their assumptions regarding the Planck scale—thus creating
seemingly indubitable facts out of merely plausible beliefs.
But before undertaking the critical analysis of these beliefs, let us first re-
view the well-established facts surrounding dimensional analysis and Planck’s
natural units.
2.1 Facts
The Planck units were proposed for the first time by Max Planck (1899)
over a century ago. His original intention in the invention of these units was
to provide a set of basic physical units that would be less arbitrary, i.e. less
human-oriented, and more universally meaningful than metre, second, and
kilogram units.2
The Planck units can be calculated from dimensionally appropriate com-
binations of three universal natural constants, namely, Newton’s gravita-
tional constant G, Planck’s constant h, and the speed of light c. The math-
ematical procedure through which Planck’s units can be obtained is not
guaranteed to succeed unless the reference set of constants {G,h, c} is di-
mensionally independent with respect to the dimensions M of mass, L of
length, and T of time. This is to say that the MLT -dimensions of none of
the above constants should be expressible in terms of combinations of the
other two.
The reference set {G,h, c} will be dimensionally independent with re-
spect to M , L, and T if the system of equations
[G] = M−1L3T−2
[h] = M1L2T−1
[c] = M0L1T−1
(2.1)
1Do scientists picture the natural world, or do they model it? For a brief elucidation,
see Appendix A.
2For an account of the early history of the Planck units, see (Gorelik, 1992).
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is invertible. Following Bridgman (1963, pp. 31–34), we take the logarithm
of the equations to find
ln([G]) = −1 ln(M) + 3 ln(L)− 2 ln(T )
ln([h]) = 1 ln(M) + 2 ln(L)− 1 ln(T )
ln([c]) = 0 ln(M) + 1 ln(L)− 1 ln(T )
, (2.2)
which is now a linear system of equations in the logarithms of the variables
of interest and can be solved applying Cramer’s rule. For example, for M
we get
ln(M) =
1
∆
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ln([G]) 3 −2
ln([h]) 2 −1
ln([c]) 1 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (2.3)
where
∆ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
−1 3 −2
1 2 −1
0 1 −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2 (2.4)
is the determinant of the coefficients of the system. We find
M = [G]−
1
∆ [h]
1
∆ [c]
1
∆ , (2.5)
and similarly for L and T . This means that the system of equations has
a solution only if ∆ is different from zero, which in fact holds in this case.
Granted the possibility to construct Planck’s units, we proceed to do so.3
The Planck length lP results as follows. We define lP by the equation
lP = KlG
αhβcγ , (2.6)
where Kl is a dimensionless constant. In order to find α, β, and γ, we
subsequently write its dimensional counterpart
[lP ] = L = [G]
α[h]β [c]γ . (2.7)
In terms of M , L, and T , we get
L = (M−1L3T−2)α(ML2T−1)β(LT−1)γ . (2.8)
Next we solve for α, β, and γ by rearranging the right-hand side and com-
paring it with the left-hand side, to get α = β = 1/2, and γ = −3/2. Thus,
the Planck length is
lP = Kl
√
Gh
c3
= Kl4.05 × 10−35 m. (2.9)
The other two Planck units can be calculated by means of a totally analogous
procedure. They are
tP = Kt
√
Gh
c5
= Kt1.35× 10−43 s (2.10)
3Although Cramer’s rule could be used to actually solve for lP , tP , and mP , in the
following we shall use a less abstract, more intuitive method.
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and
mP = Km
√
hc
G
= Km5.46 × 10−8 kg. (2.11)
The crucial question now is: is there any physical significance in these
natural units beyond Planck’s original intentions of providing a less human-
oriented set of reference units for length, time, and mass? Quantum-gravity
research largely takes for granted a positive answer to this question, and
confers on these units a completely different, and altogether loftier, role:
Planck’s units are to represent the physical scale of things relevant to a
theory of quantum gravity, or at which processes relevant to such a theory
occur.4
One may seek high and low for cogent justifications of this momentous
claim, which is to be found in innumerable scientific publications; much as
one might seek, however, one must always despairingly return to, by and
large, the same explanation (when it is explicitly mentioned at all): dimen-
sional analysis. For example, Butterfield and Isham (2000, p. 37) account
for the appearance of the Planck units in passing—and quite accurately
indeed—as a “simple dimensional argument.” Smolin (1997), for his part,
grants the suspect derivation of the Planck scale from dimensional analysis
but goes on to justify it: “This may seem like a bit of a trick, but in physics
arguments like this [dimensional analytic] are usually reliable.” He also as-
sures the reader that “several different approaches to quantum gravity do
predict” (p. 60) the relevance of this scale, but does not mention that all
these different approaches use the same trick. Is dimensional analysis such a
trustworthy tool as to grant us definite information about unknown physics
without needing to look into nature’s inner workings, or has our faith in it
become exaggerated?
Two uncommonly cautious statements regarding the meaning of the
Planck units are those of Y. J. Ng’s, and of J. C. Baez’s. Ng (2003) recog-
nized that the Planck units are so extremely large or small relative to the
scales we can explore today that “it takes a certain amount of foolhardiness
to even mention Planck-scale physics” (p. 1, online ref.). Although this is a
welcome observation, it appears to work only as a proviso, for Ng immedi-
ately moved on to a study of Planck-scale physics rather than to a criticism
of it: “But by extrapolating the well-known successes of quantum mechanics
and general relativity in low energy, we believe one can still make predic-
tions about certain phenomena involving Planck-scale physics, and check for
consistency” (p. 1).
Also Baez (2000) made welcome critical observations against the hy-
pothetical relevance of the Planck length in a theory of quantum gravity.
Firstly, he mentioned that the dimensionless factor (here denoted Kl) might
in fact turn out to be very large or very small, which means that the or-
der of magnitude of the Planck length as is normally understood (i.e. with
Kl = 1) need not be meaningful at all. A moment’s reflection shows that
this problem does not really threaten the expected order of magnitude of the
4See e.g. (Amelino-Camelia, 2003) for hypothetically possible roles of Planck’s length.
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Planck units. An overview of physical formulas suggests that, in general, the
dimensionless constant K appearing in them tends to be very large or very
small (e.g. |K| ≥ 102 or |K| ≤ 10−2) only when the physical constants enter
the equations to high powers. For example, consider a black body and ask
what might be its radiation energy density ρE. Since the system in question
involves a gas (kBτ) of photons (c, h), one proposes
ρE = Kρh
αcβ(kBτ)
γ , (2.12)
where Kρ is a dimensionless constant and τ is the absolute temperature of
the black body. The application of dimensional analysis gives the result
ρE = Kρ
(kBτ)
4
h3c3
= Kρ4.64 × 10−18τ4 J
K4m3
, (2.13)
whereas the correct result is
ρE = 7.57 × 10−16τ4 J
K4m3
, (2.14)
and thus Kρ = 163. The value of Kρ does not result from dimensional anal-
ysis but from detailed physical calculations; these values will from now on be
given in parentheses for the purpose of assessing the accuracy of dimensional
analysis. The result yielded by dimensional analysis, then, is two orders of
magnitude lower than the correct value of ρE , which represents a meaning-
ful difference for the physics of a black body. This discrepancy, however,
could have been expected since it can be traced back to the constants h, c,
and kB entering the equation to high powers (3, 3, and 4, respectively).
5 In
this respect, the situation appears quite safe for the Planck units, excepting
perhaps the Planck time, in whose expression c enters to the power −5/2.
More interestingly, Baez also recognized that “a theory of quantum grav-
ity might involve physical constants other than c, G, and ~” (p. 180).
This is indeed one important issue regarding the significance of Planck-
scale physics—or lack thereof—which will be analysed in the next section.
However, notwithstanding his cautionary observations to the effect that“we
cannot prove that the Planck length is significant for quantum gravity,” Baez
also chose to try and “glean some wisdom from pondering the constants c,
G, and ~” (p. 180).
What these criticisms intend to point out is the curious fact that, within
the widespread uncritical acceptance of the relevance of Planck-scale physics,
even those who noticed the possible shortcomings of dimensional analysis in
connection with quantum gravity decided to continue to pursue their studies
in this direction—as if to seriously question the Planck scale was taboo. We
enquire into the deeper reason behind this practice later on in Chapter 7.
For now, we concentrate on the issue at hand and ask: where do the charms
of dimensional analysis lie, then?
“[D]imensional analysis is a by-way of physics that seldom fails to fas-
cinate even the hardened practitioner,” said Isaacson and Isaacson (1975,
5See (Bridgman, 1963, pp. 88, 95) for related views.
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p. vii). Indeed, examples could be multiplied at will for the view that dimen-
sional analysis is a trustworthy, almost magical, tool. Consider, for example,
a hydrogen atom and ask what is the relevant physical scale of its radius a
and binding energy E. Dimensional analysis can readily provide an answer
apparently without much knowledge of the physics of atoms, only if one is
capable of estimating correctly which natural constants are relevant to the
problem. The general manner of this estimation will be considered in Sec-
tion 2.3; for the moment, we assume that one at least knows what an atom
is, namely, a microscopic aggregate of lighter negative charges and heavier
(neutral and) positive charges of equal strength, and where only the details
of their mutual interaction remain unknown. Without this kind of previ-
ous knowledge, in effect assuring us that we have a quantum-electrodynamic
system in our hands, the application of dimensional analysis becomes blind.6
Armed with previous physical experience, then, one notices that only quan-
tum mechanics and the electrodynamics of the electron are involved, so that
the constants to consider must be h, the electron charge e, the electron mass
me, and the permittivity of vacuum ǫ0. Equipped with these constants, one
proposes
a = Kah
αeβmγe ǫ
δ
0 (2.15)
and
E = KEh
λeµmνeǫ
ξ
0, (2.16)
where Ka and KE are dimensionless constants. A procedure analogous to
the one above for the Planck length gives the results
a = Ka
ǫ0h
2
mee2
= Ka1.66 A˚ = 0.529 A˚ (Ka = 1/π) (2.17)
and
E = KE
mee
4
ǫ20h
2
= KE108 eV = −13.60 eV (KE = −1/8). (2.18)
As we can see, meaningful values of the order of magnitude of the char-
acteristic radius and binding energy of the hydrogen atom can thus be
found through the sheer power of dimensional analysis. We believe that
it is on a largely unstated argument along these lines that quantum-gravity
researchers’ claims regarding the relevance of the Planck units rest.
Regrettably, the physical world cannot be probed confidently by means
of this tool alone, since it has its shortcomings. As we see in the next sec-
tion, these are that dimensional analysis may altogether fail to inform us
what physical quantity the obtained order of magnitude refers to; and more
severely, much can go amiss in the initial process of estimating which nat-
ural constants must be consequential and which not. Therefore, any claims
venturing beyond the limits imposed by these shortcomings, although plau-
sible, must be based on faith, hope, or belief, and should not in consequence
be held as straightforward facts.
6See (Bridgman, 1963, pp. 50–51).
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2.2 Beliefs
Our first objection against a securely established significance of the Planck
units in quantum gravity lies in the existence of cases in which dimensional
analysis yields the order of magnitude of no clear physical thing or process
at all.
To illustrate this point, take the Compton effect. A photon collides
with an electron, after which both particles are scattered. Assume—as is
the case in quantum gravity—that the detailed physics behind the effect is
unknown, and use dimensional analysis to predict the order of magnitude
of the length of any thing or process involved in the effect. Since quantum
mechanics and the dynamics of an electron and a photon are involved here,
one assumes (quite correctly) that the natural constants to be considered
are h, c, and me, where, like before, it is here essential to be assured that
the physical system under study is quantum-electrodynamic. To find this
Compton length lC , we set
lC = KCh
αcβmγe , (2.19)
where KC is a dimensionless constant, to find
lC = KC
h
mec
= KC0.0243 A˚ = 0.0243 A˚ (KC = 1). (2.20)
What is now lC the length of? In the words of Ohanian (1989), “in spite of
its name, this is not the wavelength of anything” (p. 1039).
Ohanian’s statement is controversial and requires a qualification. In
fact, one immediate meaning of the Compton length can be obtained from
the physical equation in which it appears, namely, ∆λ = lC [1 − cos(θ)],
where λ is the wavelength of the photon and θ is the scattering angle. It is
straightforward to see that lC must be the change of wavelength of a photon
scattered at right angles with the target electron. In this manner, a meaning
can be found to any constant appearing in a physical equation by looking at
the special case when the functional dependence is set to unity. Perhaps this
explains Ohanian’s denial of any real meaning to lC , since via this method
meaning can be attached to any constant whatsoever.7
In this sense, the meaning of constants appearing in physical equations
can be learnt from their very appearance in them. However, this takes all
charm away from dimensional analysis itself, since such equations are not
provided by it but become available only after well-understood physical the-
ories containing them are known; i.e. after the content of the equations is
related to actual observations. In consequence, the discovery of the meaning
7Baez (2000) explained another physical meaning of the Compton length as the distance
at which quantum field theory becomes necessary for understanding the behaviour of a
particle of mass m, since “determining the position of a particle of mass m to within
one Compton wavelength requires enough energy to create another particle of that mass”
(p. 179). Here again, a new meaning can be found for lC based on already existing,
detailed knowledge provided by quantum field theory. (But see observations on page 17.)
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of the Planck units in a theory of quantum gravity depends on such equations
being first discovered and interpreted against a background of actual obser-
vations.8 And yet, what guarantees that the Planck units will meaningfully
appear in such a future theory? Only the very definition—supported, as we
shall see, by a hasty guess—of quantum gravity as a theory involving the
constants G, h, and c. This brings us to our second objection.
A more severe criticism of the widespread, unquestioned reign of the
Planck units in quantum-gravity research results from conceptual consider-
ations about quantum gravity itself, including an exemplifying look at the
history of physics.
As mentioned above, it is a largely unchallenged assumption that quan-
tum gravity will involve precisely what its name makes reference to—the
quantum (h) and gravity (G, c)—and (i) nothing more or (ii) nothing less.
The first alternative presupposes that in a future theory of spacetime, and
any observations related to it, the combination of already known physics—
and nothing else—will prove to be significant. As correct as it might turn
out to be, this is too restrictive a conjecture for it excludes the possibility
of the need for truly new physics (cf. Baez’s observations). In particular,
is our current physical knowledge so complete and final as to disregard the
possibility of the existence of relevant natural constants yet undiscovered?
To make matters worse, mainstream quantum gravity only assumes G,
h, and c as relevant to its quest, while paying little heed to other readily
available aspects of the Planck scale. For example, why not routinely con-
sider Boltzmann’s constant kB and the permittivity of vacuum ǫ0 (or how
about other suitable constants?) to get Planck’s temperature
τP = Kτ
√
hc5
Gk2B
= Kτ3.55 × 1032 K, (2.21)
and Planck’s charge
qP = Kq
√
hcǫ0 = Kq1.33× 10−18 C (2.22)
as relevant to quantum gravity as well? Just because only length, time, and
mass appeal to our more primitive, mechanical intuition? Or is it perhaps
because the notions of temperature and charge are not included in the label
“quantum gravity”?9
The second alternative above takes for granted that at least all three
constants G, h, and c must play a role in quantum gravity. Although this is
8Another possibility is that the meaning of physical constants could be obtained from
simpler, theory-independent methods through which to measure them directly; however,
that we have such a more direct method is certainly not true today of the Planck units.
Neither is such an extreme operationalistic stance required to give meaning to them;
it suffices to have a (Planck-scale) theory of quantum gravity making some observable
predictions. But at least this much is necessary in order to make quantum gravity a
meaningful physical theory, and thus disentangle the claims of this currently speculative
and volatile field of research.
9For approaches considering extended Planck scales, see e.g. (Cooperstock & Faraoni,
2003; Major & Setter, 2001).
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a seemingly sensible expectation, it need not hold true either, for a theory
of quantum gravity may also be understood in less conventional ways. For
example, not as a quantum-mechanical theory of (general-relativistic) grav-
ity but as a quantum-mechanical theory of empty spacetime, as we explain
below.
In order to present the import of the first view more vividly, we offer
an illustration from the history of physics. Reconsider the hydrogen-atom
problem before Bohr’s solution was known and before Planck’s solution to
the black-body problem was ever given, i.e. before any knowledge of the
quantum, and therefore of h, was available.10 With no solid previous ex-
perience about atomic physics, the atom would have been considered an
electromagnetic-mechanical system, and dimensional analysis could have
been (unjustifiably) used to find the order of magnitude of physical quanti-
ties significant to the problem. Confronted with this situation, a nineteenth-
century quantum-gravity physicist may have decidedly assumed that no new
constants need play a part in yet unknown physical phenomena, proceeding
as follows.
Since an electron and a (much more massive) proton of equal charge
are concerned, the constants to be considered must be e, me, ǫ0, and the
permeability of vacuum µ0—and nothing else. This is of course wrong,
but only to the modern scientist who enjoys the benefit of hindsight. The
inclusion of µ0 is not at all unreasonable since it could have been suspected
that non-negligible magnetic effects played a part, too.
In order to find the order of magnitude of the radius a and binding energy
E of the hydrogen atom, one sets
a = K ′ae
αmβe ǫ
γ
0µ
δ
0 (2.23)
and
E = K ′Ee
λmµe ǫ
ν
0µ
ξ
0. (2.24)
Proceeding as before, one obtains
a = K ′a
e2µ0
me
= K ′a3.54 × 10−4 A˚ (2.25)
and
E = K ′E
me
ǫ0µ0
= K ′E5.11 × 105 eV. (2.26)
These expressions and estimates for a and E are completely wrong (see
Eqs. (2.17) and (2.18) for the correct results and Table 2.1 for a comparison).
This comes as no surprise to today’s physicist, who can tell at a glance that
10This demand is, of course, anachronistic since h was known to Bohr. This notwith-
standing, the hypothetical situation we propose serves as the basis for a completely plausi-
ble argument. It is only a historical accident that the problem of the collapse of the atom
was first confronted with knowledge of the quantum, since the latter was discovered while
studying black-body radiation, a problem independent of the atom. Since the black-body
problem does not lend itself to the analysis we have in mind, we prefer to take the example
of the hydrogen atom, even if we must consider it anachronistically.
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Hydrogen atom Conscientious Haphazard
Radius a Ka
ǫ0h2
mee2
≈ 1.7 A˚ K ′a e
2µ0
me
≈ 4× 10−4 A˚
Binding energy E KE
mee4
ǫ20h
2 ≈ −108 eV K ′E meǫ0µ0 ≈ −5× 105 eV
Table 2.1: Contrasting results involving two characteristic features of the hydro-
gen atom obtained via dimensional analysis. A conscientious application takes into
account the quantum-mechanical nature of the system, while a haphazard applica-
tion does not and assumes the hydrogen atom to be an electromagnetic-mechanical
system. Only the former gives reasonably approximate results.
the constants assumed to be meaningful are wrong: µ0 should not be there at
all, and h has not been taken into account. How can then today’s quantum-
gravity physicists ignore the possibility that they, too, may be missing one
or more yet unknown constants stemming from genuinely new physics?
The second, less conventional view expressed above, namely, that quan-
tum gravity need not be understood as a quantum-mechanical theory of
(general-relativistic) gravity, is supported by the following reasoning. In
view of the repeated difficulties and uncertainties encountered so far in at-
tempts to uncover the quantum aspects of gravity, one may wonder whether
the issue might not rather be whether spacetime beyond its geometric struc-
ture may have quantum aspects. In particular and as we enquire further
on, may the consideration of quantum theory reveal any physical reality (in
the form of observables) that empty spacetime possesses but which classical
general relativity denies to them (cf. hole argument)? From this perspec-
tive, the possible quantum features of gravity are not an issue and, if one
stands beyond the geometric structure of spacetime—itself the bearer of its
gravitational features (G) and causal structure (c)—the constants G and c
have no reason to arise in the theory.
As advanced in the introduction, there exist some approaches to quan-
tum gravity that do not rely on dimensional analysis in order to reproduce
Planck’s length and mass. We start by analysing one type of these, namely,
those involving the notion of Planck-scale black holes. Baez (2000, pp. 179–
180), Thiemann (2003, pp. 8–9, online ref.), and to some extent Saslow
(1998) have all independently put forward the essence of the argument in
question from different perspectives. In the language of wave mechanics, the
gist of the idea is that in order for a wave packet of mass m to be spread
no more than one Compton length lC = h/mc, its energy spectrum ∆E
must be spread no less than mc2, i.e. enough energy to create—according
to quantum field theory—a particle similar to itself. On the other hand, in
order for the same wave packet to create a non-negligible gravitational field
(strong enough to interact with itself), it must be spread no more than one
Schwarzschild radius lS = 2Gm/c
2, i.e. be concentrated enough to become—
according to general relativity—a black hole. Both effects are deemed to
become important together when lC = lS , i.e. when the particle becomes a
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black hole of mass (hc/2G)1/2 = mP /
√
2 and radius (2Gh/c3)1/2 =
√
2lP—
a so-called Planck black hole, the paradigmatic denizen of the quantum-
gravitational world.11
Is this a sound argument or is it yet another ad hoc, ad lib armchair ex-
ercise devised only to quench our thirst for tangible “quantum-gravitational
things”? Regardless of the complicated and physically controversial ques-
tion whether such black holes actually exist, let us concentrate here only on
the conceptual aspect of the issue. Our criticism has three parts.
First and irrespective of quantum-gravity ideas, to give operational mean-
ing to the above statements about wave packets and their spreads, one
should talk about a set of identically prepared microscopic particles of mass
m. Taking one microscopic system at a time and upon repeatedly measur-
ing either its position or its momentum, the statistical results are found to
be spread according to the uncertainty relation 4〈(∆Xˆ)2〉|ψ〉〈(∆Pˆ )2〉|ψ〉 ≥
|〈[Xˆ, Pˆ ]〉|ψ〉|2 = ~2.12 But spelt out this way, the argument loses its intuitive
appeal and, with it, its intended meaning. We see that to prepare a system
has nothing to do with our squeezing a particle into any sort of tight con-
finement, even less with our needing a certain minimum amount of energy
to do so. Thus, neither the creation of new particles nor of black holes is
naturally connected with the uncertainty relations at all.
Second and regardless of the above, it is straightforward to see that this
reasoning to the effect that Planck black holes must be paradigmatic of
quantum gravity assumes the previously criticized view that such a theory
must arise out of a combination of the quantum and gravity. It is really no
surprise to find that, on this supposition, the Planck scale does result even
without the intervention of dimensional analysis; now instead of combining
universal constants together, we combine theories which contain them.
In fact, a variation of this way of proceeding is found, for example,
in loop quantum gravity and in the canonical quantization of Hamiltonian
black-hole dynamics. In them, the appearance of the Planck length does not
result from dimensional analysis13 nor relying on the idea of Planck black
holes. The Planck length arises instead from a different instance of the
said physically uncalled-for procedure of now combining theories (instead of
simply constants) whose fundamental constants are G, c, and h, i.e. from
quantizing general relativity in one way or another. Why uncalled-for? Be-
cause no reasons are known as to why one should proceed thus—as if one
were, say, to quantize the traffic on the streets or the solar system—nor are
11Planck’s time is connected with this argument according to extrapolations of predic-
tions from quantum field theory in curved spacetime, namely, that a Planck black hole is
unstable with a lifetime of tP ≈ 10−43 s. However, this theory, in which spacetime is taken
to be classically curved but not “quantized,” is commonly referred to as a semiclassical
theory (of quantum gravity) and paradoxically distrusted to hold at the Planck scale. See
e.g. (Repo, 2001, p. 164).
12In this context, the substitutions 〈(∆Pˆ )2〉|ψ〉 ≈ (∆E/c)2 (relativistic approximation)
and 〈(∆Xˆ)2〉|ψ〉 = (h/mc)2 (Compton spread) are used to get ∆E ≥ mc2/4π ≈ mc2.
13See (Rovelli, 2004, p. 250) for an explicit mention of this point in regard to loop
quantum gravity.
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the consequences of quantization known to be attested in the physical world.
All in all, what this analysis shows is something we already knew, namely,
that the Planck scale must be relevant to a theory which glues the pieces of
our current knowledge together. But is there reason to do so?
Third, the manner in which the black-hole argument is construed appears
as notoriously haphazard as the quantum-gravity application of dimensional
analysis also for reasons irrespective of the first criticism. In effect, general
relativity is first assumed nonchalantly in order to implement the idea of
a Planck black hole, but this concept is subsequently taken to belong in
quantum gravity, which, according to the usual view, signals the breakdown
of general relativity—thereby precluding the possibility of black holes!—at
the Planck scale. (Or can there be black holes without general relativity?
Does the mythical, unknown yet true, theory of quantum gravity allow for
them?) Therefore, the reasoning here too seems to be conceptually flawed.
The welcome view is sometimes expressed that the appropriateness of
this notion is uncertain. For example, Thiemann shares (for his own reasons)
our last point that the notion of Planck black holes must be conceptually
flawed:
[A Planck black hole] is again [at] an energy regime at which
quantum gravity must be important and these qualitative pic-
tures must be fundamentally wrong. . . (Thiemann, 2003, p. 9,
online ref.)
Interestingly enough, Thiemann takes this negative argument optimistically,
while we can only take it pessimistically—as a bad omen.
Given the conceptually uncertain nature and relevance of these ideas, we
conclude that one should take them with a pinch of salt, and not anywhere
more seriously than considerations arising from dimensional analysis.
2.3 Appraisal
The state of affairs reviewed in the first part of the previous section leads
to serious doubts regarding the applicability of dimensional analysis. How
can we ever be sure to trust any results obtained by means of this method?
Or as Bridgman (1963) jocularly put it in his brilliant little book: “We
are afraid that. . . we will get the incorrect answer, and not know it until a
Quebec bridge falls down” (p. 8). It is therefore worthwhile asking: where,
in the last analysis, did we go wrong?
In this respect, Bridgman enlightened us by explaining that a trust-
worthy application of dimensional analysis requires the benefit of extended
experience with the physical situation we are confronted with as well as
careful thought :
We shall thus ultimately be able to satisfy our critic of the cor-
rectness of our procedure, but to do so requires a considerable
background of physical experience, and the exercise of a discreet
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Wealth of previous physical experience
Positive identification of physical system
Careful thought determining its kind
Selection of constants and variables Quantum gravity
Dimensional-analytic predictions
Figure 2.1: Steps in the correct application of dimensional analysis. This is the
only way to assure ourselves that the predictions obtained by means of this method
will likely possess physical relevance. Dimensional analysis in quantum gravity
becomes haphazard by omitting the first three steps of the procedure.
judgment. The untutored savage in the bushes would probably
not be able to apply the methods of dimensional analysis to this
problem and obtain results which would satisfy us. (Bridgman,
1963, p. 5)
And further:
The problem [about what constants and variables are relevant]
cannot be solved by the philosopher in his armchair, but the
knowledge involved was gathered only by someone at some time
soiling his hands with direct contact. (Bridgman, 1963, pp. 11–12)
In this light, a conscientious application of dimensional analysis to the
affairs of quantum gravity is hopeless. There does not exist so far any
realm of physical experience pertaining to interactions of gravitation and
quantum mechanics, and therefore there is no previous physical knowledge
available and no basis whatsoever on which to base our judgement. Thus,
the quantum-gravity researcher proclaiming the relevance of the Planck scale
resembles Bridgman’s savage in the bushes or philosopher in the armchair,
not because of being untutored or not wanting to soil his hands, but because
there are no observational means available to obtain any substantial infor-
mation about the situation of interest. In consequence, quantum gravity
skips essential steps in its application of dimensional analysis, as shown in
Figure 2.1.
Bridgman also dismissed any meaning to be found in Planck’s units
considering the manner in which they arise:
The attempt is sometimes made to go farther and see some abso-
lute significance in the size of the [Planck] units thus determined,
looking on them as in some way characteristic of a mechanism
which is involved in the constants entering the definition.
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The mere fact that the dimensional formulas of the three con-
stants used was such as to allow a determination of the new
units in the way proposed seems to be the only fact of signif-
icance here, and this cannot be of much significance, because
the chances are that any combination of three dimensional con-
stants chosen at random would allow the same procedure. Until
some essential connection is discovered between the mechanisms
which are accountable for the gravitational constant, the veloc-
ity of light, and the quantum, it would seem that no significance
whatever should be attached to the particular size of the units
defined in this way, beyond the fact that the size of such units is
determined by phenomena of universal occurrence. (Bridgman,
1963, p. 101, italics added)
Gorelik (1992), and von Borzeszkowski and Treder (1988) have, in fact, crit-
icized these remarks of Bridgman’s on account that, indeed, the connection
has now been found under the form of quantum gravity. A moment’s re-
flection shows that this is a deceptive argument. One cannot legitimately
contend that the new connection found is quantum gravity, and therefore
that Planck’s units have meaning because, with no phenomenological effects
to support it, there is no physical substance to so-called quantum gravity
besides (mostly Planck-scale based) theoretical speculations. Therefore, the
argument is at best unfounded and at worst circular.
To sum up, the relevance of Planck-scale physics to quantum gravity
rests on several uncritical assumptions, which we have here cast doubt upon.
Most importantly, there is the question of whether quantum gravity can be
straightforwardly decreed to be the simple combination of the quantum and
gravity. This excluding attitude does not appear wise after realizing, on
the one hand, that black-body physics did not turn out to be the combina-
tion of thermodynamics and relativity, nor atomic physics the combination
of electromagnetism and mechanics; and on the other hand, that quantum
gravity can also be interpreted in a less literal sense—for what’s in a name
after all?—and regarded to include, for instance, spacetime features beyond
gravity. Dimensional, quantization, and ad hoc analyses only yield meaning-
ful results when the system studied and its physics are well known to start
with. To presume knowledge of the right physics of an unknown system is
for quantum gravity to presume too much.
Further, we argued that the physical meaning of the Planck units could
only be known after the successful equations of the theory which assumes
them—quantum gravity—were known. To achieve this, however, the recog-
nition and observation of some phenomenological effects related to quantum
mechanics and spacetime are essential. Without them, there can be no
trustworthy guide to oversee the construction of, and give meaning to, the
“equations of quantum gravity,” and one must then resort to wild guesses.
Ultimately, herein lies the problem of dimensional, quantization, and ad hoc
analyses as applied to quantum gravity. The fact nevertheless remains that
no such observables have as yet been identified. As we expressed earlier, it
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is only through the discovery and observation of such phenomena telling us
what quantum gravity is about that we will gradually unravel the question
concerning what quantum gravity is.
In view of this uncertainty surrounding Planck’s natural units, we believe
it would be more appropriate to the honesty and prudence that typically
characterize the scientific enterprise, not to abstain from their study if not so
wished, but simply to express their relevance to quantum gravity as a humble
belief, and not as an established fact, as is regrettably today’s widespread
practice.
Chapter 3
The anthropic foundations
of geometry
We can hope for the best, for I see the signs of men.
Marcus Vitruvius Pollio, De architectura, Book 6.
Leaving for now quantum gravity behind, we begin the study of geome-
try—a discipline which is not only ubiquitous in quantum gravity but, in
fact, is basic to all of physics and even to a wealth of everyday cognitive
tasks.
What are the nature and origins of geometry? How ubiquitous is it,
really? Is it a tool of thought or a God-given feature of the world? Is its
use beneficial to further human understanding? To what extent? How has
geometry fared in physics so far in helping our understanding? And how
does geometry fare as quantum gravity attempts to attain by its means a
sounder comprehension of the physical meaning of space, time, and quantum
theory? These questions will occupy us in the coming chapters.
3.1 The rise of geometric thought
The meaning of the word “geometry” is far wider than its etymological root
suggests. That is to say, the meaning attributed to “geometry” is much more
comprehensive and basic than the relatively advanced notions included in a
“measurement of the earth.”
To be sure, in order to imagine a triangle or a circle, no quantitative
concept of length is needed, for such figures may well be thought of without
any need to establish what the lengths of the sides of the triangle or what
the circle radius might be. And yet, no-one would contend that a triangle
or a circle is not a geometric object.
We could therefore lay down the conceptual foundations of geometry in
the following way. Geometry is built out of two basic elements. The first
and more primitive of them is that of geometric objects such as, for example,
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Figure 3.1: Some geometric objects and associated geometric magnitudes.
point, line, arrow, plane, square, circle, sphere, cube, etc. Geometric objects
stand for the idealized shape or form of the objects of the natural world.
Geometric objects, in turn, display geometric properties. These are qual-
itative attributes abstracted from geometric objects and possibly shared by
several of them. Examples of geometric properties are flatness, curvedness,
straightness, roundness, concavity, convexity, closedness, openness, connect-
edness, disconnectedness, orientability, orthogonality, parallelism, etc. Geo-
metric objects and some of their geometric properties (those invariant under
continuous deformations) can be found at the root of the study of topology.
The second, much more advanced ingredient that geometry consists of
is that of geometric magnitudes. As its name suggests, these magnitudes in-
volve the expression of a quantity, for which the concepts of number and unit
measure are prerequisite. Geometric magnitudes arise as result of a process
by means of which geometric objects can be attributed different notions of
size or measure. The most basic and paradigmatic example of a geomet-
ric magnitude is length; this applies to a geometric object (e.g. line, curve)
or a part of it (e.g. edge of a polygon), and its original meaning is that of
counting how many times a unit measure can be juxtaposed along the object
in question. Other geometric magnitudes, shown with their corresponding
geometric objects in Figure 3.1, are distance, area, and volume.
3.2 The origins of form
According to Smith (1951, pp. 1–4), the existence of geometric form can
be traced back, as it were, to the mists of time, if one considers forms to
be present in nature in themselves, and not as somebody’s interpretation of
nature. In this view, the galactic spirals, the ellipses of the planetary orbits,
the sphere of the moon, the hexagons of snowflakes, etc., are all geometric
displays of nature and antecede any presence of life on earth.
Is nature, then, intrinsically geometric? It is all too tempting to regard
nature with human eyes, even when talking about a time when no sentient
beings existed. Is it not rather a human prerogative to interpret the world
geometrically? Or, paraphrasing Eddington (1920, p. 198), to filter out
geometry from a jumble of qualities in the external world? Do
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objects actually arise through idealization of sensory perceptions by the
mind to become geometric objects of human thought? We believe that the
history of geometric thought begins with the first conscious and purposeful
appreciations of shape or form. Geometry is to be equated with geometric
thought rather than with geometric existence, and its origins must be located
only after the advent of life. Geometry is a tool of thought, not a property
of the world.
Can we now consider, for example, the geometric patterns displayed on
the surface of tree leaves or those of a sea-shell or spiderweb as primitive dis-
plays of geometric thought by living beings? Hardly. It is too far-fetched to
say that a plant shows geometric patterns because it thinks geometrically—
plants have no brain. To a lesser degree, the same applies to spiders, which,
although endowed with brains, appear as no great candidates for abstract
thought either. As Smith (1951) put it, “Who can say when or where or
under what influences the Epeira, ages ago, first learned to trace the loga-
rithmic spiral in the weaving of her web?” (p. 5). Who can say, indeed, that
the Epeira ever learnt to do purposefully, insightfully, such a thing at all.
We reserve the capacity to think geometrically to humans, disregarding
in so doing also mankind’s closest cousins, the apes (or the more distant
dolphins), as no other animal but Man engages in geometric thought in a
deliberate, conscious, and purposeful way; no other animal is driven to geo-
metric thought by the need to conceptualize the world around, nor psycho-
logically rewarded in actually achieving the sought-for understanding after
a geometric manner. Animals can certainly tell apart different man-made
(once again, for the purpose of understanding animals) geometric figures,
but this does not qualify as an animal instance of geometric endeavour.
Although most living creatures share with humans similar sense organs—
especially, but not exclusively, those that allow vision—it is the workings of
a particularly moulded brain interpreting stimuli and striving to conceptu-
alize the world that result in geometric understanding. The deeper reason
why human brains can—or even must?—interpret the world geometrically
is but an open question. As we proceed through the coming chapters, we
shall analyse geometry as a human conceptual tool of thought further.
3.3 The origins of number
The first appreciations of form and symmetry must be as old as humanity
itself. What about the first appreciations of number? In a rudimentary
sense close to but not properly called counting, these may be taken to be
even older than humanity. According to Smith (1951, p. 5), some form of
pseudo-counting exists among magpies, chimpanzees, and even some insects.
More recently, also Hauser (2000) has described instances of apes, birds, and
rats capable of some form of counting “up to” a small number. All these
cases, however, only involve subitization, i.e. telling at a glance the number
of objects present in a small group. The fact that animals cannot “count”
beyond about four—the limit for accurate subitization—may in fact be seen
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as evidence that they are not actually counting. However, Hauser relates
that, under human-induced training, some animals can learn to count in
exchange for food.
In this light, the view according to which the ability to count exists
in animals in a way that precedes humanity is analogous to the previous
one—that displays of geometric form are found in inert nature, plants, and
animals—and similarly mistaken. The innate animal ability to recognize dif-
ferences in the number of objects in a small group is far from what we mean
by counting: an abstract process involving a deliberate act of enumeration.
The ability to count, aided today by an advanced development of language
and radix systems, comes second nature to us, and we are thus sometimes
misled into seeing our own reflection in other animals.
The first human needs for counting might have arisen out of a desire to
know the size of one’s household, as well as that of hunted animals, or that of
the members of the enemy. Originally, however, the members of large groups
were not really counted, but simply considered as “many” and designated
by some collective noun such as “heap of stones,” “school of fish,” and the
like. Hauser has proposed that the development of a more advanced form
of counting is to be found in the emergence of human trade.
The most famous—although not necessarily the oldest or most meaning-
ful—archaeological record of the human use of counting is the Ishango bone,
found near Lake Edward, on the frontier of Uganda and Zaire, and dating
back to about 18000 b.C. in the Upper Paleolithic. The 10-centimetre-long
bone, shown in Figure 3.2, displays a series of marks carved in groups and
placed in three rows. Naively, these markings have been interpreted as
follows. Row (i) shows groups of 21 (= 20+1), 19 (= 20−1), 11 (= 10+1),
and 9 (= 10 − 1) marks, which hints at a decimal number system; row (ii)
contains groups of 11, 13, 17 and 19 notches, which are the prime numbers
between 10 and 20; row (iii) shows a method of duplication. Furthermore,
the markings on rows (i) and (ii) each add up to 60, and those on row (iii)
to 48, possible evidence of knowledge of a sexagesimal number system. A
speculative, yet painstakingly thorough and rather convincing study carried
out by Marshack (1972), however, revealed that it is more plausible for this
bone—together with numerous other engraved specimens from the Upper
Paleolithic, such as the Blanchard bone, shown in Figure 3.3—to be a lunar-
phase counter displaying a record of five and a half lunar months.
The originally intended meaning of these carved objects remains never-
theless uncertain. In this respect, Flavin wrote:
Ancient straight lines, whether parietal or portable, defy forensic
interpretation because we can’t penetrate their constituent phe-
nomenological simplicity. Marshack attempts to turn marques
de chasse (“hunting marks”) into lunar calendars, eschewing a
tally of prey for a tally of days (or nights). As all of the arti-
facts presented by Marshack as evidence for Upper Paleolithic
lunar calendars are individual, seeming to share no consistent
notational pattern, every artifact remains uniquely problematic.
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Figure 3.2: Three views of the 10-centimetre-long Ishango bone dating back to
about 18000 b.C. It displays notches in three rows, naively interpreted as evidence
of Upper-Paleolithic knowledge of prime numbers, a decimal and sexagesimal num-
ber system, and duplication. According to A. Marshack, the bone consists of a
lunar-phase counter displaying a record of five and a half lunar months. Other
interpretations, such as tallies of prey or mere decoration, are also possible. Repro-
duced from (Marshack, 1972).
Much like every generation receives a different interpretation of
Stonehenge, perhaps years from now the engraved items from
the Upper Paleolithic will be envisioned as something beyond
our current imagining. (Flavin, 2004)
In any case, as far as evidence of an ability to count is concerned, both
markings representing a simple tally of prey and markings representing a
more complex tally of days are equally signs of it; not so, however, if the
markings in question were simply perfunctory decoration or the like.1
Returning to the development of counting and following Smith (1951,
pp. 7–14), a primitive notion of counting was available much earlier than
words existed for the numbers themselves. Primitively, counting consisted in
explicitly associating the objects to be counted with, for example, the fingers
of the hands or marks on the ground or on bone. Traces of such counting
methods can still be found in the habits and languages of indigenous tribes
living today. For example, the Andamans, an Oceanic tribe, only have words
for “one” and “two” but manage to keep counting up to ten by tapping their
nose with their fingers in succession and repeating “and this one.” The Zulu
tribes express the number six by saying “taking the thumb” and the number
1When it comes to interpreting isolated pieces of archaeological evidence, a cau-
tious attitude such as Flavin’s has much to be recommended for. In March 2004,
BBC News reported the finding, in the Kozarnika cave in northwest Bulgaria, of
an animal bone over a million years old that displays several markings in the form
of seemingly purposeful straight lines. Furthermore, “another animal bone found at
the site is incised with 27 marks along its edge” (BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/science/nature/3512470.stm). Ought one to conclude that Homo erectus already
had the capacity to count and keep a tally of his findings, including records of the phases
of the moon?
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Figure 3.3: Partial view of the 11-centimetre-long Blanchard bone, found in Abri
Blanchard, in the Dordogne region of France, and dating back to about 25000
b.C. in the Upper Paleolithic. It displays circular notches laid out in a meandering
pattern, interpreted by A. Marshack as a record of a two-and-a-quarter lunar month.
Reproduced from (Marshack, 1972).
seven by saying “he pointed.” Finally, in the Malay and Aztec tongues, in
that of the Niue`s of the Southern Pacific, and in that of the Javans, the
number names mean literally “one-stone,” “two-stone,” etc.; “one-fruit,”
“two-fruit,” etc.; and “one-grain,” “two-grain,” etc., respectively.
Progressively, the ability to name the numbers arose. Since counting up
to a considerably great number would have needed the invention of as many
different words (and later symbols), some system was needed to handle and
organize these numbers. Universally, this solution was found in the use of
a radix system, i.e. using a certain amount of numbers and then repeating
them over and again.
3.4 The origins of magnitude
Like form and number, the idea of size must also be as old as Man himself,
and as an animal-like rudimentary conception even older. A predatory ani-
mal, for example, must take into account the size of its prey before deciding
whether it is sensible to attack it alone, or whether it should do so with
the help of the pack. However, this is an instance of the qualitative (big,
small) or even comparative (bigger, smaller) appreciation of size, but not of
quantitative size (three arms long), as is necessary for the birth of geometric
magnitudes and the quantitative conception of geometry.
Thus, it was only after Man was armed with both his primitive, innate
power to recognize form and symmetry in nature and a later, more involved
capacity to count, that he had the necessary tools to develop the notion
of geometric magnitude and measurement. The combination of these two
skills proceeded through the realization that one need not only be satisfied
with knowing whether a natural object was bigger or smaller than another
28 The anthropic foundations of geometry
(the enemy is taller than myself), but that their size could be quantified
and stated with a number. For the magnitude of length—the paradigm
of a geometric magnitude—the process leading to it can be described as
follows. If a natural object is geometrically idealized and thought of as a
geometric object (the enemy as a straight line), one could then count how
many times a comparatively smaller unit measure could be juxtaposed along
the object in question. In addition to the natural object to be measured,
also the successful implementation of a unit measure (a measuring rod)
from a natural object (a tree branch) required the geometric idealization of
the latter (a tree branch as a straight edge). The quantitative size of the
geometrically objectified natural object could then be given by means of this
unit-measure-related number. Now—and only now—is geometry developed
enough to live up to its etymological duty of “measuring the earth.”
3.5 The rise of abstract geometry
The rise of more sophisticated geometric ideas beyond form and magnitude
is recorded to have had its origin in the Neolithic Age in Babylonia and
Egypt. It appears fair to say that the oldest geometric construction that
rates higher in abstraction than other common uses of geometric thought
is so-called Pythagoras’ theorem. Evidence of knowledge of Pythagorean
triples2 and of the Pythagorean theorem can be found in the Babylonian
cuneiform text Plimpton 322 and in the Yale tablet YBC 7289, which date
from between 1900 and 1600 b.C. in the Late Neolithic or Early Bronze Age.
In the preserved part of Plimpton 322, shown in Figure 3.4, there are
five columns of numbers in the sexagesimal system. Counting from the left,
the fifth one shows the numbers 1 to 15, the fourth one repeats the word
“number” (ki), while the second and third show the width y and the diagonal
z of a rectangle. If we calculate z2 − y2 = x2, x turns out to be (after some
corrections) a whole number divisible by 2, 3 or 5, and a missing column
for x can be reconstructed with confidence. This helps explain the first
(partly missing) column showing either v = (y/x)2 or w = (z/x)2 = 1 + v2.
It has been inferred from this that the Babylonians must have calculated
Pythagorean triples of the form (1, v, w) satisfying the equation
w2 − v2 = 1 (3.1)
and then obtained triples (x, y, z) multiplying by x. Finally, it has also been
noticed that w+v is in all cases a regular sexagesimal number, which means
that the Babylonians may have written (w + v)(w − v) = 1 and then found
w − v by inverting the regular number w + v.3
The Yale tablet YBC 7289, shown in Figure 3.5, shows a square whose
side is marked off as 30 units long, and one of its diagonals attributed the
2A Pythagorean triple consists of an ordered triple (x, y, z), where x, y, and z satisfy
the relation x2 + y2 = z2.
3See (van der Waerden, 1983, pp. 2–5).
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Figure 3.4: Plimpton 322 tablet at Columbia University. This Babylonian
cuneiform tablet shows evidence of knowledge of Pythagorean triples as early as
1900–1600 b.C. Vertical strokes “∨”, alone or grouped, represent the numbers from
1 to 9; horizontal strokes “<”, alone or grouped, represent 10, 20, 30, etc. Repro-
duced from http://www.math.ubc.ca/∼cass/courses/m446-03/pl322/pl322.html
numbers 1,24,51,10 and 42,25,35 (in base 60). If we fix the floating point
and assume that the first number is 1;24,51,10, then its equivalent in the
decimal system is
1 + 24/60 + 51/602 + 10/603 = 1.414212963. (3.2)
This is a remarkably good approximation of
√
2 = 1.414213562 . . .. The
length of the diagonal 42;25,35 (42.42638889) can then be obtained as
42; 25, 35 = 30× 1; 24, 51, 10 (30 ×
√
2). (3.3)
This tablet constitutes archaeological proof beyond the shadow of a doubt
that the Babylonians knew Pythagoras’ theorem, not just Pythagorean
triples. In particular, they knew that
√
2 is the length of the diagonal of a
square of side 1, since they used this knowledge to solve for the diagonal of
a square of side 30.
There exist records showing knowledge of Pythagorean triples by the
Egyptians, too. The papyrus Berlin 6619 dating from around 1850 b.C.
contains a mathematical problem in which the sides of two squares are to
be found knowing that one side is three-quarters of the other and that their
total areas add up to 100 squared units; i.e. y = 3x/4 and x2+ y2 = 100. In
the solution, it is recognized that the total area is also that of a square of
side 10 units, and therefore the triple (8,6,10) is recognized as well. However,
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Figure 3.5: Yale YBC 7289 tablet at the Yale Babylonian Collection. This Babylo-
nian cuneiform tablet shows incontestable evidence of knowledge of Pythagoras’ the-
orem as early as 1900–1600 b.C., over a thousand years before Pythagoras. Repro-
duced from http://www.math.ubc.ca/people/faculty/cass/Euclid/ybc/ybc.html
(Bill Casselman, photographer).
no triangles are mentioned here. van der Waerden (1983, p. 24) suggested
that the Egyptians may have learnt about Pythagorean triples from the
Babylonians. Also in support of this view, Boyer and Merzbach (1991)
wrote: “It often is said that the ancient Egyptians were familiar with the
Pythagorean theorem, but there is no hint of this in the papyri that have
come down to us” (p. 17).
All this being said, what purpose did the discovery and use of the
Pythagorean theorem and its associated triangles and triples serve ancient
Man? Boyer and Merzbach (1991) suggested that, although pre-Hellenistic
mathematics was mostly of a practical sort and people “were preoccupied
with immediate problems of survival, even under this handicap there were in
Egypt and Babylonia problems that have the earmarks of recreational math-
ematics” (p. 42). Asimov (1972, pp. 5–6), along similar lines, placed the rise
of (the arts and of) pure knowledge in human curiosity or, as he eloquently
put it, “the agony of boredom,” stemming from the fact that any sufficiently
advanced brain needs to be kept engaged in some activity. On the practical
side, it is also possible that the Pythagorean geometric construction could
have originally represented something more practical to the ancients, either
in connection with their religious beliefs, or as a calculational tool for their
astronomical problems, or both.
To sum up, what the analysis of this chapter reveals is that nature is not
geometric by essence, but that what seem to be nature’s universal geometric
features are, in fact, man-made, a direct consequence of Man’s innate ca-
pacity to recognize form, number, and measure. This ability lies at the root
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of humans’ past and present scientific achievements: these stem essentially
from the relentless geometrization that humans have made and continue to
make of the natural world, as we see in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Geometry in physics
He deals the cards to find the answer,
The sacred geometry of chance,
The hidden law of a probable outcome;
The numbers lead a dance.
Gordon Sumner, Ten summoners’ tales
We presented a view of geometry that is founded on the human concep-
tions of geometric objects and geometric magnitudes attached to or between
them. We exemplified this view of geometry by means of spatially extended
geometric objects, and the attribution of quantitative size to them by means
of rod measurements of length and its derivatives. In physics, however, we
deal with various kinds of magnitude and their measurements, of which
length and its measurement are but one case. What about these then? Is
geometry entwined with all physical measurements?
Giving a clear-cut answer to this question is difficult, because with it
we enter a realm where the presence of geometry is tied not just to the
way a measurement is made but also to how its results are interpreted the-
oretically. To begin with, rod measurements of length are an intrinsically
geometry activity because, as we said, a measuring rod must necessarily
be a straight edge. This fact makes length and distance1 paradigmatically
geometric magnitudes. What about radar-based measurements of length?
Are these geometric? We may now say that, as an activity, they are not,
because there is nothing essentially geometric about the instrument (e.g. a
clock) needed to make the measurement. As a conception, however, length
continues to be a geometric magnitude. How so?
In this case, geometry comes in as an immediate concomitant interpreta-
tion. The human mind visualizes length as spatial extension, and the mental
picture of a geometric object (straight line) whose property is the length just
1Distance can be regarded as equivalent to length because it is in essence the same
conception but applied to geometric objects differently. Length refers to the unidirec-
tional size of a geometric object (e.g. a line, an edge), while distance refers to the size of
the unidirectional space between the endpoints of the same object or between points as
independent geometric objects (e.g. points of space).
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measured immediately arises. In a more abstract but equally vivid way, the
same is done for the results of other measurements, now spatially unrelated,
which as activities having nothing to do with geometry. For example, the ob-
servations of time via clock readings, probability via simple counting, speed
via speedometer readings, spin via Stern-Gerlach device readings, etc., are
again geometry-unrelated observations or procedures. The human mind,
however, with its strong penchant for visualization in terms of extended ob-
jects in some form of space, takes the physical quantities resulting from these
measuring activities and gives them a geometric theoretical background. In
this way, observations of various natures are likened to the one which we ex-
perience as most familiar, namely, observations of length and its derivatives.
Let us see some examples.
Although time intervals are measured with clocks and space intervals
(customarily) with rods, physics likens time to space depicting it as a co-
ordinate parameter along which material objects do not move but flow.
Thus, measuring time intervals becomes theoretically equivalent to measur-
ing stretches of space, and hence the phrase “a length of time” in the sense of
a fourth spatial dimension. This geometric interpretation of time was only
deepened by relativity theory, which, superficially at least (see Chapter 10),
fused time and space into one geometric whole. Another example is furnished
by probability. While this concept only has to do with counting positive and
negative outcomes, it is understood in physical theories in one of two ways:
as Isham (1995, p. 14–17) has explained, in classical physics, probability
is likened to a ratio of volumes (the volume of successful outcomes divided
by that of total outcomes), so that each outcome is represented by a unit
volume;2 in quantum physics, on the other hand, probability is likened to an
area resulting from the squared overlap of two arrow state vectors. A third
example is provided by velocity, which is depicted as an extended arrow
tangent to the trajectory curve of a material particle, and whose magnitude
is then interpreted as the length of this arrow. A fourth example is found
in quantum-mechanical spin, which, like velocity, is mentally pictured as an
arrow and its magnitude interpreted to be its length.
A case farther detached from physics also provides an enlightening ex-
ample. In the theory of coding, one is concerned with sending messages
over a noisy information channel and with being able to recover the original
input from a possibly distorted output. Evidently, no intrinsically geomet-
ric objects or magnitudes are involved in this activity. However, these are
readily constructed to ease understanding of the situation. A word w is
thought of as an arrow vector ~w = (w0, w1, . . . , wn−1) and a distance func-
tion, called Hamming metric, is defined for any pair of words w and x as
max{i | wi 6= xi, 0 ≤ i ≤ n}, the maximum number of differing components
2In fact, one practical method to calculate π through the measurement of probability
consists in drawing a circle of unit-length radius on paper and subsequently enclosing it
within four walls forming a square whose sides are two units of length. By randomly re-
leasing a small object into the box, counting how many times it lands within the boundary
of the circle, dividing by the total amount of trials, and multiplying by four (squared units
of length), an approximate value of π can be obtained.
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physical magnitude geometric magnitude
physical thing geometric object
shape
geometric extension
Figure 4.1: Two processes of geometrization in physics. A physical magnitude
resulting from a measurement becomes a geometric magnitude when shape (geo-
metric object) is attached to it; or a physical thing becomes a geometric object
when geometric extension (length & co.) is attached to it.
between ~w and ~x. After certain assumptions about the nature of the chan-
nel, a received word w is corrected searching for the predefined codeword c
that is closest to it in the above sense, i.e. differing from a codeword in the
least number of elements.
For some physical magnitudes, however, this underlying process of geo-
metric objectification is nearly nonexistent. Mass and charge, for example,
appear as exceptions of physical magnitudes that our minds do not seem
to find useful (at least not yet) to theoretically represent as the extension
of any specific geometric object. This notwithstanding, one may (and in
practice usually does) still view these magnitudes simply as the extension,
or measure, of segments of an underlying metric line, in analogy with a
timeline or graduated tape. From this perspective, any physical magnitude
may be said to be a geometric magnitude.
In physical practice, geometrization can also take place in a different way.
Instead of starting with a physical magnitude that becomes a geometric mag-
nitude via the attachment of an underlying shape, it is sometimes the case
that theoretical portrayal starts with an abstract object—possibly inspired
directly in experience, in which case we have a physical thing—without any
shape to speak of, but which is turned into a geometric object by attributing
to it geometric extension in the form of length and its kin (distance, area,
volume, overlap). We shall see examples of this shortly in connection with
quantum theory, and later on in connection with pregeometry. Both types
of process are schematized in Figure 4.1.
As a result of these processes of geometrization, we witness today a
language of physics where geometric concepts are ubiquitous, as they have
been since the birth of science, when Galilei (1957) expressed that without
geometric concepts “it is humanly impossible to understand a single word
of [the book of nature]”; that without them “one wanders about in a dark
labyrinth” (p. 238). Today as then, if one tried to find a physical theory
that does not include geometric conceptions, one would be bound for certain
failure.
For example, on the qualitative side, we find geometric objects such
as spacetime points, straight and circular trajectories, arrow state vectors,
planetary surfaces, crystal lattices, and so forth. On the quantitative side,
we find geometric magnitudes such as spacetime intervals, lengths of vectors
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Figure 4.2: Some geometric objects and associated geometric magnitudes used in
physics.
(e.g. strength of a force), areas of surfaces (e.g. probability of a quantum-
mechanical outcome), volumes of spaces (e.g. probability of a classical out-
come), and so on (Figure 4.2). Although all the geometric concepts of phys-
ical science appear immediately familiar to us on account of our bend of
mind, their level of detachment from the things we can perceive can range
greatly. Some are developed from straightforward observations, whereas
others bear a high level of abstraction. The farther detached the concept
is from what we can directly observe and experiment with, the more trou-
blesome the ascertainment of its physical meaning becomes (cf. spacetime
points and state vectors). This, in turn, can lead to philosophical problems
about their ontology—in other words, to considerable confusion.
Before moving on to the study of the geometric foundations of standard
relativity and quantum theories, we note the existence of a geometric con-
cept that is particularly noteworthy for its role in physics. We refer to the
inner product. In physical contexts, the inner product plays a much more
essential role than the primitive idea of length or distance. This is partly
because of a mathematical reason and partly because of a physical reason.
Mathematically, the inner product provides a foundation for the emergence
of three key quantitative geometric notions; in bracket notation, these are:
the overlap of |A〉 and |B〉, 〈A|B〉 (with parallelism and orthogonality arising
as special cases); the length of |A〉, 〈A|A〉1/2; and the distance between |A〉
and |B〉, 〈A−B|A−B〉1/2 (Figure 4.3). Physically, being itself an invariant
scalar, the inner product provides a direct connection with measurements,
the results of which are invariants as well. In physics, the representation of
invariant scalars as inner products is always a sure sign of the introduction or
existence of a geometric outlook upon the object of study. The advantages
and pitfalls of this way of proceeding will come to light in later chapters.
Next we analyse the geometric character of relativity and quantum theo-
ries as conventionally understood. We shall see that both theories are deeply
geometric at their most elemental level, and even that the motivation be-
hind their geometric character is similar. This view, however, seems to be
at odds with common belief, as Ashtekar’s statement reveals:
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Figure 4.3: Four quantitative geometric notions: length of arrow vector |A〉,
projection of |A〉 on arrow vector |B〉, distance between |A〉 and |B〉, and inner
product between |A〉 and |B〉.
[W]e can happily maintain a schizophrenic attitude and use the
precise, geometric picture of reality offered by general relativity
while dealing with cosmological and astrophysical phenomena,
and the quantum-mechanical world of chance and intrinsic un-
certainties while dealing with atomic and subatomic particles.
(Ashtekar, 2005, p. 2, italics added)
In the next two sections, we attempt to maintain an expository attitude
towards the foundations of relativity and quantum theories as conventionally
understood, as our present purpose is only to expose their geometric natures.
In later chapters, we shall return to these topics and deal with them from a
more critical point of view.
4.1 Geometry in relativity theory
Historical considerations aside, we can view relativity theory as essentially
built upon several elemental geometric concepts. First and foremost, the
theory deals with physical events, which are idealized as points belonging
to a four-dimensional spacetime continuum embracing the past, the present,
and the future. A point-event in the four-dimensional spacetime continuum
is characterized analytically by means of a set of four numbers (x1, x2, x3, x4)
called the point-event coordinates.
The theory also deals with massive particles and photons, which it also
idealizes as points; a particle is, moreover, a moving point that by its motion
in the spacetime continuum determines a sequence of events called a world-
line, xα = xα(u) (α = 1, 2, 3, 4), where u is a one-dimensional parameter.
The idea of the worldline of a massive particle also includes the idealization
of the observer as a massive point that moves while making observations.
On these foundations, relativity theory builds its conceptual connection
with physical measurements. This is done by means of the central concept of
the differential spacetime interval ds. The differential interval dsAB gives a
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quantitative measure of the separation in spacetime between two neighbour-
ing events A and B. It is traditionally understood that ds, being a spacetime
interval, is measured with rods and clocks. Because time is thought as ab-
sorbed as a fourth coordinate x4 on a par with the three spatial coordinates
x1, x2, x3 (with the speed of light c as a transformation factor), the interval
is conventionally regarded geometrically, as a generalized distance between
neighbouring events. The differential interval is also called the line element;
this is a denomination inspired in the geometric picture of two general events
joined by a worldline composed of straight pieces dx, whose lengths ds add
up to the finite separation ∆s.
In relativity theory, the assumption is made that dsAB depends ana-
lytically on the coordinates xα of point-event A and homogeneously (of
first degree) on the displacement vector, or arrow, dxα form A to B; i.e.
ds = f(x,dx), where f(x,dx) is some function homogeneous in dx, and x
denotes the set of four coordinates. Besides the demand of homogeneity, the
form of f(x,dx) is not entirely free because the scalar ds, being a measurable
quantity, must be an invariant. As we mentioned previously, this situation
suggests the use of an inner product. The new assumption is now made that
the relation between ds, on the one hand, and x and dx, on the other, is
an indefinite quadratic form, namely, ds =
√
ǫgαβ(x)dxαdxβ,
3 i.e. the line
element is an invariant inner product between the displacement vectors and
some function gαβ(x) of x. This quadratic form is in fact the foundation
on which the rest of relativity theory is built. (But to what kind of theory
would the simpler linear choice ds = gα(x)dx
α lead us? This is a question
we shall ponder later on.)
A study of Riemannian space, in conjunction with its generalization to
spacetime, allows one to determine that the function gαβ(x) is a second-
order covariant tensor with a clear geometric meaning: it is the metric of
the spacetime continuum, and as such the formal (mathematical) source
of the spacetime-continuum quantitative geometry. The metric is apt to
inform us how much two vectors (in particular, two contravariant displace-
ment vectors) at the same event A(x) overlap; on this basis, we can find
the generalized length, or norm, of a vector at A(x), the generalized dis-
tance between two vectors at A(x), and, via integration, the separation or
generalized distance between any two events.
The Newtonian law of inertia is generalized in relativity theory via Ein-
stein’s geodesic hypothesis. According to it, a free (massive or massless)
particle follows a geodesic in spacetime, i.e. a straight line in spacetime, such
that the separation ∆s between two events joined by this line is maximized.
On the other hand, the intrinsic shape of a spacetime geodesic followed by
a free particle is given by an absolute property of spacetime, its curvature.
Curvature is set in a one-to-one correspondence with gravitation as a
phenomenon as follows. Absolute spacetime curvature is characterized, not
simply by some tensor (e.g. gαβ(x)), but by some suitable tensor equation
3Here ǫ = ±1 ensures that ds ≥ 0 always, since the quadratic form is not positive
definite.
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(e.g. Rδαβγ(x) = 0) to be specified later on. When this equation vanishes
identically (Rδαβγ(x) ≡ 0), i.e. when the tensor is null everywhere, spacetime
is flat and there are no gravitational effects; when this equation does not
vanish identically (Rδαβγ(x) 6≡ 0), i.e. when the tensor is not null everywhere,
spacetime is curved and there are gravitational effects.
In view of the pervasiveness and essentialness of geometric notions in
relativity theory, it seems understandable that this theory has come to be re-
garded as epitomically geometric, and “more geometric” than its Newtonian
predecessor. But is this really so? Has general relativity truly geometrized
gravitation? Is physics more geometric now after general relativity? Not at
all. With general relativity, gravitation only acquires a new geometric char-
acter. New because the Newtonian description of gravitation as a vectorial
force was also a geometric concept, namely, a directed arrow in Euclidean
space with a notion of size (strength) attached, acting between point-like
massive bodies a certain Euclidean distance apart.
In the current climate of misunderstanding regarding the essential lack
of novelty introduced by general relativity as a geometric theory, it is not
without a measure of surprise that we find that a correct assay of the uno-
riginal geometric status of relativity was made by its own creator over half
a century ago. In a letter to Lincoln Barnett dated from 1948, Einstein
considered as follows:
I do not agree with the idea that the general theory of relativity
is geometrizing Physics or the gravitational field. The concepts
of Physics have always been geometrical concepts and I cannot
see why the gik field should be called more geometrical than
f.[or] i.[nstance] the electromagnetic field or the distance between
bodies in Newtonian Mechanics. The notion comes probably
from the fact that the mathematical origin of the gik field is the
Gauss-Riemann theory of the metrical continuum which we are
wont to look at as a part of geometry. I am convinced, however,
that the distinction between geometrical and other kinds of fields
is not logically founded.4
Having disclosed the geometric essence—but not geometric novelty—of
relativity theory, but having left its physical foundations as yet unanalysed,
we now turn our gaze to quantum theory and its geometric essence.
4.2 Geometry in quantum theory
Quantum theory studies the measurable properties of microscopic physical
systems, such as microscopic material particles. Unlike relativity theory,
quantum theory does not find it essential to geometrically conceptualize
particles as points, since the classical trajectory, or worldline, of a particle
plays no role in it. Geometric concepts have in quantum theory a different
4Quoted from (Earman, Glymour, & Stachel, 1977, p. ix).
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physical source—yet the same formal expression motivated by needs similar
to those of relativity theory.
In order to ascertain the properties of a microscopic system, one must
set up measurements, which soon reveal that these systems display a non-
classical feature of superposition. We study as an example the measurement
of the polarization of photons. Following Dirac (1958, pp. 4–7), set up a plate
which only transmits light polarized perpendicularly to its optical axis, and
direct at it a low-intensity beam of light, polarized at an angle θ with the
above axis, such that photons arrive one at a time. One finds that the
intensity of transmitted light, and therefore of transmitted photons, is a
fraction sin2(θ) of the total intensity, suggesting that polarization cannot
be a classical property in the following sense: it cannot correspond to a
tiny material stick attached to photons that is blocked by the plate unless
aligned perpendicularly to its optical axis, for then no photons could pass
through. Indeed, against classical expectations, some intensity is perceived,
signalling the unimpeded passage of a fraction of the original photons: on
arrival at the plate, each photon reorganizes itself polarization-wise as either
compatible or incompatible with it.5 Moreover, because the interaction at
the polarization plate acts, to all intents and purposes, like a black box, one
cannot predict what the fate of each individual photon will be with certainty,
but only with a certain probability. This probability is an invariant scalar.
The task of quantum theory is to provide a link between this probabilis-
tic experimental result and some theoretical feature attributable to each
microscopic photon. On the basis of the said non-classical behaviour, quan-
tum theory pictures each photon to be in a polarization state |P 〉, such that
it is a complex-number (see below) linear superposition
|P 〉 = ct|Pt〉+ ca|Pa〉 (4.1)
of two polarization states, |Pt〉 and |Pa〉, associated with transmission and
absorption with respect to a given plate. The superposition feature of |P 〉
leads directly to the suggestion that quantum-mechanical states are vectors,
since it holds physically that the linear combination of two states is also
a state, but this is not to say (yet) that state vector |P 〉 is a geometric
object. This interpretation, however, provides a ready-made foundation for
the introduction of geometry into quantum theory, which takes place in two
steps.
For the construction of |P 〉 as a linear superposition to make sense and
be useful, the complex coefficients ct and ca should indicate (qualitatively
at least) to what degree, on arrival at a given plate, the original state |P 〉 is
compatible with the one associated with transmission |Pt〉 and to what de-
gree with the one associated with absorption |Pa〉, respectively. A geometric
5A display of the non-classical nature of polarization can be produced in a purely
phenomenological—and therefore much more striking—way. Place two plates with optical
axes orthogonal to each other, so that no light will be perceived through both plates.
Insert then a third plate obliquely between the previous two and observe now some light
passing through the three plates. The addition of an extra filter allows more light to pass
through—a phenomenon that goes against classical intuition.
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Figure 4.4: Rise of quantum-mechanical probabilities from Pythagoras’ theorem.
picture is immediately created in which state vectors are imagined as metric
vectors or extended arrows, and their mutual compatibilities expressed in
terms of their overlaps or, in other words, the inner product. The linear
superposition of Eq. (4.1) is thus recast geometrically as
|P 〉 = 〈Pt|P 〉|Pt〉+ 〈Pa|P 〉|Pa〉, (4.2)
with |Pt〉 and |Pa〉 imagined as mutually orthonormal and with unit arrow
vector |P 〉 imagined as being projected or collapsed onto them. The inner
product effectively turns in principle shapeless state vectors into extended
arrows, because the idea of overlap induces a need for geometric objects in
order for us to project onto one another (but why should we overlap arrows
and not surfaces or spatial figures?). The inner product being a complex
number, however, we cannot yet talk of geometric magnitudes in a physical
sense.
The second step in the geometrization of quantum theory comes from
the way it is linked to the experimentally obtained probability. On the
one hand, probability is a real scalar that should arise from some invariant
function f(|P 〉, |Pt〉, |Pa〉) of state vectors; on the other hand, state vectors
so far only combine to produce complex numbers6 〈Pi|P 〉 (i = t, a). Further
6As justification for the significant but otherwise arbitrary requirement that the coef-
ficients 〈Pi|P 〉 be complex numbers, Dirac (1958, p. 18) offered the following explanation.
Within the context of the polarization experiment above, he argued that, given that the
length of state vectors is irrelevant (normalization condition), in a linear superposition
c1|ψ〉 + c2|φ〉 of two states only the ratio c3 = c2/c1 carries a meaning, and so c3 must
be complex (two real parameters), i.e. c1 and c2 must be complex, since two indepen-
dent real numbers are necessary to specify a general state of plane polarization. But
why should two complex numbers (four real coefficients) be needed in a superposition of
three linearly independent state vectors, etc.? Another proposal for the need of complex
numbers was given by Penrose (1998, pp. 62–63). He stressed the feature of complex
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geometric analysis succeeds in finding common ground. On the basis of
Pythagoras’ theorem, one can see that the three state vectors |P 〉, |Pt〉, and
|Pa〉 are connected by a real-number relation,∑
i
|〈Pi|P 〉|2 = ‖|P 〉‖2, (4.3)
so long as we think them as arrows (but not surfaces or spatial figures). Now,
because the length of |P 〉 is a geometric invariant and equal to unity, this
relation becomes suitable for a probabilistic interpretation. The probability
of each outcome |Pi〉 is given by the squared length, or area, of the projection
of |P 〉 onto |Pi〉, and the probability of obtaining any outcome adds up to
unity (i.e. a unit area), as shown in Figure 4.4.
It is in this manner that probability, an invariant7 scalar that only
has to do with counting positive and negative outcomes, is geometrized
on the basis of the inner product and Pythagoras’ theorem (in general,
in n-dimensions) in order to provide the human mind with geometric un-
derstanding of, in principle, geometry-unrelated observations. Pythagoras’
theorem comes thus from its humbler Neolithic uses to serve human under-
standing in yet another facet of Man’s enquiries into nature—to instate, in
this case, Sumner’s “sacred geometry of chance.”
conjugation between a complex number α and its conjugate α∗ in connection with quan-
tum information and its relation to classical information. He argued that the existence of
quantum information, which does not respect causality, is only possible via the existence
of complex amplitudes and their conjugates, which can be interpreted as going forwards
and backwards in time: 〈Pi|P 〉 from the present state |P 〉 to the future state |Pi〉 and
〈Pi|P 〉∗ = 〈P |Pi〉 from the future state |Pi〉 to the present state |P 〉. One the other hand,
classical information—in other words, probability—results from multiplying the complex
amplitude α by its complex conjugate α∗, obtaining thus a real number. In Chapter 12,
we give a deeper justification of why complex numbers are needed to describe quantum
phenomena.
7By quantum-mechanical probability being an invariant, we mean that it is an absolute
property of a large ensemble of identically prepared microscopic systems (relative to the
tests measuring apparatuses submit them to). The denomination “invariant” is used here
in order to highlight the independence of measurable quantum-mechanical probability
from the unobservable state vectors from which it traditionally arises. The name is also
used to draw attention to the similar conceptual way in which both quantum and relativity
theories introduce the invariant results of measurements via the inner product of entities
deemed more elemental from a logico-axiomatic—but not physical—perspective. The
denomination, however, is not intended to hint at a relativistic connection. For more on
the relativistic interpretation of a single quantum-mechanical measurement, see (Eakins
& Jaroszkiewicz, 2004, pp. 4, 9).
Chapter 5
New geometries
It would be fascinating if, ultimately, we build all the funda-
mental things in the world out of geometry.
Interviewer to Abdus Salam, Superstrings: A theory of ev-
erything?
In the light of the previous chapter, it is not surprising to find that
physics is not only built out of geometry, but also that it seeks progress
through the invention of new geometries. Ptolemy’s geocentric system of
spheres was improved upon by Copernicus’ heliocentric system of spheres,
in turn replaced by Kepler’s ellipses. Newton’s Euclidean space and time
structure were improved upon by Minkowski’s flat spacetime structure, in
turn replaced by Riemann and Einstein’s curved one. In the maiden field of
quantum mechanics, headway was made as the early collection of scattered
results was set in a progressively more intuitive geometric framework: from
Heisenberg-Born-Jordan matrix mechanics, passing through Schro¨dinger’s
wave mechanics, and ending with Dirac’s bracket algebra, whose geometric
features we examined in the previous chapter.
In early attempts at unification of gravitation and electromagnetism,
Weyl, Eddington, Kaluza, Klein, and Einstein and collaborators (Mayer,
Bergmann, Bargmann, Strauss) attempted to improve on general relativity
through the introduction of new geometries: generalized Riemannian geom-
etry, affine geometry, five-dimensional spacetime, a non-symmetric metric
tensor, teleparallelism, five-vectors on four-dimensional spacetime, bivector
fields, a complex-valued metric tensor, etc.1 This fruitless quest for new ge-
ometries aiming to overthrow the reigning order in spacetime physics contin-
ues today unimpared in quantum-gravity research programmes, as follows.
According to unanimous agreement by decree in the physics commu-
nity,2 there are three roads to quantum gravity. The first road is the road
of string theory, which seeks progress through the geometric concepts of
strings, membranes, deca- and endecadimensional metric spacetimes, etc.
1See (Goenner, 2004; Kostro, 2000, pp. 98–101, 115–148).
2See e.g. (Chalmers, 2003; Smolin, 2001, pp. 10–11).
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The second road is the road of loop quantum gravity, which seeks progress
through the geometric concepts of loops of space, spin networks, spin foams,
etc. And the third road to quantum gravity is the politely acknowledged
road of everything else—a waste dump, as it were—that does not fit the first
two characterizations and that, beyond politeness, one gets the impression,3
can be safely ignored. Pursuing this less glittering third road, we can men-
tion pregeometricians, who, inspired in Wheeler, also continue to further the
same geometric trend (only now unwittingly) in the search for less common
keys to a quantum theory of space and time.
It is also customary in any of these fields for yet newer geometries to be
readily invoked to explain any difficulties that their tentative new geome-
tries, attempting to explain well-established older ones, might have given
rise to. Woit (2002) exemplifies this state of affairs when he writes, “String
theorists ask mathematicians to believe in the existence of some wonderful
new sort of geometry that will eventually provide an explanation for M-
theory” (p. 110). That is to say, in the face of difficulties with the tentative
new geometries of five distinct string theories, researchers naturally resort to
a yet newer, more convoluted geometry on which to base so-called M-theory,
and with the help of which problematic issues might still be resolved. The
essence of the present situation is captured rather accurately by Brassard
(1998), when (for his own reasons) he remarks that “The most difficult step
in the creation of a science is. . . the finding of an appropriate geometry. It is
the difficulty that is facing the physicists who are trying to merge quantum
physics with general relativity. . . ” (§ 3.4).
May this procedure of fitting nature into ever newer geometric moulds,
essentially physically unenlightening since the establishment of general rel-
ativity,4 then reach a natural end? This question must be answered in the
negative so long as the human mind continues to be exclusively gripped, as
it is, by geometric modes of thought, remaining oblivious to other manners
of theoretical reflection. But what would be the symptoms of a condition in
which the physical problems that confront us—whether pertaining to quan-
tum theory, spacetime theories, or both—were immune to our relentless
geometric attacks? Trapped by our own conceptual tools of thought, we
would witness (i) inexhaustible philosophical argument over old topics cast
in the same recurring geometric language, and (ii) increasingly complicated,
mathematically or philosophically inspired frameworks built out of geomet-
rically “elegant,” “self-consistent” concepts yet without physical referents.
Such symptoms are, in fact, already visible; the first category is populated
by self-perpetuating philosophical discussions on Einstein’s hole argument
and spacetime ontology (substantivalism vs. relationalism, the meaning of
spacetime points, etc.), as well as interpretational debate on the meaning of
quantum-theoretical geometric concepts (the state vector and its collapse,
3See e.g. (Chalmers, 2003) and (Rovelli, 2003, p. 37).
4The geometric formulation of quantum mechanics, which reached its full form with
Dirac’s bracket formulation, is not here considered precisely speaking enlightening, since
the present controversies of quantum theory stem from a lack of physical meaning in its
geometric concepts, as we shall see later on.
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probability, etc.); and the second category is inhabited by much of what
presently goes by the name of quantum gravity.
Is it reasonable to continue along a tangled geometric path when it gets
more twisted the farther it is trodden? Are our developed geometric instincts
leading us in the same ominous direction that the geometric instincts of the
Aristotelian tradition led the Ptolemaic geocentric system of perfect spheres?
For over a millennium since Ptolemy, an army of spheres interlocking with
ever-mounting complexity was a price gladly paid to preserve an astronomy
based on the philosophical opinion that spheres are perfect (and the earth
all-important) yet “fraught with cosmological absurdities” (Saliba, 2002,
p. 364). Confronted by so much absurd complexity, Ptolemy excused it as
natural, considering that nothing short of understanding the mind of God
was in question here:
Now let no-one, considering the complicated nature of our de-
vices, judge such hypotheses to be over-elaborated. For it is not
appropriate to compare human [constructions] with divine, nor
to form one’s beliefs about such great things on the basis of very
dissimilar analogies.5
The layman’s point of view, when he dares to voice it unintimidated by the
proficiency of the expert, is usually closer to the truth. In the thirteenth
century, King Alfonso X of Spain was much less impressed by Ptolemaic as-
tronomy than Ptolemy himself. “If the Lord Almighty had consulted me be-
fore embarking upon Creation,” remarked the king (perhaps apocryphally),
“I should have recommended something simpler.”
The story of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic astronomy strikes a resonant chord
with quantum gravity. Saving the distances, it warns against blindness
towards our geometric biases, whether innate or inherited from a philosophy
built upon opinion, as well as against the rationalization of complexity in
the name of the fundamentality of the task at hand and the inexorability of
geometry in dealing with it.
How far is quantum gravity ready to go, and how much to sacrifice, to
save its geometric prejudices?
5.1 Three roads to more geometry
String theory does not find fault with its thoroughly geometric character—
and, in the context of a paradigmatically geometric science, why should
it?—most elementally given by the very concept of a string and the multidi-
mensional metric spacetimes to which they belong. What is more, its more
vehement proponents predicate the correctness of the theory on a sense of
“elegance” and “beauty” based on features of its geometric portrayal that,
by their very geometric nature, tend to be psychologically appealing. In his
revealing article, Gopakumar (2001) ponders the “almost mystical” (p. 1568)
5Quoted from (Saliba, 2002, p. 366).
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connection between geometry and the laws of nature and, embracing it, cor-
rectly describes progress in string theory as the evolution and growth of its
geometric edifice, together with the geometric insights to be found in its
newly built storeys. He also foretells—and we are likely to agree with him
in view of current trends—more “innovations in geometry” (p. 1572) in the
progressive reformulation of string theory. The desirability of furthering this
geometric trend in string theory (and in physics as a whole) is perhaps best
epitomized in the almost mystical words of an anonymous reporter during
an interview to Abdus Salam:
Clearly string theory is deeply rooted in geometry. I suppose one
could say that science started with geometry (if one goes back to
ancient Greece). It would be fascinating if, ultimately, we build
all the fundamental things in the world out of geometry.6
These strong views notwithstanding, and as in other quantum-gravity
endeavours (see below), even in expositions of an admittedly geometric the-
ory such as this one, one puzzlingly witnesses isolated, casual allusions to the
possible limitations of geometric theorizing. Gopakumar asks, “Are there
geometrical structures than can replace our conventional notions of space-
time? Or perhaps geometry emerges only as an approximative notion at
distances large compared to the Planck length?” (p. 1568). Lacking appro-
priate context or further explanation, one can only attribute a vague and
ambiguous meaning to “geometry” in this type of remarks. If by “geometry”
is meant any form of geometric concept, then quantum gravity answers the
former question with a resounding yes, and the latter with a resounding no;
but if by “geometry” is meant simply a continuous manifold, then quantum
gravity answers the former question most probably with a no, and the latter
most probably with a yes.
In loop quantum gravity, on the other hand, the standpoint regarding
geometry is much more confusing. Its proponents not rarely but often claim
that “the very notion of space-time geometry is most likely not defined in
the deep quantum regime” (Perez, 2006, p. 17), or that a “quantum gravity
theory would. . . be free of a background space-time geometry” (Ashtekar,
2005, p. 11), but we then repeatedly witness expositions of loop quantum
gravity as a straightforward quantum theory of geometry.7 Despite their
lack of clarity, what these phrases intend to mean is simply that, after the
lessons of general relativity, one should not assume an absolutely fixed back-
ground spacetime in quantum gravity, but not that there is no background
geometry in the loop-quantum-gravity quantization of general relativity; else
witness the thoroughly geometric formulation of loop quantum gravity in ev-
ery exposition of it: from elemental arrow-vector triads8 to the celebrated
“quantum geometry” of spin networks in the form of their quantized area
6In (Davies & Brown, 1988, p. 178).
7See e.g. (Ashtekar, 2005, p. 13), (Smolin, 2001, pp. 75–191) and (Rovelli, 2004, p. 262).
8Because of its inviability for quantization, talk of the metric field is at first banished
and instead supplanted by talk of a (mathematically disembodied) “gravitational field”
as an elemental physical concept. But because loop quantum gravity desperately needs a
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and volume. Like string theory, then, loop quantum gravity also progresses
via the invention of new geometries.
At this point, it is worthwhile noting that some loop-quantum-gravity
scholars do not only deny the evident geometric foundations of their field but,
more seriously, also those of general relativity (and by implication, should
one understand, of loop quantum gravity?). Smolin (1997) explicitly claims
that “while the analogy between spacetime, as Einstein’s theory describes
it, and geometry is both beautiful and useful, it is only an analogy” with
“little physical content” (p. 333) and that
The metaphor in which space and time together have a geometry,
called the spacetime geometry, is not actually very helpful in
understanding the physical meaning of general relativity. The
metaphor is based on a mathematical coincidence that is helpful
only to those who know enough mathematics to make use of
it. . . (Smolin, 2001, p. 59)
Smolin’s words are inspired in the general-relativistic feature of diffeomor-
phism invariance, according to which the spacetime metric gαβ(x) has no
absolute meaning, as its values change from one coordinate system to an-
other. Geometrically speaking, gαβ(x) has no absolute meaning because
spacetime points P (cf. x) are not physically real and fail to individuate the
metric field. And this is correct, but to infer that general relativity is not
essentially a geometric theory because the metric field has no absolute phys-
ical meaning is utterly mistaken—a confusion caused by the connotation of
words. While tensors are relative to a coordinate system, tensor equations,
however, are not. The reason gαβ(x) plays no physical role in relativity
theory is that it does not as such satisfy any tensor equation. Riemann’s
curvature tensor Rδαβγ(x), on the other hand, does satisfy a tensor equa-
tion, Einstein’s field equation, and thus has absolute (i.e. independent of
coordinate system) meaning as a geometric property of spacetime, namely,
its curvature.
We showed the geometric foundations of relativity in the previous chap-
ter, and we shall still say more about this issue later on, but for the moment
let us stress that the role of geometry in general relativity is neither an anal-
ogy, nor a metaphor, nor a mathematical coincidence, nor devoid of physical
content. Even at its more basic level, general relativity is essentially about
a geometric network of invariant intervals dsAB (norm of the differential
displacement arrows dxAB) between point-events A(x) and B(x+dx), and,
as for its physical content, we could not make any theoretical sense of the
physical measurements ds without this underlying geometric structure.
The helpfulness of the geometric foundations of the theory for under-
standing its physical meaning is therefore enormous; in this regard, we can
mathematical field in any case, a new mathematical concept—rechristened “gravitational
field”—appears at the starting point of the theory, namely, triads of arrow vectors EaI
(a, I = 1, 2, 3) whose trace Tr(EaIE
b
I) = det(g)g
ab (an inner product on the internal indices
I) mathematically recreates the previously banished metric field.
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perhaps do no better than heed the words of its creator, who, during an
address to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1921, openly acknowledged:
I attach special importance to the view of geometry which I have
just set forth, because without it I should have been unable to
formulate the theory of relativity. Without it the following re-
flection would have been impossible:—In a system of reference
rotating relatively to an inert system, the laws of disposition
of rigid bodies do not correspond to the rules of Euclidean ge-
ometry on account of the Lorentz contraction; thus if we ad-
mit non-inert systems we must abandon Euclidean geometry.
(Einstein, 1983b, p. 33)
And during his Kyoto lecture a year later in 1922, Einstein (1982) expressed
words to the same effect: “I found that that the foundations of geometry had
deep physical meaning in this problem” (p. 47). Moreover, neither is it true
that the geometric formulation of general relativity is “helpful only to those
who know enough mathematics” since, as has been made plain time and
again, Einstein was led to this geometric formulation despite not knowing
enough mathematics to express his physical insights in mathematical terms.
Finally, not even Smolin’s (1997) claim that he has himself “described
general relativity while making no mention of geometry” (p. 333) is true,
as his own description of this theory is in terms of “the geometry of space
and time” (p. 234) and “the metric of spacetime” (pp. 235, 239). Smolin’s
remarks leave one feeling uneasy with a bitter aftertaste: if correct, why
introduce such revolutionary ideas only as a short endnote or in passing in his
books? Can one really do away with 90 years of physical understanding since
Einstein, and with nearly 200 years of mathematical development relevant
to relativity theory since Gauss and Riemann, in a footnote? This can only
be the benefit of speaking from an authoritative position.
Finally and most unexpectedly, also pregeometricians attempt to make
progress via the invention of new geometries. By design, pregeometry is the
attempt to explain the origin of geometry in physical theories from a concep-
tually different basis, like a material continuum finds explanation in terms of
atoms. The use of geometric concepts is thus proscribed if pregeometry is to
live up to its intended goal. Unwittingly, however, because physics knows of
no other mode of operation than geometry, all ideas for pregeometries (ex-
cepting a few of Wheeler’s) turned out to be fraught with geometric objects
and magnitudes: graphs, networks, lattices, and causal sets with metrics
determining the distances of the edges between their point-like constituents.
In the erroneous belief that mere engagement in pregeometry would turn its
products pregeometric, the geometric nature of these building blocks went
unnoticed, and the task of pregeometry was tacitly reinterpreted as the
search for the origin of the geometric spacetime continuum from a discrete
geometric foundation. The case of pregeometry is so exemplifying that it
deserves a chapter of its own, to which we now turn.
We close this chapter with an illustration (Figure 5.1) of the geometric
road physics has followed so far, and suggest an unexplored alternative.
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Figure 5.1: The language of physics is the language of geometry, and progress in physics has always been sought, whether successfully or not,
via the invention of new geometries. This is still the case nowadays with the latest endeavours in the field of quantum gravity. We submit there
exists a different, unexplored road, the treading of which can help us understand the physical world in ways deeper than any amount of further
branching of the geometric road is capable of. This is the road of metageometry.
Chapter 6
Pregeometry
Curious things, habits. People themselves never knew they
had them.
Agatha Christie, Witness for the prosecution
After having dwelt in the meaning of geometry and witnessed its ubiqui-
tous role in physics and attempts at new physics, we analyse those theoret-
ical pictures that have explicitly proposed to forgo geometric ideas in their
depiction of space and time, and which go by the name of pregeometry—a
very apt name indeed, for the word is evocative of positioning oneself before
geometry. In pregeometry, the geometric spacetime continuum is considered
a flawed physical picture, and it is attempted to replace it without assuming
any other type of manifold for spacetime (in particular, without quantizing
general relativity as a presupposed starting point); instead, spacetime is to
be depicted via non-geometric constructs ontologically prior to the geometric
ones of its present description.
Indeed, if, like us, one is interested in going beyond geometry in physics,
what better place than in pregeometry to search for the realization of this
goal? Has not pregeometry, after all, already argued in earnest for the
overthrow of geometric explanations, and even fulfilled the very goals that
we have set ourselves in this work? Have we suddenly realized, on reaching
Chapter 6, that the work we have embarked on is at best superfluous and
at worst obsolete?
Hardly. A critical study soon reveals that the above preliminary char-
acterization of what is called pregeometry1 is for the most part incongruous
with its actual archetypes. That is to say, despite its claims to the contrary,
pregeometry surreptitiously and unavoidably fell prey to the very mode of
description it endeavoured to evade, as evidenced by its all-pervading geo-
metric pictures. Indeed, the distinctive feature of pregeometric approaches
is that, as intended, they drop the assumption of spacetime being correctly
described by a metric continuum, but only to replace it with some type or
other of geometric-theoretical conception.
1See e.g. (Monk, 1997, pp. 11–18).
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Nothing supports this statement more dramatically and vividly than the
words of Gibbs’ (1996), who explains the mode of working of pregeometry
thus: “Once it has been decided which properties of space-time are to be dis-
carded and which are to remain fundamental, the next step is to choose the
appropriate geometric structures from which the pregeometry is to be built”
(p. 18, italics added). In this use of the term, pregeometry is synonymous
with pre-continuum physics, although not synonymous with pregeometry in
the proper semantic and historic sense of the word—the sense its inventor,
J. A. Wheeler, endowed it with and which its current practitioners attempt
to fulfill; in terms of Wheeler’s (1980) two most striking pronouncements:
“a concept of pregeometry that breaks loose at the start from all mention
of geometry and distance” and “. . . to admit distance at all is to give up on
the search for pregeometry” (p. 4).2
On the basis of the incongruity between Gibbs’ and Wheeler’s state-
ments, it is striking to come across remarks such as Cahill and Klinger’s
(1996), who tell us that “The need to construct a non-geometric theory to
explain the time and space phenomena has been strongly argued by Wheeler,
under the name of pregeometry. Gibbs has recently compiled a literature
survey of such attempts” (p. 314). At the reading of these words, one is at
first quite pleased and subsequently nothing but disheartened. For, whereas
it is true that Wheeler vowed for a non-geometric theory of space and time
and named it pregeometry, it could not be farther from the truth to say
that the pregeometric theories devised so far (for example, those in Gibbs’
or Monk’s survey) refrain from the use of geometric concepts; to the con-
trary, they use them extensively, as is our purpose to show.
At the risk of displeasing some authors, in the show-piece analysis that
follows, attempts to transcend the spacetime continuum will be understood
as pregeometric in tune with what is called pregeometry, even when this
designation is not used explicitly in every programme. In such cases, this
way of proceeding is somewhat unfair, since the following works will be
criticized chiefly as failed expressions of a genuine pregeometry (but many
also for lack of underlying physical principles). Where they exist, explicit
mentions of pregeometric intentions will be highlighted; lack of any such
mention will be acknowledged as well.
6.1 Discreteness
One category could have embraced most of—if not all—the works in this
analysis. Without doubt, the best-favoured type of programme to deal with
new ways of looking at spacetime is, in general terms, of a discrete na-
ture. The exact meaning of “discrete” we will not attempt to specify; the
2The criticism to pregeometry to be put forward here is not based merely on a verbal
objection. It consists of an objection to the activities of pregeometricians proper, given
that they explicitly set out to avoid geometry—and fail. Since this goal is depicted very
well indeed by the name given to the field, the criticism applies to the word “pregeometry”
just as well. It is only in this sense that it is also a verbal objection.
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simple intuitive connotation of the word as something consisting of sepa-
rate, individually distinct entities3 will do. A choice of this sort appears
to be appealing to researchers; firstly, because having cast doubt upon the
assumption of spacetime as a continuum, its reverse, discreteness of some
form, is naturally envisaged; secondly, because quantum-theoretical consid-
erations tend to suggest, at least on an intuitive level, that also spacetime
must be built by discrete standards.
Last but not least, many find some of the special properties of discrete
structures quite promising themselves. Among other things, such structures
seem to be quite well-suited to reproduce a continuum in some limit, because
they naturally support geometric relations as a built-in property. This was
originally Riemann’s realization. As to the possible need for such a type of
structure, he wrote in an often-quoted passage:
Now it seems that the empirical notions on which the metrical
determinations of space are founded, the notion of a solid body
and of a ray of light, cease to be valid for the infinitely small. We
are therefore quite at liberty to suppose that the metric relations
of space in the infinitely small do not conform to the hypothesis
of geometry; and we ought in fact to suppose it, if we can thereby
obtain a simpler explanation of phenomena.
The question of the validity of the hypotheses of geometry in
the infinitely small is bound up with the question of the ground
of the metric relations of space. In this last question, which we
may still regard as belonging to the doctrine of space, is found
the application of the remark made above; that in a discrete
manifoldness, the ground of its metric relations is given in the
notion of it, while in a continuous manifoldness, this ground must
come from outside. Either therefore the reality which underlies
space must form a discrete manifoldness, or we must seek the
ground of its metric relations outside it, in the binding forces
which act upon it. (Riemann, 1873, p. 11, online ref.)
Riemann can therefore be rightly considered the father of all discrete
approaches to the study of spacetime structure. He should not be considered,
however, the mentor of an authentic pregeometry since, as he himself stated,
quantitatively geometric relations are given in the very notion of a discrete
manifold, which, through these relations, becomes a geometric object itself.4
3Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com
4In Article I, the sign of geometry in pregeometry was taken to be the appearance
of the geometric magnitude length. Here, attention is also drawn to the presence of
geometric objects. Although these appear sometimes in self-evident ways, at other times
they appear at first as abstract objects, which become geometric objects via the attachment
of geometric magnitudes to them. For example, a “set of objects with neighbouring
relations” becomes a graph, i.e. a set of points with joining lines, when a distance is
prescribed on the abstract relations. In quantum mechanics, we saw that state vectors
likewise become geometric objects (arrows) after the specification of their complex-number
overlaps (inner product) and their squared real moduli (areas).
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The absolute veracity of his statement can be witnessed in every attempt at
pregeometry, not as originally designed by Wheeler, but as it of itself came
to be. (Wheeler’s pregeometry will be examined in Chapter 8.)
6.2 Graph-theoretical pictures
Graphs are a much-favoured choice in attempts at pregeometric schemes.
Following Wilson (1985, pp. 8–10, 78), a graph of a quite general type con-
sists of a pair (V,E), where V is a possibly infinite set of elements called
vertices and E is a possibly infinite family of ordered pairs, called edges, of
not necessarily distinct elements of V . Infinite sets and families of elements
allow for an infinite graph, which can be, however, locally-finite if each ver-
tex has a finite number of edges incident on it. Families (instead of sets)
of edges permit the appearance of the same pairs more than once, thus al-
lowing multiple edges between the same pair of vertices. An edge consisting
of a link of a single vertex to itself represents a loop. Finally, ordered pairs
allow for the existence of directed edges in the graph.
A particular reason for the popularity of graphs in pregeometry is that,
along the lines of Riemann’s thoughts, they naturally support a metric.
When a metric is introduced on a graph, all edges are taken to be of the
same length (usually a unit) irrespective of their actual shapes and lengths
as drawn on paper or as conjured up by the imagination. This distinguishes
graphs from certain types of lattices, which have a more literal interpreta-
tion, as explained below.
6.2.1 Dadic´ and Pisk’s discrete-space structure
Dadic´ and Pisk (1979) went beyond the manifold assumption by representing
“space as a set of abstract objects with certain relations of neighbourhood
among them” (p. 346), i.e. a graph; in it, the vertices appear to correspond to
space points. This approach assumes a metric as naturally inherited from
the graph, and a definition of dimension—based on a modification of the
Hausdorff dimension—that is scale-dependent. The graph |G〉 representing
spacetime is required to be unlabelled in its points and lines, and must
be characterizable by its topological structure only. Operators b† and b
are defined for the creation and annihilation of lines, such that |G〉 can be
constructed from the vacuum-state graph |0〉 by repeated application of b†.
This is a Fock-space framework, which includes a second metric (on state
vectors) as part of its built-in structure.
What led Dadic´ and Pisk to this choice of graph-theoretical approach?
They argued that in analysing what is essential in the intuitive notion of
space, they found this to be the existence of some objects and the relation
of neighbourhood between them. Based on this, they proceeded to con-
struct their discrete-space structure. However, this motivational basis is not
grounded on any further physical principles. Quantum-theoretical ideas—
in particular, a Fock-space method—are used in this approach only as a
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formalism to deal with graphs, their states, and their evolution.
Geometric concepts are here clearly assumed. They are typified by the
natural metric defined on the graph on the one hand, that of Fock spaces on
the other, and not least by a graph as a composite geometric object (vertices
and edges) itself. This fact alone would make this approach a questionable
case of an authentic pregeometry, although we acknowledge that its authors
did not so argue.
6.2.2 Antonsen’s random graphs
Antonsen (1992) devised a graph-theoretical approach that is statistical in
nature. Space is identified with a dynamical random graph, whose vertices
appear to be associated with space points, and whose links have unit length;
time is given by the parameterization of these graphs (spaces) in a meta-
space. Primary point-creation and point-annihilation operators, a† and a,
are defined, as well as secondary corresponding notions for links, b† and
b; probabilities for the occurrence of any such case are either given or in
principle calculable. According to Antonsen, this framework does not really
assume traditional quantum mechanics although it might look like it. He
claimed, echoing perhaps the way of proceeding of Dadic´ and Pisk, that the
operators and the Hilbert space introduced by him are only formal notions
without direct physical interpretations besides that of being able to generate
a geometric structure.
This approach is, according to its author, “more directly in tune with
Wheeler’s original ideas” (p. 8) and, in particular, similar to that of Wheeler’s
“law without law” (p. 9) in that the laws of nature are viewed as a statisti-
cal consequence of the truly random behaviour of a vast number of entities
working at a deeper level. One must have reservations about this view, since
Antonsen is already working in a geometric context (a graph with a notion
of distance), which is not what Wheeler had in mind. Moreover, there does
not appear to be any principle leading Antonsen to introduce this kind of
graph structure in the first place. He sometimes (pp. 9, 84) mentions the
need to assume as little as possible, perhaps overlooking the fact that not
only the quantity but also the nature of the assumptions made—as few as
they might be—bears as much importance.
Antonsen is therefore the first claimant to pregeometry who calls for
the use of geometric objects (a graph) and magnitudes (distance) in its
construction; for this reason, his scheme is rather suspicious as an authentic
expression of pregeometry.
6.2.3 Requardt’s cellular networks
Requardt also went beyond the manifold assumption by means of a graph-
theoretical approach. At a deeper level, space is associated with a graph
whose nodes ni are to be found in a certain state si (only differences of
“charge” si − sk are meaningful), and its bonds bj in a state Jik that can
be equal to 0, 1, or −1 (vanishing or directed bonds). In contrast to the
54 Pregeometry
preceding scheme, here spacetime points are not associated with the graph
vertices but with “densely entangled subclusters of nodes and bonds of the
underlying network or graph” (Requardt & Roy, 2001, p. 3040). A law
for the evolution in the “clock-time” of such a graph is simply introduced
(pp. 3042–3043) on the grounds that it provides, by trial and error, with
some desired consequences. Requardt (2000, p. 1) then assumed that this
graph evolved from a chaotic initial phase or “big bang” in the distant past
in such a way as to have reached a generally stable phase, associated with
ordinary spacetime.
A peculiarity of this scheme is that it seeks to understand the current
structure of spacetime as emergent in time,5 i.e. as a consequence of the
primordial events that are believed to have given rise to it in the first place.
In this respect, it could have also been classified as a cosmological scheme,
although not as a quantum-cosmological one since quantum mechanics is not
assumed: Requardt’s (1996) goal is to “identify both gravity and quantum
theory as the two dominant but derived aspects of an underlying discrete
and more primordial theory. . . ” (pp. 1–2).
A lack of guiding principles must again be criticized. Requardt’s (1995)
choice of approach seems to rest on “a certain suspicion in the scientific com-
munity that nature may be ‘discrete’ on the Planck scale” (p. 2). Therefore,
he argued, cellular networks make a good choice because they are naturally
discrete and can, moreover, generate complex behaviour and self-organize.
However, it must be said that basing a physical choice on a generally held
suspicion whose precise meaning is not clear may not be very cautious.
Although Requardt (1995) intended to produce a pregeometric scheme
(“What we are prepared to admit is some kind of ‘pregeometry ’ ” (p. 6)) and
strove for “a substratum that does not support from the outset. . . geometrical
structures” (p. 2), he soon showed—in total opposition to the earlier re-
marks—that his graphs “have a natural metric structure” (p. 15). He intro-
duced thus a very explicit notion of distance. Requardt was concerned with
avoiding the assumption of a continuum, and in this he succeeded. However,
geometric notions are not merely continuum notions, as argued earlier. This
attempt at pregeometry suffers therefore from the same geometric affliction
as the previous one.
6.3 Lattice pictures
At an intuitive level, (i) a lattice consists of a regular geometric arrangement
of points or objects over an area or in space.6 From a mathematical point
5As is typical of arguments considering the dynamic emergence of time (also as in
spacetime), it is unclear in what dynamic time the emergent time is supposed to appear.
This hypothetical, deeper dynamic time, when considered at all (discrete ticks of clock-
time for Requardt), is nevertheless always the same kind of simple and intuitive external
parameter as the notion of time it attempts to give rise to. The end result is then to trade
one little-understood external-parameter time for another.
6Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com
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of view, (ii) a lattice consists of a partially ordered set 〈L,≺〉 in which there
exists an infimum and a supremum for every pair of its elements.
The first notion of lattice goes hand in hand with the same idea as used in
Regge calculus. In it, an irregular lattice is used in the sense of an irregular
mesh whose edges can have different lengths. For this reason, such a lattice
cannot be a graph, where all links are equivalent to one another. The second
notion of lattice is, to a degree, connected with the approach to spacetime
structure called causal sets. Although, strictly speaking, a causal set is only
a locally finite, partially ordered set without loops, when it also holds that
there exists a unique infimum and supremum for every pair of its elements
(existence of a common past and a common future), the causal set becomes
a lattice in the second sense of the term. Despite the fact that they are not
rigorously always a lattice, causal sets have been included here in order to
also exemplify, in as close a fashion as possible, the use of a lattice of the
second type in the construction of an alternative structure for spacetime.7
6.3.1 Simplicial quantum gravity by Lehto et al.
Lehto (1988), and Lehto, Nielsen, and Ninomiya (1986a, 1986b) attempted
the construction of a pregeometric scheme in which it was conjectured that
spacetime possesses a deeper, pregeometric structure described by three dy-
namical variables, namely, an abstract simplicial complex ASC, its number
of vertices n, and a real-valued field ℓ associated with every one-simplex
(pair of vertices) Y . It is significant that, up to this point, the approach
has a chance of being truly pregeometric since the fields ℓ are not (yet) to
be understood as lengths of any sort, and the vertices could also be thought
as (or called) elements or abstract objects (cf. abstract simplicial complex).
However, the introduction of geometric concepts follows immediately.
Next, an abstract simplicial complex is set into a unique correspondence
with a geometric simplicial complex GSC, a scheme of vertices and geometric
simplices. By piecing together these geometric simplices, a piecewise-linear
space can be built so that, by construction, it admits a triangulation. The
crucial step is now taken to interpret field ℓ as the link distance of the
piecewise-linear manifold. The conditions are thus set for the introduction
of a Regge-calculus lattice with metric gRCµν given by the previously defined
link lengths.
Traditionally, the primary idea of Regge calculus is to provide a piecewise-
linear approximation to the spacetime manifolds of general relativity by
means of the gluing together of four-dimensional simplices, with curvature
concentrated only in their two-dimensional faces. In this approach, however,
the approximation goes in the opposite direction, since simplicial gravity is
now seen as more fundamental, having the smooth manifolds of general rel-
ativity as a large-scale limit. Moreover, whereas the basic concept of the
7Causal sets can also be classified as graph-theoretical, considering that they can also
be thought of as consisting of a locally finite, loopless, directed graph without circuits,
in the sense that it is not possible to come back to a starting vertex while following the
allowed directions in it.
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Regge calculus consists in the link lengths, which once given are enough to
determine the geometry of the lattice structure, Lehto et al. also introduced
the number of vertices n as a dynamical variable.
A quantization of the Regge-calculus lattice is subsequently introduced
by means of the Euclidean path-integral formalism. A pregeometric par-
tition function Z summing over ASC, fields ℓ, and vertices n is first pro-
posed as a formal abstraction to be geometrically realized by a correspond-
ing Regge-calculus partition function ZRC summing over piecewise-linear
manifolds and link lengths ℓ. Indeed, quantization can be viewed as one of
the reasons why the notion of length must be introduced in order to move
forwards.
Two reasons can be offered for the choice of the starting point of this
framework. On the one hand, being concerned with the production of a gen-
uine pregeometry, an abstract simplicial complex was chosen on the grounds
that, as such, it is abstract enough to be free from geometric notions intrinsic
to it. On the other hand, an abstract simplicial complex with a variable set
of elements was seen fit to provide an appropriate setting in which to study
further and from a different point of view the character of diffeomorphism
invariance—a useful concept to help us rethink the ontology of spacetime
points (see Chapter 9). The requirement of diffeomorphism symmetry of
the functional integral measure with respect to a displacement of vertices
resulted in a free-gas behaviour of the latter as elements of a geometric
lattice. Any pair of vertices could then with high probability have any mu-
tual distance, helping to avoid the rise of long-range correlations typical of
fixed-vertex lattices.
In one sense, this work is no exception among all those analysed in this
chapter. Geometric concepts such as link length have to be assumed to real-
ize the abstract simplicial complex as a geometric object, a Regge-calculus
lattice, bringing it thus closer to a more familiar geometric setting and ren-
dering it fit for quantization. However, despite the assumption of geometry,
a distinctive feature of this work is that it recognizes clearly pregeometric
and geometric realms and, even though it cannot do without the latter, it
keeps them clearly distinguished from one another rather than, as is more
common, soon losing sight of all differences between them.
6.3.2 Causal sets by Bombelli et al.
Bombelli, Lee, Meyer, and Sorkin (1987) proposed that at the smallest scales
spacetime is a causal set: a locally finite set of elements endowed with
a partial order corresponding to the transitive and irreflexive macroscopic
relation that relates past and future.
In this framework, causal order is viewed as prior to metric relations and
not the other way around: the differential structure and the conformal metric
of a manifold are derived from causal order. Because only the conformal
metric (it has no associated measure of length) can be obtained in this way,
the transition is made to a non-continuous spacetime consisting of a finite
6.4 Number-theoretical pictures 57
but large number of ordered elements, a causal set. In such a space, size can
be measured by counting.
What considerations have led to the choice of a causal set? In this
respect, Sorkin explains:
The insight underlying these proposals is that, in passing from
the continuous to the discrete, one actually gains certain in-
formation, because “volume” can now be assessed (as Riemann
said) by counting ; and with both order and volume information
present, we have enough to recover geometry. (Sorkin, 2005, p. 5,
online ref.)
This is a valid recognition resting on the fact that, given that the general-
relativistic metric is fixed by causal structure and conformal factor, a discrete
causal set will be able to reproduce these features and also provide a way
for the continuous manifold to emerge. But is Sorkin here following any
physical principle that leads him to the conclusion that a causal-set structure
underlies spacetime, or is the proposal only mathematically inspired?
As regards geometry, volume is already a geometric concept, so that
“to recover geometry” above must mean “to recover a continuous, metric
spacetime,” not “geometry” in the stricter sense of the word. The causal-set
picture uses other geometric concepts as well. The correspondence principle
between a manifold and a causal set from which it is said to emerge, for
example, reads:
The manifold (M,g) “emerges from” the causal set C [if and
only if] C “could have come from sprinkling points into M at
unit density, and endowing the sprinkled points with the order
they inherit from the light-cone structure of g.” (Sorkin, 1991,
p. 156)
The mentioned unit density means that there exists a fundamental unit of
volume, expected by Sorkin to be the Planck volume, 10−105 m3. Further-
more, he also considers the distance between two causal-set elements x and
y as the number of elements in the longest chain joining them (p. 17), turn-
ing the ordering relations into lines and x and y into points. Thus, if a
causal set is to be seen as a pregeometric framework, due to its geometric
assumptions, it makes again a questionable case of it. However, we do not
know its proponents to have staked any such claim.
6.4 Number-theoretical pictures
Some investigators have identified the key to an advancement in the problem
of spacetime structure to lie in the number fields used in current theories
or to be used in future ones. Butterfield and Isham (2000, pp. 84–85), for
example, arrived at the conclusion that the use of real and complex numbers
in quantum mechanics presupposes that space is a continuum. According to
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this view, standard quantummechanics could not be used in the construction
of any theory that attempts to go beyond such a characterization of space.8
6.4.1 Rational-number spacetime by Horzela et al.
Horzela, Kapus´cik, Kempczyn´ski, and Uzes (1992) criticized those discrete
representations of spacetime that assume an elementary length, and which
may furthermore violate relativistic invariance, on the grounds that the for-
mer is experimentally not observed and the latter is, in fact, experimentally
verified.9 They proposed to start their analysis by studying the actual ex-
perimental method used to attribute coordinates to spacetime points, the
radio-location method.
Their starting point is that the measured values of the coordinates
t = (t1 + t2)/2 and x = c(t2 − t1)/2 of an event in any system of refer-
ence are always rational (rather than real) numbers, since both the time of
emission t1 and reception t2 of the radio signal are crude, straightforward
measurements made with a clock.10 Subsequently, they showed that the
property of being rational is preserved when calculating the coordinates of
an event in another system, as well as in the calculation of the relative ve-
locity of this system. Therefore, they maintained that Lorentz invariance
holds in a spacetime pictured in terms of rational-number coordinates. In
addition, since the rational numbers are dense in the real numbers, such a
spacetime frees itself from any notion of elementary distance. If spacetime
must be described in a discrete manner, the rational-number field is then
seen as the key to a better understanding of it.
While Horzela et al. suggested that this line of investigation should be
furthered by means of algebraic mathematical methods, they admitted not
knowing at the time of their writing of any guiding physical principle to do
this. As a consequence, since they do not propose to go as far as building
a more complete spacetime picture based on their preliminary findings, the
usual criticisms being made in this chapter do not apply. Further physical
guiding principles are lacking, but then this has been acknowledged and
action taken in accord with it; geometric ideas are of course present, but
then no real attempt to transcend the framework of relativity was made
after all.
6.4.2 Volovich’s number theory
Volovich (1987) argued that, since at the Planck scale the usual notion
of spacetime is suspected to lose its meaning, the building blocks of the
8But do not real numbers simply arise as the probability of quantum-mechanical out-
comes as the limiting relative frequency between successes and total trials? These are quite
unproblematic observations made in the real world, so why should we fabricate problems
worrying about what might go wrong in the “quantum gravity regime” where “space and
time might break down” (Isham & Butterfield, 2000, p. 6, online ref.)?
9See (Hill, 1955) for a precursor of this programme.
10For this idea to work, it is also essential that the value c of the speed of light be
understood as the result of a “crude” measurement.
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universe cannot be particles, fields, or strings, for these are defined on such
a background; in their place, he proposed that the numbers be considered as
the basic entities. At the same time, Volovich suggested that for lengths less
than the Planck length, the Archimedean axiom11 may not hold. Putting the
two ideas together, he asked why should one construct a non-Archimedean
geometry over the field of real numbers and not over some other field?
To make progress, Volovich proposed as a general principle that the
number field on which a theory is developed undergoes quantum fluctuations
(p. 14). He maintained that this means that the usual field of real numbers
is apparently only realized with some probability but that, in principle,
there also exists a probability for the occurrence of any other field. Volovich
furthermore speculated that fundamental physical laws should be invariant
under a change of the number field, in analogy with Einstein’s principle of
general invariance (p. 14).
It is difficult to see what principle led Volovich to propose this pro-
gramme; it appears that only analogies have guided his choices. It is also
difficult to come to terms with his opinion that “number theory and the cor-
responding branches of algebraic geometry are nothing else than the ultimate
and unified physical theory” (p. 15). Finally, the role of geometry in this
framework is crystal-clear: instead of attempting to reduce “all physics”
to Archimedean geometry over the real numbers, it is proposed that one
should rather attempt to reduce “all physics” to non-Archimedean geometry
over a fluctuating number field. For this reason, although Volovich did not
so claim, his scheme could, again, hardly be considered a true instance of
pregeometry.
6.5 Relational or process-based pictures
Having found inspiration in Leibniz’s relational conception of space, some
researchers have proposed that spacetime is not a thing itself but a resultant
of a complex of relations among basic things. Others, on a more philosoph-
ical strand, have found inspiration in Heraclitus’ principle that “all is flux”
and have put forward pregeometric pictures in which, roughly speaking,
processes are considered to be more fundamental than things. This view is
sometimes linked with the currently much-disseminated idea of information,
especially in its quantum-mechanical form.
6.5.1 Axiomatic pregeometry by Perez Bergliaffa et al.
Perez Bergliaffa, Romero, and Vucetich (1998) presented an axiomatic frame-
work that, via rules of correspondence, is to serve as a “pregeometry of
space-time.” This framework assumes the objective existence of basic phys-
ical entities called things and sees spacetime not as a thing itself but as a
resultant of relations among those entities.
11The Archimedean axiom states that any given segment of a straight line can be even-
tually surpassed by adding arbitrarily small segments of the same line.
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In order to derive from this more basic substratum the topological and
metric properties of Minkowskian spacetime, a long list of concepts and
axioms is presented. But for the said general requirements of objectivity and
relationality, these “ontological presuppositions” (p. 2283) appear arbitrary
and inspired in purely mathematical ideas rather than stemming from some
physical principle concerning spacetime.
Among these concepts, we centre our attention on something called ontic
space Eo. Although its exact meaning cannot be conveyed without reviewing
a great deal of the contents of the article in question, it could be intuitively
taken to be a form of space connected with the basic entities, which is
prior (in axiomatic development) to the more familiar geometric space EG
of physics—Minkowskian space, in this case. Perez Bergliaffa et al. proved
(pp. 2290–2291) that the ontic space Eo is metrizable and gave an explicit
metric d(x, y) for it, a distance between things, turning, again, relations into
lines and things into points. Finally, by means of an isomorphism between
Eo and a subspace dense in a complete space, the geometric space EG is
obtained as this complete space itself, while at the same time it inherits the
metric of Eo.
One notices once again the stealthy introduction of a metric for pregeom-
etry, with the ensuing geometric objectification of earlier abstract concepts,
in order to derive from it further geometric notions. This procedure must
be criticized in view that this approach explicitly claims to be an instance
of pregeometry.
6.5.2 Cahill and Klinger’s bootstrap universe
Cahill and Klinger (1997) proposed to give an account of what they rather
questionably called “the ‘ultimate’ modelling of reality” (p. 2). This, they
claimed, could only be done by means of pregeometric concepts that do not
assume any notions of things but only those of processes since, according
to them, the former notions (but not the latter) suffer from the problem of
their always being capable of further explanation in terms of new things.
One must wonder for what mysterious reason certain processes cannot be
explained in terms of others.
As an embodiment of the concepts above, these authors used a “boot-
strapped self-referential system” (p. 3) characterized by a certain iterative
map that relies on the notion of relational information Bij between monads
i and j. In order to avoid the already rejected idea of things, these monads
are said to have no independent meaning but for the one they acquire via
the relational information Bij. Once again, it is evident that this mathe-
matically inspired starting point does not rest on any physical foundation.
Due to reasons not to be reviewed here, the iterative map will allow the
persistence of large Bij. These, it is argued, will give rise to a tree-graph—
with monads as nodes and Bij as links—as the most probable structure
and as seen from the perspective of monad i. Subsequently, so as to ob-
tain (by means of probabilistic mathematical tools) a persistent background
structure to be associated with some form of three-dimensional space, a dis-
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tance between any two monads is defined as the smallest number of links
connecting them in the graph.
“This emergent 3-space,” Cahill and Klinger argued, “. . . does not arise
within any a priori geometrical background structure” (p. 6). Such a con-
tention is clearly mistaken for a graph with its defined idea of distance is
certainly a geometric background for the reasons we have pointed out ear-
lier. Thus, yet another mathematically inspired pregeometric scheme falls
prey to geometry.
6.6 Quantum-cosmological pictures
Quantum-cosmological approaches tackle the problem of spacetime struc-
ture from the perspective of the universe as a whole and seen as a neces-
sarily closed quantum system. For them, the problem of the constitution of
spacetime is bound up with the problem of the constitution of the cosmos,
customarily dealing as well with the problem of how they interdependently
originated.
6.6.1 Eakins and Jaroszkiewicz’s quantum universe
Jaroszkiewicz (2001) and Eakins and Jaroszkiewicz (2002, 2003) presented
a theoretical picture for the quantum structure and running of the universe.
Its first class of basic elements are event states; these may or may not be fac-
tored out as yet more fundamental event states, depending on whether they
are direct products (classicity) of yet more elementary event states |ψ〉, or
whether they are entangled (non-separability) event states |Ψ〉. The second
class of basic elements are the tests acting on the event states. These tests Σ,
represented by Hermitian operators Σˆ, provide the topological relationships
between states, and endow the structure of states with an evolution (irre-
versible acquisition of information) via “state collapse” and with a quantum
arrow of time. A third component is a certain information content of the
universe—sometimes, although not necessarily, represented by the semiclas-
sical observer—at each given step in its evolution (stage), which, together
with the present state of the universe, determines the tests which are to
follow. Thus, the universe is a self-testing machine, a quantum automaton,
in which the traditional quantum-mechanical observer is accounted for but
totally dispensed with.
Eakins and Jaroszkiewicz (2002, p. 5), like Requardt but after their own
fashion, also attempt to understand the present structure of spacetime as a
consequence of primordial events, which in this case can be traced back to
what they call the “quantum big bang.” In this case, however, the emergence
of spacetime is more sophisticated than in Requardt’s, since here it happens
in the non-parameter intrinsic time given by state-vector collapse.
The subject of pregeometry as pioneered by Wheeler is also touched
upon (Eakins & Jaroszkiewicz, 2003, p. 2). The view that the characteristic
feature of pregeometric approaches consists in “avoiding any assumption of a
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Author Geometric Geometric
objects magnitudes
Dadic´ & Pisk vertices, edges overlap, length, distance
Antonsen∗ idem length, distance
Requardt∗ idem idem
Lehto et al.∗ idem idem
Bombelli et al. idem length, distance, volume
Horzela et al. as in sp. rel. as in sp. rel.
Volovich as in mod. phys. as in mod. phys.
Perez Bergliaffa et al.∗ points, lines length, distance
Cahill & Klinger∗ idem idem
Eakins & Jaroszkiewicz∗ as in q. mech. as in q. mech.
Nagels∗ points, lines length, distance
Stuckey & Silberstein∗ idem idem
Table 6.1: Summary of the use of geometric concepts in the pregeometric ap-
proaches analysed in this chapter, plus two more discussed later in Section 8.3.1.
Approaches that mention pregeometry explicitly are marked with an asterisk (∗).
Abbreviations: Special relativity (sp. rel.), quantum mechanics (q. mech.), modern
physics (mod. phys.).
pre-existing manifold” (p. 2) is also stated there, although it is nowhere men-
tioned that the notion of distance, according to Wheeler, should be avoided
as well. In any case, these authors explain that their task is to reconcile
pregeometric, bottom-up approaches to quantum gravity with other holis-
tic, top-bottom ones as in quantum cosmology. Finally, since the traditional
machinery of quantum mechanics is assumed in the approach, so is therefore
geometry. Again, this fact undermines the status of this programme as a
genuine representative of pregeometry.
Of all the above approaches, we find this one to be the most appeal-
ing. It gives clear explanations about the nature of its building blocks and
puts forward judicious physical principles and mechanisms—as contrasted
to purely mathematically inspired ones—by means of which the traditional
notions of spacetime and quantum non-locality may emerge.
In Table 6.1, we summarize the use of geometric concepts in all the
pregeometric pictures analysed in this chapter, plus two more discussed later
on in Chapter 8.
6.7 The inexorability of geometric understanding?
By way of appraisal, we take note of certain views expressed by Anandan, as
they constitute the absolute epitome of the mode of working of pregeometry
witnessed so far. Anandan suggests
a philosophical principle which may be schematically expressed as
Ontology = Geometry = Physics.
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The last equality has not been achieved yet by physicists because
we do not have a quantum gravity. But it is here proposed as a
philosophical principle which should ultimately be satisfied by a
physical theory. (Anandan, 1997, p. 51)
Anandan appears to have taken the geometric essence of present physical
theories as a ground to argue ahead that, correspondingly, any successful fu-
ture physical theory must of necessity be geometric. (So much for Wheeler’s
pregeometry as a road to quantum gravity!) Such is his conviction that he
raises this idea to the status of a principle that any physical theory should
“ultimately” follow. But does it ensue from the fact that physics has so
far described nature by means of geometry that it will continue to do so in
the future? Physics must describe nature geometrically come what may—
whence such an inevitability? Moreover, in what way has the first part of
the quoted equality, as implicitly stated, already been achieved? Simply be-
cause it is a fact that reality itself is geometric? We are reminded of Smith’s
view, according to which form is an inherent part of nature. Why does this
idea keep coming back to haunt us?
Thus, we witness here an overstated version of the spirit implicitly un-
derlying the cases analysed through this section. If in the latter the use
of geometry was, so to speak, accidental or non-intentional, in Anandan’s
statement we find the explicit claim materialized that geometry must be the
mode of description of physical science, in particular, concerning a solution
to the problem of the quantum structure of spacetime. No stronger grip
of geometry on physics—and on the human mind—could possibly be con-
ceived. But is this conception justified? And if not, what is the source of
this widespread misconception?
The connection underlying Chapters 3–6 now comes to the fore. From
the mists of antiquity to the forefront of twenty-first century theoretical
physics, geometry remains (for better or worse, successfully or vainly) the
enduring, irreplaceable tool by means of which humans portray the world.
Ironically enough, even in a field that sets itself the task of explaining the
origin of geometry in physics and names itself pregeometry, one is to find
the most explicit displays of geometric understanding. In the next chapter,
we start to consider the reasons behind this peculiar state of affairs.
Chapter 7
The geometric anthropic
principle and its
consequences
The more I study religions the more I am convinced that
man never worshipped anything but himself.
Sir Richard Francis Burton, The book of the thousand nights
and a night, Vol. 10
J. Ellis (2005) described the state of affairs documented in the two pre-
vious chapters rather insightfully when he said, “Following Einstein, most
theoretical physicists assign a central role to geometrical ideas” (p. 57). Ellis’
recognition is quite valid, but after pondering geometry to the extent that
we have done, we are ready to make a few specifications. Although it is true
that physicists currently draw their geometric inspiration to a certain extent
from the success of Einstein’s work—for it does look more geometric than
the physical theories preceding it—we have seen that the geometric drive in
physics is rooted much deeper and much farther back in time than in any
twentieth-century intellectual product. Moreover, one may even push Ellis’
claim further and, without fear of error, say that, with the exceptions of
the next chapter, it is essentially all physicists that assign a central role to
geometric ideas. How central is this role?
Pedersen (1980), for example, tells us that “Geometry is the connec-
tion between the real world and the mathematics we use to solve problems
about that real world,” and reports on mathematician Rene´ Thom’s notion
that “Geometry is the most fundamental abstract representation of the real
world” (Hilton & Pedersen, 2004). Pedersen’s statement is an accurate de-
scription of the contingent manner in which geometry has so far happened to
be used by humans, but it should not be understood as a description of the
necessity of geometric theorizing. Thom’s remark, on the other hand, errs
in its conflation of contingency with necessity, namely, that the language of
geometry is not simply a parochial picturing means of humans, but the uni-
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versal tool by means of which any theorist (human or otherwise) at any time
(now and forever) must represent any aspect (known and unforeseeable) of
the physical world. What is the origin and reason for this exaltation of
geometry?
7.1 The geometric anthropic principle
The astounding effectiveness of geometry in the portrayal of the natural
world has since antiquity been interpreted by many to signify that the nat-
ural world is geometric in itself. The roots of this persuasion are found in
ancient Greece and are represented by Plato’s thought; in particular, they
are best epitomized by a notable phrase attributed to him, namely, “God
eternally geometrizes.”
Instead of Plato, Foss (2000, p. 36) attributes the origin of this belief to
Pythagoras, and calls it the “Pythagorean Intuition.” However, Pythago-
ras’ view was that “reality is number” or that “at its deepest level, reality
is mathematical in nature,”1 which is not equivalent to its being essentially
geometric. Jammer (1969), on the other hand, does capture the distinc-
tion, together with the Platonic origins of the geometric physical tradition,
when he writes, “With Plato physics becomes geometry, just as with the
Pythagoreans it became arithmetic” (p. 14).2
Two millennia later, hardly anything had changed. The same opinion
as Plato’s but without its religious overtones was articulated by Galilei, for
whom the book of nature
is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are
triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is
humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without
these, one wanders about in a dark labyrinth. (Galilei, 1957,
p. 238)
Whence so much emphasis on the essentialness of geometry?
These statements propounding the fundamentality of geometry can be
understood as originating from a geometric form of the notorious anthropic
principle. Ordinarily, this principle asserts that “the universe must be as
it is because, otherwise, we would not be here to observe it.” In a similar
vein, Plato’s words epitomize a strong geometric version of the anthropic
principle, which could be phrased thus: “God must have made the universe
geometrically because, otherwise, we would not be able to describe it as we
do.” Galilei’s words embody a weaker version of the same principle: “The
universe must be geometric because, otherwise, we would not be able to
1Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com
2The conflation of mathematics with geometry is an error commonly incurred in. For
example, in connection with the “Pythagorean Intuition,” Foss (2000) writes: “why has
geometry become the modeling tool of science? Is it because Pythagoras was right in
thinking that reality itself is somehow deeply mathematical by nature?” (p. 87). For a
similar error, see (Stewart, 2002, p. 5).
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describe it as we do.” As common sense is apt to reveal, the reasoning
expressed by anthropic principles is nevertheless inadequate, considering
that the fact that Man can do something—in the former case, simply exist; in
the latter, devise successful geometric theories—is a contingent consequence,
not a cause, of the features of the world.
Despite its ineffectualness and basically flawed nature, the anthropic
principle continues to be widely upheld today in both its geometric varieties.
Its weaker version finds expression in statements such as Brassard’s (1998)
“A science has to be based on a geometry” (§ 3.4), whereby physics is
posited as a branch of geometry—a view that puts the cart before the horse.
It also finds expression in Anandan’s (1997) previously analysed principle
“Reality = Geometry = Physics” (p. 57) that any physical theory should
ultimately follow. Its strong version is in turn exemplified by straightout
religious assertions such as “God is a geometer.”3 The strong version of
the geometric anthropic principle has even been spelt out in its full explicit
form—and shockingly, too—by Stewart (2006): “Only a Geometer God can
create a mind that has the capacity to delude itself that a Geometer God
exists” (p. 203).
Has Geometry perchance become a modern religion—physicists’ latest
incarnation of God? Unexpectedly, this rhetorical question finds a willing
reply from Smolin (1997), who answers forthrightly in the positive: “the
belief that at its deepest level reality may be captured by an equation or a
geometrical construction is the private religion of the theoretical physicist”
(p. 178); he even goes on to say that “an education in physics or mathematics
is a little like an induction into a mystical order” (p. 179). But if this is a
statement of fact (and it may well be), then it is of a sad fact, and not of
one we should be sympathetic of or mention lightly.
Not even twenty-first century physics—much though it may secretly
presume—has ridden itself of the religious mindset originally part of natural
philosophy. Peacock (2006), for example, rightly criticized physicists in gen-
eral for subscribing to the religious view that “God wrote the equations” of
nature revealed (not made) by our theories, and Susskind in particular for
transferring “the quasi-religious awe [from intelligent design] to string the-
ory, whose mathematical results he repeatedly describes as ‘miraculous’ ”
(p. 170). And Horgan (1996) hit the nail nearly on the head when he at-
tributed physicists’ calling God a geometer to their being “intoxicated by
the power of their mathematical [geometric] theories” (p. 77; see also p. 136).
Far from God or nature, we place the origin of geometry in human na-
ture; more specifically, in the character of the human brain. It is not because
the world is geometric itself (a cryptic notion, at any rate), or because God
made it so, that our theories of it speak the language of geometry; it is
because evolutionary vicissitudes have moulded the human brain such that,
for better or worse, successfully or vainly, we write geometric theories of
the world. Indeed, it appears rather more evident that Galilei’s geometric
3See e.g. (Stewart & Golubitsky, 1993) and (Stewart, 2002, p. 5); see also (Pollard,
1984, p. 881).
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book of nature is not pre-existent but written by Man—who eternally ge-
ometrizes but, ingrained as his ways of thinking are, is unable to recognize
the handwriting as his own.
Without hesitation, we place the source of human geometric abilities—or
even, compulsions—in the character of the brain and not elsewhere, such as
in that of the sense organs, especially eyesight. It is quite possible that if we
were still endowed with the familiar five senses but our brains were essen-
tially different, we would not develop any geometric concepts and insights
into nature. An acquaintance with the self-related life experiences of Helen
Keller, the famous deaf-blind woman who overcame her sensory handicaps
to become a full human being, gives observational support to this view.
Keller (1933) tells us about her mind’s natural ability to grasp all the
established, conventional thoughts and concepts of seeing and hearing people
despite her own, practically life-long, visual and hearing disabilities. She
wrote: “Can it be that the brain is so constituted that it will continue the
activity which animates the sight and the hearing, after the eye and the ear
have been destroyed?” (p. 63). And further reflected:
The blind child—the deaf-blind child—has inherited the mind of
seeing-and-hearing ancestors—a mind measured to five senses.
Therefore he must be influenced, even if it is unknown to himself,
by the light, colour, song which have been transmitted through
the language he is taught, for the chambers of the mind are ready
to receive that language. (Keller, 1933, p. 91)
Keller discovers in her personal experience that her mind naturally bridges
the gap to that of her seeing-and-hearing peers by producing appropriate
conceptual correspondences, such as between a “lightning flash,” which she
cannot experience, and a “flash of thought and its swiftness” (p. 92), which
she can; and she notes that no matter how far she will exercise this method,
it will not break down. Keller tells us that she conceives of the world in
essentially the same manner as do her normal peers, and that she knows this
from the fact that she has no difficulty in comprehending other people; she
distinctly knows that her consciousness—primarily a product of her brain—
is in essence the same as that of sensorially unimpaired people. “Blindness,”
she metaphorically decrees from her vantage position, “has no limiting effect
upon mental vision” (p. 95). Keller’s awe-inspiring words, then, bear out the
point in question in first-hand manner, namely, that it is primarily the brain,
not the senses, that leads us to our particular description and understanding
of the world. Change a man’s senses, or to a certain extent deprive him of
them, and his worldview will not change; but change a man’s mind and
witness his vision, hearing, and touch acquire unsuspected new meanings.
Geometric thought is no exception to this rule. Shape and extension are
not properties we abstract any more from the sight of objects than from the
sounds they make or the way they feel. As one can infer from the above
account, the nature of the mind’s means of contact with the outer world is
to a large extent irrelevant to the formation of geometric conceptions—the
task of creating these rests essentially upon the brain.
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It is sometimes told that a fisherman whose fishing net is loosely knit
will only catch big fish. But while we intellectually understand the meaning
of this statement, we fail to feel its meaning in our bones. After all, we
can imagine a more tightly knit net that would catch the smaller fish in
the ocean; we can easily see on the other side of this artificially imposed
limitation; we can easily see how mistaken it is to infer an ocean populated
exclusively by big fish from the character of the net—and so the moral
eludes us. The extent to which it eludes us is directly proportional to the
difficulty we experience in trying to come to terms with a statement of the
type, “Snowflakes are not inherently hexagonal,” because snowflakes look
invariably hexagonal to us, and we find it hard—and pointless—to conceive
of them otherwise. This is not to suggest that the hexagonality of snowflakes
is an illusion, but that it is one possible true description of them, just like
bigness is one true description of fish in the ocean—the net does not lie,
only possibly misleads.
When the geometric worldview, instead of stemming from an outside
filter such as a fishing net, stems from the innermost recesses of our own
selves, it is little wonder that it will go unrecognized as the conceptual tool it
is, and be instead conflated with God, nature, and reality themselves. What
is more, it will continue to pass unrecognized as a non-essential tool even
after we have caught a glimpse of its possible shortcomings. Foss (2000)
makes a striking case of this situation in his book on consciousness. After
insightfully recognizing the exclusively geometric mode of working of science,
he goes on to note that qualia (i.e. the quality of conscious experience)
have escaped scientific understanding because science deals with the world
only geometrically. But such is the grip of the geometric worldview, and
such is the strength of the taboo on any thought that would cast doubt
upon it, that Foss’s valuable realization soon regresses and becomes a victim
of itself. Instead of concluding that scientific descriptions need not then
always be geometric, he writes: “The crucial insight is that even though
science must model things geometrically, this does not entail that it can
only model geometric things, geometric properties, or geometric aspects of
reality” (p. 70). (We return to Foss’s ideas later on in Chapter 12.)
But whence must science picture things geometrically, beyond the con-
tingency that it presently happens to do so? Is it not more natural to
conclude that some things (e.g. qualia)—which are neither geometric nor
non-geometric in themselves—defy geometric representation simply because
their physical nature is such that it does not allow for its casting into geomet-
ric moulds? It is gripped by an indelible geometric imperative as they probe
the physical world that, no matter how speculative and non-conservative
today’s scientists might be, they continue to pound away with the only
artillery they can conceive—geometry, more geometries, new geometries.
Returning once again to quantum gravity, we ask: would it be fair to
say that, after three-quarters of a century of disorientation and frustra-
tion in quantum gravity, the disclosure of a deeper layer of the nature of
things through new geometries has reached a dead-end? That, after nearly
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a century of philosophical puzzles concerning the ontology of state vectors
and spacetime points, more and new geometric deliberations on quantum
and spacetime ontology can take us no further? That with more and ever-
renewed geometric modes of thought we can only continue to imprison our-
selves in a labyrinth of our own making?
In the rest of this chapter, we expound some of the consequences for
theoretical physics of belief in the geometric anthropic principle.
7.2 Ontological difficulties: State vectors and
spacetime constituents
Attitudes towards the state vector and its collapse are as varied as human
imagination. The ontological dependence of quantum theory on states, com-
bined with the human yearning to gain insight exclusively through geometric
visualization, has led to a frantic search for the physical meaning of the ar-
row state vector. Isham (1995, p. 83) submits some of the many possibilities:
does the state vector refer to an individual system, a collection of identi-
cal systems, our knowledge of the system(s), the result of a measurement
on a system, the results of repeated measurements on a collection of them,
the definiteness with which a system possesses a value, etc.? Further, to
make sense of the collapse of the geometric state vector, potentially physi-
cal mechanisms have been proposed, such as gravity or consciousness, that
might cause it; others have in denial engineered a metaphysical escape to a
myriad of parallel universes; etc.
Not only does one universe suffice to give answers to the ontological ques-
tions of quantum theory but, we submit, not even physical influences beyond
quantum mechanics need be invoked for the task, so long as we are willing
to reexamine the geometric foundations of the portrayal of phenomena and,
in line with a long physical tradition, are ready to start the development
of theoretical concepts from physical things we are familiar with (obser-
vations, experiments) instead of, as is today more common, mathematical
contrivances without physical referents.
Attitudes towards the ontology of empty spacetime are in no short sup-
ply either. These arise primarily as a sequel of Einstein’s hole argument,
which, looking at what is left beyond the metric structure of spacetime (i.e.
its quantitatively geometric scaffold) concluded that what remains, space-
time points (i.e. its qualitatively geometric constituents), have no physical
meaning. As a fallout of this argument, professional philosophers and philo-
sophically minded physicists continue to devise, as far as logic will allow,
ingenious stratagems to furnish the geometric objectification of spacetime
with new meanings (substantivalism); or then to reassure us that Einstein
was correct in the first place, that spacetime points have in effect no physical
meaning, and that relations between particles and fields in spacetime is all
there is to it (relationalism).4 But is a solution to be sought by means of
4For a review, see e.g. (Earman, 1989, esp. pp. 175–208).
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an increase in our knowledge within the very geometric tradition that gave
rise to the problem? If these philosophical battles have no end in sight, it
is because, in all probability, the concepts used to seek solutions lie at the
root of the difficulties.
Addressing the problem of spacetime ontology from a different perspec-
tive—yet with equally doubtful physical relevance—we find quantum-gravity
endeavours. Here, due to conceptual discontent with the general-relativistic
spacetime picture, complicated geometric edifices representing new space-
time structures are industriously built in an almost exclusively mathemat-
ical spirit; only subsequently is physical meaning sought for these psycho-
logically compelling geometric creations, but with starting points based on
observationally disembodied concepts, physical meaning is later hard to find
regardless of how “beautiful” or “self-consistent” these geometric creations
may be. As we said in Section 2.2, not even the quantization of general
relativity, when mathematically viable, is a reliable starting point, so long
as the consequences of quantization fail to be attested in the physical world.
7.3 Psychological difficulties: Time and space
Besides finding inspiration in the physical world rather than in purely math-
ematical realms, quantum gravity may also benefit from reconsidering the
possibilities contained in the elemental question that drives it, “What are
space and time?” This question is always tacitly assumed to be synonymous
with “What is the geometry of space and time?” but this reading only cir-
cumscribes research to a narrow context. Is it thoroughly unthinkable that
there may be more aspects to the physical world than those that can be
captured in geometric language? We see in this light that “What are space
and time?” is neither, as we know, a simple question to answer but not even,
as Smolin (2001) suggests, “the simplest question to ask” (p. 1). Research
still uniquely focuses on the geometry of space and time, while remaining
oblivious to any alternatives.
As for the geometric answers offered, it is noteworthy that the treat-
ments given to space and time are in general disunited, and that, more-
over, neither treatment is as radically new, unconventional, or different as
the characterizations made by quantum-gravity researchers would have one
believe. Although quantum gravity endeavours for an elucidation of the
quantum-mechanical structure of space and time, the classical concept of
time as an external one-parameter is so deep-rooted in physics, and so much
more so than the classical concept of space as a three-dimensional continuum
of points, that it is common for quantum-gravity ventures to invent notions
of discrete or quantized space that are non-classical to varying degrees but,
when it comes to “dynamics,” some form of external time marking para-
metric evolution is surreptitiously added to the picture. The psychological
difficulty to think of space other than geometrically (as a metric network of
points), and of time in ways other than geometrically (as a parametric line)
and classically (as an external parameter) reveals itself, in different ways, in
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all geometric roads to quantum gravity.
In string theory and most pregeometries, space is depicted less classi-
cally than time, yet classically enough. Whether described as a wrapped-up
multidimensional metric manifold, or as a graph, a network, a lattice, or a
causal set, the difference with the classical notion of space is only one of
adding dimensions, changing the topology and metric, or making a contin-
uum discrete in literal-minded ways. As for time, dynamic evolution either
still takes place along a continuous parameter or, when any new treatment is
given to time at all, this is at the outside postulated to be discrete (in steps
of Planck’s time, naturally), but still an external parameter nonetheless.
The discretization of both space and time normally comes from forcing the
classical notions to comply with common preconceptions in simple-minded
manners, rather than as the result of a process (e.g. quantization) or, better
still, some observationally inspired idea that would naturally lead to it.
In loop quantum gravity, on the other hand, space is represented by a
quantum-mechanical state |s〉, called a spin network, which is not put in by
hand but arises from a quantization of general relativity.5 In this sense and
unlike in the instances mentioned above, space as per loop quantum gravity
may be called a genuinely non-classical space.6 It is here, then, that the
contrast with the treatment of time stands out in sharpest relief. Although
Rovelli (2004) insists on presenting a “timeless” loop quantum gravity, this
is far from true. In his book Quantum gravity, a magnum opus born ahead
of time, loop quantum gravity7 is presented in terms of a mathematical,
unobservable parameter τ which acts to order spin networks and along which
these states of space evolve dynamically.8 One may call parameter τ time, or
one may call it what one will; Rovelli, determined to do without time come
what may, calls it “an artifact of this technique” (p. 112) referring to the
Hamiltonian formalism. Time as an unobservable parameter also appears—
now without any proviso—as a coordinate variable t when dynamic evolution
is represented by means of the spin-foam (i.e. sum-over-histories) formalism;
spin networks are said to be embedded in a four-dimensional spacetime and
to move “upward along a ‘time’ coordinate” (p. 325). Finally, time also
appears as a partial observable q (also t); of all of the above, this is the
only type of time parameter that can be measured directly by macroscopic
systems called clocks but, being external, it is useless as an intrinsic measure
of time for any “quantum-gravitational system” purportedly at the Planck
scale. (In the macroscopic theory of relativity, clock measurements do play
5The question remains, however, to what degree the state vector itself is “put in by
hand” (or better: by mind) in a quantum theory. We give an answer in Chapter 12.
6Examples of less literal-minded pregeometries in this sense are provided by Dadic´ and
Pisk (1979) and Antonsen (1992), who view graphs themselves as quantum states |G〉; and
by Jaroszkiewicz (2001), who considers a topological network whose elements are quantum
states |ψ〉 and test operators Σˆ.
7Presumably the quantum theory of gravity? So much for the three roads to quantum
gravity—or even two! (Cf. Rovelli’s quotation on page 73.)
8Most notably, the probability amplitudeW (s|s′) of a transition from |s′〉 to |s〉 is given
in terms of τ as 〈s| R exp(iτH)dτ |s′〉, with suitable integration limits in τ , and where H
is the Hamiltonian.
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an essential physical role, as we see in Chapter 10.)
Despite the psychological difficulties involved in dealing with the con-
cept of time other than classically, it is common for researchers to ignore
the matter (whether purposefully or unwittingly), presenting their theories
as if in them space and time were on equally non-classical footings. Witness
the following comments going back and forth without ryhme or reason be-
tween “space” and “space and time,” or “space” and “spacetime”: Smolin
(2001) writes, “Is there an atomic structure to the geometry of space and
time. . . ? [. . . ] Both loop quantum gravity and string theory assert that
there is an atomic structure to space” (pp. 102–103, italics added; see also
p. 170); in the same vein, Rovelli (1998) says, “A knot state is an elemen-
tary quantum of space. In this manner, loop quantum gravity ties the new
notion of space and time introduced by general relativity with quantum me-
chanics” (p. 19, italics added); last but not least, Weinberg (1999) writes,
“The nature of space and time must be dealt with in a unified theory. At the
shortest distance scales, space may be replaced by a continually reconnecting
structure of strings and membranes—or by something stranger still” (p. 36,
italics added). And time? Is time, in the end, just a classical parameter
even in concept-sweeping quantum gravity? Or is there any non-classical,
non-geometric concept of time intrinsic to quantum-mechanical systems?
A step away from this conceptual confinement was taken by Jaroszkiewicz
(2001). He pictured the passage of time in a non-parameter and intrinsically
quantum-mechanical way, as quantum ticks determined by the irreversible
acquisition of information at every quantum-mechanical measurement. Al-
though attractive, this idea is potentially treacherous as long as it is con-
nected with the geometric formulation of quantum theory. For if a quantum
tick corresponds to the collapse of the state vector, one could—enslaved
to geometric thinking and parameter time—immediately ask: how, where,
and when does |ψ(t)〉 collapse when a measurement occurs? Ultimately, the
idea of a quantum tick and the geometric state-vector formalism are mutu-
ally uncongenial. In Chapter 12, we leave geometry behind in order to find
a non-parameter concept of time that is intrinsic to quantum-mechanical
systems and from which the origin of time t can be understood.
To pose the question, “What are space and time?” and, withheld by the
shackles of the geometric anthropic principle, attempt a thousand and one
geometric answers to it reminds one of the irony in Shakespeare’s Hamlet
words: we could be bounded in a theoretical nutshell and count ourselves
kings of an infinite space of theoretical possibilities.
7.4 Experimental difficulties: The Planck scale
Another instance of the grip of geometric thought on quantum-gravity the-
orizing is revealed by the notorious issue of the Planck scale. As many and
varied as the geometric approaches to quantum gravity may be, a detached
observer is greatly surprised to find that all theoretical pictures nevertheless
agree on a seemingly elemental point: the relevance of the Planck scale.
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The observer’s surprise mounts as he hears of the pettiness of this scale, and
wonders why all these endeavours into the unknown should impose such
stringent limits on their area of relevance, awkwardly cornering their exper-
imental hopes to the probing of the secluded, far-off depths of space and
time (and heights of energy). Does this agreement stem from a shred of de-
pendable shared knowledge obtained via observation of the physical systems
of interest? Or does it rather stem—in the absence of any guiding observa-
tions or even positive identification of the physical system under study—from
shared ignorance combined with the desire to yet make a statement? As we
learnt in Chapter 2, the relevance of the Planck scale to quantum gravity is
not justified by the use of dimensional, quantization, and ad hoc analyses:
their application is meaningful only after the system studied is well known,
but rather hopeless in the absence of previous knowledge of these systems.
In view of its shaky foundations, why is yet so much thrust put into
the essentialness of this scale? A deeper answer may be here considered by
taking into account the psychological make-up of the human researcher. The
human mind, as it seeks to reach out beyond the limits of knowledge, craves
nonetheless the familiarity of mechanical concepts and intuition, the ease
of geometric tools, and the comfort and safety of geometric containment.
In this particular instance, this led to its trapping itself in the marginality
of a 10−105-cubic-metre cage—and intellectual sanctuary, as it were—from
which it is unwilling to peek out, much less escape. In this light, the Planck
scale stands today as the leitmotiv of human beings’ psychological needs as
they attempt new physics. It is the scale that came most handy to do a job
already in dire need of being filled—if the gravitational constant G, Planck’s
constant h, and the speed of light c had not combined to produce it, another
scale would have been ordained to take the vacant role.
But, alas! So long as we continue to be ushered to “get in lane now”
by following either one of the “two obvious routes to quantum gravity”
(Chalmers, 2003) hand in hand with the Planck scale and its presumed phe-
nomenology, and so long as we rejoice in not being “lost in a multitude of
alternative theories” because we have “two well developed, tentative theo-
ries of quantum gravity” (Rovelli, 2003, p. 37); in other words, so long as
reiteration and endorsement of conventional ideas by large communities con-
tinues to be taken as a certificate of innovativeness and worthiness, and so
long as self-assured exposition of physically uncertain ideas continues to be
mistaken for relevance and correctness, we shall remain far from the genuine
revolution in physical thought whose absolute necessity is yet the inclination
of main-road Planck-scale-bound researchers to insistently proclaim.
But while the value of this attitude to physics is doubtful, its extra-
physical values are clearer, for, as Hardin (1993) has pointedly put it, “In
the learned world, as in others, repetition and self-advertizement contribute
mightily to the amassing of a reputation” (p. 223). After all, as another
critic of science said, “in science,. . . despite appearances, a discovery needs
credentials louder than its own merit” (Lem, 1984a, p. 50).
Chapter 8
Beyond geometry
Describing the physical laws without reference to geometry
is similar to describing our thought without words.
Albert Einstein, “How I created the theory of relativity”
Throughout the preceding chapters, we witnessed how essential and ubiq-
uitous geometry is in human theorizing. This notwithstanding, it is even
this cherished realm that, as early as over a century ago, some proposed
may need to be transcended in the search for new physics—whether it be
a better theory of spacetime structure or, more generally, the uncovering of
a deeper layer of the nature of things. To this rare attempt to go beyond
geometry, stated in each case with varying degrees of explicitness, belong
the views espoused by Clifford in 1875, by Eddington in 1920, by Wheeler
in the decades between 1960 and 1980, and by Einstein in the latter part of
his life.
Of these four scholars, only Wheeler makes an explicit case for the su-
perseding of geometry in physics with his well-known proposals for a pre-
geometry. Clifford and Eddington, on the other hand, do not make a very
explicit case for transcending geometric thought, although one can see the
seeds of this idea in their works, too. Einstein, for his part, does not take
issue with geometry in particular, but worries in general about the nefarious
effects of being unconsciously ruled by our well-established conceptual tools
of thought, whatever these may be.
Einstein’s reflections bring up the question of the influence of language
on thought, a notorious issue that has been most famously dealt with by
linguist Benjamin L. Whorf. His views, when conservatively interpreted in
the light of the unchallenged reign of geometry in physics, provide a new
angle to understand the orthodox behaviour of physicists currently engaged
in the creation of new physics and, in particular, to uncover another reason
behind the failure of pregeometry to follow the directions marked out by its
own road map.
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8.1 Clifford’s elements of feeling
Views that seem to advocate the provisional character of geometric expla-
nations in physical theories date at least as far back as 1875. For then, not
only did Clifford express his better-known belief that matter and its mo-
tion are in fact nothing but the curvature of space—and thus reducible to
geometry—but also lesser-known ideas about matter and its motion—and
so perhaps, indirectly, geometry—being, in turn, only a partial aspect of
“the complex thing we call feeling.”
Within the context of a general investigation in terms of vortex-atoms,
the mechanical ether, and other speculative ideas of the day—ideas which
the modern physicist feels arcane but which, at the same time, give rise in
him to the ominous thought whether this is the way most of today’s spec-
ulation will look a century from now—we rescue an idea that we still find
meaningful today. Clifford (1886b, pp. 172–173) asked about the existence
of something that is not part of the “material or phenomenal world” such as
matter and its motion, but that is its “non-phenomenal counterpart,” some-
thing to which one can ascribe existence independently of our perceptions.
Clifford wrote:
The answer to this question is to be found in the theory of sen-
sation; which tells us not merely that there is a non-phenomenal
counterpart of the material or phenomenal world, but also in
some measure what it is made of. Namely, the reality corre-
sponding to our perception of the motion of matter is an element
of the complex thing we call feeling. What we might perceive as
a plexus of nerve-disturbances is really in itself a feeling; and the
succession of feelings which constitutes a man’s consciousness is
the reality which produces in our minds the perception of the
motions of his brain. These elements of feeling have relations
of nextness or contiguity in space, which are exemplified by the
sight-perceptions of contiguous points; and relations of succes-
sion in time which are exemplified by all perceptions. Out of
these two relations the future theorist has to build up the world
as best he may. (Clifford, 1886b, p. 173)
In an essay published three years later, Clifford (1886a) spells out the mean-
ing he attributes to the phrase “elementary feeling” and the logical inference
leading him to see them as the primordial constituents of the world. He ar-
gues that as the complex feelings that constitute our consciousness always
occur in parallel with material nerve-disturbances in the brain, and because
the evolution of life forms a continuum from inorganic matter to the high-
est life forms, a non-arbitrary line cannot be drawn only past which one is
justified in inferring the existence of conscious feelings in other organisms—
i.e. ejects, facts ejected from one’s consciousness and attributed to others.
Clifford concludes that “every motion of matter is simultaneous with some
ejective fact or event which might be part of a consciousness” (p. 284), but
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that in its most elementary form is not and does not need a conscious-
ness to support it. He arrives thus at the idea of an elementary feeling as
something non-phenomenal, something “whose existence is not relative to
anything else” (p. 284).
Clifford pursued after this fashion the conviction that matter and motion
do not lie at the bottom of things, but that, on the contrary, they are
themselves an aspect of different entities—elementary feelings—and their
mutual relations, contiguity and succession, of which the contiguity and
succession of matter are an image. If one so chooses, both the said basic
constituents and their two relations may be understood to be geometry-
unrelated, as neither form nor size is attributed to the former or to the
latter. In fact, this we shall do when, in Chapter 12, we take Clifford’s
dictum in the last sentence quoted above in earnest, and try “to build the
quantum-mechanical world as best we may” out of metageometric physical
things, bearing a resemblance to conscious feelings, and the two relations of
nextness and succession reinterpreted in a strictly metageometric sense; in
particular, without any reference to space or time. It is in these elements
of feeling, then, in these things beyond matter and possibly geometry, that
Clifford believed one can catch a glimpse of a deeper layer of the constitution
of the world.
When in addition we consider Clifford’s (1886b) further words indicating
a possible way to apply the idea of “contiguity of feelings in space,” namely,
“There are lines of mathematical thought which indicate that distance or
quantity may come to be expressed in terms of position in the wide sense of
analysis situ” (p. 173), the allusion to dispensing with typically geometric
concepts such as distance becomes clearer still. One may then say that in
Clifford we find the (perhaps unwitting) germ of the idea to move away from
geometric concepts in physics—indeed, a sort of forefather of the later idea
of pregeometry.
8.2 Eddington’s nature of things
Forty-five years later, Eddington (1920, pp. 180–201) expressed views in a
similar spirit as above regarding what he called the nature of things, while,
at the same time, more explicitly casting doubt on the extent of the powers
of geometric theorizing. In analysing general relativity, he identified the
point-events as its basic elements, and the interval as an elementary relation
between them. As to the nature of the latter, Eddington wrote:
Its [the interval’s] geometrical properties. . . can only represent
one aspect of the relation. It may have other aspects associated
with features of the world outside the scope of physics. But in
physics we are concerned not with the nature of the relation but
with the number assigned to express its intensity; and this sug-
gests a graphical representation, leading to a geometrical theory
of the world of physics. (Eddington, 1920, p. 187)
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Along these lines (in agreement with the idea that size induces shape), he
suggested that the individual intervals between point-events probably escape
today’s scales and clocks, these being too rudimentary to capture them. As
a consequence, in general relativity one only deals with macroscopic values
composed of many individual intervals. “Perhaps,” Eddington ventured
further in an allusion to transcending geometric magnitudes,
even the primitive interval is not quantitative, but simply 1 for
certain pairs of point-events and 0 for others. The formula given
[ds2 = gµνdx
µdxν ] is just an average summary which suffices for
our coarse methods of investigation, and holds true only statis-
tically. (Eddington, 1920, p. 188)
One should not be confused by the association of the numbers 1 and 0 to
the primitive intervals and think that such numbers represent their lengths.
In the passage, the non-quantitativeness of the primitive intervals is clearly
stated. What the 1 and 0 represent is merely whether the intervals exist or
not, any other designation being equally satisfactory for the purpose. Ed-
dington’s insight into the need to transcend geometric notions is reinforced
by his further remarks: “[W]e can scarcely hope to build up a theory of the
nature of things if we take a scale and a clock as the simplest unanalysable
concepts” (p. 191). It is nothing short of remarkable to find expressed such
views, on the one hand, inspired in the general theory of relativity while, on
the other, in a sense contrary to its spirit, only five years after the publi-
cation of the latter. Eddington’s avowal, however, only seems to be for the
overthrow of geometric magnitudes but not of geometric objects, since he
does not seem to find fault with the concepts of point-events and intervals
as lines.
Eddington also stressed the role of the human mind in the construction
of physical theories. He argued that, out of the above primitive intervals
(taken as elements of reality and not of a theory of it) between point-events,
a vast number of more complicated qualities can arise; as a matter of fact,
however, only certain qualities of all the possible ones do arise. Which
qualities are to become apparent (in one’s theories) and which not depends,
according to Eddington, on which aspects of these elementary constituents
of the world (and not of a theory of it) the mind singles out for recognition.
“Mind filters out matter from the meaningless jumble of qualities,” he said,
as the prism filters out the colours of the rainbow from the
chaotic pulsations of white light. Mind exalts the permanent
and ignores the transitory. . . Is it too much to say that mind’s
search for permanence has created the world of physics? So that
the world we perceive around us could scarcely have been other
than it is? (Eddington, 1920, p. 198)1
1Eddington talks about the mind creating the world of physics, but one finds such a
thing a daring exploit, for how could the mind create the physical world? Or to put it in
the words of Devitt and Sterelny (1987), “how could we, literally, have made the stars?”
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In these words, we find the echo of a provoking statement we made earlier
on, namely, that “snowflakes are not inherently hexagonal,” but that it is
our minds which, to use now Eddington’s phrasing, filter out their geometry
from what are to us a remaining jumble of indiscernible qualities. Mind
exalts geometry and ignores the non-geometric—so much so that no word is
apt to describe that which is ignored other than by clumsy negation. Mind
exalts and filters out geometry because it is what it knows how to do, just
as a prism naturally decomposes white light according to the frequency of
its component parts. White light, however, may by the use of other suitable
instruments be understood not in terms of component frequencies, but in
terms of its intensity or its polarization. Since we only have one kind of
intellect at our disposal, in order to find out what may be the possible
counterparts of intensity and polarization in this comparison, we must learn
to apply the mind to the physical world in new ways.
As for the way things stand today, paraphrasing Eddington’s last-quoted
question, we ask: is it too much to say that mind’s geometric instinct has
created all the current theories of the physical world? So that our theories
of the world could scarcely have been other than they are?
8.3 Wheeler’s pregeometry
Wheeler (1964, 1980), Misner et al. (1973), and Patton and Wheeler (1975)
expressed pioneering ideas on what they called pregeometry already four
decades ago. Since we understand Wheeler to be by far the main contrib-
utor to this idea, the kind of pregeometry analysed in this section is called
Wheeler’s pregeometry. In order to avoid confusion, we remark yet again—in
addition to the early comments of Chapter 6—that Wheeler’s pregeometry
is not really what later on came to be known by the same name, i.e. pre-
continuum physics, but the more radical stance of going beyond geometry
in a proper sense.
His basic demand amounts to the rejection of geometric concepts in
order to explain geometric structure. Indeed, Wheeler (1980) advocated
“a concept of pregeometry that breaks loose at the start from all mention
of geometry and distance,” he was wary of schemes in which “too much
geometric structure is presupposed to lead to a believable theory of geometric
structure,” and he clearly recognized that “to admit distance at all is to
give up on the search for pregeometry” (pp. 3–4). This means that one
surprisingly finds the very inventor of pregeometry generally invalidating all
the schemes analysed in Chapter 6, as far as they are to be an expression of
his original pregeometry.
What are the grounds for these strong pronouncements of Wheeler’s?
Firstly, he envisaged,2 among other things, spacetime collapse in the form of
the presumed big bang and big crunch, black holes, and a supposed foam-like
(p. 200). Rather, what the mind creates is theories of the world and into these inventions
it puts, naturally, all its partialities and prejudices.
2See (Patton & Wheeler, 1975, p. 547) and (Misner et al., 1973, p. 1201).
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structure of spacetime on small scales, as indicators that spacetime cannot
be a continuous manifold, since it has the ability to become singular. Feeling
for these reasons that the spacetime continuum needed rethinking, he posed
the question:
If the elastic medium is built out of electrons and nuclei and
nothing more, if cloth is built out of thread and nothing more,
we are led to ask out of what “pregeometry” the geometry of
space and spacetime are built. (Wheeler, 1980, p. 1)
A reading of Wheeler suggests that the reason why he seeks a “pregeometric
building material” (Misner et al., 1973, p. 1203) in order to account for
the spacetime continuum instead of simply a “discrete building material” is
that he believes that genuine explanations about the nature of something
do not come about by explicating a concept in terms of similar ones, but
by reducing it to a different, more basic kind of object. This is evidenced
in the passage: “And must not this something, this ‘pregeometry,’ be as
far removed from geometry as the quantum mechanics of electrons is far
removed from elasticity?” (p. 1207).
What were Wheeler’s proposals to implement this programme to go be-
yond geometry? His attempts include pregeometry as binary-choice logic,
pregeometry as a self-referential universe, and pregeometry as a Borel set or
bucket of dust.3
An early attempt at pregeometry based on binary choice was Wheeler’s
“sewing machine,” into which rings or loops of space were fed and connected
or left unconnected by the machine according to encoded binary information
(yes or no) for each possible pair of rings (pp. 1209–1210). Wheeler consid-
ered the coded instructions to be given from without either deterministically
or probabilistically, and then asked whether fabrics of different dimension-
ality would arise, and whether there would be a higher weight for any one
dimensionality to appear. As a design for pregeometry, this idea succeeds
in staying clear of geometric magnitudes but fails, at least superficially, to
avoid geometric objects: Wheeler’s loops of space have no size and yet are
rings. We say this failure is superficial because these rings or loops, so long
as they have no size, could as well be called abstract elements. If nothing
else, the mention of rings is witness to the fact that geometric modes of
thought are always lurking in the background.
A subsequent idea still based on binary-choice logic was pregeometry
as the calculus of propositions (pp. 1209, 1211–1212). This conception was
much less picturesque and rather more abstract. Wheeler exploited the
isomorphism between the truth-values of a proposition and the state of a
switching circuit to toy with the idea that “ ‘physics’ automatically emerges
from the statistics of very long propositions, and very many propositions”
(Patton & Wheeler, 1975, p. 598) in thermodynamic analogy. In that ref-
erence and in (Wheeler, 1980), however, the expectation that pure math-
3See (Demaret, Heller, & Lambert, 1997, pp. 157–161) for an independent review of
Wheeler’s pregeometry.
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ematical logic alone could have anything whatsoever to do with providing
a foundation for physics was sensibly acknowledged as misguided. In this
case, perhaps due to its abstractness and total divorcement with physics,
this conception of pregeometry is truly free of all geometry in a strict sense.
For all this scheme was worth, it is at least rewarding to find it has this
feature, instead of quickly proceeding to negate its intended pregeometric
nature.
Later on, inspired in self-referential propositions, Wheeler conceived of
the idea of pregeometry as a self-referential universe. As with the previous
approaches, Wheeler (1980) admitted to having no more than a vision of how
this understanding of geometry in terms of (his) pregeometry might come
about. Two basic ingredients in this vision appear to be (i) events consisting
of a primitive form of quantum principle: investigate nature and create
reality in so doing (see below) and, more intelligibly, (ii) stochastic processes
among these events producing form and dependability out of randomness.
His vision reads thus:
(1) Law without law with no before before the big bang and no
after after collapse. The universe and the laws that guide it could
not have existed from everlasting to everlasting. Law must have
come into being. . . Moreover, there could have been no message
engraved in advance on a tablet of stone to tell them how to
come into being. They had to come into being in a higgledy-
piggledy way, as the order of genera and species came into being
by the blind accidents of billions upon billions of mutations, and
as the second law of thermodynamics with all its dependability
and precision comes into being out of the blind accidents of mo-
tion of molecules who would have laughed at the second law if
they had ever heard of it. (2) Individual events. Events beyond
law. Events so numerous and so uncoordinated that flaunting
their freedom from formula, they yet fabricate firm form. (3)
These events, not of some new kind, but the elementary act of
question to nature and a probability guided answer given by na-
ture, the familiar everyday elementary quantum act of observer-
participancy. (4) Billions upon billions of such acts giving rise,
via an overpowering statistics, to the regularities of physical law
and to the appearance of continuous spacetime. (Wheeler, 1980,
pp. 5–6)
Earlier, Patton and Wheeler (1975, pp. 556–562) had elaborated further on
this. They considered two alternatives to the problem of spacetime collapse,
namely: (a) taking into account quantum mechanics, the event of universal
collapse can be viewed as a “probabilistic scattering in superspace.” In this
way, the universe is reprocessed at each cycle, but the spacetime manifold
retains its fundamental mode of description in physics. This alternative was
not favoured by these authors, but instead (b) considering as an overarching
guiding principle that the universe must have a way to come into being
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(cosmogony), they suggested that such a requirement can be fulfilled by
a “quantum principle” of “observer-participator.”4 According to it, the
universe goes through one cycle only, but only if in it a “communicating
community” arises that can give meaning to it. This universe is thus self-
referential, which was the standpoint favoured by these authors.5 As far as
pregeometric ideas are concerned, this vision of a self-referential cosmology
succeeds in eschewing all kinds of geometric concepts again due to its being
conceived in such broad and general terms. Regardless of its worth and
in the general context of paradoxical geometric pregeometry, let this be a
welcome feature of Wheeler’s effort.
Regardless of Wheeler’s actual implementations of his pregeometry and
any criticisms thereof, the imperative demand that the foundations of such
a theory should be completely free of geometric concepts remains unaltered.
The fact that so many (including, to the smallest extent, Wheeler himself)
have misconstrued his idea of a programme for pregeometry is a tell-tale
sign of something beyond simple carelessness in the reading of his views.
Indeed, the large-scale misinterpretation witnessed in Chapter 6 may just as
well stem from the lack of all background for thought that one encounters
as soon as one attempts to dispense with geometry. Physics knows of no
other mode of working than geometry, and thus physicists reinterpreted
Wheeler’s new idea in the only way that made sense to them—setting out
to find geometry in pregeometry.
8.3.1 More buckets of dust
As two final claimants to pregeometry, we turn to the works of Nagels and of
Stuckey and Silberstein in the light of their close connection with another,
partly new approach to pregeometry by Wheeler. In the works of these
authors, two independent attempts are made to build again “space as a
bucket of dust” after Wheeler’s (1964, pp. 495–499) earlier effort. This ear-
lier effort, clearly connected with the above-mentioned “sewing machine” in
character and purpose, consisted in starting with a Borel set of points with-
out any mutual relations whatsoever and assembling them into structures of
different dimensionality on the basis of different quantum-mechanical prob-
ability amplitudes attributed to the relations of nearest neighbour between
the points. Wheeler dismissed his own trial because, among other reasons,
the same quantum-mechanical principles used to define adjacency rendered
the idea untenable, since points that had once been neighbours would re-
main correlated after departing from each other (p. 498). We observe once
more that this idea, in its use of the concept of points (cf. earlier rings), is
not free from geometric objects, but that this flaw is minimized by Wheeler’s
4This principle is tantamount to the first ingredient (i) above, and perhaps helps to
clarify it.
5This latter proposal seems to confuse nature with our theories of it. It is indeed correct
to say that only a communicating community of beings can give meaning to the displays
of nature, but it is rather something else to contend that a communicating community
creates the world in so doing; once again: “how could we, literally, have made the stars?”
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Author Basic objects Basic relations
Clifford feelings nextness, succession
Eddington points, intervals statistical interaction
Wheeler
Sewing machine rings nextness (bin. choice)
Borel set points nextness (prob. amp.)
Calculus of propositions propositions statistical interaction
Self-referential universe act of observation idem
Table 8.1: Summary of the use of basic objects and relations in the non-geometric
or partly non-geometric approaches analysed. Geometric concepts appear in italics.
Abbreviations: Binary (bin.), probability amplitude (prob. amp.).
avoidance of the introduction of any quantitative geometry. As for the men-
tioned quantum amplitudes, these need not have geometric meaning as long
as they do not arise from an inner product of state vectors. In Table 8.1, we
summarize the use of basic objects and relations in the non-geometric and
partly non-geometric approaches we have discussed.
Nagels’ (1985) attempt started off with a scheme similar to Wheeler’s,
where “the only structure imposed on individual points is a uniform proba-
bility of adjacency between two arbitrarily chosen points” (p. 545). He only
assumed that these probabilities are very small and that the total number of
points is very large (and possibly infinite). He thus believed his proposal to
satisfy the always desired requirement of “a bare minimum of assumptions”
and very natural ones at that. However, much too soon he fell prey to quan-
titative geometry. Given this is a pregeometric framework directly inspired
in Wheeler, it is startling to come across the following early remarks:
Without a background geometry, the simplest way to introduce
distance is to specify whether or not two given points are “adja-
cent.” [. . . ] We may then say that two “adjacent” points are a
distance of 1 unit of length apart. (Nagels, 1985, p. 546, italics
added)
For his part, Stuckey introduced in his attempt
a pregeometry that provides a metric and dimensionality over a
Borel set (Wheeler’s “bucket of dust”) without assuming prob-
ability amplitudes for adjacency. Rather, a non-trivial metric
is produced over a Borel set X per a uniformity base generated
via the discrete topological group structures over X. (Stuckey,
2001, p. 1, italics added)
Thus, both authors managed to create pregeometric metrics, i.e. metrics
that will give a notion of distance for pregeometry and by means of which
they hoped to obtain the usual spacetime metric. This assertion is sup-
ported by Stuckey and Silberstein’s (2000) words: “our pregeometric notion
of distance” (p. 9) and “the process by which this metric yields a spacetime
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metric with Lorentz signature must be obtained” (p. 13). Stuckey (2001)
moreover asserted that the pregeometries of Nagels, Antonsen, and Requardt
have, arguably, overcome the difficulties represented by the presupposition
of “too much geometric structure” as previously brought up by Wheeler,
since their assumptions are minimal and “the notion of length per graph
theory is virtually innate” (p. 2). Arguably, indeed, because the assump-
tion of length is totally contrary to the spirit of pregeometry according to
its very inventor, and its introduction acts to geometrically objectify what
could have otherwise been pregeometric schemes.
Alas, what has become of Wheeler’s reasonable dictum: “to admit dis-
tance at all is to give up on the search for pregeometry,” or his demands for
“break[ing] loose at the start from all mention of geometry and distance,”
and for pregeometry to be “as far removed from geometry as the quantum
mechanics of electrons is far removed from elasticity?” Or yet to quote
Wheeler in two other early illuminating passages:
One might also wish to accept to begin with the idea of a dis-
tance, or edge length, associated with a pair of these points, even
though this idea is already a very great leap, and one that one
can conceive of later supplying with a natural foundation of its
own.
[. . . ] [T]he use of the concept of distance between pairs of points
seems unreasonable. . . [L]ength is anyway not a natural idea with
which to start. The subject of analysis here is “pregeometry,” so
the concept of length should be derived, not assumed ab initio.
(Wheeler, 1964, pp. 497, 499)
Has all this simply gone into oblivion?
The question, indeed, remains—why the need of a metric for pregeom-
etry? Should not pregeometry produce the traditional spacetime metric
by non-geometric means alone? Should it not go even “beyond Wheeler”
and do without any sort of geometric objects too? This state of affairs
comes to show to what extent the craving of the human mind for geometric
explanations goes; at the same time, one catches a glimpse of the psycho-
logical difficulties that might be encountered in any attempt that genuinely
attempts to go beyond such explanations, so deeply rooted in the mind.
8.4 Einstein’s conceptual tools of thought
Einstein, alongside his contributions to physics, also entertained thoughts
about the validity of the “conceptual tools of thought” we use to portray
the world. He begins the foreword to Max Jammer’s Concepts of space with
a crisp and clear reflection, which we here quote at length:
In the attempt to achieve a conceptual formulation of the con-
fusingly immense body of observational data, the scientist makes
use of a whole arsenal of concepts which he imbibed practically
84 Beyond geometry
with his mother’s milk; and seldom if ever is he aware of the
eternally problematic character of his concepts. He uses this
conceptual material, or, speaking more exactly, these concep-
tual tools of thought, as something obviously, immutably given;
something having an objective value of truth which is hardly
ever, and in any case not seriously, to be doubted. How could
he do otherwise? [. . . ] And yet in the interests of science it is
necessary over and over again to engage in the critique of these
fundamental concepts, in order that we may not unconsciously
be ruled by them. This becomes evident especially in those sit-
uations involving development of ideas in which the consistent
use of the traditional fundamental concepts leads us to paradoxes
difficult to resolve.6
We sympathize deeply with these words, which eloquently bring forth one of
the underlying themes of this work when we identify the conceptual tools of
thought referred to with our ingrained and ubiquitous geometric concepts.
Einstein indirectly questioned certain geometric concepts when, as Pais
(1982, p. 347) recounts, in the early 1940s he considered whether partial
differential equations may prove unsuitable for a more elemental description
of nature. This idea appears to have been inspired in the face of quantum
mechanics. Einstein (1935, pp. 148, 156) notes that quantum theory does
away with the possibility of describing the world fundamentally in terms
of spatiotemporal fields subject to causal laws given by differential equa-
tions, since quantum-mechanical systems are described by state functions
that are not fields in spacetime and whose behaviour is not strictly causal.
This view is relevant in this connection when we consider that transcending
the field concept together with differential equations means leaving behind
the qualitative geometry inherent in spatiotemporal points P (locality and
causality; cf. field as f(P )) and the quantitative geometry inherent in the
values (physical quantities) of the field.7 Although J. Ellis (2005), refer-
ring to Einstein’s idea, correctly asserts that “Modern theorists can hardly
be accused of excessive conservatism, but even they have not revived this
startling speculation!”(p. 56), it is even this startling notion of leaving fields
and differential equations behind that should be part of a plan to do without
geometry entirely.
Finally, in this context of reservation towards the limitations imposed
by our tools of thought, it is difficult to know how to interpret a deeper pro-
nouncement of Einstein’s (1982) (which opens this chapter) now in direct
connection with geometric concepts in general. Explaining how he had cre-
ated the theory of relativity, he said: “Describing the physical laws without
reference to geometry is similar to describing our thought without words”
(p. 47). Is Einstein here suggesting that, despite being possibly ruled by it,
doing physics without the assistance of a geometric language is as hopelessly
inviable as describing our thoughts without words, or does he mean to say
6In (Jammer, 1969, pp. xi–xii).
7See also Einstein’s quotation on page 38.
8.5 Whorf’s linguistic relativity 85
that it would be as hard, yet not necessarily fruitless, to do so? Perhaps it
is wisest not to seek too much meaning in these otherwise remarkable words
and simply take them at face value, as a correct indication of the fact that
geometry is indeed the only physical language so far available—dispensing
with it, therefore, leaves us wordless.
However, this circumstance need not be as inescapable as it seems. Ein-
stein’s comparison only holds true until the non-geometric words of a non-
geometric language are invented and become available, allowing our physical
thoughts to be expressed anew in terms of them. Further on in this the-
sis, we shall see that the task of going beyond geometry, although mentally
strenuous, is not only feasible but moreover essential to better comprehend
some aspects of the physical world.
8.5 Whorf’s linguistic relativity
Linguist Benjamin L. Whorf is best known for his now notorious principle
of linguistic relativity. A judicious interpretation of this principle provides
us with quite a straightforward framework to understand the source of Ein-
stein’s apprehensions regarding our conceptual tools of thought and our own
remarks that thought beyond geometry can be buttressed by a supporting
language: language, whether it be scientific or otherwise, is apt to greatly
influence thought both positively and negatively. Whorf wrote:
It was found that the background linguistic system. . . of each lan-
guage is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas
but rather is itself the shaper of ideas. . .We dissect nature along
lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and
types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not
find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the
contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impres-
sions which has to be organized by our minds—and this means
largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.
This fact is very significant for modern science, for it means that
no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality
but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while
he thinks himself most free. . .We are thus introduced to a new
principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led
by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe,
unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar, or can in some
way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 212–214)
One ought to be careful as to what to make of Whorf’s remarks, as their
significance could go from (i) an implication of an immutable constraint of
language upon thought with the consequent fabrication of an unavoidable
world picture to which one is led by the language used, to (ii) milder insinua-
tions about language being “only” a shaper of ideas rather than a tyrannical
master. How far is the influence of language on thought to be taken to go?
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In this, we share the views of Devitt and Sterelny’s. In their book, they
explained the circular—although not viciously so—process in which thought
and language interact; they wrote:
We feel a pressing need to understand our environment in or-
der to manipulate and control it. This drive led our early an-
cestors, in time, to express a primitive thought or two. They
grunted or gestured, meaning something by such actions. There
was speaker meaning without conventional meaning. Over time
the grunts and gestures caught on: linguistic conventions were
born. As a result of this trail blazing it is much easier for oth-
ers to have those primitive thoughts, for they can learn to have
them from the conventional ways of expressing them. Further,
they have available an easy way of representing the world, a way
based on those conventional gestures and grunts. They borrow
their capacity to think about things from those who created the
conventions. With primitive thought made easy, the drive to un-
derstand leads to more complicated thoughts, hence more com-
plicated speaker meanings, hence more complicated conventions.
(Devitt & Sterelny, 1987, p. 127)
In the first place, this means that, as one could have already guessed, thought
must precede any form of language, or else how could the latter have come
into being? Secondly, it shows that thought, as a source of linguistic conven-
tions, is not in any way restricted by language, although the characteristics
of the latter do, in fact, facilitate certain forms of thought by making them
readily available, in the sense that the thought processes of many can now
benefit from existing concepts already made by a few others. This is espe-
cially the case in science, which abounds in instances of this kind. For exam-
ple, thought about complex numbers is facilitated by the already invented
imaginary-number language convention “i =
√−1,” just like the thought
of a particle being at different places at the same time is facilitated by the
already invented state-vector-related conventions of quantum mechanics.
At the same time, an existing language can also discourage certain
thoughts by making them abstruse and recondite to express (Devitt &
Sterelny, 1987, p. 174). This does not mean that certain things cannot
be thought—they eventually can be—but only that their expression does
not come easily as it is not straightforwardly supported by the existing lan-
guage. As an example of this instance, we can mention the reverse cases of
the above examples. That is to say, the evident difficulty of conjuring up any
thoughts about complex numbers and delocalized particles before the formal
concepts above supporting these thoughts were introduced into the language
of science by some specific individuals. The fact, however, that such linguis-
tic conventions were created eventually shows that thought beyond linguistic
conventions is possible—essential, moreover, for the evolution of science.
One is thus led to the view that the picture that physics makes of nature
is not only guided by the physicist’s imagination, but also by the physi-
cist’s language—with its particular vices and virtues. This language, due
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to its constitution attained after a natural development, favours geometric
modes of thought, while it appears to dissuade any sort of non-geometric
contemplation. Pregeometric schemes have shown this fact clearly: imagi-
nation was able to produce varied creative frameworks, but they all spoke
the same geometric language despite the attempt to avoid it. Only against
this language-favoured background did physicists’ minds roam effortlessly.
The reason why humans have naturally developed primitive geometric
thoughts, leading to geometric modes of expression, in turn reinforcing more
geometric-like thinking, and so forth—in conclusion, developing a geometric
understanding—can only be guessed at. It is reasonable to suppose that
geometric insight should be connected with the natural provision of an early
evolutionary advantage, rather than with a specially designed tool to devise
physical theories. But as little as geometric insight may have been designed
for high forms of abstract conceptualization, it is the only insight we can
effortlessly avail ourselves of, and so the prospect of dispensing with geo-
metric thought in physical science is not encouraging, for when geometry is
lost, much is lost with it. We close this section, then, with the encouraging
words of others who also believed that, mentally strenuous as it might be,
this endeavour is worth pursuing:
And is not the source of any dismay the apparent loss of guidance
that one experiences in giving up geometrodynamics—and not
only geometrodynamics but geometry itself—as a crutch to lean
on as one hobbles forward? Yet there is so much chance that
this view of nature is right that one must take it seriously and
explore its consequences. Never more than today does one have
the incentive to explore [Wheeler’s] pregeometry. (Misner et al.,
1973, p. 1208)
8.6 Appraisal
A long way has so far been travelled. Starting off in the realm of geometry,
we laid down its foundations in the form of geometric objects and magni-
tudes, and concluded that physical theories are woven out of these concep-
tions because of a basic human predilection to conceptualize the world after
a geometric fashion. Indeed, we witnessed the essentially geometric nature
of all physical theorizing, from Babylonian clay diagrams through Ptolemaic
astronomy to modern science, and continuing with the attempted improve-
ments of twenty-first-century frontier physics despite the lack of physical
counterparts for its latest geometric entities, and despite the mounting com-
plexity of the geometric edifices built upon them.
Furnishing a particularly conspicuous instance of quantum-gravity re-
search, we visited the abode of pregeometry. Although judging by its name
and goals, pregeometry was the last place in which one would have expected
to find geometry, the former nevertheless fell prey to the latter. Pregeometry,
in its need for its own geometric means to explain the origin of geometry in
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physics, cannot but raise the disquieting question: is the human mind so de-
pendent upon geometric means of description that they cannot be avoided?
Or has pregeometry not tried hard enough? In any case, we concluded that
pregeometry has failed to live up to the semantic connotations of its name
and to the original intentions of its creator, as well as to the intentions of
its present-day practitioners, only to become a considerable incongruity.
Subsequently, we surveyed the vistas of a land farther beyond. Different
older suggestions for the need to overcome geometry in physics were anal-
ysed, including those views pertaining to the father of pregeometry proper.
In general, this proposal stemmed from the desire to reach into yet another
layer of the nature of things, in conjunction with the realization that every-
day and scientific normal language—i.e. geometric language—were likely to
stand in our way.
After this critical general survey of the geometric physical tradition—
from the mists of prehistory, ancient Babylonia and Greece, through the rise
and golden age of classical physics, to contemporary modern physics up to
its pushing frontiers—it is now time to take a deeper look at space and time
according to our best available knowledge of them. In other words, it is now
time to take a step, as it were, backwards and leave the speculative doctrines
of quantum gravity behind to study what classical and modern physics have
to say about the physical nature of space and time. This inexorably leads
us to the problem of the ether.
Chapter 9
The tragedy of the ether
The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It re-
sides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things.
Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the modern world
Upon hearing the word “ether,” the modern physicist finds his lips almost
involuntarily forming a knowing smile. The vision of nineteenth-century
physicists with their convoluted theoretical pictures of this all-pervading
luminiferous medium and their experimentally vain attempts to observe the
motion of the earth through it comes to his mind, and he cannot but feel
sorry for his precursors embarking on such a wild-goose chase. For they were,
after all, only chasing a ghost: what is the material medium in which light,
gravity, heat, and the electric and magnetic forces propagate? Today we
know better. The luminiferous ether simply does not exist. Electromagnetic
and gravitational interactions need no medium to propagate, and so we can
put this notorious idea, greatly troubled since its very inception, to rest. Or
can we?
Not really. Contrary to common belief, the ether still haunts physics at
the turn of a new century. Not in the form of a mechanical medium—that
idea is dead and buried—but in a different, transmuted guise. That this is so
is not readily acknowledged, because the belief that only our ancestors were
capable of falling prey to their own conventional conceptions overpowers all
capability to look at our own position with anything resembling objectivity.
Our knowing smiles, however, slowly give way to chagrin as we start to
recognize ourselves in the reflection of the past. What kind of ether still
haunts physics? A quick preliminary survey of the history of this concept is
apt to naturally lead us to an outline of the present predicament.
The need for an ether as a material medium with mechanical properties
first became apparent to Descartes in the first half of the seventeenth century
in an attempt to avoid any actions that would propagate, through nothing,
from a distance. During its history of roughly three centuries in its original
conception, the idea of the ether managed to materialize in endless forms
via the works of countless investigators. Its main purpose of providing a
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medium through which interactions could propagate remained untouched,
but the actual properties with which it was endowed in order to account for
and unify an ever-increasing range of phenomena were mutually incongruous
and dissimilar. Never yielding to observation and constantly confronted by
gruelling difficulties, the mechanical ether had to reinvent itself continually,
but its very notion staggered not a bit.
After almost 300 years of bitter struggle, the mechanical ether eventually
gave in. The first step of this change took place in the hands of Lorentz, for
whom the ether was a sort of substantial medium that affected bodies not
mechanically but only dynamically, i.e. due to the fact that bodies moved
through it. Drude and Larmor further declared that the ether need not
actually be substantial at all but simply space with physical properties. The
second and decisive step in this demechanization of the ether was brought
about by Poincare´ and Einstein through ideas that eventually took the shape
of the special theory of relativity. In Einstein’s (1983a) own words, this
change “consisted in taking away from the ether its last mechanical quality,
namely, its immobility” (p. 11).
Far from being dead, however, the ether had only transmuted its charac-
ter—from a mechanical substance to an inertial spacetime characterized by
an absolute metric structure. The need for regarding inertial spacetime as an
ether came after noticing that empty spacetime, despite being unobservable
and unalterable, displayed physical properties: it provided an absolute ref-
erence not for velocity but for acceleration, and it determined the behaviour
of measuring rods and clocks, similar to the function Newton’s ethereal ab-
solute space had had before.
The nature of this new, special-relativistic ether underwent yet another
change with the general theory of relativity, as the ether became the dynamic
and intrinsic metric structure of spacetime (Einstein, 1961, p. 176). This
was so significant a change that it modified the very ideas of ether and
empty spacetime. By making the metric structure alterable, it actually put
an end to its status as a genuine ether. And by making the metric field
a content of spacetime, it did away with empty spacetime, since now to
vacate spacetime meant to be left with no metric structure and, therefore,
with nothing physical at all: only an amorphous, unobservable substratum
of spacetime points, whose physical reality was denied by Einstein’s hole
argument. From this standpoint, Einstein concluded that empty spacetime
cannot possess any physical properties, i.e. that empty spacetime does not
exist.
What degree of certainty can we attach to this conclusion? Are spacetime
points truly superfluous entities, such that they neither act nor are acted
upon? Far from it. Spacetime points P act by performing the localization
of fields f(P ), i.e. by giving the location P of physical properties f ; in other
words, spacetime points are part and parcel of the field conception in physics,
on which the elemental physical categories of locality and causality rest. And
yet spacetime points cannot be acted upon such that their displacement
would produce a measurable effect. So did the banishment of the second
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ether—the metric ether—give way to empty spacetime and the birth of a
third ether—the geometric ether.
Einstein’s conclusion as to the physical unreality of empty spacetime
must be viewed with caution also as a result of more general considerations.
This conclusion rests solely on the classical, geometric framework of the gen-
eral theory of relativity, and this is all very well, but if we seek better physics
we should not restrict ourselves unduly. May quantum theory have anything
new to add to the concept of spacetime points and empty spacetime? May,
moreover, the adoption of a metageometric outlook reveal a deeper layer of
this ontological problem, currently hiding beneath its geometric face value?
Be this as it may, when heeding the history of the ether, one thing is at any
rate certain: for empty spacetime to lay any claim on physical reality, the
recognition of observables is an unconditional must.
9.1 The mechanical ether
We start by tracing the rich history of the ether, starting here from its older
conception as a material substance, passing through its virtual disappear-
ance after the progressive removal of its mechanical attributes, and ending
with its new form of an immaterial metric substratum, analysed in the next
section. For the historical review of this section, the very comprehensive
work of Whittaker (1951) will be followed as a guideline.1
Rene´ Descartes (1596–1650) was the first to introduce the conception of
an ether as a mechanical medium. Given the belief that action could only
be transmitted by means of pressure and impact, he considered that the
effects at a distance between bodies could only be explained by assuming
the existence of a medium filling up space—an ether. He gave thus a new
meaning to this name, which in its original Greek (α
,
ιθη´ρ) had meant the
blue sky or the upper air; however, the elemental qualities the Greeks had
endowed this concept with, namely, universal pervasiveness (above the lu-
nar sphere) and indestructibility (cf. unaffectability),2 remained untouched
throughout its modern history. Descartes’ ether was unobservable and yet
it was needed to account for his mechanistic view of the universe, given his
assumptions.3 At the same time, the notion of an ether was right from its
inception entwined with considerations about the theory of light. Descartes
himself explained the propagation of light as a transmission of pressure from
a first type of matter to be found in vortices around stars to a second type
of matter, that of which he believed the ether to be constituted (pp. 5–9).
1Page numbers in parentheses in this section are to Vol. 1 of this reference unless
otherwise stated.
2Kostro (2000) writes: “The ether filled and made up the supra-lunar universe. Earth,
water, air, and fire were composed of primary matter and form, thus being capable of
transformations from one into the others, whereas the ether was so perfect that it was not
capable of being transformed, and was thus indestructible” (p. 3).
3With the invention of the coordinate system, Descartes was, at the same time, the
unwitting precursor of the later conception of the ether as a form of space.
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The history of the ether continued tied to the theory of light with Robert
Hooke’s (1635–1703) work. In an improvement with respect to Descartes’
view, he conceived of light as a wave motion, an exceedingly small vibration
of luminous bodies that propagated through a transparent and homogeneous
ether in a spherical manner. Hooke also introduced thus the fruitful idea of
a wave front (pp. 14–15).
Isaac Newton (1642–1727) rejected Hooke’s wave theory of light on the
grounds that it could not explain the rectilinear propagation of light or its
polarization (see below). In its place, Newton proposed that light consisted
of rays that interacted with the ether to produce the phenomena of reflec-
tion, refraction, and diffraction, but that did not depend on it for their
propagation. He gave several options as to what the true nature of light
might be, one of which was that it consisted of particles—a view that later
on would be associated with his name; nevertheless, as to the nature of light,
he “let every man here take his fancy.” Newton also considered it possible
for the ether to consist of different “ethereal spirits,” each separately suited
for the propagation of a different interaction (pp. 18–20).
Regarding gravitation in the context of the universal law of attraction,
Newton did not want to pronounce himself as to its nature. He nonetheless
conjectured that it would be absurd to suppose that gravitational effects
could propagate without the mediation of an ether. However, Newton’s
eighteenth-century followers gave a twist to his views; antagonizing with
Cartesians due to their rejection of Newton’s gravitational law, they went
as far as denying the existence of the ether—originally Descartes’ concept—
and attempted to account for all contact interactions as actions at a distance
between particles (pp. 30–31).
Christiaan Huygens (1629–1695) was also a supporter of the wave theory
of light after observing that light rays that cross each other do not interact
with one another as would be expected of them if they were particles. Like
Hooke, he also believed that light consisted of waves propagating in an
ether that penetrated vacuum and matter alike. He managed to explain
reflection and refraction by means of the principle that carries his name,
which introduced the concept of a wave front as the emitter of secondary
waves. As to gravitation, Huygens’ idea of a Cartesian ether led him to
account for it as a vortex around the earth (pp. 23–28).
An actual observation that would later have a bearing on the notions
of the nature of light and of the ether was that of Huygens’ regarding the
polarization of light. He observed that light refracted once through a so-
called Icelandic crystal, when refracted through a second such crystal, could
or could not be seen depending on the orientation of the latter. Newton cor-
rectly understood this result as the first light ray being polarized, i.e. having
properties dependent on the directions perpendicular to its direction of prop-
agation. He then concluded that this was incompatible with light being a
(longitudinal) wave, which could not carry such properties (pp. 27–28).
Another thoroughly Cartesian account of the ether was presented by
John Bernoulli Jr. (1710–1790) in an attempt to provide a mechanical basis
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for his father’s ideas on the refraction of light. Bernoulli’s ether consisted of
tiny whirlpools and was interspersed with solid corpuscles that were pushed
about by the whirlpools but could not astray far from their average locations.
A source of light would temporarily condense the whirlpools nearest to it,
diminishing thus their centrifugal effects and displacing the said corpuscles;
in this manner, a longitudinal wave would be started (pp. 95–96).
In the midst of a general acceptance of the corpuscular theory of light
in the eighteenth century, also Leonhard Euler (1707–1783) supported the
view of an ether in connection with a wave theory of light after noticing that
light could not consist of the emission of particles from a source since no
diminution of mass was observed. Most remarkably, Euler suggested that, in
fact, the same ether served as a medium for both electricity and light, hinting
for the first time at a unification of these two phenomena. Finally, he also
attempted to explain gravitation in terms of the ether, which he assumed
to have more pressure the farther from the earth, so that the resulting net
balance of ether pressure on a body would push it towards the centre of the
earth (pp. 97–99).
At the turn of the century, the wave theory of light received new sup-
port in the hands of Thomas Young (1773–1829). Within this theory, Young
explained reflection and refraction in a more natural manner than the cor-
puscular theory and, more importantly, also accounted successfully for the
phenomena of Newton’s rings (and hinted at the cause of diffraction) by in-
troducing an interference principle for light waves. It was Augustin Fresnel
(1788–1827) who, in 1816 and amidst an atmosphere of hostility towards
the wave theory, managed to explain diffraction in terms of Huygens’ and
Young’s earlier findings (pp. 100–108).
Young and Fresnel also provided an alternative explanation of stellar
aberration, which had been first observed by James Bradley (1692–1762) in
1728 while searching to measure stellar parallax and which had so far been
explained in terms of the corpuscular theory of light. Young first proposed
that such effect could be explained assuming that the earth did not drag the
ether with it, so that the earth’s motion with respect to it was the cause of
aberration. Subsequently, Fresnel provided a fuller explanation that could
also account for aberration being the same when observed through refractive
media. Following Young, Fresnel suggested that material media partially
dragged the ether with them in such a way that the latter would pick a
fraction 1−1/n2 (where n is the medium’s refractive index) of the medium’s
velocity. So far the ether was viewed as a somewhat non-viscous fluid that
could be dragged along in the inside of refractive media in proportion to
their refractive index, and whose longitudinal excitations described light
(pp. 108–113).
Considerations about the polarization of light would bring along funda-
mental changes to the conception of the ether. As Newton had previously
observed, the properties of polarized light did not favour a longitudinal-
wave theory of light. Inspired by the results of an experiment performed
by Franc¸ois Arago (1786–1853) and Fresnel, Young hit on the solution to
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the problem of polarization by proposing that light was a transverse wave
propagating in a medium. Fresnel further hypothesized that the ether must
then be akin to a solid and display rigidity so as to sustain such waves
(pp. 114–117).
The fact that only a rigid ether could support transverse waves robbed
the idea of an immobile, undragged ether of much of its plausibility, since it
was hard to imagine a solid medium of some sort that would not be, at least,
partially dragged by bodies moving through it. George Stokes (1819–1903)
rose up to this challenge by providing a picture of the ether as a medium that
behaved like a solid for high-frequency waves and as a fluid for slow-moving
bodies. As a fluid, Stokes’ ether was dragged by material bodies such that,
in particular, it was at rest relative to the earth surface (pp. 128, 386–387).
Michael Faraday (1791–1867) gave a new dimension to the ether con-
ception by introducing the notion of field, which in hindsight was the most
important concept to be invented in this connection.4 In studies of the
induction of currents, of the relation of electricity and chemistry, and of po-
larization in insulators, he put forward the concepts of magnetic and electric
lines of force permeating space. He introduced thus the concept of a field as
a stress in the ether and present where its effects took place. Faraday went
on to suggest—prophesying the relativistic development—that an ether may
not be needed if one were to think of these lines of force, which he under-
stood as extensions of material bodies, as the actual carriers of transverse
vibrations, including light and radiant heat as well. Or then that, if there
was an luminiferous ether, it might also carry magnetic forces and “should
have other uses than simply the conveyance of radiations.” By including
also the magnetic field as being carried by the ether, Faraday added now to
Euler’s earlier prophecy, hinting for the first time at the conception of light
as an electromagnetic wave (pp. 170–197).
Another unifying association of this type was made by William Thomson
(1824–1907), who in 1846 compared heat and electricity in that the isotherms
of the former corresponded to the equipotentials of the latter. He suggested
furthermore that electric and magnetic forces might propagate as elastic
displacements in a solid. James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879), inspired by
Faraday’s and W. Thomson’s ideas, strove to make a mechanical picture of
the electromagnetic field by identifying static fields with displacements of the
ether (for him equivalent to displacements of material media) and currents
with their variations. At the same time, Maxwell, like Gustav Kirchhoff
(1824–1887) before him, was impressed by the equality of the measured
velocity of light and that of the disturbances of the electromagnetic theory
and suggested that light and electromagnetic waves must be waves of the
same medium (pp. 242–254).
So far, the theories of Maxwell and Heinrich Hertz (1857–1894) had not
4And this not without a sense of irony. At first, it was on the field, a physical entity
existing on its own and needing no medium to propagate, that the overthrow of the
mechanical ether would rest; however, later on Einstein would reinstate the ether as a
(metric) field itself.
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made any distinction between ether and matter, with the former considered
as totally carried along by the latter. These theories were still in disagree-
ment with Fresnel’s successful explanation of aberration in moving refractive
media, which postulated a partial ether drag by such bodies. However, ex-
periments to detect any motion of the earth with respect to the ether, such
as those by Albert Michelson (1852–1931) and Edward Morley (1838–1923),
had been negative and lent support to Stokes’ theory of an ether totally
dragged at the surface of the earth (pp. 386–392).
Not content with Stokes’ picture, in 1892 Hendrik Lorentz (1853–1928)
proposed an alternative explanation with a theory of electrons, which recon-
ciled electromagnetic theory with Fresnel’s law. However, Lorentz’s picture
of the ether was that of an electron-populated medium whose parts were
mutually at rest; Fresnel’s partial drag was therefore not allowed by it.
Lorentz’s theory denied the ether mechanical properties and considered it
only space with dynamic properties (i.e. affecting bodies because they moved
through it), although still endowed it with a degree of substantiality.5 The
negative results of the Michelson-Morley experiment were then explained by
Lorentz by means of the existence of FitzGerald’s contraction, which con-
sisted in a shortening of material bodies by a fraction v2/2c2 of their lengths
in the direction of motion relative to the ether. Thus, the ether would cease
being a mechanical medium to become a sort of substantial dynamic space
(pp. 392–405).
Near the end of the nineteenth century, the conception of the ether would
complete the turn initiated by Lorentz with the views of Paul Drude (1863–
1906) and Joseph Larmor (1857–1942), which entirely took away from the
ether its substantiality. Drude (1894, p. 9) declared:
Just as one can attribute to a specific medium, which fills space
everywhere, the role of intermediary of the action of forces, one
could do without it and attribute to space itself those physical
characteristics which are now attributed to the ether.6
Also Larmor claimed that the ether should be conceived as an immaterial
medium, not a mechanical one; that one should not attempt to explain the
dynamic relations so far found in terms of
mechanical consequences of concealed structure in that medium;
we should rather rest satisfied with having attained to their ex-
act dynamical correlation, just as geometry explores or corre-
lates, without explaining, the descriptive and metric properties
of space.7
Larmor’s statement is so remarkable that it will receive more attention later
on in Section 9.4.
5See (Kostro, 2000, p. 18) and (Kox, 1989, pp. 201, 207).
6Quoted from (Kostro, 2000, p. 20).
7Quoted from (Whittaker, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 303).
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Despite the seeming superfluousness of the ether even taken as a fixed
dynamic space, Lorentz held fast to the ether until his death, hoping perhaps
that motion relative to it could still somehow be detected (Kox, 1989).
Others, like Poincare´ and Einstein, understood the repeated failed attempts
to measure velocities with respect to the ether as a clear sign that the ether,
in fact, did not exist. Henri Poincare´ (1854–1912) was the first to reach
such conclusion; in 1899 he asserted that absolute motion with respect to
the ether was undetectable by any means, and that optical experiments
depended only on the relative motions of bodies; in 1900 he openly distrusted
the existence of the ether with the words, “Our ether, does it really exist?”;
and in 1904 he proposed a principle of relativity (Vol. 2, pp. 30–31).
It was Albert Einstein (1879–1955) who in 1905 provided a theory where
he reinstated these earlier claims but with a new, lucid interpretational basis.
In particular, Einstein considered
The introduction of a “luminiferous ether”. . . to be superflu-
ous inasmuch as the view here to be developed will not require
an “absolutely stationary space” provided with special proper-
ties. . . (Einstein, 1952b, p. 38)
Thus, in the hands of Poincare´ and Einstein, the ether had died.
9.2 The metric ethers
Belief in the nonexistence of the ether would not last very long, for it would
soon rise from its ashes—transmuted. A rebirth of the ether as an inertial
medium was advocated by Einstein about a decade after 1905 on the grounds
that, without it, empty space could not have any physical properties; yet it
displayed them through the effects of absolute acceleration, as well as effects
on measuring rods and clocks.
It is a well-known fact that all motion simply cannot be reduced to the
symmetric relationship between any two reference systems. Newton (1962,
pp. 10–12), through the rotating-bucket and revolving-globes (thought) ex-
periments, realized that the effect of acceleration is not relative, and that
rotation in empty space is meaningful. As a result, he held on to the need for
a space absolutely at rest with respect to which this absolute acceleration
could be properly defined.8 Einstein (1952a, pp. 112–113) was impressed
by the same fact, which he brought up by means of the rotating-spheres
thought experiment. The conclusion forces itself upon us that some ref-
erence frames are privileged. In Newtonian space and special-relativistic
spacetime, these are the inertial frames; in general relativity, these are the
freely-falling frames.
However, regarding the classical and special-relativistic cases, Einstein
(1952a, p. 113) complains that no “epistemologically satisfactory” reason
8In fact, only a family of inertial spaces linked by Galilean transformations would have
sufficed.
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that is “an observable fact of experience” can be given as to why or how
space singles out these frames and makes them special. Speaking for a
layman whose natural intelligence has not been corrupted by a study of
geometry and mechanics, he says in blunt reply to the mechanist:
You may indeed be incomparably well educated. But just as I
could never be made to believe in ghosts, so I cannot believe in
the gigantic thing of which you speak to me and which you call
space. I can neither see such a thing nor imagine it. (Einstein,
1996b, p. 312)
Inertial Newtonian space and inertial special-relativistic spacetime are
metric substrata, each characterized by a metric structure determined by
an invariant quadratic form9 (not just a metric). The Newtonian metric
substratum is determined by
dl2 = Eabdx
adxb (a, b = 1, 2, 3), (9.1)
where Eab = diag(1, 1, 1), and the special-relativistic metric substratum by
ds2 = ǫηαβdx
αdxβ (α, β = 1, 2, 3, 4), (9.2)
where ηαβ = diag(1, 1, 1,−1) and ǫ = ±1 ensures that ds2 ≥ 0. In both
cases, the metrics Eab and ηαβ are constant, in the sense that coordinates
can always be found such that their values do not depend on the space
or spacetime coordinates x. Do Newtonian space and special-relativistic
spacetime have anything in common with the luminiferous ether?
Just like the luminiferous ether never displayed any property intrinsic to
its material nature—most notably, the ether wind always had null relative
velocity—so do these two metric substrata fail to display any non-null or
non-trivial properties intrinsic to their own metric nature—most notably,
they are flat and, therefore, structurally (metrically) sterile. For example,
gently release two massive particles and observe their mutual separation
remain constant as a result of inertial media having no active effect on them;
inertial media only act dynamically, by having bodies move through them,
but not statically, as a result of only being placed in them. Further, just like
the luminiferous ether acted as a medium that made the propagation of light
and other interactions possible, yet had an enigmatic origin and could not
be altered in any way, so do these two metric substrata act as the source of
physical effects by determining inertial frames; however, because they have
no sources, they cannot be acted upon in any way, and so their reason of
being cannot be determined in a physical sense. The Newtonian and special-
relativistic metric substrata are thus in precise correlation with the original
characterization of the older mechanical ether, and we are compelled to hold
them as a new, metric embodiment of the ether.
Not content with the absolute nature of special-relativistic spacetime
insofar as it could not be affected, Einstein looked for sources via which
9For more on the physical and mathematical meaning of this concept, see Section 10.1.4.
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the physical properties displayed by spacetime could be influenced and thus
no longer fixed and beyond reach. While dealing with the rotating-spheres
thought experiment, he wrote:
What is the reason for this difference [spherical and ellipsoidal]
in the two bodies? No answer can be admitted as epistemologi-
cally satisfactory, unless the reason given is an observable fact of
experience. . . [T]he privileged space R1 [inertial] of Galileo. . . is
merely a factitious cause, and not a thing that can be observed. . .
The cause must therefore lie outside this system. . . [T]he distant
masses and their motions relative to S1 and S2 [the spheres]
must then be regarded as the seat of the causes (which must be
susceptible to observation) of the different behaviour of our two
bodies S1 and S2. They take over the role of the factitious cause
R1. (Einstein, 1952a, pp. 112–113)
In the metric context of relativity theory, this meant searching for a space-
time whose metric structure could be changed by the distribution of matter
and which had gravitation as its active metric effect. On accomplishing this,
Einstein was the first physicist since the conception of the ether to bring it
to full physical accountability, i.e. not only to observe its active effects but
also to control its structure. In other words, after two conceptual revolu-
tions, Einstein was the first physicist to observe and control the ether. But
this is surely a contradiction in terms, and so the ether died again. Einstein
had uprooted it for the second time, but this time with the right tool—not
denial, observation.
Einstein nevertheless continued to call the general-relativistic metric sub-
stratum an ether, because he seemingly meant the word primarily in its
primitive sense of a ubiquitous substratum with physical properties regard-
less of whether its effects had now turned from passive to active and its
nature changed from absolute to alterable.10
When we say that the metric ether became fully accounted for as a
consequence of the second relativistic revolution, we generally mean that
the metric ether (i) became observable as a result of its non-trivial metric
structure, displaying now an active geometric effect in the form of gravita-
tion; and (ii) lost its absolute character when, through the field equation,
its intimate linkage to matter as its source was established. But did the
dynamic, alterable nature of the general-relativistic metric substratum, now
determined by the invariant quadratic form
ds2 = ǫgαβ(x)dx
αdxβ, (9.3)
put the metric field gαβ(x) on an equal footing with other physical fields? Is
gαβ(x), in fact, nothing else than the new gravitational field? The answers
to these two questions are not as straightforward as we might wish, because
mathematical concepts, otherwise of aid, also blur our physical vision.
10See (Kostro, 2000) for a useful source of historical material on Einstein and the ether.
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On the surface, the metric field gαβ(x) is akin to other physical fields, like
the electric field Ea(x) or magnetic field Ba(x)—or, better, to the electro-
magnetic tensor field Fαβ(x). In effect, whereas matter acts as the source of
the former, charge and current act as the sources of the latter. But this com-
parison is misleading. How could the metric tensor be the gravitational field
if it is not even null in the special-relativistic case, i.e. when gαβ(x) = ηαβ?
Should we perhaps concede that one should not take the correspondence
so literally but continue to claim that it holds, for example, by claiming
something like “the ‘gravitational field’ is null when the ‘gravitational field’
gαβ(x) is constant”? Even if we accepted this contradiction in terms, it
would not be workable. The values of gαβ(x) change from one coordinate
system to another, and even when there exists a coordinate system in flat
spacetime with respect to which gαβ(x) = constant holds, there are many
other coordinate systems in which it does not hold. In other words, there is
no tensor equation, meaningful in all coordinate systems, linking the metric
tensor as such to the stress-energy tensor Tαβ , which characterizes the matter
distribution in spacetime; there is no straightforward invariant connection
between gαβ(x) and gravitation. The same analysis applies to the view that,
if not the metric field, then the Christoffel symbol { αβγ } must be the gravi-
tational field; it can be actually null (not just constant) in gravitation-free
spacetime, but this value too changes from one coordinate system to an-
other. In consequence, equations gαβ(x) 6= constant and { αβγ } 6= 0 tell us
nothing about the existence or nonexistence of a gravitational field.
By looking at the actual field equation,
Rαβ(x)− 1
2
gαβ(x)R(x) = −8πG
c4
Tαβ(x), (9.4)
where Rαβ is the Ricci tensor and R the Ricci scalar, we notice that, if a
correspondence with a “gravitational field” must be made, it is in general
the curvature tensor Rδαβγ (of which the Ricci tensor and curvature scalar
are contractions) that should be identified with it. It is only the curvature
tensor, a complicated combination of second derivatives and products of first
derivatives of the metric tensor,11 that (i) can be set in direct correspondence
with the existence of gravitational effects in all coordinate systems, and (ii)
has matter as its source by means of which it can be altered. Compare
with the case of electromagnetism, where the electromagnetic tensor field
Fαβ(x) (i) can be set in a one-to-one correspondence with the existence
of electromagnetic effects in all inertial coordinate systems, and (ii) has
the four-current Jα(x) (charge and current) as its source according to the
inhomogeneous Maxwell equations
∂Fαβ(x)
∂xα
= µ0J
β(x), (9.5)
where µ0 is the permeability of vacuum.
11The physical dimensions [xα]−2 of curvature arise from the dimensionless metric tensor
in this way.
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The confusion of the metric field gαβ(x) with the “new gravitational
field” is rooted in the fact that, in general relativity, gαβ(x) is the most fun-
damental field in mathematical development. Forgetting that mathematics
is in physics only a useful tool to aid and guide our thought, we fall prey to
the belief that what is mathematically fundamental must also be physically
fundamental. This is not so. The gravitational effects that we experience
and observe are not in direct correspondence with the metric field but with
the curvature of spacetime. In the next chapter, we shall see that the metric
field is, in fact, closely connected with (but not equivalent to) an observable
fact of experience, but not in connection with curvature—in connection with
clocks. Finally, a supplementary cause of misdirection, whose psychological
influence should not perhaps be underestimated, is that the metric field is
denoted with the letter “g” for “geometry,” suggesting at the same time
“gravitation.”
Can now the analogy of the metric and the luminiferous ether be fur-
thered in such a way that, by considering cases that are not actually the
case in the physical world—cases intermediate between the fixed, flat special-
relativistic metric substratum and the alterable, curved general-relativistic
one—we may gain better understanding of the ether concept? What prop-
erties are characteristic of an ether, and what meaning do we attach to
them?
If instead of having a fixed, flat spacetime, we had a fixed spacetime of
everywhere-constant curvature such as, for example, a spherical spacetime,
would we consider this a metric ether, and what would be its analogous me-
chanical counterpart? A curved spacetime possesses a property that a flat
spacetime lacks, namely, it displays an active physical property on account
of its non-trivial metric structure, i.e. of its curvature, which we experience
as gravitational effects: bodies are affected not dynamically, because they
move through this substratum, but statically, because they are placed in this
substratum. This would be analogous to having had a luminiferous ether
with an active mechanical property, namely, an ether wind constant every-
where. Since this is precisely what was sought as evidence of the existence
of the old ether, we may as well conclude that such a metric substratum
could not be an ether at all (in the negative sense of the word). And yet,
are we not nonetheless troubled by the fact that gravitation as the result
of a fixed spacetime curvature has a physically unexplained origin? Would
not nineteenth-century physicists have been likewise disturbed at having at-
tained to the measurement of an immutable property (ether wind) of physi-
cally unaccountable origin? In both cases, after momentary exultation, the
need to know the origin of these otherwise God-given media would take over.
(But see page 178 for a possible way to view this issue as no puzzle.)
What would happen if, generalizing the above, we were confronted by
a spacetime of variable curvature, but that is fixed once given, such as, for
example, a spherical spacetime glued smoothly to a hyperbolic one? Here
gravitation would vary in different regions of space; bodies released at rest
would gradually converge towards each other at some places and gradually
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diverge from each other at other places. Finding ourselves unable to modify
this variable active effect of the metric spacetime substratum, we would
in this case be even more puzzled than before, and the need to account
for its physical source (whether it had any or not) would be even more
compelling. Analogously, if the luminiferous ether had displayed a wind
velocity that varied in speed and direction at different locations of space,
the need to account for the origin of these “upper winds of the Gods” would
have become even more pressing.
Now, do these these two kinds of observable yet absolute media qualify
as ethers or not? We see that they are midway between the idea of a
genuine ether, which is unobservable, homogeneous, and absolute, and a non-
ether, which is observable, inhomogeneous, and malleable. The first of these
fictitious constructions is, in fact, observable, homogeneous, and absolute,
while the second is observable, inhomogeneous, and absolute. Because they
share part of the full characterization of ether, we call them partial ethers
or demiethers.12
We move forwards in the analysis of the ether conception by asking
next: did the metric ether die a clean death in the hands of observation as
gravitation and affectability via its two-way interaction with matter, or did
it leave behind a difficult legacy in the emptiness lying beneath it?
General relativity changed not only the notion of ether, but also that
of empty spacetime. Another feature of gαβ(x) is that it depends on the
spacetime coordinates x (geometrically speaking, on its points), so that it
does not give rise to an immutable metric background that can be associated
with empty spacetime, as ηαβ did in special relativity. On the contrary, the
metric field gαβ(x) appears now as an intrinsic content
13 of spacetime. The
removal of this special field means that the metric structure is gone, so
that not an empty spacetime with physical properties but, rather, nothing
physical remains without it (Einstein, 1961, p. 176).
Upon removal of the metric content of spacetime, what remains, what
we can still call empty spacetime, are the spacetime points P (cf. x). Now,
are we certain that the amorphous substratum formed by these geometric
objects displays no physical properties at all? If this were so, the ether
problem in physics would be definitely solved, perhaps not forever but at
least so far as we can see, i.e. within the reigning physical worldview.
However, luck does not seem to be on our side—faithful to its history, the
ether rises from its second ashes transmuted yet once more, as if enacting
its tragic destiny of immortality. Why tragic?
In the classic essay, “The tragedy of the commons,” Hardin (1968) brings
our attention to the meaning of “tragedy” as something beyond simple un-
happiness. He bases the use of the word “tragedy” in Whitehead’s observa-
12Demi, from Latin dimidius, dis- “apart” + medius “middle”: one that partly belongs
to a specified type or class. (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com)
13Einstein (1961) distinguished space from its contents with the words: “[S]pace as
opposed to ‘what fills space,’ which is dependent on the coordinates. . . ” (p. 176, italics
added). This distinction is based on the idea that anything that depends on the spacetime
coordinates (or points) must be in spacetime.
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tion that
The essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides
in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things. . . This in-
evitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human
life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only
by them that the futility of escape can be made evident in the
drama. (Whitehead, 1948, p. 17)
Like Hardin’s grazing commons but in reverse, so does the ether remorse-
lessly follow an inevitable destiny—endless life.
What passive physical properties do spacetime points display that we
must still call them an ether? And, if endowed with physical properties,
why can spacetime points not be observed? What is this third rise of the
ether all about?
9.3 The geometric ether
We call the substratum of spacetime points the geometric ether. But before
we can move on, the reader asks: are not the metric ethers also geometric?
They are indeed, but in different ways. Revealing the ways in which they
are similar and the ways in which they differ can help us see what the third
rise of the ether shares with its ancestors and in what it is different.
We have characterized geometry as comprising two essential parts, geo-
metric objects and geometric magnitudes attached to them. What we called
metric ethers each possessed an inherent quantitative geometric structure
given by its invariant quadratic form. This metric structure determined spa-
tial or spatiotemporal geometric extension, dl2 or ds2, in space or spacetime.
A metric ether is for this reason endowed with a quantitatively geometric
structure.
Spacetime points, on the other hand, are geometric objects but, after
the removal of gαβ(x), no quantitatively geometric structure is any longer
placed on them. Spacetime points consist only of a qualitatively geometric
medium whose elements bear no mutual quantitative relations. We acknowl-
edge, then, that the metric ethers are also geometric ethers, and so that the
classification of spacetime points as “geometric ether” is, strictly speaking,
too inclusive. However, the more accurate denominations “qualitatively ge-
ometric ether” or “geometric-object ether” do not have a good ring about
them, and considering that “metric ether” brings out the essential charac-
teristic of the ethers of the previous section, we shall value naturalness of
expression over taxonomic precision.
Spacetime points are actors not acted upon. What is the physical role
they play? To find it, we should not look for passive or active metric effects,
even less for mechanical ones, because these geometric objects form neither
a metric nor a mechanical substratum. The physical properties displayed by
spacetime points are as far removed from the ones attributed to the inertial
ethers as these were from those attributed to the mechanical ether. To
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become aware of them, we must learn to see this new geometric ether in its
proper light.
Spacetime points are inherent in the physical concept of field f(P ) by
performing their localization—or, more accurately, by performing the local-
ization of physical quantities. Regarding the intrinsic connection that holds
between spacetime points and the field, Auyang writes:
The spatiotemporal structure is an integral aspect of the field. . .
We can theoretically abstract it and think about it while ignoring
the dynamical aspect of the field, but our thinking does not cre-
ate things of independent existence; we are not God. (Auyang,
2001, p. 214)
She further criticizes Earman’s (1989) remarks that “When relativity theory
banished the ether, the space-time manifold M began to function as a kind
of dematerialized ether needed to support fields” (p. 155).
We agree with Auyang’s view that “spacetime” (spacetime points) is not
merely a substratum on which to mathematically define fields. Spacetime
points are inherent in fields inasmuch as they perform the physical task
of localizing physical quantities. This is what, after Weyl (1949), Auyang
(2001, p. 209) called the “this” or “here-now” aspect of a field, additional to
its “thus” or qualitative aspect. We also concur with Auyang in that isolated
points are the illusive creations of our geometric thinking, but should we
offhand renounce the possibility that empty spacetime—beyond its geometric
description—be real on its own, and not simply an illusion created by the
mind? Might we not still discover that it has active observable effects, if we
learnt to probe it with different conceptual tools?
In performing the localization of fields, spacetime points give foundation
to the concept of locality (here-now) of physical quantities. This is, further-
more, the foundation on which the causality (from here-now smoothly to
there-then) of all physical laws is grounded, and which also goes hand in
hand with the notion of time as a one-parameter along which things flow
causally. Without the field as a local concept, no theoretical explanation can
be given for the primary physical properties of locality and causality, whose
effects we passively observe in the workings of the world. In current theo-
ries, we make sense of these perceived properties by attributing to empty
spacetime a point-like constitution, and then holding locality and causality
to be consequences of it.
In question here is not just an “ether of mechanics” or an “ether of space-
time theories” but an ether of field-based physics, of all local and causal
physics. There is, then, no part of current physics that the geometric ether
does not touch, with the exception—not surprisingly—of that part of quan-
tum mechanics that cannot be understood within the field conception. In
quantum physics, the field concept survives partly (although not as a space-
time field) in the state vector |ψ(x, t)〉 and its causal Schro¨dinger equation
of motion, but it cannot be applied at the global, non-causal circumstance
of its preparation or measurement, when it said to “inexplicably collapse.”
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And conversely, if we felt that locality and causality are not good moulds to
describe the natural world, we could not move past them without giving up
on the local field.
On the other hand, however, active spacetime points cannot be acted
upon such that their displacement would cause any observable effects. This
conclusion forced itself upon Einstein (1996a) as a consequence of an analysis
he called the hole argument. This analysis was brought back into the spot-
light by professional philosophers of science after about six decades of incon-
spicuousness, and is today the object of luxuriant philosophical debate—so
luxuriant, in fact, that the argument has ramified beyond recognition, and
one wonders whether more harm than good has been done by resurrecting
the matter. Originally, Einstein offered this argument in 1914 as proof that
the equations of general relativity could not be generally covariant,14 be-
cause accepting the alternative consequence of the hole argument was at
first unthinkable. However, this path led to difficulties, and about two years
later Einstein (1952a) re-embraced general covariance while at the same
time making his peace with the hole argument by accepting the unthink-
able, namely, that general covariance “takes away from space and time the
last remnant of physical objectivity” (p. 117). In other words, that empty
spacetime has no physical meaning.15
We review the train of thought leading Einstein to this conclusion. Be-
cause the field equation is expressed in generally covariant form, if gαβ(x)
is a solution to it corresponding to the matter source Tαβ(x), then so is
g′αβ(x
′) with corresponding matter source T ′αβ(x
′) for any continuous coor-
dinate transformation x′ = xˆ′(x). Here the same metric and matter fields
are being described in two different coordinate systems, both of which are
viable on account of the field equation being expressed in generally covariant
form. Dropping the primed coordinate system S′ completely, how to express
g′αβ(x
′) and T ′αβ(x
′) in the unprimed coordinate system S? This is done by
replacing x′ by x, so that g′αβ(x) and T
′
αβ(x) describe now with respect to S
the fields as were earlier described with respect to S′. This transformation
is the active equivalent of the original coordinate transformation. It works
by replacing x′ by x, as if, within S, point x′ was displaced to point x via
the transformation xˆ(x′) = x (here xˆ = xˆ′−1), i.e. as if the backdrop of
spacetime points was moved as a whole (Figure 9.1).
For an arbitrary transformation xˆ(x′) = x as here considered, a new
valid solution g′αβ(x) can be obtained in this active way only because, in
general relativity, gαβ(x) is not absolute but varies with Tαβ(x) (see below).
The result is that both gαβ(x) with source Tαβ(x) and g
′
αβ(x) with source
T ′αβ(x) are solutions to the field equation in the same coordinate system.
Here are two different metric fields at the same point x, which is acceptable
so long as each is attached to a different matter source and, therefore, are
14Ultimately, the equations of all spacetime theories can be expressed in generally co-
variant form, but general relativity alone admits only a generally covariant formulation.
See (Friedman, 1983, pp. 46–61).
15For a historically complete review of the hole argument, see e.g. (Stachel, 1989, pp. 71–
81), where relevant quotations and a full list of early references can be found.
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Figure 9.1: Same metric field seen from S and S′ (top). S′ is dropped; points
x′ are moved to x to express the metric field in S as previously expressed in S′
(bottom).
not simultaneously valid at x.
Now H is a so-called hole in spacetime in the sense that within this
region no matter is present, i.e. Tαβ(x) = 0; outside H, on the other hand,
Tαβ(x) is non-null. Furthermore, gαβ(x) is the spacetime metric, necessarily
non-null both inside and outside the hole, and φ is an active coordinate
transformation (akin to xˆ before) with the property that it is equal to the
identity outside H, different from the identity inside H, and continuous
at the boundary. The unchanged gαβ(x), with unchanged source Tαβ(x),
is now a solution outside H, but inside H, where no matter is present,
both gαβ(x) and g
′
αβ(x) are two different and coexisting solutions at the
same point x (Figure 9.2). Einstein reasoned that this implies the field
equation is not causal, since both coexisting metric fields in H are produced
by the same source outside H. To avoid this, Einstein postulated that,
their mathematical differences notwithstanding, gαβ(x) and g
′
αβ(x) must
be physically the same. In other words, Einstein postulated that the point
transformation xˆ(x′) = x leading from g′αβ(x
′) to g′αβ(x) is physically empty,
i.e. there is no physical meaning to be attached to (the displacement of)
spacetime points.
We add parenthetically that only the hole argument applied to general
relativity leads to this problem. In special relativity, for example, where
the metric field ηαβ is absolute and does not result as a solution to a field
equation, a new field η′αβ(x) can be obtained from η
′
αβ(x
′) by the active
method xˆ(x′) = x of moving the spacetime points only if x′ and x are
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Spaetime
{gαβ(x), Tαβ(x)}
Hole
Tαβ(x) = 0
{gαβ(x), 0}
{g′αβ(x), 0}
Figure 9.2: Schematic representation of the hole argument in coordinate language.
otherwise connected by special transformations xˆL that leave ηαβ invariant:
these are the Lorentz transformations. As a consequence, the quadratic form
remains invariant:
ds2 = ǫηαβ(x)dx
αdxβ = ǫη′αβ(x)dx
αdxβ = ds′2. (9.6)
In the general-relativistic case, where no special transformations exist that
leave gαβ(x) invariant,
ds2 = ǫgαβ(x)dx
αdxβ 6= ǫg′αβ(x)dxαdxβ = ds′2, (9.7)
but then again this is no violation of the invariance of ds2, because the
source of geometric structure has changed too, from Tαβ(x) to T
′
αβ(x).
16
Einstein was therefore right to declare that empty spacetime does not
have physical properties—but only if by “physical properties” we understand
observable (active) effects arising from their displacement. Locality and
causal evolution in parameter time, on the other hand, are nothing but the
passive physical effects that we attribute to the point-like constitution of
empty spacetime and to the behaviour of the local fields the points are part
of. Does not all this ring a bell? The ether repeats its history—tragically—
once again.
Despite the odds against them, Friedman (1983, pp. 216–263) nonethe-
less argued for the physical reality of bare and isolated spacetime points.
According to him, the core of an explanation of natural phenomena is to be
able to reduce a wide variety of them to a single framework (Friedman, 1974),
so that what one is required to believe is not a vast range of isolated rep-
resentational structures, but a single, all-encompassing construct. However,
in order to provide scientific understanding, theoretical entities with suffi-
cient unifying power must be taken to be of a literal kind. Thus, Friedman
argued that denying the existence of spacetime points—themselves essential
for geodesics to exist—can only lead to a loss of unifying and explanatory
power in spacetime theories.
As logically impeccable as this typically philosophical argument may be,
it is at odds with history itself and with the interests of physical science. If
16For more details, see (Friedman, 1983, pp. 46–61) and (Stachel, 1989, p. 78).
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anything has been learnt from the narration of the history of the mechanical
ether, it should be this: no other conception gripped the minds of so many
illustrious men of science for longer and more strongly than that of the lu-
miniferous ether. It was always held to be physically real and unified a wide
range of phenomena (light, heat, gravitation, electricity, and magnetism) de-
spite its relentlessly unobservable existence. And yet, at the opening of the
twentieth century, a scientific revolution rendered it superfluous and useless,
and so, with no further ado and hardly enough mourning to do justice to
its nearly three hundred years of age, it was declared nonexistent and duly
buried. Science quickly forgets its waste products and moves on.
Evidently, no spell of time during which a conception proves to be
successful is long enough to declare it real because of its utility or unify-
ing power. What is to guarantee that today’s vastly successful spacetime
points—the geometric ether—will not run, in their own due time, the same
fate as their mechanical and inertial ancestors? If any concept that is of
aid in physics is to be held real, nothing more and nothing less should be
demanded of it that it be observable, i.e. that it have active physical effects
and be open to human manipulation and control.
While professional philosophy does not try to overcome the geometric
ether, neither does quantum gravity. A study of this discipline reveals that
it does not try to determine from where observable locality and causal evo-
lution in parameter time may come by attempts to find observables related
to empty spacetime. Instead, quantum gravity focuses on the creation of
ever more involved geometric structures for space and time, leaving the
qualitative problem of the geometric ether untouched. When an attempt at
observation is at all made in quantum gravity, it is only to link its proposed,
so far unobservable, geometric structures with some hypothetical effect, but
never giving second thoughts to the observability of the underlying geometric
objects—spacetime points among them.
In this respect, Brans (1999, pp. 597–602) argues that much by way of
unobservable structure is taken for granted in current spacetime theories,
such as the existence of a point set, a topology, smoothness, a metric, etc.
He compares the vortices and atoms of the mechanical ether with these
unobservable building blocks of spacetime and, moreover, with the yet con-
siderably more complex spacetime structures and “superstructures” devised
more recently. We interpret Brans to be asking: will strings and membranes,
spin networks and foams, nodes and links—to name but a few—appear a
hundred years from now like the mechanical ether does today? Are the
above the new geometric counterparts of the old mechanical contraptions?17
In other words, will the phrase “quantum theory of gravity” come to be
regarded, a hundred years from now, as we regard today the phrase “vortex-
atom theory of the ether”? It is likely that a new name become necessary
for a theory that, by being both physical and faithful to nature, succeeds in
17For a recent explicit revival even of the long-dead mechanical ether, see (Jacobson &
Parentani, 2005), where the authors ask: “Could spacetime literally be a kind of fluid,
like the ether of pre-Einsteinian physics?” (p. 69).
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differentiating itself from the failed attempts that preceded it, and that the
abused term “quantum gravity” only remain as a useful handle to denote
the historical debacle of another dark age of physics.
Be all this as it may, even if we turned a blind eye to their physical
uncertainty and assumed that some of these more recently proposed struc-
tures were not to follow such a fate and could eventually be observed, the
observations relating to them would at any rate give evidence of a new met-
ric spacetime structure. But if the goal is to advance the understanding of
the geometric ether (locality, causality, parameter time, and fields) then we
must move away from geometry—forwards on a new path.
For an appraisal of the different concepts of ether analysed, turn to the
summary table at the end of this chapter on page 118.
9.4 Beyond the geometric ether
The luminiferous ether was superseded by stripping it of all its intrinsic me-
chanical properties and rendering them superfluous; there was no luminifer-
ous ether or any such thing at all. The metric ether, on the other hand, did
not have its metric properties rendered superfluous but instead accounted
for once their connection with matter was found. The story of the mechan-
ical and inertial ethers is repeating itself today in a geometric, instead of a
metric or a mechanical, guise—but which of these two fates (denial or obser-
vation), if any, may the future hold in store for the geometric ether? Both,
we hope. We seek for the geometric ether both a conceptual change and the
recognition of observables linked to its new nature, a change comparable to
the shift from the unobservable mechanical ether to the observable metric
structure of general-relativistic spacetime.
As we seek to learn what lies beneath locality, causality, parametric time,
and fields—as we seek to find, as it were, the source of these passive physical
properties inherited from empty spacetime—the geometric ether must, like
its mechanical ancestor, have another layer of its nature revealed. This is
to be done, once again, by stripping the ether of its intrinsic properties, but
this time they are geometric ones. We believe that, taking a conceptual step
beyond the geometric ether, i.e. beyond geometry entirely, may be the key
to identifying observables related to empty spacetime. These hypothetical
observables, however, would not be directly related to spacetime points,
which are geometric objects, but rather to “metageometric things,” just like
spacetime curvature has little to do with the mechanical properties of the
earlier-hypothesized material medium.
To put it differently, we are here proposing an updated version of Lar-
mor’s centenary words:
We should not be tempted towards explaining the simple group
of relations which have been found to define the activity of the
aether by treating them as mechanical consequences of concealed
structure in that medium; we should rather rest satisfied with
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having attained to their exact dynamical correlation, just as ge-
ometry explores or correlates, without explaining, the descriptive
and metric properties of space.18
Larmor’s statement is remarkable for its correctness, and all the more re-
markable for its incorrectness. Its first half (up to the semicolon) is a correct
testimony of what soon would prove to be the way out of the mechanical-
ether problem: its denial by special relativity. Its second half was—at the
time of its utterance—a correct comparison between the way Larmor thought
the mechanical ether should be considered and the way geometry was then
regarded, namely, not as background for the explanation of phenomena.
However, 16 years later in 1916 the ether would be overtly reinstated as a
dynamic metric structure, and the physical properties of spacetime would be
explained by it in the sense of a metric geometric substratum.19 This trend
of attempting to explain phenomena in terms of geometry, and in particular
metric geometry, did not stop with general relativity but, as we saw, con-
tinues with the efforts of quantum gravity. Therefore, nowadays geometry
does explain, as a substratum, the properties of spacetime,20 and the second
part of Larmor’s view is no longer correct.
The updated version of Larmor’s words proposed here reads thus:
We should not be tempted towards explaining the simple group
of relations (locality, causality, parametric time) which have been
found to define the activity of the geometric ether (spacetime
points) by treating them as consequences of concealed struc-
ture in that geometric medium; we should rather seek to explain
the activity of the geometric ether beyond its geometric nature,
searching for empty-spacetime observables metageometrically.
Unlike Larmor, we do not renounce an explanation of the geometric ether,
but we do not attempt to find it at the same conceptual level as this ether
finds itself.
The search for observables related to empty spacetime requires taking
a genuine conceptual step beyond the state of affairs as left by Einstein’s
hole argument. We believe that the current philosophical literature on this
problem, as reviewed e.g. in (Earman, 1989, pp. 175–208), has not been able
to take this step by adding something physically new to the discussion. On
the contrary, the philosophical debate appears to function in the spirit of
18Quoted from (Whittaker, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 303).
19In fact, Newton’s space had already assumed this role over 200 hundred years before,
and Einstein’s special-relativistic inertial spacetime 11 years before, but neither of them
had been openly considered as substrata with physical geometric properties until after
1916. Then Einstein identified ηαβ and gαβ(x) with metric ethers. Breaking with history,
we chose to identify the invariant quadratic forms derived therefrom with the metric ethers
due to their closer connection with actual physical observables.
20Friedman (1983), for example, writes that “the development of relativity appears to
lead. . . to the view that the geometrical structure of space or space-time is an object of
empirical investigations in just the same way as are atoms, molecules, and the electro-
magnetic field” (p. xi).
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Earman’s words, which measure the fruitfulness of a work by asking “How
many discussions does it engender?” (p. xi). What is needed is a new
physical insight by means of which the present philosophical debate (like
every other) may be rendered inconsequential, much like the older disputes
as to the shape and position of the earth or the nature of the heavenly bodies
were only settled by new physical investigations. Indeed, what is needed is
a discovery in the sense of Oppenheimer’s words:
All history teaches us that these questions that we think the
pressing ones will be transmuted before they are answered, that
they will be replaced by others, and that the very process of
discovery will shatter the concepts that we today use to describe
our puzzlement. (Oppenheimer, 1973, p. 642)
To understand how a possible way to go beyond the hole argument is
related to the hole argument itself, we now re-rehearse it in geometric, rather
than coordinate, language and for a general field f(P ). We start with two
points, P and Q, inside H linked by a diffeomorphism φ(P ) = Q, and we
have these two points be the local aspect or location of fields f(P ) and f ′(Q),
each solution to the field equation with the same source. The demand that
f(P ) = f ′(Q) (9.8)
(cf. gαβ(x) = g
′
αβ(x
′)) reproduces geometrically the requirement that, after
an arbitrary coordinate transformation x′ = xˆ′(x), a physical situation re-
mains unchanged. In terms of an active transformation, point P (cf. x) is
dropped in solution f(P ) (cf. gαβ(x)), and a new solution is obtained by
displacing P to Q (cf. x′) as follows:
f(P )→ f(Q) = f(φP ) =: φ∗[f(P )], (9.9)
where φ∗[f(P )] is induced by φ in the way shown and is called the push-
forward of f(P ). The new field φ∗[f(P )] = f(Q) is also a solution, but
f(Q) 6= f ′(Q) (9.10)
(cf. gαβ(x
′) 6= g′αβ(x′)) (Figure 9.3).21 Again, to preserve the causality of
the field equation one postulates that displacements of points lead to no
observable effects and that, therefore, (displacements of) points have no
physical meaning.
In order to move forward and catch a glimpse of what form empty-
spacetime observables may take, we reason heuristically as follows. We note
21It would have been more natural to denote Q by P ′ and later to perform an active
transformation dropping P ′ (cf. x′) instead of P (cf. x), in which case one would have
obtained the expressions f(P ) = f ′(P ′) instead of (9.8), f ′(P ′) → f ′(P ) = f ′(φ−1P ′) =:
φ∗[f
′(P ′)] instead of (9.9), and f(P ) 6= f ′(P ) instead of (9.10), in closer parallel with
Einstein’s original coordinate notation and with the one of the previous section. However,
remaining faithful to this starting point would have complicated the notation and obscured
the intuitive appeal of the investigation that follows at the end of this section.
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Spaetime
{gαβ(P ), Tαβ(P )}
Hole
Tαβ(P ) = 0
{gαβ(P ), 0}
{φ∗[g
′
αβ(P
′)], 0}
Figure 9.3: Schematic representation of the hole argument in geometric language
in tune with the coordinate notation of the previous section. Here φ∗[g
′
αβ(P
′)] =
g′αβ(P ). To match the geometric notation just introduced, replace: gαβ(P ) by
g′αβ(Q), Tαβ(P ) by T
′
αβ(Q), and φ∗[g
′
αβ(P
′)] by φ∗[gαβ(P )].
that the postulate above appears to go farther in its claim than it really
needs to. The required property of diffeomorphism invariance with respect
to an arbitrary displacement of points is satisfied by simply having space-
time points be all alike, i.e. have no physical identity and form a perfectly
homogeneous substratum. Thereby, the problem posed by the hole argu-
ment is avoided, since having physically indistinguishable spacetime points
makes the two solutions gαβ(P ) and φ∗[g
′
αβ(P
′)] physically equivalent.22
What do we mean by physically indistinguishable points? We can see
this by recognizing the difference between mathematical and physical points.
Mathematical points may well be labelled points but, as Stachel remarked,
No mathematical coordinate system is physically distinguished
per se; and without such a distinction there is no justification
for physically identifying the points of a [mathematical] mani-
fold. . . as physical events in space-time. Thus, the mathemati-
cian will always correctly regard the original and the dragged-
along fields as distinct from each other. But the physicist must
examine this question in a different light. . . (Stachel, 1989, p. 75)
The physicist must, in this case, rather ask whether in a spacetime empty of
matter and metric structure there is anything by means of which its points
can be told apart from one another. Finding there are no such means,
the physicist is forced to hold spacetime points physically identical to one
another.
However, having a multitude of indistinguishable spacetime points does
not necessarily mean that they must be physically meaningless in every other
way. How so? Think, for example, of hydrogen atoms, which are exact
physical copies of each other and yet display physical properties. Which
type of property displayed by hydrogen atoms may serve as a useful analogy
for the case of spacetime points?
22Rewrite φ∗[g
′
αβ(P
′)] as g′αβ(P ) and replace P by P
′ to get g′αβ(P
′) = gαβ(P ).
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The hydrogen atoms conforming a gas of this element are, like space-
time points, physically identical, but denying the reality of hydrogen atoms
on these grounds does not seem at all reasonable.23 Hydrogen atoms, de-
spite being identical, possess a property that spacetime points do not seem
to have: they interact with other matter and correlate with one another
creating bonds, hydrogen molecules. In empty spacetime, there is noth-
ing else for points to interact with, and so the interaction of the hydrogen
atoms with, for instance, their container walls seems to be an unworkable
analogy. However, hydrogen atoms also interact among themselves—and
this is the only analogy with spacetime points that remains open for us to
pursue. Could spacetime points show observable properties—active physi-
cal effects—due to mutual correlations, just like hydrogen molecules display
observable properties that give evidence of their constituent identical atoms?
Forty years ago, Wheeler touched upon an idea somewhat similar to this
one within the context of the so-called “bucket of dust.” Pondering the
consequences of changes in the topology of space, he wrote:
Two points between which any journey was previously very long
have suddenly found themselves very close together. However
sudden the change is in classical theory, in quantum theory there
is a probability amplitude function which falls off in the classi-
cally forbidden domain. In other words, there is some residual
connection between points which are ostensibly very far apart.
(Wheeler, 1964, p. 498)
However, Wheeler did not develop this idea, but only used it in order to
reject the quantum-theoretical concept of nearest neighbour, according to
the manner in which he had previously defined it.
A more thorough attempt in this direction was carried out by Lehto
(1988) and collaborators (Lehto et al., 1986a, 1986b). In the context of the
geometrized pregeometric lattice analysed in Section 6.3.1, they found that
when the principle of diffeomorphism invariance was considered in connec-
tion with quantum theory, fields on the said lattice displayed correlations of
quantum-mechanical origin.
Like the analogy between identical spacetime points and hydrogen at-
oms—themselves identical on account of their quantum nature—and like
Wheeler’s conjectured consequence of a change in the topology of space in
a quantum-mechanical world, these results insinuate the same conclusion.
When the physical identity of spacetime points is considered in conjunction
with quantum theory—the only branch of natural science, as Isham (1995,
p. 65) remarked, so far forced to confront the problem of existence—we are
led to results that differ from the conclusions drawn by classical general
relativity alone, namely, to the concept of quantum-mechanical spacetime
correlations. Could they hold a key to the identification of empty-spacetime
observables?
23See (Horwich, 1978, p. 409) and (Friedman, 1983, p. 241).
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In order to display the idea of correlations within the existing context of
the hole argument—but moving, at the same time, beyond it by introducing
a physically new idea into the classical setting—we consider the following.
We saw that, in an otherwise empty spacetime, a field f(P ) at point P is
also an acceptable field when dragged onto another point Q,
f(P )→ φ∗[f(P )] = f(Q). (9.11)
But what happens if we now pull it back again to get φ∗[f(Q)]? The field
could carry properties pertaining to Q back with it, so that a comparison of
the original field f(P ) and the restored field φ∗[f(Q)] could yield that they
are physically different.
This is not to say that we expect to find new physics by means of a
purely mathematical operation plus its inverse. It means the reverse: given
the privately gathered (not logically deduced) insight that indistinguish-
able points may nonetheless display physical effects by correlating with each
other quantum-mechanically, then the above construction constitutes a ge-
ometric means to represent the ensuing broken physical symmetry of dif-
feomorphism invariance. Moreover, when we speak of “moving points,” no
system is actually being displaced in the physical world; the physical mean-
ing of the mathematical expressions above (and below) ultimately falls back
on spacetime correlations of quantum origin, the existence of which is here
conjectured.
In other words, this heuristic analysis does not try to prove, by math-
ematical manipulation or deduction, that such quantum correlations exist,
like some (as criticized in Chapter 2) infer the existence of Planck black
holes—and, therefore, the relevance of the Planck scale—from a heuristic
analysis of the relations between mass, energy, and spatial localization. We
only use heuristics to inspire our physical thought and to guide its mathe-
matical expression, but not to establish the physical substance of the ideas
thus arrived at. The ideas presented in this section, then, are part of an ex-
ploratory approach to the problem of the geometric ether. Its true solution,
however, must be rooted at its origin in familiar observations of the physical
world; it must come from simple experiments that humans can understand
and affect and not from disembodied mathematical push-forwards and pull-
backs. These ideas should therefore be interpreted from this exploratory
perspective.
Given f(P ), the appearance of the pull-back φ∗[f(Q)] rests on the need to
compare locally the original field and the original field restored. This need
arises from the fact that physical experiments are not performed globally
but locally. An analogy close at hand is that of parallel transport in general
relativity. Given two (covariant) vector fields vα(P ) and vα(Q) in curved
spacetime, they can only be compared by computing ∆vα at one point P
by parallel-transporting the latter field:
∆vα(P ) = vα(Q)‖ − vα(P ). (9.12)
The analogy works best for the case of a small closed loop traced start-
ing at P (u0, v0) by following a worldline x
α = xα(u, v0) until we reach a
114 The tragedy of the ether
P
Q
du
xα(u, v0)
dv xα(du, v)
xα(−u,dv)
xα(u0,−v)
vα(P ) vα(P )‖
dvα(P )
Figure 9.4: Parallel transport of a vector vα(P ) around a closed loop in curved
spacetime.
separation du, and then a worldline xα = xα(du, v) until we reach a sepa-
ration dv, thus arriving at Q; we then come back24 from Q to P following
worldline xα = xα(−u,dv) until we reach a separation du and then worldline
xα = xα(u0,−v) until we reach a separation dv. Field vα(P ) is compared
to itself after having travelled the loop and restored to its original position.
We find that
dvα(P ) = R
δ
αβγ(P )vδ
(
∂xβ
∂u
du
)(
∂xγ
∂v
dv
)
, (9.13)
where Rδαβγ is the (mixed) Riemann tensor, quantifies how much the com-
ponents, but not the size, of vα(P ) have been changed by the experience
(Figure 9.4).
Similarly, if instead of thinking of a field as a mere value, we visualize it as
a vector f , and f(P ) as a component of f , then a new (geometric) dimension
to the hole argument is revealed: the local comparison of φ∗[f(Q)] and f(P )
quantifies how much the field component f(P ), but not the field value,
changes due to the possible quantum correlation of P with Q; in short, f as
a vector would behave like vα. This change would stem from any physical
reality of quantum-mechanical origin that the points may have. Pictorially
speaking, P would behave as if it remembered having interacted with Q,
remaining “entangled” with it.
24We cannot actually come back to P in the literal sense of the word because we can
only traverse spacetime forwards, in the direction of the tangent vectors to the worldlines.
That is to say, the separation du alluded to is given by the values of a parameter u that
increases monotonically on the worldline, e.g. a clock reading. What we can in fact do is
travel from P to Q following two different routes and then mathematically form a loop by
subtracting one change in the transported vector from the other. See Section 10.3.4 for
details.
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Let us now push the parallel-transport analogy further. The parallel-
transport procedure constitutes the mathematical representation of a phys-
ical property of spacetime. This property is curvature and is unheard-of
in flat spacetime, which is sterile with respect to active metric effects. A
curved spacetime, on the other hand, is not. The parallel transport of a
field around a closed loop uncovers curvature as a previously hidden active
metric effect. Now, the description above intends to point to the appearance
of quantum-related spacetime correlations in a corresponding manner. They
are a hypothetical property completely foreign to the homogeneous substra-
tum of spacetime points, which is sterile with respect to active geometric
effects (diffeomorphism invariance)—but could such correlations arise as the
active effect of a different kind of medium? And if so, what kind of medium?
We believe that we should not seek the source of quantum spacetime
correlations in extra hidden geometric properties of points but somewhere
else, within a deeper layer of the nature of things: as an active effect of the
quantum-mechanical connection between metageometric things. Indeed, the
search for observables related to empty spacetime should be accompanied
by the conceptual overthrow of the geometric ether as well. If nothing else,
the fact that the present geometric description of spacetime leads again to
the futile problem of an ether is hint enough that there must be something
amiss with this form of description.
Where shall we look to find observables that capture the above-described
behaviour of field f(P ) and that are, at the same time, in principle free of
geometric denotation? These cannot certainly be the fields themselves, since
they are purely geometric concepts, nor are they observable as such.
Sometimes the answers to the hardest questions are staring one in the
face. What is the most fundamental physical concept in the present under-
standing of spacetime? What is general relativity essentially about? Not
the metric field but an observable network of invariant intervals ds between
events; it is on the measurable intervals that the metric description of space-
time ultimately rests. The metric field, as we mentioned earlier and will
show in more detail in the next chapter, comes after the directly mea-
surable intervals, and endows them with geometric meaning as part of a
differential-geometric theoretical description. By picturing in our minds the
measurable separation ds between two events as the extension of a spacetime
vector d~r(x) parametrized with coordinates x, we find
ds2 = ǫd~r · d~r = ǫ
(
∂~r
∂xα
∣∣∣
P
dxα
)
·
(
∂~r
∂xβ
∣∣∣
P
dxβ
)
= ǫgαβ(P )dx
αdxβ. (9.14)
The realization that ds, as a direct observable, takes physical precedence
over its geometric theoretical interpretation is useful to this search, because
it helps us disentangle all posterior geometric baggage (full differential geom-
etry) from the physically more essential measurement result itself. Recalling
the ideas of Chapter 4, we are then left with ds as a minimal, bare geomet-
ric notion, namely, as the extension of some underlying metric line. This
is not yet a metageometric realm, but it places us one step closer to it. It
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P
P ′
dsPP ′
Q
Q′
dsQQ′
φ
φ
gαβ(P )
φ∗[gαβ(Q)]
gαβ(Q) =
φ∗[gαβ(P )]
φ∗
φ∗
Figure 9.5: Push-forward and successive pull-back of the metric field gαβ(P ) in
an otherwise empty spacetime. If spacetime points had any physical reality of
quantum-mechanical origin, long-range correlations would been seen in the line
element ds.
suggests that we may look at the physical essence behind ds—a classical
link correlating two events as phenomena—to inspire and guide the search
for metageometric correlations of quantum origin.
Once again in geometric language, we could now explore25 whether the
line element
dsPP ′ =
√
ǫgαβ(P )dxαdxβ (9.15)
between two points remains unchanged after gαβ(P ) is pushed forward,
φ∗[gαβ(P )], to get
dsQQ′ =
√
ǫφ∗[gαβ(P )]dxαdxβ =
√
ǫgαβ(Q)dxαdxβ, (9.16)
and subsequently pulled back, φ∗[gαβ(Q)], to get for the original line element√
ǫφ∗[gαβ(Q)]dxαdxβ. (9.17)
If spacetime points had any physical reality of quantum-mechanical origin,
the final expression (9.17) could not be equal to the initial one (9.15), and
there would be some long-range correlations seen in the line element ds
(Figure 9.5).
This would not upset general relativity, because the envisioned corre-
lations represent a new kind of effect rather than corrections to physical
magnitudes predicted by the theory. Moreover, at a conceptual level, the
diffeomorphism-invariance principle and the hole-argument conclusion are
not challenged either, since these belong in the general-relativistic classical,
geometric description of spacetime, which does not consider quantum the-
ory at all and, therefore, must view quantum-mechanical correlations as an
element foreign to its framework. In particular and furthering the previous
25Here P ′ and Q′ are points in the neighbourhoods of P and Q respectively, and are
linked by a diffeomorphism φ(P ′) = Q′, in the same way that P and Q are.
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analogy, we may say that the local comparison between φ∗[f(Q)] and f(P )
deals with changes in the components of a field, whereas the hole argument
refers to (lack of) changes in the value of a field. Thus, the classical, geo-
metric theory of general relativity remains untouched from this perspective.
Strictly speaking and consistent with the general-relativistic picture,
then, it is not possible for the correlations envisioned to be displayed by
dsPP ′ as a classical geometric notion, i.e. as the distance between points
of a non-quantum theory. Building beyond the raw material provided by
ds with the aid of metageometric thought and quantum-mechanical ideas,
we seek to learn what lies behind it as a measurement value. Our expec-
tation is for the classical geometric interval dsPP ′ to result as a geometric
remnant or trace left behind by metageometric things. It is through these
things beyond geometry that the conceptual overthrow of the geometric ether
can be pursued. In this light, one should regard points the way one would
Wittgenstein’s ladder: as concepts to be discarded after one “has climbed
out through them, on them, over them” (Wittgenstein, 1922, § 6.54).
But the road to this goal is conceptually demanding; much physical
insight needs first to be gained and brought to light before the metageometric
path involving ds can be pursued. Why is ds so important and, especially,
more important than the metric field? How is all relativity to be built upon
it? And what is its physical meaning, what kind of measurement is it? Does
it really involve the proverbial rods and clocks? These queries lead us to an
analysis of the concept of time.
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Ether Action Observability Affectability
Mechanical.
Material medium
Medium for the propagation
of light, gravitation, electric-
ity, magnetism, heat, etc.
Mechanically sterile homoge-
neous substratum. No observ-
able (active) mechanical prop-
erties (e.g. velocity, density)
Its effect on light, gravitation,
electricity, magnetism, heat,
etc. cannot be changed
Inertial.
Absolute space and absolute
spacetime
Media for the determination
of acceleration and spatial, or
spatiotemporal, extension
Geometrically sterile homoge-
neous substrata. No observ-
able (active) geometric proper-
ties
Their effect on particles, or
particles and clocks, cannot be
changed
Gravitational.
Dynamic spacetime
Medium for the determination
of acceleration and spatiotem-
poral extension
Geometrically rich inhomoge-
neous substratum. Observable
geometric property: curvature
Has matter as source. Its effect
on particles and clocks can be
changed
Geometric.
Spacetime points
Medium for the localization of
fields f(P ). Embodiment of lo-
cality and causal evolution in
parametric time
Qualitatively homogeneous,
quantitatively structureless
geometric substratum. No
observable (active) geometric
properties
Its localizing effect on fields
cannot be changed by moving
the points (f(P ) = φ∗[f(Q)]).
Not even self-interacting due
to geometric amorphousness
Table 9.1: A summary of the different concepts of the ether in physics, from the mechanical luminiferous ether to the geometric spacetime
points. Of the four, only the gravitational “ether” was brought to full physical accountability: it is observable and open to manipulation and
control.
Chapter 10
A geometric analysis of time
An analysis of the concept of time was my solution.
Albert Einstein, “How I created the theory of relativity”
Philosophers of science thrive in the analysis of scientific concepts. If
we want to draw a lesson on how to make a good analysis of the physical
concept of time, we should take a look at the works of (broadly speaking)
natural philosophers—from V b.C. to XXI a.D.—or should we? What do
philosophers of science do when they make an analysis?
A conceptual analysis can be interpreted variously. It may refer to the
meticulous logical dissection of a concept into constituent parts or to the
physical examination of a concept regarding its physical origin and nature.
If, as we suggest, these two activities are not one and the same, how do they
differ? And what is their connection with the activities of scientists and
philosophers of science?
In his enlightening book, Reichenbach (1951) finds the source of “philo-
sophical error” in speculative philosophy in “certain extralogical motives”
(p. 27). These are compounded in the speculative philosopher’s psychologi-
cal make-up, “a problem which deserves more attention than is usually paid
to it” (p. 36). Reichenbach describes the fall of speculative (i.e. traditional)
philosophy and the rise of scientific philosophy, a philosophy to be guided
by modern science and its tools. Unlike speculative philosophy, the goal of
scientific philosophy is not a one-person explanation of the natural world
but the elucidation of scientific thought; its object of study is science itself.
Or in the words of Reichenbach, “Scientific philosophy. . . leaves the expla-
nation of the universe entirely to the scientist; it constructs the theory of
knowledge by the analysis of the results of science” (p. 303). Identifying sci-
entific philosophy with modern philosophy of science, we can preliminarily
conclude that, whereas the raw material of science is the natural world, the
raw material of philosophy of science is (as its name correctly suggests) the
scientific enterprise.
As distinct as science and philosophy of science seem to be, we still find
ourselves at a loss to tell which of the two disciplines we should pursue
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if we want to better understand the physical concept of time. A reading
of Reichenbach suggests that we should embrace philosophy of science, be-
cause it is through it, and not normal science, that we gain clarification
of scientific concepts (p. 123). Indeed, Reichenbach traces the rise of the
full-blown “professional philosopher of science” to the incipient attempts
of scientists who would unsystematically ponder the nature of their fields
between the lines of their technical works. But has this evolutionary devel-
opment from enquiring scientist to professional philosopher of science truly
yielded a species better adapted to the clarification of conceptual scientific
puzzles? Or has the speciation product, becoming overspecialized, shifted
instead to a separate and altogether different habitat, a new place where it
can not only survive but even thrive?
If by “philosophy of science” we understand the natural extension of
the ordinary work of the scientist that comes from asking not only “how
do I calculate this?” but also—or instead—“what is this, and why should
I calculate it?” then philosophy of science is a useful and integral part of
science. Progress in the scientific worldview would not be possible without
it. But philosophy of science as a discipline in its own right, carried out
“professionally” by philosophers because, as Reichenbach put it, “scientific
research does not leave a man time enough to do the work of logical analysis,
and. . . conversely logical analysis demands a concentration which does not
leave time for scientific work” (p. 123)—this is another matter altogether.
Does the meticulous logical dissection of scientific concepts produce use-
ful results without limit? Or is there instead a fuzzy boundary carried
beyond which logical analysis stops clarifying anything at all? Reichenbach
goes on to admit that philosophy of science, “aiming at clarification rather
than discovery may even impede scientific productivity.” May it not impede,
when carried too far, not just scientific productivity but even clarity itself,
thus turning against its original goal?
With the professionalization of the conceptual examination naturally
falling on the enquiring scientist, the link with the natural world as the
motivator of scientific concepts and informer of their analysis was severed
in professional philosophy of science, for, as Reichenbach put it, the pro-
fessional philosopher of science has no time to deal with nature. What is
then his working method? His starting point is established science and his
methods scientific, but his logical analyses roam largely unconstrained by
feedback from the physical world. That is to say, philosophy of science
freezes the science of the day and, armed with the tools of the same science,
looks away from the physical world and proceeds to dissect the concepts of
science in as many different ways, into as many possible constituents, as logic
and frozen science will allow. Thus, philosophers of science become—in the
words of one of them—“professional distinction drawers” (Earman, 1989,
p. 2), because, without fresh feedback from the natural world, progress (ap-
propriately understood) must necessarily be made from the differentiation
of frozen scientific material into new, abstract forms.
Whether these new forms are useful to the scientific enquiry, whether
121
they actually clarify it or only succeed in making of it a worse conceptual
shambles, is not the measure by which philosophical fruitfulness is assayed.
Inevitably, having severed the link with nature in the name of professional-
ism, philosophers judge their works, de facto as well as in the words of the
same renowned philosopher of science above, “by one of the most reliable
yardsticks of fruitful philosophizing, namely, How many discussions does
it engender? How many dissertation topics does it spin off?” (Earman,
1989, p. xi). To a non-philosopher, this is an astounding confession, for one
would have thought that philosophers were not just after more discussion
but solutions.
In this way, the discussions of scientific philosophy become similar to
those of speculative philosophy, which it thought to have superseded. Stuck
in a field of hardened scientific lava and without any objective, natural
standard to assay their merits and discard the unfit, the debates of scien-
tific philosophy too are apt to perpetuate themselves through millennia, to
last from everlasting to everlasting. To be sure, the debates of scientific
philosophy, unlike those of traditional philosophy, are capable of growing in
complexity on a par with the development of scientific tools—but whether
this is for better or for worse, one does not dare say.
Can we expect the resolution of a conceptual scientific problem out of the
arguments of professional scientific philosophy? Hardly, because its yard-
stick of success inevitably demands of it that it become argument for ar-
gument’s sake (cf. Earman’s remarks). Scientific puzzles have always been
solved by more and better scientific investigations, by individuals who dared
to give a fresh new look at the physical world around them. For this to be
possible, the link with the natural world must not be severed. The establish-
ment of new scientific knowledge is then apt to banish some philosophical
debates that look rather rusted and obsolete in the light of the new knowl-
edge. (Are spheres the only acceptable shape for the locus of the heavenly
bodies? Is the centre of the universe the only acceptable position of the
earth? How can Achilles ever overtake the tortoise?) But scientific philoso-
phy drinks in the waters of science—insatiably: for every banished debate,
an untold number of others will arise on the basis of the new science, and
so on forevermore.
A telltale indication of scientific philosophy as argument for argument’s
sake can be found in its conspicuously bellicose language, i.e. the language
typically used by philosophers as they, intellectual enemies, battle each
other—till they draw blood (see below) but not to death: it is essential
for the well-being of philosophy that all arguments be kept alive. The sci-
entific philosopher’s everyday vocabulary is fraught with all sorts of words
allusive of violent conflict, so much so that at times one gets the impression
to be reading an account of war. One hears1 of battlegrounds, where enemies,
unfurling myriad pro- and anti-ism flags, deploy attacks on the opponent’s
position, and defend their own with counterattacks; of struggles in which,
amidst the smoke of battle, rivals seek victory over defeat by dealing each
1All italicized words from genuine texts by professional philosophers of science.
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other blows and undermining each other’s ground. Not without a shock, we
catch an epitomic glimpse of the scientific philosopher’s bellicose mindset in
Earman’s (1989) book on spacetime ontology, where he seeks to “revitalize
what has become an insular and bloodless philosophical discussion” (p. 3,
italics added). One may be inclined to excuse such expressions as mere fig-
ures of speech, but when these repeat themselves constantly, one is led to
presume an underlying reason of being.
The reason behind this custom is now apparent: locked within the inert
confines of a frozen science, yet seeking development and progress, the focus
of scientific philosophy shifts in practice to the dynamic and constantly
evolving views of other philosophers. As a result, argument is built upon
argument in a viciously upward spiral, which only a fresh confrontation with
the bare bones of nature’s raw material can collapse back to the ground.
A sustained reading of scientific philosophy is thus apt to lead a scientist
(besides despair) to the following reflection: philosophy—or philoversy? The
love of knowledge, or the love of war/confusion?2
This situation reminds us of Wittgenstein’s words:
A person caught in a philosophical confusion is like a man in a
room who wants to get out but doesn’t know how. He tries the
window but it is too high. He tries the chimney but it is too
narrow. And if he would only turn around, he would see that
the door has been open all the time!3
The symbolic door is in actuality not so easy to find, but the direction in
which we should look to find it is clear: the way out of the philosophical
house is the way that originally brought us in, namely, the study of nature.
Wittgenstein’s metaphorical “turn around” turns out to be singularly apt.
To sum up with an exemplifying question: if Einstein had been a philoso-
pher, as he is sometimes called, would he have discovered special relativity
through his physical analysis of time, or would he have instead remained sci-
entifically frozen in an endless logical analysis of Newtonian absolute time
and space?
All this is not to say that professional philosophy of science never helps
science or clarifies anything. At times, in the hands of exceptional, scientif-
ically inspired philosophers, professional though they may be, it does; but
on a whole, in the hands of the average professional philosopher, it does not.
If the analyses of scientific philosophy go astray due to being logical
dissections uninformed by fresh experience, scientists should know better.
2The etymological association is particularly apt. Wers-, meaning “to mix up, to
lead to confusion,” is the original Indo-European root of the modern English “war.”
Cf. German verwirren, meaning “to confuse, to perplex,” originally from the Proto-
Germanic root werra-. From the first reference below we learn that “Cognates sug-
gest the original sense was ‘to bring into confusion.’ There was no common Ger-
manic word for ‘war’ at the dawn of historical times.” (See “war” in Online Et-
ymology Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com; and American Heritage Dictionary,
http://www.bartleby.com/61)
3Quoted from (Malcolm, 1972, p. 51).
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Scientists, after all, deal with the physical world. This is at any rate true of
the ideal scientist, for it is not today uncommon to come across the variety
that finds more inspiration in “self-consistent” mathematical abstractions
than in nature, and has thus more in common with scientific philosophers
than scientists. But what about the scientist who investigates the physical
world and works in the spirit in which physics has been traditionally carried
out for most of its history?4 What does an analysis mean to him? To him,
an analysis does not mean definition, postulation, or logical dissection (into
what?) but examination. Examination of a concept’s physical meaning, of
its physical root and nature. The content of his analysis is not to be found
primarily in his head, but in the world around him. This is not to say that
an analysis of this type does not rely on the scientist’s conceptual tools of
thought. It necessarily does, but only in conjunction with a keen observation
of nature: his elemental theoretical concepts are developed directly from
observations and experiments—science’s raw material—not off the top of
his secluded head. One particular advantage of proceeding thus is that the
scientist in question knows from the start what he is talking about : the
ontology of his foundational concepts is, by and large, uncontroversial.
This being said, we proceed to a geometric analysis of the concept of
time. What can be expected from such an analysis? First and foremost, an
understanding of relativity theory on the basis of the raw material of simple
measurements and on physical (as opposed to mathematical or philosoph-
ical) ideas. Secondly, an understanding of relativity built progressively as
a natural concatenation of steps, where by “natural” we mean that, at ev-
ery roadblock, we let physics (and, when necessary, psychology) suggest the
way forward. In particular, we let only our physical needs suggest what kind
of mathematical concepts we need, and we develop these naturally, not as
formal, hard-to-swallow definitions without any apparent reason of being.
An expected upside of this way of proceeding is a minimization of math-
ematical baggage, but—as every upside surely must have a downside—the
sceptical reader may ask, are we perhaps trading depth of understanding for
mathematical lightness? Breaking the above-insinuated conservation law of
upsides and downsides, we are here unexpectedly confronted by an upside
without a downside, but instead conducive to a further upside: it is because
mathematics is used only in its due measure, as physics demands and no
more, that we end up gaining understanding of relativity theory instead of,
as is more common, ending up clouded in confusion. The fact that mathe-
matics is in physics only a tool can be ignored only at the physicist’s peril.5
4In connection with space and time, most notably by Riemann and Einstein. In his fa-
mous essay, Riemann (1873), a mathematician, talks as a physicist when he points out that
“the properties which distinguish [physical] space from other conceivable triply extended
magnitudes are only to be deduced from experience,” and is even wary of assuming the
validity of experience “beyond the limits of observation, on the side both of the infinitely
great and of the infinitely small” (pp. 1–2, online ref.). As for Einstein, his continual use
of simple thought experiments during the first half of his life as a starting point for the
theoretical concepts of physics is well known.
5Mathematics as practiced by the mathematician, i.e. as a formal system empty of
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The dire consequences of the abuse of mathematical baggage in physics
have also been noticed by other people pondering these issues. Physicist
Robert Geroch writes:
One sometimes hears expressed the view that some sort of uncer-
tainty principle operates in the interaction between mathematics
and physics: the greater the mathematical care used to formulate
a concept, the less the physical insight to be gained from that
formulation. It is not difficult to imagine how such a viewpoint
could come to be popular. It is often the case that the essen-
tial physical ideas of a discussion are smothered by mathematics
through excessive definitions, concern over irrelevant generality,
etc. Nonetheless, one can make a case that mathematics as math-
ematics, if used thoughtfully, is almost always useful—and oc-
casionally essential—to progress in theoretical physics. (Geroch,
1985, p. vii)
In conclusion, for an insightful physical analysis, mathematics in due
measure and professional philosophy not at all.
10.1 Clock readings as spatiotemporal basis
10.1.1 Events and particles as geometric objects
As we survey the macroscopic world in connection with classical and rela-
tivistic theories, two key concepts come to our attention: that of an event
and that of a particle. An event is, quite simply, a phenomenon, anything
that we register as happening: a flash of lightning, the sound of a horn, the
touch of a hand on the shoulder, etc.
Is an event as such a geometric concept? It certainly is a human-made
concept, for what we call an event never appears alone and differentiated
from the rest of a jumble of impressions. But it certainly is not a geometric
concept. We can ask of it a pair of test questions: does an event have a
shape? Does the concept of size apply to it? The answer to both questions
is no. Not before we idealize it.
The idealization of an event made in physics is one of the most basic yet
extreme cases of geometric idealization. Going much farther than having,
for example, the more tangible earth crust idealized as an even spherical
surface, here we have an indefinite physical phenomenon squeezed into the
tightest of all geometric objects, a point.
Does now a point-event have a shape, and can we speak of its size? The
first question is the trickier of the two because, of all geometric objects, a
point is by far the most abstract—an extreme case. Unlike all other geomet-
ric objects, the shape of a point is irrelevant because its size (understood in
any way) is zero. This answers the second question above: the concept of
size does apply to a point, namely, it is zero. This is not at all the same as
semantic meaning, is another matter altogether and not the subject of this criticism.
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saying that it is meaningless to speak of its size, as it is to speak of the size of
a raw event. Due to their utmost geometric abstractness, points are strictly
speaking impossible to visualize, although they are normally thought of and
depicted as dots of some irrelevant shape (circular, square, spherical, etc.).
How does this translate to the physically inspired point-events? By
geometrically idealizing physical phenomena as points, the former become
endowed with two seemingly physical properties: a point-event is something
that does not take space and does not have duration. But with such extreme
features, how can point-events be measured (or localized) as such? After all,
if they do not take space and do not have duration, they must not exist.
At this difficult junction, counting comes to our aid. The quality of being
point-like can be characterized analytically by means of numbers: a point
is simply a set of real numbers. In classical physics, a point-event is iden-
tified with the set of four numbers (x, y, z; t), and the whole of all possible
point-events forms a four-dimensional continuum called space-time—with a
hyphen, since t is special and given separately. The same idea can be trans-
ferred to relativity theory by loosening the restriction above, according to
which time t is given independently of the other three numbers. In relativity
theory, a point-event is identified with the set of four numbers (x1, x2, x3, x4),
and the whole of all possible point-events forms a four-dimensional con-
tinuum called spacetime—without a hyphen, since no element of the set
(x1, x2, x3, x4) can be separately singled out as special and, in particular,
representing time.
The sets of four numbers (x, y, z; t) and (x1, x2, x3, x4) are the coordi-
nates of a point-event, but what physical meaning shall we attribute to
them? If coordinates are to have any meaning, it must be given them oper-
ationally: how are these numbers attributed to a point-event?
Since the space-time coordinate t, symbolizing absolute time in (x, y, z; t),
has in fact no operational meaning, we focus only on the general spacetime
coordinates (x1, x2, x3, x4). To localize a spacetime event, we resort to an
arbitrary operational method, whereby we specify the way in which the four
numbers are measured. Consider as an example Ohanian’s (1975, pp. 222–
223) astrogator coordinates used by a hypothetical astronavigator. To deter-
mine the spacetime coordinates of his spaceship, he identifies four different
stars (red, yellow, blue, and white), measures the angles θα between any
four different pairs of stars, and associates each number with a spacetime
coordinate, θα =: xα (α = 1, 2, 3, 4).
In spacetime, no coordinate is differentiated from the others; each shares
the same status with the other three. But so that two distinct events (e.g.
two distinct phenomena inside the spaceship) will be tagged with different
numbers, at least one of the stars (but possibly all four) must be in relative
motion with respect to any of the other three. Ohanian calls this coordinate
the “time coordinate.” However, this name may be misleading for, if all the
stars are moving relative to one another, which one is to be the “time coordi-
nate”? If the four coordinates are operationally equivalent and any of them
can be taken as the “time coordinate,” then why give one a special name
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without reason? The ghost of Newtonian time keeps haunting relativity.
The establishment of a connection between time and a coordinate, say,
x4, is only possible in special cases. For example, if spacetime is separable
into a spatial part and a temporal part, i.e. if its quadratic form Q can be
written as
Q = gab(x
1, x2, x3, x4)dxadxb + g44(x
1, x2, x3)(dx4)2, (10.1)
and if we choose comoving coordinates such that x1 = x2 = x3 = constant
(only one moving star with respect to the ship), then ds2 = constant (dx4)2.
When these requirements are fulfilled, the differential dx4 of the fourth coor-
dinate is directly proportional to the clock separation ds (see Sections 10.1.3
and 10.4.5).
Whenever spacetime coordinates are chosen without establishing at the
same time their operational meaning (e.g. spherical coordinates), these re-
main physically meaningless until a connection is established between them
and a measurable parameter such as s. For example, once the metric field is
known and the geodesic equation solved, one can find a relation xα = xα(s).
Given two sets of coordinates (x1, x2, x3, x4) and (y1, y2, y3, y4), we can
find analytic transformations xα = xα(y) and yα = yα(x) that take one set
of coordinate values to another (x represents the whole set of coordinate
values, and likewise for y).
The next concept essential to classical and relativistic theories is that
of a (massive or massless) particle. Like events but less dramatically so,
particles are also idealized geometrically as points. Unlike events, however,
particles are taken to be moving points both in classical and relativistic
theories. An event and a particle are connected as follows: the history of a
particle is a sequence of events.
In classical physics, the history of a particle is given by the set of equa-
tions {x = x(t), y = y(t), z = z(t)}, where t has the role of a (coordinate)
parameter. These three equations determine a particle’s classical world-
line. In relativistic physics, on the other hand, the history of a particle is
given by the set of equations xα = xα(u), where u is a one-dimensional
(non-coordinate) parameter. These four equations determine a particle’s
relativistic worldline. Now, if possible and if so wanted, one could solve for
u (e.g. u = u(x4)) and use this to rewrite the above set of four equations
as a set of three, xa = xa(x4) (a = 1, 2, 3), but in so doing the separation
between space and time has not taken place—there is no reason to take in
general x4 as a time coordinate in relativity theory.
In classical physics, a particle of mass m satisfies the equations of motion
m
d2xa
dt2
= F a, (10.2)
where the classical force F a is of the form F a(x,dx/dt). These three equa-
tions determine the history of a particle, or its worldline, if one is given (i)
an event (x1, x2, x3; t) that belongs to it and (ii) a direction in space-time
at the said event, i.e. the ratios between the differentials dxa and dt. Can
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this idea of an equation of motion also be applied in relativity theory? We
now demand that the history of a massive particle, or its worldline, be de-
termined once one is given (i) an event (x1, x2, x3, x4) that belongs to it and
(ii) a direction in spacetime at the said event, i.e. the ratios between the dif-
ferentials dxα and du. This demand can be met if the differential equations
for the worldline of a particle are of the form
d2xα
du2
= Xα, (10.3)
where Xα = Xα(x,dx/du). Here du appears only as a differential. What is
Xα equal to and what is its physical meaning? We return to this issue later
on, when the time is ripe for it.
10.1.2 The observer as psychological agent
We saw that physical phenomena are geometrically idealized as point-events,
and that matter is geometrically idealized as point-particles. In particular,
now a human observer is geometrically idealized as a moving point-particle
that makes observations along its worldline. Conventionally, the so-called
observer does not need to be human, but is embodied by a set of measuring
devices moving along a worldline. However, there exists one essential side to
the observer that only a human observer can provide, namely, its subjective
experience. According to this experience, events can be laid down in a
certain order along the human observer’s worldline, who thus creates in his
mind the past, the present, and the future.
We saw earlier that none of the four coordinates of a relativistic event
(x1, x2, x3, x4) could in general be isolated as time. The isolation of one
of these four coordinates as universal time would unavoidably lead to an
absolute ordering of events as in classical physics (classical absolute time),
but relativity theory does not claim the existence of a natural order for an
arbitrary pair of point-events. When at all possible, a pair of events can only
be ordered with respect to the worldline of a given observer—he is actually
the one who does the ordering. For those pairs of events that cannot possibly
be contained on the observer’s worldline due to restrictions of his motion,
no ordering relation is possible at all. All these events belong together in
the relativistic four-dimensional present, whereas those than can be ordered
along the observer’s worldline belong in the relativistic four-dimensional past
or future.
Also the classical worldview can be understood from this temporal per-
spective. As the constraint imposed by the three-dimensional hypersurface
limiting the motion of the observer is relaxed, the forbidden four-dimensional
present becomes an allowed three-dimensional present, together with a wider
four-dimensional past and future (Figure 10.1). Classical physics, then, ap-
pears to be a special case of relativistic physics as far as the dimensions of
the present are concerned, but, on the other hand, relativistic physics is also
more limiting than classical physics, because in it the present is a forbidden
area. The restrictive nature of the relativistic present is one of the reasons
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Figure 10.1: In a relativistic world, an observer determines the past, the present,
and the future, as he orders events on his worldline into these three categories ac-
cording to his subjective experience. The present is formed by the set of all events
that lie outside the physical boundary imposed by restrictions on his motion. The
classical conception of an absolute present arises when the boundary is collapsed
onto a three-dimensional plane t = constant. Event D belongs to both the relativis-
tic and classical present, while event C belongs to the relativistic present but to
the classical future.
why classical physics continues to be preferred for most of our daily needs,
since in it the allowed present is understood more widely.
10.1.3 Clocks and the line element
The foundations of classical and relativistic physics can be laid down on the
basis of clock measurements. Ideally, a clock should progress at a constant
pace; this requirement is realized in practice by searching for natural pro-
cesses with respect to which a great many other natural processes are in
synchronicity, thereby simplifying their study. As an ideal clock can only be
determined by comparison with other clocks, its basic property may be given
as follows: two ideal clocks carried along by an observer along his worldline
remain synchronous—their ticking ratio remains constant—for any worldline
C joining any pair of events A and B.
Consider now an observer who carries an ideal clock along his worldline
C from point-event A to point-event B. At A he records the clock read-
ing sA and on reaching B records the new clock reading sB. These clock
readings (not time instants) are the results of physical measurements. We
now say that the separation between events A and B along worldline C is
∆s = sB − sA. When event B is close to event A, by which we mean opera-
tionally that the observer “stops his watch quickly after A,”6 a good approx-
imation to ∆s is furnished by the separation ds along a straight worldline
element; in symbols, ∆s ≈ ds.
The worldline-element separation ds as here presented (in terms of clock
6We may also say that A and B are close if their coordinate values differ by a small
amount.
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Figure 10.2: The line element ds can act as a starting point for the development
of classical and relativistic theories, and presumably for any other geometric theory
of space and time, when we choose to geometrize it according to tradition. But
what kind of metageometric theory, describing what physics, would one arrive at if
one followed the opposite, no-geometry direction?
measurements) gives enough foundation to lead, via different choices, to the
concepts of either Newton’s classical physics, Einstein’s special- and general-
relativistic physics, and presumably to any other geometric theory of space
and time. Here we shall deal with classical and relativistic theories on the
basis of ds.
It is noteworthy, however, that ds, as a temporal correlation between
two events, or two “nows,” is not a geometric concept. There is nothing
geometric in the (psychological) identification of the present (when the ini-
tial and final observations are made), and there is nothing geometric in an
event, since, as we saw, these are not originally points but raw phenomena.
The activity comprised by a clock measurement and the values it produces,
however, can lead to a geometric representation. Such a geometrization
and its main results are in fact the essence of this chapter. These observa-
tions lead then to a provoking thought: what kind of theory may be arrived
at by following an opposite, no-geometry direction from ds? What kind
of metageometric theory, describing what physics of time, would this be?
(Figure 10.2).
A geometric picture emerges when events become point-events, an ob-
server a point-particle, an observer’s history a world-line, ∆s the length of
the worldline between the joined point-events, and ds the length of the dif-
ferential arrow dx between point-events A at x and B at x+ dx, i.e. when
we start to view ds in terms of coordinate points and coordinate arrows. In
fact, the geometrization of the differential ds leads us—naturally enough—
to differential geometry. What else do we know about ds? How does it
depend on the coordinates of point-events A and B?
To move forward, some choices must be made. The main stopovers on
the road to Einstein’s geometric theory of gravitation have, in fact, already
been called into attention in two public lectures: by Riemann in 1854, “On
the foundations which lie at the bases of geometry,” and by Einstein in 1922,
“How I created the theory of relativity”—it is through their steps that we
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shall progress.
The first clue is older than relativity itself and comes from Riemann’s
famous 1854 lecture. As he sets himself the task of determining the length
of a line in a manifold, he writes:
The problem consists then in establishing a mathematical ex-
pression for the length of a line. . . I shall confine myself in the
first place to lines in which the ratios of the quantities dx of the
respective variables vary continuously. We may then conceive
these lines broken up into elements, within which the ratios of
the quantities dx may be regarded as constant; and the problem
is then reduced to establishing for each point a general expression
for the linear element ds starting from that point, an expression
which will thus contain the quantities x and the quantities dx. I
shall suppose, secondly, that the length of the linear element, to
the first order, is unaltered when all the points of this element un-
dergo the same infinitesimal displacement, which implies at the
same time that if all the quantities dx are increased in the same
ratio, the linear element will also vary in the same ratio. On these
assumptions, the linear element may be any homogeneous func-
tion of the first degree of the quantities dx. . . (Riemann, 1873,
p. 5, online ref., italics added)
Following Riemann, we set the line element ds to be a function of the coor-
dinates of A and B,
ds = f(x,dx), (10.4)
where f(x,dx) is a homogeneous function of first degree in the differentials
dx , i.e. f(x, kdx) = kf(x,dx) (k > 0 can be a function of x).7 When the
equation of worldline C is given by xα = xα(u), where u is a parameter
whose value grows from the past to the future, we can then write
ds = f
(
x,
dx
du
du
)
= f
(
x,
dx
du
)
du, (10.5)
and therefore the separation ∆s between A and B is given by
∆s =
∫ B
A
C
ds =
∫ uB
uA
f
(
x,
dx
du
)
du. (10.6)
10.1.4 Invariance of the line element
Talking about his personal struggle to understand gravitation geometrically,
Einstein (1982) relates during his Kyoto lecture discussing with Marcel
Grossmann whether “the problem could be solved using Riemann theory,
in other words, by using the concept of the invariance of the line elements”
(p. 47). This is a key issue, whose study now allows us to move on.
7We have found that also Synge (1964) has understood relativity chronometrically
based on the Riemannian hypothesis.
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Event separation ∆s and its differential approximation ds are the re-
sults of physical measurements with a clock made by the observer along his
worldline; ds is an absolute spacetime property of this worldline, namely,
its extension between events A and B. Because ds is here meant only in
this classical sense, its invariance is a simple matter.8 Having proposed that
the line element is a function of the coordinates, ds = f(x,dx), the physical
raw material encoded as ds now demands that its mathematical expression
f(x,dx) be an invariant in the mathematical sense of the word. That is, the
value of f(x,dx) must be independent of the set of coordinates chosen by
the observer on his worldline, i.e. f(x,dx) = f ′(y,dy), where yα = yα(x).
The need to deal with physical invariance leads us to search for math-
ematical objects that are meaningful regardless of the coordinate system
in which they may be expressed. Tensor equations (not just tensors) are
such objects; if a tensor equation holds in one coordinate system, it holds in
any coordinate system. Tensor equations have this property because tensor
transformations between coordinate systems are linear and homogeneous.
Events A at x and B at x + dx determine a differential displacement
vector whose components are dxα and whose tail is fixed at A. In another
coordinate system, the components of this differential displacement vector
are dyα and can be obtained by differentiation of the coordinate transfor-
mation yα = yα(x). We find
dyα =
∂yα
∂xβ
dxβ, (10.7)
which is a linear and homogeneous coordinate transformation of the dif-
ferential with coefficients ∂yα/∂xβ . The set of differentials dxα, together
with the way they transform from one coordinate system to another, gives
us a prototype for a first type of vector (and, in general, tensor) called
contravariant.9
Following the contravariant vector prototype, we can build other sets of
magnitudes attached to A that transform in the same way. The magnitudes
Tαβ, transforming linearly and homogeneously in Tαβ according to
T ′αβ =
∂x′α
∂xγ
∂x′β
∂xδ
T γδ, (10.8)
8In the present context, the physical scale (seconds, minutes, hours) or dimension used
to express ds is inconsequential to its invariance. A measurement result expressed as 60 s,
1 min, etc., or in a different dimension, say 2π rad, makes reference to the same objective
physical extension—this is something we can metaphorically point at, in the same way
that “book” and “Buch” refer to the same physical object. (Cf. comments by Eakins and
Jaroszkiewicz (2004, p. 10)). Beyond the tentative, exploratory remarks at the end of
Chapter 9, a quantum-mechanical discussion of invariance (in particular, that of ds) falls
outside the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of quantum experiments involving two
different inertial frames, see (Jaroszkiewicz, 2007, pp. 50–54).
9Although contravariant vectors and tensors are inspired in differential displacement
vectors (their components are small), the components of contravariant vectors and tensors
do not in general need to be small. For example, the components dxα/du of the derivative
along a worldline represent a unbounded contravariant vector.
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constitute a second-order contravariant tensor. And similarly for higher-
order contravariant tensors.
A zeroth-order tensor is a scalar that transforms according to the identity
relation, T ′ = T , i.e. it is an invariant. If we now take a zeroth-order tensor
to be a function of the coordinates f(x), we must have that f(x) = f ′(x′).
How does the gradient of f(x) transform when expressed in another coordi-
nate system? Using the chain rule, we have
∂f ′(x′)
∂x′α
=
∂f(x)
∂x′α
=
∂xβ
∂x′α
∂f(x)
∂xβ
. (10.9)
It turns out that a gradient transforms in a manner opposite to that of
contravariant vectors (and tensors). The gradient then serves as a proto-
type for a second type of vector (and, in general, tensor) called covariant.
Historically, this name actually comes from a shortening and reshuffling of
“variation co-gradient,” i.e. variation in the same manner as the gradient,
and the name contravariant comes from “variation contra-gradient,” i.e.
variation against the manner of the gradient.
Like before, following the covariant-gradient prototype, we can have
other sets of magnitudes attached to A that transform in the same way.
The magnitudes Tαβ , transforming linearly and homogeneously in Tαβ ac-
cording to
T ′αβ =
∂xγ
∂x′α
∂xδ
∂x′β
Tγδ , (10.10)
constitute a second-order covariant tensor. And similarly for higher-order
covariant tensors, and also for mixtures of both types. Finally, when a tensor
is attached not only to a single event, but to every event along a worldline
or to every event in the four-dimensional spacetime continuum, we have a
spacetime field called tensor field.
10.1.5 The Newtonian line element
So far, we know two chief properties of ds. One is that it represents a classi-
cal measurement of an absolute spacetime property and is therefore a phys-
ical invariant; this means that f(x,dx) must be a mathematical invariant.
The other is that f(x,dx) is homogeneous with respect to all components
dxα. Within these requirements there is still freedom to choose the form of
f(x,dx), but what choices lead to physically relevant results? We proceed
in what one may call a natural way. Let us try to separate the dependence
of f(x,dx) on x and dx using the mathematical invariance and homogeneity
of this function. Both requirements can be fulfilled by considering an inner
product.
We propose as a first case to be analysed an inner product of two vectors,
a linear form
ds = f(x,dx) = gα(x)dx
α. (10.11)
This function is clearly homogeneous of first degree with respect to dxα and
produces an invariant number. Moreover, because gα(x)dx
α is invariant and
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dxα is a general contravariant vector, we must have that gα(x) is a covariant
vector.10 But what is the physical meaning of gα(x)?
The simplest option is to choose the covariant vector after the covariant
prototype,
gα(x) =
∂t(x)
∂xα
, (10.12)
where t(x) is an invariant function of the spacetime coordinates x. The
separation between events A and B becomes
sB − sA =
∫ B
A
ds =
∫ B
A
C
∂t(x)
∂xα
dxα =
∫ B
A
C
dt(x) = tB − tA. (10.13)
In other words, because dt(x) is an exact differential, the separation between
events A and B does not depend on the worldline C travelled. Because we
know experimentally that this result is false, we can conclude that there
must be something wrong with our choice of Eq. (10.12), and presumably
even with the linear form (10.11). On the positive side, we learn that this
choice leads to the interpretation of s as absolute classical time t. This is
one of the essential differences between classical and relativistic physics; in
the latter, ds is not an exact differential and the separation ∆s between
events depends on the worldline travelled.
10.1.6 The Riemann-Einstein line element
The second simplest choice for f(x,dx) satisfying the same two requirements
set above consists of an inner product of a second-order covariant tensor and
two differential displacement vectors, that is, a quadratic form
ds = f(x,dx) =
√
−gαβ(x)dxαdxβ. (10.14)
The square root is necessary to meet the requirement of homogeneity of first
degree with respect to the differential displacements, whereas the reason for
the minus sign will become apparent later on.
On the basis of a similar procedure as above (see previous footnote),
we can now deduce something about the tensorial nature of gαβ(x), but
not as much as before. Although dxα is a general contravariant tensor,
since it appears in the symmetric product dxαdxβ, we can now only deduce
that gαβ + gβα must be a second-order covariant tensor, but we cannot
conclude anything about the tensorial nature of gαβ itself on the basis of
the invariance of the inner product. However, if we assume that gαβ(x) is
symmetric—and this we shall do—then we can conclude that gαβ(x) is a
second-order covariant tensor.11
10The invariance of the inner product means that g′αdx
′α = gβdx
β, and the fact that dxα
is a contravariant vector means that it transforms as dx′α = (∂x′α/∂xβ)dxβ. Together
these two relations lead to [(∂x′α/∂xβ)g′α − gβ]dxβ = 0. On account of dxβ being an
arbitrary contravariant vector, the bracketed expression must be null, which means that
gα transforms as a covariant vector.
11Einstein considered the possibility of an asymmetric metric tensor in the latter part
of his life in the context of attempts at a unified theory of electromagnetism and gravity.
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Given then a symmetric second-order covariant tensor gαβ(x) that is,
moreover, non-singular (det(gαβ) 6= 0), the invariant quadratic form
Q = gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ (10.15)
determines a four-dimensional continuum called Riemann-Einstein space-
time. The line element (10.14) of Riemann-Einstein spacetime, which is
based on this quadratic form, is the foundation of relativity theory.
A challenging question, however, remains: what is the physical meaning
of gαβ(x)? To sketch a solution, we now need to take a look at the founda-
tions of Riemannian metric geometry. In connection with the search for a
new description of gravitation, the necessity of this stopover was related by
Einstein during his Kyoto lecture:
What should we look for to describe our problem? This problem
was unsolved until 1912, when I hit upon the idea that the surface
theory of Karl Friedrich Gauss might be the key to this mystery.
I found that Gauss’ surface coordinates were very meaningful
for understanding this problem. Until then I did not know that
Bernhard Riemann [who was a student of Gauss] had discussed
the foundation of geometry deeply. . . I found that the founda-
tions of geometry had deep physical meaning. (Einstein, 1982,
p. 47)
10.1.7 From Gaussian surfaces to Riemannian space
Metric geometry—geometry that deals essentially with magnitudes—has
length as its basic concept. In Euclidean metric geometry, this concept
always refers to the finite distance between two space points. In Rieman-
nian metric geometry, on the other hand, it refers to the distance between
two very (not necessarily infinitesimally) close points. In other words, the
passage from finite Euclidean geometry to differential Riemannian geometry
is achieved by approximating the finite distance ∆l between two points with
the differential distance dl.
We start by examining Cartesian coordinates (straight lines meeting
at right angles) in a three-dimensional Euclidean space. On the basis of
Pythagoras’ theorem, the squared distance between the points (y1, y2, y3)
and (y1 + dy1, y2 + dy2, y3 + dy3) is given by
dl2 = (dy1)2 + (dy2)2 + (dy3)2. (10.16)
In terms of general coordinates x1, x2, x3 (curved lines meeting at oblique
angles), because dyi = (∂yi/∂xa)dxa (i, a = 1, 2, 3), we obtain
dl2 = hab(x)dx
adxb, (10.17)
where
hab(x) =
3∑
i=1
∂yi
∂xa
∂yi
∂xb
(10.18)
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is symmetric with respect to a and b by inspection. Again, because hab(x)
is assuredly symmetric, the squared length dl2 is an invariant, and dxa is a
general vector, we can conclude (based on the results of the previous section)
that hab(x) is a (symmetric) second-order covariant tensor.
12 This tensor
determines the metric structure, or metric, of three-dimensional Euclidean
space, and is therefore called the metric tensor.
The next step towards Riemannian space is to consider with Gauss a
two-dimensional surface yi = yi(x1, x2) (i = 1, 2, 3), where x1 and x2 are
parameters, embedded in a three-dimensional Euclidean space. Now the
squared distance between neighbouring points on the surface is given by
dl2 = (dy1)2 + (dy2)2 + (dy3)2 = γab(x)dx
adxb, (10.19)
where
γab(x) =
3∑
i=1
∂yi
∂xa
∂yi
∂xb
(a, b = 1, 2). (10.20)
This symmetric second-order covariant tensor is called the surface-induced
metric, i.e. the metric that the surrounding three-dimensional Euclidean
space induces on the surface. What happens if we now remove the space
surrounding the surface altogether?
Although it was Gauss who first developed the idea of a surface em-
bedded in a higher-dimensional Euclidean space, it was Riemann who took
the seemingly nonsensical step of removing the embedding space and taking
what remained seriously: a two-dimensional non-Euclidean space, a two-
dimensional continuum determined by the invariant quadratic form
Q = γab(x)dx
adxb (a, b = 1, 2), (10.21)
where x1 and x2 are Gauss’s surface coordinates and γab(x) is a second-order
covariant tensor. We assume this new tensor inherits its metric role in this
new space from Gauss’s case, and that it, too, is symmetric. What remains,
then, is a two-dimensional Riemannian space, a space one can inhabit but
not look at from the outside because it has no outside. For example, what is
normally thought as a spherical surface is, in fact, only a Gaussian picture
(embedded in Euclidean space) of what is truly a non-Euclidean elliptical
plane.
If γab(x) is the (symmetric) metric tensor of two-dimensional Riemannian
space, does this mean that its quadratic form gives a meaningful idea of
the squared distance between two neighbouring points of this space? As it
stands, it does not, because there is no reason to assume that the quadratic
form (10.21) is positive definite,13 as it was for Euclidean space and Gaussian
surfaces embedded in it. In Riemannian space, the quadratic form can be
12If hab(x) = 0 when a 6= b, the coordinate lines meet at right angles. If, in addition,
hab(x) = 1 when a = b, the coordinates are Cartesian.
13The quadratic form is positive definite if it is always positive except when all the
components of the differential displacement dxa are null, i.e. when the two points in
question coincide with each other.
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negative for some differential displacements dxa (i.e. in certain directions
from a point), positive for others, and null for others; in consequence, the
concept of distance must be introduced separately. This can be done with
the help of an indicator ǫ, which can have the values +1 or −1, such that
dl2 = ǫγab(x)dx
adxb ≥ 0 (10.22)
for all dxa. The equality holds for a null displacement, but can also hold for
a non-null one, i.e. the distance between two points can be null even when
they are not coincident.
Indicators can also be used in a different way. The coordinates can be
so chosen that the quadratic form γab(x)dx
adxb can be brought into the
simpler one
Q = ǫ1(dx
′1)2 + ǫ2(dx
′2)2, (10.23)
at one point at a time but not globally.14 For a Riemannian space with a
positive-definite quadratic form, we have the case ǫ1 = ǫ2 = +1, leading
to a locally Cartesian quadratic form; it describes a space whose geometry
is locally Euclidean. For a Riemannian space with an indefinite quadratic
form, we have the rest of the cases, leading to a pseudo-Cartesian quadratic
form; they describe a space whose geometry is locally pseudo-Euclidean.
The pair (ǫ1, ǫ2) is called the space signature and it is an invariant, i.e. it
cannot be changed by means of a (real) coordinate transformation.
With the introduction of a stand-alone two-dimensional Riemannian
space, we have banished three-dimensional Euclidean space. But as we next
add a dimension to take into account a three-dimensional space, should Eu-
clidean space be resurrected again? If we want to conserve the chance of
describing new physics through the idea of Riemannian space, we should not.
We should now consider a three-dimensional Riemannian space (i) which is
not embedded in any higher-dimensional Euclidean space, (ii) whose geom-
etry is by nature non-Euclidean, and (iii) which is determined by the invari-
ant indefinite quadratic form hab(x)dx
adxb (a, b = 1, 2, 3). Here hab(x) is a
symmetric second-order covariant metric tensor, and the quadratic form in
question is locally Cartesian or locally pseudo-Cartesian, i.e. locally of the
form
Q = ǫ1(dx
1)2 + ǫ2(dx
2)2 + ǫ3(dx
3)2, (10.24)
with ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 each being +1 or −1. Finally, the concept of distance is at-
tached to this three-dimensional space via the use of indicator ǫ as before:15
dl2 = ǫhab(x)dx
adxb. (10.25)
14To do this, write γab(x)dx
adxb (a = 1, 2) in explicit form, complete squares, and make
the change of variables x′1 =
√
ǫ1γ11x
1 + (γ12/
√
ǫ1γ11x
2), x′2 =
p
ǫ2[γ22 − (γ12)2/γ11]x2
to obtain ǫ1(dx
′1)2+ ǫ2(dx
′2)2. The quadratic form thus obtained is valid only at a point
at a time, because for this method to work γab(x) must be kept constant. The indicators
should be chosen so as to avoid the appearance of imaginary roots, thus keeping the
transformations real.
15In physical spacetime, dl2 is not an invariant, but the spatial part of the invariant ds2
(when it is possible to make the space-time split).
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10.2 Riemann-Einstein physical spacetime
10.2.1 Towards local physical geometry
Having studied Gaussian surfaces and Riemannian space to suit our needs,
we now turn to physical spacetime, resuming where we left earlier.
We proposed the form of the line element ds of Riemann-Einstein space-
time in Eq. (10.14) to be
ds =
√
−gαβ(x)dxαdxβ.
We can now make physical sense of this expression, including an elucidation
of the minus sign, by approaching the line element from the perspective of
Riemannian geometry. Because ds represents clock-reading separations and
these are positive real numbers, ds is always real and positive. Its square
ds2 must then also be real and positive.16 On the other hand, we saw that
the quadratic form gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ of a Riemannian (now four-dimensional)
space is not positive definite. However, we learnt how to solve this problem
(in trying to get a non-negative length dl2) using an indicator ǫ. It is then
natural to propose
ds2 = ǫgαβ(x)dx
αdxβ (10.26)
in order to ensure that ds2 is never negative.
As an aside, we also find the geometric meaning of gαβ(x): gαβ(x) is the
metric tensor, or metric, of Riemann-Einstein four-dimensional spacetime.
As a Riemannian metric, gαβ links contravariant and covariant vectors, T
α
and Tα, which have otherwise no connection; the invariant inner product
between two such vectors TαTα is the same as the invariant quadratic form
gαβT
αT β, whereby we obtain the identification
gαβT
β =: Tα. (10.27)
We conclude that, from the point of view of Riemannian geometry, con-
travariant and covariant vectors (and, in general, tensors) are essentially
the same.
This interpretation of gαβ(x) comes as an anticlimactic answer to the
challenging question we posed earlier, for at the back of our minds we al-
ready knew that gαβ(x) was the metric of spacetime. This mathematical,
geometric meaning, then, is not really what we were pursuing when we asked
for the meaning of gαβ(x); it is a more physical meaning, if any, that we are
still after.
As we now compare Eq. (10.14) with Eq. (10.26), we must conclude
that for any observer moving along his worldline and actually measuring
the positive real-number separation between two events with his clock, ǫ
must be equal to −1. In other words, an observer with a clock can only
move in directions determined by differential displacements dxα such that
gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ is negative; other directions are physically forbidden.
16The case of a photon is dealt with later.
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Signature ǫ1 ǫ2 ǫ3 ǫ4
(+,+,+,+) +1 +1 +1 +1
(+,+,+,−) +1 +1 +1 −1
(+,+,−,−) +1 +1 −1 −1
(+,−,−,−) +1 −1 −1 −1
(−,−,−,−) −1 −1 −1 −1
Table 10.1: Five different possibilities for the signature of Riemann-Einstein
spacetime. Each of these choices leads to a different local physical geometry for
spacetime.
According to the direction of a differential displacement dxα, and in
keeping with the usual names, we can now say that17
(i) dxα is timelike (i.e. allowed) if gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ < 0 (ǫ = −1),
(ii) dxα is spacelike (i.e. forbidden) if gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ > 0 (ǫ = +1), and
(iii) dxα is lightlike (i.e. allowed only for photons) if gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ = 0.
Regarding item (iii), in relativity theory the hypothesis is made that the
differential displacements characterizing the history of a photon satisfy the
relation ds = 0. Strictly speaking, this hypothesis is outside the boundaries
of the operational meaning of ds, since the clock to be carried along by a
photon to make the necessary measurements is a material object which can
never reach the speed of light. One may, however, understand this photon-
history hypothesis as the limiting case of increasing velocities of material
bodies (see Section 10.3.2).
Because Riemann-Einstein spacetime is locally pseudo-Cartesian, coor-
dinates can be found such that its indefinite quadratic form takes the form
Q = ǫ1(dx
1)2 + ǫ2(dx
2)2 + ǫ3(dx
3)2 + ǫ4(dx
4)2 (10.28)
at one point at a time. What are all the possible different combinations of
ǫi? Because no separation between three space coordinates and one time
coordinate has as yet been made—and any such separation would at this
point be artificial—all four coordinates stand on an equal footing. It is then
immaterial the signs of which ǫi are being changed in any one combination.
The five different possible combinations are listed in Table 10.1.
Which of the five possibilities should we choose? And on what grounds?
No answer makes itself naturally available to us—we have reached a road-
block. This is a critical stage of this analysis. It is time to recapitulate.
17The same classification can be generalized to include any contravariant vector Tα.
An example of another timelike (i.e. allowed) contravariant vector is the tangent vector
dxα/du to a worldline.
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10.2.2 Local physical geometry from psychology
The present analysis of time has so far been based, first and foremost, on a
physical component consisting of clock measurements ds; and secondly, on
the other side of the equation, on amathematical component consisting of the
geometric description of spacetime via its characteristic invariant quadratic
form gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ. Is there anything missing from this analysis of time?
Should we consider something else besides physics and mathematics? We
must; if we are to move forwards in a natural, non-axiomatic way, we are
forced to also take into account a psychological component regarding the
conception of time: the human notions of past, present (or being), and
future.
The past and the future include all the allowed directions that an ob-
server can follow, and so, recalling that we can only measure positive values
of ds and that Eq. (10.14) carries a minus sign, we have that
(i) gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ < 0 (ǫ = −1) for the past and the future,
(ii) gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ > 0 (ǫ = +1) for the present, and
(iii) gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ = 0 for the boundary surface between the present and
the past and future, i.e. the lightcone (see below).
What choice of indicators ǫi do the conceptions of past, present, and
future lead to? Choices (+,+,+,+) and (−,−,−,−) can be discarded as
soon as we notice that they lead to quadratic forms of the type
Q = ±[(dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 + (dx4)2], (10.29)
which are always positive and do not allow the conceptions of the past
and the future, or always negative and do not allow the conception of the
present. Of the remaining options, which should we choose? And again, on
what grounds?
While the existence of the present on the one hand, and the past and
future on the other, acted as a first guideline, it is now the distinction
between the past and the future that acts as the next one. We perceive
the past becoming the future as a serial, unidirectional, or one-dimensional
affair through the present, and so it appears that this process of becoming
should be pictured locally by means of the progression of a single coordinate
parameter and not of several of them. Given one coordinate parameter
x that we may locally associate with the psychological conception of the
unidirectional flow of time, we may then connect the past with decreasing
values of x and the future with increasing values of x.
Because we associated the past and the future with negative values of
the invariant quadratic form, we may now discard options (+,+,−,−) and
(+,−,−,−), which introduce, respectively, two and three (coordinate) pa-
rameters locally associated with the past and the future (prefixed with neg-
ative signs)—a so-called embarrassment of riches. Why? Because there do
not exist two or three different ways in which we feel it is possible to go
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from the past to the future—e.g. is there a way through the present but
perhaps also another that shortcuts it, as if past and future shared one or
more direct connections? This idea does not conform with the seriality of
the psychological conception of time, and we therefore discard these two
options. We are left with option (+,+,+,−), which we adopt.18
The choice of the invariant quadratic form with signature (+,+,+,−)
leads to the following classification:
(i) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 < 0 for the past and future,
(ii) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 > 0 for the present, and
(iii) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 = 0 for the lightcone.
Moreover, through the increase and decrease of coordinate x4, we can locally
differentiate the past from the future, thus:
(i-a) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 < 0 & dx4 < 0 for the past, and
(i-b) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 < 0 & dx4 > 0 for the future.
In addition, we can also identify
(iii-a) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 = 0 & dx4 < 0 with the branch
of the lightcone that differentiates the past from the present, and
(iii-b) (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 = 0 & dx4 > 0 with the branch
of the lightcone that differentiates the future from the present.
Now, why should physics take into account these aspects of the psy-
chological notion of time? Why should physics be partly based on them?
Should physics also take into account the properties of other psychological
conceptions, such as hunger, happiness, pain, and disdain? Not really, not
in any specific way. What is then special about time? It is this: the psycho-
logical notion of time as a stream that drags us from past to future through
the ubiquitous present is the deepest rooted feature of human consciousness
and, as a result, physics has since its beginnings described the changing
world guided by this form of human experience, yet without succeeding (or
even trying) to explain it. From Galilean dynamics to quantum gravity, a
picture of time as “t”is all physics has so far managed: an abstract math-
ematical parameter that by itself cannot tell us why the past is gone, the
present all-pervading, and the future unknown and out of reach.
In classical physics, the mathematical depiction of time as “t” is simple
enough for the psychological property of things-in-flow to be superimposed
on it in a straightforward way: past, present, and future are taken as uni-
versal notions, each associated with different positions along the absolute
18If we had not prefixed Eq. (10.14) with a minus sign, we would have been forced to
choose option (+,−,−,−), with the positive coordinate now being associated with the
past and the future. This would have been a workable alternative too, although we would
now have to carry along three minus signs instead of one.
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parametric timeline. This is not to say that the human experience of time
was explained by t, but that it was easy enough to project ourselves onto
that timeline and imagine ourselves to flow along it. Classically, then, as
well as in conventional expositions of relativity theory with its block-universe
picture, the human categories of past, present, and future remain physically
ignored.
In this presentation of relativity, however, we notice that in this the-
ory an allowance must be made for human temporal notions in a somewhat
more explicit way. On the one hand, from the subjective point of view of
the ordering of events along an observer’s worldline, we again find that past,
present, and future are ignored by physics, if we now replace the absolute
parametric timeline given by t by the relative parametric timeline given by
clock readings s. On the other hand, however, relativistic physics is not
just about the history of one observer’s worldline; it is a description of any
and every worldline. In other words, relativistic physics is about absolute
spacetime properties, and we find that in the construction of the absolute
property of spacetime signature (+,+,+,−), it needs to explicitly acknowl-
edge, though minimally, the psychological conceptions of past, present, and
future for the problem to be unlocked in a meaningful way.
The sceptical reader, having heard that physics ought to be independent
of humans and external to them, may ask: but if the conceptions of past,
present, and future are psychological, why make them a part of physics?
Or then, if they are part of physics, why stress they are of psychological
origin? Because we want psychology, where relevant, to inform physics, so
that physics, where possible, will be reconciled with psychology. The pursuit
of this twofold connection, which one may call psychophysics, requires that
we seriously acknowledge the factualness of conscious experience and that we
identify those features of it that are relevant to physics. In order to do this,
we must start by taking ourselves seriously and not dismiss, in the pursuit
of the ideal of “objectivity,” human experience as an irrelevant delusion.
When it comes to time, that we should take ourselves seriously means
that we should not consider ourselves the victims of an illusion in which we
feel that time flows irreversibly, with the past known and irretrievable, the
present a permanent and all-pervading “now,” and the future unknown and
out of reach, while in fact time is reversible because the deterministic equa-
tions of physics make no dynamical distinction between t and −t, and past,
present, and future are all on an equal footing because spacetime theories lay
them out as a homogeneous block. If physics says the earthly carousel and
the heavenly bodies in their orbits can equally well run backwards in time,
but our raw experience of time says that this is impossible, which should we
trust? Is the physics of time correct as it is and we delusional, or could we
learn a better physics of time by taking ourselves more seriously?
That we should do so is not a forgone conclusion but an attitude we
propose. Against such an attitude, one may observe with Dennett (1991)
that “nature doesn’t build epistemic engines” (p. 382). That is, why should
we trust our minds to capture something essential about the nature of time
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that physical theories have not yet grasped, if our minds did not arise to
know the world but only to improve our chances of staying alive? Regarding
colour perception, for example, the context in which Dennett makes his
observation, this is quite true; the perception of red does not represent any
basic property of the world. But when it comes to time, we are inclined to
give the mind the benefit of the doubt. Unlike any other feeling, time is an
inalienable experiential product of human consciousness and, while physics
desperately needs some concept of time, so far it has only managed to offer a
caricature of it, grasping barely its serial aspect in a mathematical parameter
and no more. Because the conception of time is a consciousness-related idea,
to understand it, we need to pay heed to ourselves.
This presentation of relativity takes a small step in a positive direc-
tion. Through it we learn that, despite appearances, relativity does not
straightout hold the spatiotemporal universe to be a completely undiffer-
entiated block, because in its choice of local physical geometry (or global
signature) there is a mild recognition that (i) past and future are different
from the present (first discard of signatures), and (ii) echoing “t” in classi-
cal physics, that past and future are serially connected (second discard of
signatures).
However, this understanding of relativity does not achieve nearly enough.
How are past, present, and future qualitatively different from each other?
Why is past-present-future a serial chain? And, more significantly, what
about the present, that permanent now in which we constantly find our-
selves? How does physics explain the present moment? Can it single it as
special in any way? Our consciousness does, and so distinctly so that we
feel we are nothing but the present. If we decide to heed ourselves when it
comes to time, we should consider this an enigma. An enigma neither clas-
sical nor relativistic physics can solve. But what about quantum physics?
Can it succeed where its predecessor theories fail? Can quantum physics
do better in accounting for what is otherwise the human delusion that the
present is paramount? And what is the role of geometric tools of thought
in this search? We return to this issue in Chapter 12.
10.2.3 Spacelike separation and orthogonality from clocks
Up to now, we have used an ideal clock to measure separations between
events that can be reached by an observer travelling along his worldline, i.e.
the separations measured have always been in directions given by timelike
displacement vectors dxα. Can we also measure separations between events
along directions given by spacelike displacement vectors? And if so, what
kind of experimental setup do we need to do this?
We examine two neighbouring events A and B joined by a spacelike
displacement vector dxAB, with A situated between events P and Q and
all three events on the observer’s timelike worldline. Events P and Q are
determined experimentally by the application of the radar method: P is
an event such that a light signal (a photon) emitted from it is reflected at
B and received by the observer at Q; both timelike separations dsPA and
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P
A
Q
B
dxPA
dxAQ
dxAB
dxBQ
dxPB
worldline
Figure 10.3: Measurement of a spacelike separation by means of a clock and a
reflected photon. Displacement vectors can be detached from their original positions
due to the fact that they are small.
dsAQ are experimentally determined with the observer’s clock. Looking at
the diagram of Figure 10.3, we can write down the system of equations
dxAQ = kdxPA (k > 0)
dxPB − dxPA = dxAB
dxAQ − dxAB = dxBQ
. (10.30)
Using the last two equations to express the lightlike separations ds2PB = 0
and ds2BQ = 0 in terms of the two timelike and one spacelike displacement
vectors, and subsequently using the first equation, we find
ds2AB = dsPAdsAQ.
19 (10.31)
Spacelike separations can then be measured with the simple addition of emis-
sion, reflection, and reception of photons to the original clock-on-worldline
type of measurements, i.e. spacelike separations can be expressed in terms
of timelike ones.
We find, moreover, that if events A, B, P , and Q can be experimentally
so arranged as to have dsPA = dsAQ, then the k-factor is unity and dxAQ =
dxPA. In that case, ds
2
BQ = 0 becomes the bilinear form
gαβdx
α
ABdx
β
AQ = 0, (10.32)
where dxαAB is spacelike and dx
α
AQ is timelike. What is the geometric mean-
ing of this result?
We know that, in Euclidean space, whose quadratic form is positive
definite, the cosine of the angle between vectors
−−→
AB and
−→
AQ is given by the
dot product of the corresponding unit vectors:
cos(θ) = uˆAB · uˆAQ = u1ABu1AQ + u2ABu2AQ + u3ABu3AQ. (10.33)
19In more detail, we have (1) ds2PB = −ds2PA + ds2AB + 2gαβdxαPAdxβAB = 0 and (2)
ds2BQ = −k2ds2PA + ds2AB − 2gαβ(kdxαPA)dxβAB = 0. Now k(1)+(2) gives ds2AB = kds2PA,
from which follows the desired result.
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A
Q
B
dxAQ
dxAB
dxBQ
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Q
B
dsAQ
dsAB
ds = 0
Figure 10.4: Experimental test to determine the orthogonality of a spacelike
vector dxAB and a timelike vector dxAQ. The two vectors are orthogonal if dsAB =
dsAQ, where events B and Q are joined by the worldline of a photon.
Generalizing for a Riemannian space with a positive-definite quadratic form,
we have
cos(θ) = hab
(
dxaAB
dlAB
)(
dxbAQ
dlAQ
)
. (10.34)
In consequence, also in Riemannian space we say that two vectors are orthog-
onal when their inner product is null. Although in the case of an indefinite
quadratic form it is not sensible to define an acute or obtuse angle with
a cosine-type relation, we do nevertheless accept the concept of a straight
angle, i.e. of orthogonality, from the positive definite case, and character-
ize two orthogonal vectors in Riemann-Einstein spacetime by the relation of
Eq. (10.32). As a result, the experimental determination of spacelike separa-
tions supplies a method for the experimental determination of orthogonality
between displacement vectors: Eq. (10.32) means that spacelike displace-
ment vector dxαAB and timelike displacement vector dx
β
AQ are orthogonal in
an experimental test where dsAB = dsAQ and where events B and Q are
joined by the worldline of a photon (Figure 10.4). This concept of orthogo-
nality can be generalized for any pair of contravariant vectors Tα and Uα.
Can now two spacelike displacement vectors dxAB and dxAC be orthog-
onal? And if so, under what conditions? By means of what experimental
test can we verify their orthogonality? Because now we have two spacelike
displacement vectors, we use the radar method twice to measure ds2AB and
ds2AC in terms of timelike separations. Noting that dxBC = dxAC − dxAB
(Figure 10.5), we find
gαβdx
α
BCdx
β
BC − ds2AC − ds2AB = −2gαβdxαACdxβAB. (10.35)
The left-hand side can only be null and orthogonality possible when dxBC is
spacelike and thus gαβdx
α
BCdx
β
BC = ds
2
BC > 0. In that case, the condition
for the orthogonality of dxAB and dxAC is
ds2BC = ds
2
AC + ds
2
AB. (10.36)
This is Pythagoras’ theorem in spacetime!
Two timelike vectors, however, can never be orthogonal. This fact leads
to a counterintuitive (from a Euclidean point of view) triangle inequality
in spacetime, with consequences reaching farther than one would expect.
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A
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C
dxAB dxBC
dxAC
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dsAB dsBC
dsAC
Figure 10.5: Experimental test to determine the orthogonality of two spacelike
vectors dxAB and dxAC . The two vectors are orthogonal if they are joined by a
spacelike vector dxBC and ds
2
BC = ds
2
AC + ds
2
AB, that is, when dxBC , dxAC , and
dxAB satisfy Pythagoras’ theorem in spacetime.
To show first that two timelike vectors Tα and Uα cannot be orthogonal,
we investigate their behaviour at a point (chosen to be the origin) after
recasting them in pseudospherical coordinates r, θ, φ, χ (r > 0):
T 1 = r sin(θ) cos(φ) sinh(χ)
T 2 = r sin(θ) sin(φ) sinh(χ)
T 3 = r cos(θ) sinh(χ)
T 4 = r cosh(χ)
(10.37)
and 
U1 = r˜ sin(θ˜) cos(φ˜) sinh(χ˜)
U2 = r˜ sin(θ˜) sin(φ˜) sinh(χ˜)
U3 = r˜ cos(θ˜) sinh(χ˜)
U4 = r˜ cosh(χ˜)
(10.38)
The quadratic form of Tα at the origin gives
(T 1)2 + (T 2)2 + (T 3)2 − (T 4)2 = −r2 < 0, (10.39)
which assures us that Tα is timelike at that event; and similarly for Uα.
After using several trigonometric- and hyperbolic-function identities,20 we
find that the inner product of these two vectors at the origin is
T 1U1 + T 2U2 + T 3U3 − T 4U4 = −rr˜[cosh(χ− χ˜) cos2(ω/2)−
cosh(χ+ χ˜) sin2(ω/2)] ≤ −rr˜ < 0, (10.40)
where
cos(ω) = cos(θ) cos(θ˜) + sin(θ) sin(θ˜) cos(φ− φ˜). (10.41)
This means that
gαβT
αUβ ≤ −rr˜ 6= 0, (10.42)
i.e. timelike vectors Tα and Uα cannot be orthogonal.
20The trigonometric identities needed are 2 sin(x) sin(y) = cos(x − y) − cos(x + y),
2 cos(x) cos(y) = cos(x− y)+ cos(x+ y), and cos(2x) = cos2(x)− sin2(x). The hyperbolic
identities needed are 2 sinh(x) sinh(y) = cosh(x+ y)− cosh(x− y) and 2 cosh(x) cosh(y) =
cosh(x+ y) + cosh(x− y).
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The triangle inequality in spacetime results now as follows. In Euclidean
space, the triangle inequality for the sides of a triangle with vertices A, B,
and C reads |−→AC| ≤ |−−→AB|+ |−−→BC|, which says that the sum of the lengths of
any two sides of a triangle is greater than the length of the remaining side.
In spacetime, things are otherwise.
Let TαAB, T
α
BC , and T
α
AC be three timelike vectors forming a triangle with
vertices at events A, B, and C. We assume that the three vectors point
towards the future and that the vectors characterizing the displacements
are small. On the basis of Figure 10.6, we have
TαAC = T
α
AB + T
α
BC . (10.43)
We express these vectors using their norms
T =
√
ǫgαβTαT β (ǫ = −1) (10.44)
and unit vectors uˆ to get
TACu
α
AC = TABu
α
AB + TBCu
α
BC . (10.45)
Because the unit vectors are timelike, we have
gαβu
α
ABu
β
AB = gαβu
α
BCu
β
BC = −1 and gαβuαABuβBC ≤ −1. (10.46)
As a result, we find
T 2AC = T
2
AB + T
2
BC − 2TABTBCgαβuαABuβBC , (10.47)
from where
T 2AC ≥ (TAB + TBC)2. (10.48)
It follows that
TAC ≥ TAB + TBC (10.49)
is the triangle inequality in spacetime, with equality holding when TαAC = T
α
AB
or TαAC = T
α
BC (no actual triangle).
The triangle inequality for timelike vectors has consequences that extend
beyond the character of the geometric structure of spacetime. Notably, it has
a bearing on the features of material processes that take place in spacetime,
such as the spontaneous decay or induced fission of a massive particle into
decay or fission products with an ensuing release of energy.
In classical physics, the collision of material particles is understood in
terms of the conservation of two quantities, the total quantity of motion∑
imivi and the total kinetic energy
∑
imiv
2
i /2 of the system of particles.
From a strictly mechanical point of view, this is only true of elastic colli-
sions, in which no energy is lost by the colliding bodies in the form of heat.
Classical mechanics needs to be complemented by thermodynamics in or-
der to make full sense of energy-dissipating (i.e. inelastic) collisions. On the
other hand, relativity theory is in this respect self-contained; every aspect of
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TαAB
TαBC
TαAC
Figure 10.6: The counterintuitive triangle inequality TAC ≥ TAB+TBC for three
timelike vectors in spacetime.
the interaction of massive particles can be explained based on the geometric
structure of spacetime where the processes occur.
Taking now the natural step of using clock readings s as a worldline
parameter, we recast the worldline equation as xα = xα(s). Because ds is
always positive, the covariant vector dxα/ds points in the same direction as
dxα, and so
dxα
ds
=: V α (10.50)
is a good representation of the worldline tangent vector, which is called
the four-velocity. The four-velocity V α is, in fact, a unit vector. Writing
dxα = V αds in the quadratic form for ds2, we find
V 2 = ǫgαβV
αV β = 1. (10.51)
Because the worldline is that of a material particle, then ǫ = −1, and so
gαβV
αV β = −1. (10.52)
Finally, we attach the mass of the particle m (an invariant scalar) to the
four-velocity V α to get the four-momentum
Pα = mV α. (10.53)
In the event of a particle decaying into two subproducts, in relativity
theory we only require the conservation of the four-momentum of the total
system, namely,
Pα1 = P
α
2 + P
α
3 , (10.54)
which we can graphically represent with three timelike vectors in the form
PαAC = P
α
AB + P
α
BC , (10.55)
as shown in Figure 10.7. Because V α is a unit vector, m acts as the norm
of Pα, and we can apply the results of the triangle inequality we found for
Tα, to get
m1 > m2 +m3. (10.56)
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Figure 10.7: Particle decay (A) into two subproducts (B and C). Energy is
released in these processes as a result of the spacetime triangle inequality.
We find that the conservation of the four-momentum in the decay of a
particle involves the release of energy, m1c
2 > m2c
2+m3c
2, as an inescapable
consequence of the non-Euclidean geometric structure of Riemann-Einstein
spacetime, namely, the non-orthogonality of timelike vectors. This positive
energy deficit m1c
2 − (m2c2 +m3c2) is normally denoted as Q in textbooks
on the topic, but its origin is left unexplained.
10.3 Gravitation as spacetime curvature
In his Kyoto lecture, Einstein describes the train of thought leading him to
the general theory of relativity:
If a man falls freely, he would not feel his weight. . . A falling
man is accelerated. . . In the accelerated frame of reference, we
need a new gravitational field. . . [I]n the frame of reference with
acceleration Euclidean geometry cannot be applied. (Einstein,
1982, p. 47)
If a falling man does not feel his weight yet is accelerated, it seems he
must not be subjected to any gravitational force or field but to some form of
interaction (whose effects we see in his acceleration) nonetheless—he must
be subjected to a “new gravitational field.” What is this new interaction
that induces gravitational effects yet is not a force? An answer can be
sketched as follows. It has been long since realized that the gravitational
force is a special interaction. Galilei and Newton observed that inertial
masses mi and gravitational masses mg were the same (Newton’s principle)
and that, therefore, all massive bodies in free fall in a vacuum suffer the same
acceleration (Galilei’s principle) regardless of their constitution. This pulling
on all bodies and light in like fashion insinuates that the “new gravitational
field” we are after could be some property of space or spacetime in which
massive bodies and light move.
Could gravitation, then, be conceived as a property of space? Intuitively,
as Rindler (1977, p. 115) explains, this cannot be just so because the future
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motion of a body under gravitational interaction depends on its initial veloc-
ity, but this information is not included in the description of a space geodesic,
which is determined only by initial position and direction.21 However, an
account of all necessary initial conditions is included in the specification of
a spacetime geodesic. The validity of this heuristic reasoning is strength-
ened when we observe with Einstein that, in the man’s accelerated frame
of reference, Euclidean geometry cannot be applied beyond a point-event,22
and note at the same time the essential role that the geometry of the four-
dimensional, non-Euclidean Riemann-Einstein spacetime has had so far in
the development of relativity theory.
Given the geometric setting of relativity theory, we suspect then that
the “new gravitational field” must be somehow included in the geometry
of Riemann-Einstein spacetime. Gravitation, moreover, must be an ab-
solute property of spacetime, in the sense that either gravitational effects
are present or they are not. As has been often remarked, when it comes
to spacetime properties, there is nothing relative in relativity theory. The
prime example of this truth is the spacetime interval ds. In absolute classi-
cal physics, on the other hand, gravitation is, in fact, a relative concept: an
observer on earth deems it to be a force acting on the falling man, while the
falling man deems it as no force at all. Einstein’s classical thought experi-
ment would teach us nothing were we not willing to also take into account
the relative point of view of the man on earth.
What spacetime property shall we now consider to represent gravitation
as an absolute interaction? And what is the role of measurements in this
search? On account of a long acquaintance with it (and perhaps also because
of the suggestive notation), one’s first intention is to take the metric tensor
gαβ(x) to play the vacant role of “new gravitational field,” while at the same
time finally giving an answer to the still-standing question of its physical
meaning. However, the metric tensor is a rather bad candidate to act as
“gravitation,” the absolute spacetime property we are seeking. For, if truth
be told, there is nothing absolute in gαβ(x): it is a tensor field, and that
is all very well, but what absolute spacetime property does it represent?
In one coordinate system, gαβ(x) takes certain values; in another, it takes
different ones.
When we introduced tensors at the beginning of this chapter, we ob-
served that their reason of being was to provide mathematical objects mean-
ingful in all coordinate systems. We then identified such mathematical ob-
jects, not with the tensors themselves, but with tensor equations. Here is
then the key to this search. Is there any tensor equation that gαβ(x) satisfies
21For example, a free particle confined to a surface follows a geodesic that depends only
on its initial position and direction, but is independent of its initial velocity.
22This means that, because the velocity of the (rigid) frame changes constantly, we must
attach a different inertial system to each spacetime point or event. However, Einstein
(1983b) sometimes reached the same conclusion in a more intuitive way by looking at
a rotating frame; here an inhomogeneous distortion of “rigid bodies” (measuring rods)
ensues in a more easily visualizable way, as even each space point becomes an own, separate
inertial frame “on account of the Lorentz contraction” (p. 33).
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as such? So far the only absolute equation connected with the metric field
has been ds2 − ǫgαβ(x)dxαdxβ = 0, but this is an equation for the whole
quadratic form and for the clock separation ds. Evidently, this elemental
relation is tightly connected with clock measurements but has no straight-
forward connection with gravitation. It is time to give up the illusion that,
in relativity theory, it is simply the metric field that has taken up the role of
the “new gravitational field.” If a name with a strong physical connotation
must still be given to the metric field, one should then perhaps call gαβ(x)
the chronometric field—and stop at that.
10.3.1 Einstein’s geodesic hypothesis
Newton’s first law of motion, or the law of inertia, states that a free massive
particle follows a uniform and rectilinear trajectory. Here “free” means free
of all external interactions, including the gravitational force.
In relativity, we proceed to include a description of gravitation by means
of an extension of Newton’s first law of motion called Einstein’s geodesic
hypothesis. According to it, a free massive particle has a timelike world-
line that is a geodetic curve, or geodesic, in Riemann-Einstein spacetime,
where by “free” we now mean free of all external forces but not of gravita-
tion, which we want to describe not as an external force but as an absolute
geometric property of spacetime. As such, it is impossible to be free of its
effects. Einstein’s geodesic hypothesis also applies to a free photon, in which
case it says that a free photon follows a null geodesic in Riemann-Einstein
spacetime.
A geodesic is a line whose extension (length) between two given points
is stationary, i.e. has an extremal value. This can be a maximum or a mini-
mum. When we consider two points in three-dimensional Euclidean space, a
geodesic refers to a spatial path of minimal length, i.e. the shortest distance
between the two points. In Riemann-Einstein spacetime, on the other hand,
our Euclidean intuition fails again: where we expect less we get more (cf.
triangle inequality and energy surplus in particle decay). In spacetime, a
geodesic represents a worldline of maximal separation as measured by clocks.
Incidentally, this is not, strictly speaking, a maximal length in any literal
sense, although our geometric intuition leads us to think of it that way.
Insightfully, in this regard, Synge writes:
It is indeed a Riemannian chronometry rather than a geometry,
and the word geometry, with its dangerous suggestion that we
should go about measuring lengths with yardsticks, might well
be abandoned altogether in the present connection were it not
for the fact that the crude literal meaning of the word geometry
has been transmuted into the abstract mathematical concept of
a “space” with a “metric” in it. (Synge, 1964, p. 109)
Here is yet another instance of a rule we have repeatedly observed: the mind
turns everything it beholds into its golden standard—geometry.23
23What mythical character does this behaviour remind us of? (See Epilogue.)
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In order to find the equation xα = xα(u) satisfied by the geodetic world-
line with extremes at events A and B, we calculate the variation of the event
separation ∆s and equate it to zero,
δ
∫ B
A
ds = δ
∫ uB
uA
f
(
x,
dx
du
)
du = 0. (10.57)
Taking the variations of xα and x′α =: dxα/du, we find∫ uB
uA
(
∂f
∂xα
δxα +
∂f
∂x′α
δx′α
)
du = 0. (10.58)
Rewriting δx′α = d(δxα)/du and integrating the second term by parts
(u˜α = ∂f/∂x
′α, dv˜ = d(δxα)), we get∣∣∣uB
uA
∂f
∂x′α
δxα(u) +
∫ uB
uA
[
∂f
∂xα
− d
du
(
∂f
∂x′α
)]
δxαdu = 0. (10.59)
Because the first term is null on account of δx(uB) = δx(uA) = 0 (the
extremes are fixed), and because δxα is an arbitrary small variation, we find
that, at every point of the geodesic, f(x, x′) must satisfy the Euler-Lagrange
equations
d
du
(
∂f
∂x′α
)
− ∂f
∂xα
= 0, (10.60)
where f(x, x′) =
√−gαβx′αx′β. To avoid having to differentiate a square-
root expression, we rewrite Eq. (10.60) in the equivalent form
d
du
(
∂f2
∂x′α
)
− ∂f
2
∂xα
− 1
2f2
df2
du
∂f2
∂x′α
= 0. (10.61)
Replacing u by the natural worldline parameter s, we find
f2(x, x′) = −gαβV αV β = +1 and df
2
ds
= 0, (10.62)
to get
d
ds
(
∂f2
∂x′α
)
− ∂f
2
∂xα
= 0. (10.63)
Replacing f2(x, x′) by −gαβx′αx′β, we obtain the geodesic equation in the
more explicit form
gδβ
dx′β
ds
+ [αβ, δ]x′αx′β = 0, (10.64)
where
[αβ, δ] =
1
2
(
∂gαδ
∂xβ
+
∂gβδ
∂xα
− ∂gαβ
∂xδ
)
(10.65)
is called Christoffel’s symbol of the first kind, which is symmetric with re-
spect to its first two indices. Finally, multiplying Eq. (10.64) by gγδ, we
obtain a yet more explicit form of the geodesic equation:
d2xγ
ds2
+
{ γ
αβ
}dxα
ds
dxβ
ds
= 0, (10.66)
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where
{ γ
αβ
}
= gγδ [αβ, δ] is called Christoffel’s symbol of the second kind. In
addition, the timelike condition
gαβ
dxα
ds
dxβ
ds
= −1 (10.67)
holds for all events on the geodesic. The solution xα = xα(s) to this second-
order differential equation can be determined unequivocally when we know
xα(s) and dxα at some event on the timelike geodesic, i.e. for some clock-
reading value s.
The geodesic equation (10.66) gives us now the answer to a question
we asked earlier on. On page 127, we had expected that the equation of
motion (10.3) of a particle would be of the form d2xα/du2 = Xα(x,dx/du).
Now we have found that this is indeed the case, with
Xα
(
x,
dx
ds
)
= −{ αβγ }dxβ
ds
dxγ
ds
, (10.68)
where the x-dependence is contained in Christoffel’s symbol.
As an example, we can apply the geodesic equation to the case of a
spacetime whose quadratic form is
Q = (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2 (10.69)
everywhere and its metric, therefore, gαβ = diag(1, 1, 1,−1) = ηαβ . As a
result, all Christoffel symbols are null and the geodesic equation reduces to
d2xα
ds2
= 0, (10.70)
with timelike condition(
dx1
ds
)2
+
(
dx2
ds
)2
+
(
dx3
ds
)2
−
(
dx4
ds
)2
= −1. (10.71)
The solutions are straight lines in spacetime
xα(s) = Aαs+Bα, (10.72)
where Aα and Bα are constants, and Aα satisfies timelike condition (10.71).
Excepting this last restriction, the equation of motion and its solution have
the same form as those for a free particle in classical physics, namely,
d2xa/dt2 = 0 with solution xa(t) = Aat + Ba. The correspondence sug-
gests that a spacetime whose quadratic form is pseudo-Cartesian everywhere
resembles flat Euclidean space.
So far we have dealt with geodesics of material particles, for which
ds > 0. How shall we deal with geodesics of photons, for which ds = 0?
In this case, the use of s as a geodesic parameter is impossible, and we
must use a different parameter u together with its corresponding lightlike
condition
f2(x, x′) = gαβU
αUβ = 0, (10.73)
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where Uα = dxα/du. On account of it, the simplification df2/ds = 0
introduced earlier now becomes df2/du = 0. From here on, the procedure
is analogous to the one for a timelike geodesic. The equation of a lightlike
geodesic is then
d2xγ
du2
+
{ γ
αβ
}dxα
du
dxβ
du
= 0, (10.74)
with lightlike condition
gαβ
dxα
du
dxβ
du
= 0. (10.75)
This way of proceeding, however, begs the question as to what kind of
parameter u is. How general can it be and what is its relation to s? We defer
the answer to this question until we have studied the absolute derivative in
connection with the generalized law of inertia of relativity theory.
The geodesic equation for material particles and photons can also be
derived by means of a different method. We return to the original Euler-
Lagrange equation (10.60) and proceed to find its first integral. In order to
avoid confusion with the preceding analysis, we now rename f as φ in this
equation.
Multiplying Eq. (10.60) by x′α = dxα/du in the sense of an inner prod-
uct, we find
x′α
d
du
(
∂φ
∂x′α
)
− x′α ∂φ
∂xα
= 0, (10.76)
which can be rewritten as
d
du
(
x′α
∂φ
∂x′α
)
−
(
∂φ
∂xα
dxα
du
+
∂φ
∂x′α
dx′α
du
)
= 0. (10.77)
Because the second term is dφ/du, the whole expression can be recast as a
total derivative,
d
du
(
x′α
∂φ
∂x′α
− φ
)
= 0. (10.78)
Integrating once with respect to u, we get
x′α
∂φ
∂x′α
− φ = C (constant). (10.79)
Proposing the solution φ = gαβx
′αx′β , we find φ = C. Choosing u = s leads
to the earlier results for a timelike geodesic; in that case, C = −1 (timelike
condition). When C = +1, we find the spacelike condition gαβx
′αx′β = +1,
and we are led to a “spacelike geodesic,” a mathematical concept that has
no correspondent in the physical world and we can forthwith forget. When
C = 0, we find the lightlike condition gαβx
′αx′β = 0, and we are led to a
null geodesic, the worldline followed by a free photon. Finally, because we
now have φ = −f2(x, x′),24 the earlier derivation of the geodesic equation
leading to Eq. (10.74) remains the same.
24The extra minus sign does not change the final result.
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10.3.2 The absolute derivative
Given the geodesic equation (10.74) (in principle applicable to both material
particles and photons), let us perform a general parameter transformation
u 7→ v(u) and rewrite the geodesic equation in terms of the new parameter
v. Using the chain rule to go from u to v, we find
d2xγ
dv
+
{ γ
αβ
}dxα
dv
dxβ
dv
= −d
2v
du2
(
dv
du
)−2 dxγ
dv
. (10.80)
This result tells us two things. First, that the geodesic equation retains its
simple form only for linear (also called affine) parametric transformations.
Returning to the possible relation between the null parameter u and timelike
parameter s, we learn that, given s is a naturally valid parameter, in order for
the geodesic equation of a photon to conserve its simplest form, we must have
that u = as + b, where a and b are yet physically undetermined constants.
Second, it tells us that because the right-hand side is a contravariant vector
Uγ(v) of the form f(v)dxγ/dv, then so must be the left-hand side, despite the
fact that neither its first term nor its second term in isolation are vectors
themselves (their sum must be). As we see next, the second observation
opens up a natural (i.e. physically inspired) road towards the concept of
absolute derivative. We pursue the implications of the first observation
later on.
What we wish to do is find a form for the geodesic equation that is
explicitly tensorial; to achieve it, we need to remove from sight both the total
second derivative of the coordinates (which is not a tensor) and Christoffel’s
symbol (which is not a tensor either) and recast the equation in terms of a
single, explicitly contravariant vector.
Returning to a notation in terms of u, in a change of coordinates x 7→ x′
we should then have U ′γ(u) = (∂x′γ/∂xδ)U δ ; explicitly, this is
d2x′γ
du
+
{ γ
αβ
}′dx′α
du
dx′β
du
=
∂x′γ
∂xδ
d2xδ
du
+
{
δ
αβ
}∂x′γ
∂xδ
dxα
du
dxβ
du
. (10.81)
Applying the chain rule repeatedly to express the right-hand side in terms of
partial derivatives with respect to x′ and total derivatives of x′ with respect
to u, and subsequently comparing with the left-hand side, we get({ γ
αβ
}′ − { δǫζ }∂x′γ∂xδ ∂xǫ∂x′α ∂xζ∂x′β − ∂x′γ∂xδ ∂2xδ∂x′α∂x′β
)
dx′α
du
dx′β
du
= 0. (10.82)
Therefore, Christoffel’s symbol of the second kind transforms as follows:
{ γ
αβ
}′
=
{
δ
ǫζ
}∂x′γ
∂xδ
∂xǫ
∂x′α
∂xζ
∂x′β
+
∂x′γ
∂xδ
∂2xδ
∂x′α∂x′β
; (10.83)
the appearance of the second term on the right-hand side shows that Christof-
fel’s symbol of the second kind is not a tensor.25
25With a similar procedure, one can also show that Christoffel’s symbol of the first kind
is not a tensor either.
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Next, we take a general contravariant vector Tα, which is attached to ev-
ery point of a worldline xα(u); this is, in other words, a vector field Tα[x(u)],
although its being attached only to a worldline is, at the moment, a more
realistic (i.e. physical) situation than its being attached to the whole space-
time continuum. Inspired by the present form of the geodesic equation and
our goal of expressing it tensorially, we propose a derivative extension of it
of the form
δTα
δu
=:
dTα
du
+
{ α
βγ
}
T β
dxγ
du
. (10.84)
Is this derivative extension of Tα a contravariant vector?
To check the possible tensorial nature of δTα/δu, we must verify whether
δT ′α
δu
− ∂x
′α
∂xβ
δT β
δu
is null. Written explicitly, the expression becomes
dT ′α
du
− ∂x
′α
∂xβ
dT β
du
+
{ α
βγ
}′
T ′β
dx′γ
du
− ∂x
′α
∂xβ
{ β
γδ
}
T γ
dxδ
du
. (10.85)
The first two terms taken together reduce to
∂2x′α
∂xβ∂xγ
T β
dxγ
du
6= 0, (10.86)
showing that dTα/du alone is not a vector. Using Eq. (10.83), the third and
fourth terms taken together reduce to
∂2xδ
∂x′ǫ∂x′ζ
∂x′α
∂xδ
∂x′ǫ
∂xβ
∂x′ζ
∂xγ
T β
dxγ
du
6= 0, (10.87)
showing that the second term of the derivative extension (10.84) is not a
vector either. However, when both results are taken together, we find(
∂2x′α
∂xβ∂xγ
+
∂2xδ
∂x′ǫ∂x′ζ
∂x′α
∂xδ
∂x′ǫ
∂xβ
∂x′ζ
∂xγ
)
T β
dxγ
du
= 0 (10.88)
on account of the parenthesized expression being null.26 We conclude that
δTα/δu is an explicitly contravariant vector and call it the absolute derivative
of Tα.
We can now put the absolute derivative of a vector to good use. We
observe that the condition δTα/δu = 0 pictures the absolute constancy of
the vector Tα; Tα is said to be parallel-transported along a worldline. These
names are inspired in the Euclidean picture, shown in Figure 10.8, that
results from visualizing this situation: a curve in space and an arrow vector
~V attached to two points P and Q on the curve, such that ~V (P ) points in
the same direction as ~V (Q). This Euclidean image is given by the condition
d~V/du = 0, which is only a special case of δTα/δu = 0. The image also
26This can be proved by differentiating both sides of (∂x′α/∂xγ)(∂xβ/∂x′α) = δβγ with
respect to xδ.
156 A geometric analysis of time
z
y
x
P
~V (uP )
Q
~V (uQ)
xa = xa(u)
Figure 10.8: Euclidean vizualization via space vector ~V of the parallel transport
of a spacetime vector Tα along a worldline. The parallel-transport condition on
~V is given by the null ordinary derivative, d~V/du = 0, at each point of a space
trajectory, while the same condition on Tα is given by a null absolute derivative,
δTα/δu = 0, at each point of the wordline.
holds under conditions of pseudo-Euclidicity as in special relativity, where
the Christoffel symbol is null and the absolute derivative reduces to the usual
total derivative, δTα/δu = dTα/du. The null absolute derivative pictures
the parallel transport of a vector along a worldline in a spacetime that is
not in general flat.
Because the form of the absolute derivative was inspired in that of the
geodesic equation, we should not be surprised to find that, when parallel-
transported, Tα satisfies an equation remarkably similar to the geodesic
equation, namely,
δTα
δu
=:
dTα
du
+
{ α
βγ
}
T β
dxγ
du
= 0. (10.89)
It is now only a small step to recast the geodesic equation in the form we were
seeking, one that is explicitly covariant—and not only that but, moreover,
one that has both an elegant form and interpretation:
δ
δu
dxα
du
= 0. (10.90)
While the elegant form is self-evident, the elegant interpretation is the fol-
lowing: a geodesic tangent vector progresses along its worldline in the direc-
tion which it itself points to, and so, necessarily, without changing direction.
This is a generalization of the case of a geodesic in the Euclidean plane,
which, being a straight line, is traced by the unidirectional, unperturbed
progression of its tangent vector. In consequence, a geodesic in Riemann-
Einstein spacetime is a straight line which progresses, as it were, by following
the natural intrinsic shape of spacetime. The usual Euclidean visualization
of this situation is, however, somewhat misleading, because by picturing
Riemann-Einstein spacetime as an extrinsically curved surface (e.g. a sphere
embedded in three-dimensional Euclidean space), a geodesic tangent vector
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(the tangent to a maximal circle) sticks out of the surface into the embedding
space, thus giving the impression that it does not progress in the direction
that it points to but that, rather, some external pressure forces it to turn
with the sphere.
We find, furthermore, that the above metaphorical allusions to “un-
perturbed progression” of and “external pressure” on a geodesic tangent
vector are particularly apt to describe its behaviour, since in question here
is a (new) physical picture of gravitation. A free particle (in the general-
relativistic sense, i.e. not gravitation-free) follows a geodesic in spacetime.
Our classical intuition does not mislead us when we expect the free parti-
cle to continue along its worldline unperturbed, since there are no external
forces to change the direction or rate of its progression; and so it does, as
it is carried along in the intrinsic spacetime direction of least resistance on
account of its inertia.
This is a generalization of Newton’s first law of motion. Because the
mass m of a particle is a constant, we can rewrite Eq. (10.90) in terms of
its four-momentum Pα = mV α and timelike parameter s to get
δPα
δs
= 0. (10.91)
This means that the four-momentum of a free massive particle progresses
unperturbed (i.e. is parallel-transported) in spacetime, of which a special
case is
d~p
dt
= ~0, (10.92)
namely, Newton’s first law of motion, or the law of inertia (with the proviso
that we interpret s as absolute time t).
Finally, we examine the special case of a photon. This is a massless
particle whose four-momentum Pα is nevertheless not null, and so for a
photon we may simply write27
Pα =
dxα
du
. (10.93)
Comparing with the four-momentum Pα = mdxα/ds of a massive particle
leads to the suggestion that a photon can be understood as a limiting case
of a massive particle whose mass m tends to zero as the interval separation
ds measured by a clock on its worldline tends to zero with it, such that the
quotient of ds to m converges to a non-null limit; this limit is du. The linear
connection between u and s envisioned earlier is thus
u =
1
m
s. (10.94)
So far, the absolute derivative was developed only for a contravariant
vector, but because in the context of Riemannian geometry contravariant
27Choosing Pα = θdxα/du, we find that θ must be absolutely constant, δθ/δu = 0, on
account of δPα/δu = 0 and δUα/δu = 0, where Uα = dxα/du. The simplest choice is
θ = 1. In general, Eq. (10.94) becomes u = (θ/m)s.
158 A geometric analysis of time
and covariant vectors are fundamentally the same, it is reasonable to expect
that the absolute derivative can also be a derivative extension of covariant
vectors. In order to find its form, we resort once more to the concept of in-
variance. Let Tα be a covariant vector attached to the worldline x
α = xα(u),
and let Uα be an arbitrary contravariant vector which is parallel-transported
along the same worldline, and therefore
dUα
du
= −{ αβγ }Uβ dxγ
du
. (10.95)
Comparing the ordinary rate of change of the invariant overlap between Tα
and Uα, after applying the chain rule and Eq. (10.95), we find
d(TαU
α)
du
=
(
dTα
du
− { βαγ }Tβ dxγdu
)
Uα. (10.96)
Because the left-hand side is an invariant and Uα on the right-hand side is
an arbitrary contravariant vector, the parenthesized expression, which is an
extension of vector Tα, must then be a covariant vector. We call
δTα
δu
=:
dTα
du
− { βαγ }Tβ dxγdu (10.97)
the absolute derivative of Tα.
The same heuristic process that led us to the absolute derivative of a
covariant vector can also lead us to the absolute derivative of a tensor of
any type and order. For example, by setting up the ordinary derivative of
the invariant TαβUαWβ , where Uα and Wβ are parallel-transported along
the worldline, we obtain, proceeding as before, the absolute derivative of a
second-order contravariant tensor
δTαβ
δu
=
dTαβ
du
+
{ α
γδ
}
T γβ
dxδ
du
+
{ β
γδ
}
Tαγ
dxδ
du
. (10.98)
The manner in which this result is obtained allows us to conclude that the
absolute derivative of a general tensor is built out of its ordinary derivative
plus one positive term for each of its contravariant indices and one negative
term for each of its covariant indices, each index being summed over one at
a time.
From its general form follows that the absolute derivative satisfies the
linear-combination rule and Leibniz’s chain rule. Another useful result also
follows, namely, that the absolute derivative of the metric field is null in
both its covariant and contravariant versions,28
δgαβ
δu
= 0 and
δgαβ
δu
= 0. (10.99)
This means that, although the metric field is not a constant in the usual
sense, it is a constant in the absolute sense of Riemann-Einstein spacetime.
28This can be shown by rewriting dgαβ/du as (∂gαβ/∂x
δ)(dxδ/du) and considering the
identity [δα, β] + [δβ, α] = 0 in the expression for the absolute derivative of the metric
tensor.
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Finally, because an invariant scalar has no indices, we add the convention
that its absolute derivative corresponds to its ordinary derivative,
δT
δu
=:
dT
du
. (10.100)
At this point, the reader might object that our way of proceeding in
order to find the absolute derivative as an extension of vectors and gen-
eral tensors has no real justification behind it. Why should it be what it
is and not otherwise? To this we reply simply that there is no certified,
royal road to mathematical physics. By pretending that there is and defin-
ing mathematical concepts in an axiomatic spirit, we trade learning the
informal, freewheeling, and privately conceived physical motivation behind
mathematical concepts for the illusion of security offered by authoritative
disembodied definitions. Would defining the absolute derivative in a dry
axiom, while leaving out all mention of the heuristic method by which we
obtained it, have made this concept clearer or more obscure in the present
physical context? Let us leave rigorously stated definitions and axioms to
pure mathematicians; these are their rightful turf—but physics is not math-
ematics nor should it strive to be.
10.3.3 The covariant derivative
Absolute differentiation applies to tensors that are attached to a worldline
in Riemann-Einstein spacetime. And this is all very well because the object
of our examination has so far been material particles and photons moving
along geodesics in spacetime. However, because the geodesic equation does
not give us knowledge of the spacetime geometry but only informs us how
particles will move given the metric tensor, it needs the partnership of a field
equation. A field equation can fill this gap by providing knowledge of the
metric tensor given the distribution of matter in spacetime, which thus acts
as the source of spacetime geometry, akin to the way charge and current act
as the sources of the electric and magnetic forces.
A field equation linking matter distribution to curvature distribution in
spacetime differs from the geodesic equation in that the tensors involved
in the former need to be attached to whole regions of spacetime and not
just to the worldlines of particles. The absolute derivative, then, will not
do as a physically meaningful derivative extension of fields, since the term
dxα/du appearing in it does not have any meaning in the absence of a
worldline. This is enough motivation for the development of a different kind
of extension of a tensor—for a spacetime derivative—as closely related to
the absolute derivative as possible, yet without reference to a worldline.
What this spacetime derivative should be is insinuated after a simple
rewriting of the absolute derivative as follows:
δTα
δu
=
(
∂Tα
∂xγ
+
{ α
βγ
}
T β
)
dxγ
du
. (10.101)
Again, because the absolute derivative of Tα on the left-hand side is a
contravariant vector and the worldline derivative on the right-hand side
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is as well, the parenthesized expression—which does not depend on the
worldline—must now be a second-order once-covariant once-contravariant
tensor. As this expression satisfies all we asked from a derivative extension
applicable to fields in spacetime, we take
Tα;γ =:
∂Tα
∂xγ
+
{ α
βγ
}
T β (10.102)
as the spacetime derivative we seek. We see that, just like the absolute
derivative was a generalization of the total derivative in flat space or flat
spacetime, so is the spacetime derivative a generalization of the partial
derivative in flat space or flat spacetime. From now on, we call Tα;γ the
covariant derivative of Tα in line with a long physical tradition. As justifi-
cation for this name—less descriptive of its physical function than the name
spacetime derivative—it is noted that this derivative always has the effect of
adding one extra covariant index to the covariantly differentiated tensor. As
before, because the covariant derivative comes from the absolute derivative
in a straightforward way, the covariant derivative of a tensor of general type
follows the same form as that of its absolute derivative. Finally, also the
covariant derivative satisfies the linear-combination rule and Leibniz’s rule,
and the metric tensor is also covariantly constant, gαβ;γ = g
αβ
;γ = 0.
Once the covariant derivative has been developed, we can recreate with
it generalizations of well-known concepts from vector analysis to be useful
in the following pages:
(i) The covariant gradient T;α of an invariant scalar T is by convention
(because it has no indices) taken to correspond with its ordinary gra-
dient (ordinary partial derivative),
T;α =:
∂T
∂xα
=: T,α, (10.103)
where from now on we also denote partial derivatives with a comma.
(ii) The covariant divergence Tα;α of a contravariant vector T
α is29
Tα;α = T
α
,α +
1
2
gαγ
∂gαγ
∂xβ
T β. (10.104)
(iii) The covariant curl Tα;β − Tβ;α of a covariant vector Tγ is its ordinary
curl,
Tα;β − Tβ;α = Tα,β − Tβ,α (10.105)
on account of the symmetry property of the Christoffel symbol. As
a consequence, when Tα is some invariant gradient U,α, we recover
the spacetime (i.e. covariant) version of the well-known result that a
gradient is a conservative vector field,
U,α,β − U,β,α = 0, (10.106)
29This is a consequence of the simplified form of the appearing Christoffel symbol
˘
α
βα
¯
,
when this form is made explicit.
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since ordinary partial derivatives commute. From now on, we denote
consecutive ordinary partial derivatives of tensors with a single comma;
e.g. U,α,β =: U,αβ.
10.3.4 The curvature tensor
We saw on page 152 that the geodesics of a free particle in a spacetime whose
quadratic form is everywhere pseudo-Cartesian are straight lines resembling
those of flat Euclidean space of classical mechanics. This motivates us to
characterize flat spacetime by the condition that it be possible to choose
coordinates such that the quadratic form be everywhere pseudo-Cartesian,
i.e. Q = (dx1)2 + (dx2)2 + (dx3)2 − (dx4)2; in other words, that gαβ can be
transformed into ηαβ = diag(1, 1, 1,−1) at every point. If this were not
possible, we take spacetime to be curved.
This characterization of flat and curved spacetime is clear and intuitive,
but is it practical? Given a quadratic form, how shall we proceed to show
that it can or cannot be recast as an everywhere pseudo-Cartesian one? Can
we devise an easier way of testing whether spacetime is flat or curved? To do
this, we take advantage of the intuitive image given by the spacetime-related
concepts inherited from ordinary vector calculus, and think in terms of an
analogy. It may be objected that the analogy is far-fetched, but we should
not worry about this so long as it naturally guides us to the solution of our
problem.
We take a covariant vector field Tα and use its second covariant derivative
Tα;βγ =: (Tα;β);γ = Tα;β,γ −
{
δ
αγ
}
Tδ;β −
{
δ
βγ
}
Tα;δ (10.107)
to construct a kind of covariant curl (third-order tensor) Tα;βγ − Tα;γβ of
its first covariant derivative Tα;β (second-order tensor). This curl can be
written out explicitly to find
Tα;βγ − Tα;γβ = Tα;β,γ −
{
δ
αγ
}
Tδ;β −
{
δ
βγ
}
Tα;δ − Tα;γ,β+{
δ
αβ
}
Tδ;γ +
{
δ
γβ
}
Tα;δ. (10.108)
The third and sixth terms on the right-hand side cancel out. Writing out
the remaining covariant derivatives, we find
Tα;βγ − Tα;γβ = (Tα,β −
{
δ
αβ
}
Tδ),γ −
{
δ
αγ
}
(Tδ,β −
{ ǫ
δβ
}
Tǫ)−
(Tα,γ −
{
δ
αγ
}
Tδ),β +
{
δ
αβ
}
(Tδ,γ −
{ ǫ
δγ
}
Tǫ). (10.109)
The first and fifth terms, part of the second term and the seventh term, and
the third term and part of the sixth term cancel out in pairs. Finally, we
find
Tα;βγ − Tα;γβ = RδαβγTδ, (10.110)
where
Rδαβγ =
{
δ
αγ
}
,β
− { δαβ },γ + { ǫαγ }{ δǫβ }− { ǫαβ }{ δǫγ } (10.111)
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must be a fourth-order mixed tensor, since the left-hand side of Eq. (10.110)
is a third-order covariant tensor and Tδ on the right-hand side is a covariant
vector. We call Rδαβγ the mixed curvature tensor or the mixed Riemann
tensor. In general, RδαβγTδ 6= 0, suggesting that the discrepancy arising
from the order of spacetime directions in which a vector is differentiated is
the result of a non-conservative property of spacetime captured by the tensor
field Rδαβγ . But what is the connection of all this with curvature?
If spacetime is flat, there exist coordinates such that the metric field is
ηαβ = diag(1, 1, 1,−1) at every point. In that case, all Christoffel symbols
and their ordinary partial derivatives in Eq. (10.111) are null, and so
RδαβγTδ(x) ≡ 0 (10.112)
at every spacetime point x. Since this is a tensor equation, its validity is
independent of the coordinate system used; if it holds in one coordinate
system, it holds in all of them. Now, while this is a necessary condition
for the flatness of spacetime, is it also a sufficient condition, such that we
may say that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the curvature
tensor and curvature? A reading of Einstein’s original paper on the general
theory of relativity is not auspicious regarding the level of complexity re-
quired to answer this question. Einstein (1952a) prefers not to tackle this
problem and, in a footnote, writes: “The mathematicians have proved that
this is also a sufficient condition” (p. 141). Let us nonetheless attempt this
demonstration—the physicist’s way.
We start with an arbitrary covariant vector Tα(x˜) at an arbitrary space-
time point, and parallel-transport it first along a worldline xα = xα(u, v0) a
separation du, and subsequently along another worldline xα = xα(du, v) a
separation dv, where u0 and v0 are constants, thus reaching spacetime point
x (see Figure 9.4 on page 114). Alternatively, we can reach x from x˜ by
parallel-transporting Tα(x˜) first along worldline x
α = xα(u0, v) a separation
dv, and subsequently along worldline xα = xα(u,dv) a separation du. The
two resulting vectors at x are the same only if the difference
δ2Tα
δvδu
− δ
2Tα
δuδv
=
(
Tα;β
∂xβ
∂u
)
;γ
∂xγ
∂v
−
(
Tα;β
∂xβ
∂v
)
;γ
∂xγ
∂u
(10.113)
is null. Because ∂xβ/∂u and ∂xβ/∂v on the right-hand side are the vectors
tangent to the worldlines, they are absolutely constant and can be taken out
of the covariant derivative. We find
δ2Tα
δvδu
− δ
2Tα
δuδv
= Tα;βγ
∂xβ
∂u
∂xγ
∂v
− Tα;βγ ∂x
β
∂v
∂xγ
∂u
= (Tα;βγ − Tα;γβ)∂x
β
∂u
∂xγ
∂v
, (10.114)
and we now recognize the Riemann tensor in the parenthesized expression:
δ2Tα
δvδu
− δ
2Tα
δuδv
= RδαβγTδ
∂xβ
∂u
∂xγ
∂v
, (10.115)
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where the worldlines are arbitrary and so is Tα.
Therefore, if the Riemann tensor is identically null, then the result of
parallel-transporting Tα(x˜) to x is a unequivocal vector Tα(x) independently
of the worldline followed. But then, its covariant derivative must be null,
Tα;β(x) = 0. Since spacetime point x is arbitrary, given R
δ
αβγ ≡ 0 (sufficient
condition),30 we can create a spacetime vector field at any spacetime point x
via parallel-transport of an original vector. Based on our intuition, we now
expect that the unequivocal existence of Tα(x) will imply that spacetime is
flat. For example, in the intuitively curved case of a spherical surface, the
parallel-transport of a vector from the equator to the north pole produces
different vectors at the north pole depending on the path chosen, but the
same vector on a flat surface.
We now take the covariant vector field Tα(x) to be the gradient S,α(x) of
an arbitrary invariant scalar field S(x). We take, moreover, four independent
scalars fields, which we choose to be the coordinates x′1(x), x′2(x), x′3(x),
and x′4(x). Now Tα;β = 0 translates into x
′γ
,α;β(x) = 0, which, in turn, gives
∂2x′γ
∂xα∂xβ
=
{
δ
αβ
}∂x′γ
∂xδ
. (10.116)
We now show that in the primed coordinates obtained through parallel trans-
port, the metric tensor g′αβ(x
′) is constant.
Because
gαβ =
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xβ
g′γδ, (10.117)
we find
∂gαβ
∂xǫ
=
∂2x′γ
∂xα∂xǫ
∂x′δ
∂xβ
g′γδ +
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂2x′δ
∂xβ∂xǫ
g′γδ +
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xβ
∂g′γδ
∂xǫ
, (10.118)
which, on account of Eq. (10.116), becomes
∂gαβ
∂xǫ
=
{
ζ
ǫα
}∂x′γ
∂xζ
∂x′δ
∂xβ
g′γδ +
{ ζ
ǫβ
}∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xζ
g′γδ +
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xβ
∂g′γδ
∂xǫ
. (10.119)
The first and second terms can be simplified to get
∂gαβ
∂xǫ
=
{
ζ
ǫα
}
gζβ +
{ ζ
ǫβ
}
gαζ +
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xβ
∂g′γδ
∂xǫ
= [ǫα, β] + [ǫβ, α] +
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xβ
∂g′γδ
∂xǫ
, (10.120)
finally giving
∂gαβ
∂xǫ
=
∂gαβ
∂xǫ
+
∂x′γ
∂xα
∂x′δ
∂xβ
∂g′γδ
∂xǫ
. (10.121)
30This is also a necessary condition. The system of equations Tα,β =
˘
δ
αβ
¯
Tδ is inte-
grable only if Tα,βγ = Tα,γβ. This gives
`˘
δ
αβ
¯
Tδ
´
,γ
=
`˘
δ
αγ
¯
Tδ
´
,β
, implying Rδαβγ ≡ 0.
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It follows that ∂g′γδ/∂x
ǫ = 0, and therefore ∂g′γδ/∂x
′ζ = 0. In conclusion, if
the Riemann curvature tensor is identically null, then coordinates x′ exist
such that g′αβ(x
′) is constant everywhere in spacetime.31
The mixed Riemann tensor Rδαβγ , its covariant version Rαβγδ , and its
contractions, Rγαβγ and R
α
α, satisfy several useful identities. We can see
straight from Eq. (10.111) that the mixed Riemann tensor is antisymmetric
on its last two covariant indices,
Rδαβγ = −Rδαγβ , (10.122)
and that the sum of its cyclic permutations is null,
Rδαβγ +R
δ
γαβ +R
δ
βγα = 0. (10.123)
The covariant Riemann tensor can be obtained from the mixed one lowering
the contravariant index, Rαβγδ = gαǫR
ǫ
βγδ , which gives
32
Rαβγδ = [βδ, α],γ − [βγ, α],δ + gǫζ ([αδ, ǫ][βγ, ζ] − [αγ, ǫ][βδ, ζ]) . (10.124)
A more useful expression of the covariant Riemann tensor can be obtained
by writing the Christoffel symbols of the first kind in terms of those of the
second kind, the metric tensor, and its derivatives. We find
Rαβγδ =
1
2
(gαδ,βγ + gβγ,αδ − gαγ,βδ − gβδ,αγ)+
gǫζ
({
ǫ
αδ
}{ ζ
βγ
}− { ǫαγ }{ ζβδ }) . (10.125)
By direct inspection, we see that the covariant Riemann tensor is antisym-
metric on its first two and last two indices,
Rαβγδ = −Rβαγδ and Rαβγδ = −Rαβδγ , (10.126)
and it is symmetric with respect to a swap of the first and second pairs of
indices taken as a unit,
Rαβγδ = Rγδαβ . (10.127)
Applying all these results together, we also find that the covariant Riemann
tensor is symmetric with respect to an opposite reordering of its indices,
Rαβγδ = Rδγβα. (10.128)
In addition, the covariant derivatives of the mixed and covariant Rie-
mann tensors each satisfy an identity called the Bianchi identity, which says
31We have not proved, however, that g′αβ(x
′) = ηαβ .
32Express gαǫ
˘
ǫ
βδ
¯
,γ
as the derivative of the product minus an extra term, and rewrite
both in terms of Christoffel symbols of the first kind and their derivatives.
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that the sum of the cyclic permutations on the last three covariant indices
of the derivative tensor is null. For the mixed Riemann tensor, it reads33
Rǫαβγ;δ +R
ǫ
αδβ;γ +R
ǫ
αγδ;β = 0. (10.129)
The corresponding Bianchi identity for the covariant Riemann tensor can
be obtained from the former by lowering the contravariant index; it reads
Rαβγδ;ǫ +Rαβǫγ;δ +Rαβδǫ;γ = 0. (10.130)
The Ricci tensor Rαβ is a useful tensor derived from the covariant Rie-
mann tensor Rδαβγ by contracting the first and last indices,
gγδRδαβγ = R
γ
αβγ =: Rαβ. (10.131)
The Ricci tensor is symmetric34 and has only 10 independent components,
which is the same amount of independent components as that of the met-
ric tensor. This property becomes essential when we form Einstein’s field
equation linking gravitation with its sources. Another useful quantity, the
invariant curvature scalar R, can be derived from the Ricci tensor by con-
tracting its two indices,
gαγRγα = R
α
α =: R. (10.132)
Do the Ricci tensor and curvature scalar have any noteworthy properties?
Taking the second Bianchi identity (10.130) and contracting its indices in a
suitable way, we find
gβγgαδRαβγδ;ǫ + g
αδgβγRαβǫγ;δ + g
βγgαδRαβδǫ;γ =
gβγRβγ;ǫ − gαδRαǫ;δ − gβγRβǫ;γ = R;ǫ − 2Rδǫ;δ = 0. (10.133)
Multiplying by gǫζ , we get
gǫζR;ǫ − 2Rδζ;δ =
(
Rǫζ − 1
2
gǫζR
)
;ǫ
= 0. (10.134)
We have found that the symmetric tensor
Gαβ =: Rαβ − 1
2
gαβR, (10.135)
called the Einstein tensor, has the special property that its covariant diver-
gence is null,
Gαβ ;β = 0. (10.136)
33To prove the Bianchi identity, calculate the “covariant curl” of the third-order tensor
(AαBβ);γ to find (AαBβ);γδ−(AαBβ);δγ = AαRǫβγδBǫ+BβRǫαγδAǫ. Next identify AαBβ
with Tα;β and form the sum of its three cyclic permutations of β, γ, and δ. Express this
sum, on the one hand, in terms of the mixed Riemann tensor and first covariant derivatives
of Tα and, on the other hand, in terms of covariant derivatives of the product of the mixed
Riemann tensor and Tα. Use R
δ
αβγ +R
δ
γαβ +R
δ
βγα = 0 and simplify.
34To show this result, write the Ricci tensor in terms of the covariant Riemann tensor
and use the symmetry properties of the latter.
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Finally, noticing that the Einstein tensor Gαβ consists of a second-order
tensor Rαβ and a scalar R, we consider whether any further, still simpler,
term could be added to it such that its covariant divergence continues to
be null. Thinking in purely mathematical terms, a term of the form Λgαβ ,
where Λ is some constant unrelated to the Ricci tensor, satisfies Λgαβ;β = 0.
Adding it to the Einstein tensor for now only with this purely mathematical
motivation, we get the generalized Einstein tensor
G
αβ =: Rαβ − 1
2
gαβR+ Λgαβ , (10.137)
where
G
αβ
;β = 0. (10.138)
Is the inclusion of Λ in the Einstein tensor also justified on physical grounds
by the display of relevant observable effects? And if so, what is its physical
interpretation? Not dark and mysterious, one should hope. We return to
this issue later on.
10.3.5 Geodesic deviation and the rise of rod length
How do we observe the active effects of the curvature tensor? In a curved
spacetime, we expect that two particles that follow at first parallel geodesics
will not remain on parallel spacetime tracks but will start to converge or
diverge, i.e. two test particles released at rest will either move towards or
away from each other (discounting their mutual gravitational interaction).
This two-geodesic method of probing curvature sounds promising, because
the test in question involves only local information.
To inspect the behaviour of the separation between two particle geodesics
in relation to curvature, we examine two close-lying geodesics xα = xα(u)
and x′α = x′α(u) (not its derivative) that are nearly parallel to each other,
as shown in Figure 10.9 for the case of two massive particles. The small
difference ηα(u) = x′α(u)− xα(u) is a differential vector that connects those
points in the geodesics that have the same value of parameter u. Since the
two geodesics are nearly parallel, the rate of change dηα/du of their mutual
separation is also very small.
In order to obtain an equation for ηα, we subtract the geodesic equation
of xα(u) from that of x′α(u). Using the first-order approximation to the
primed Christoffel symbol,{ α
βγ
}′
=
{ α
βγ
}
+
{ α
βγ
}
,δ
ηδ, (10.139)
on account of x′α(u) = xα(u) + ηα(u), we find
d2ηα
du2
+
{ α
βγ
}
,δ
dxβ
du
dxγ
du
ηδ +
{ α
βγ
}dxβ
du
dηγ
du
+
{ α
βγ
}dηβ
du
dxγ
du
= 0. (10.140)
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Figure 10.9: Deviation of two timelike geodesics as a local active effect of space-
time curvature. When spacetime is flat, two geodesics deviate from each other
linearly. When the size η of ηα does not depend on s, dη/ds = 0, ηα acts like an
idealized measuring rod.
Introducing the derivative of a sum and subtracting two extra terms, we get
d
du
(
dηα
du
+
{ α
βγ
}
ηβ
dxγ
du
)
− { αβγ },δηβ dxγdu dxδdu − { αβγ }ηβ d2xγdu2 +{ α
βγ
}
,δ
dxβ
du
dxγ
du
ηδ +
{ α
βγ
}dxβ
du
dηγ
du
= 0. (10.141)
Finally, using the geodesic equation to rewrite d2xγ/du2, adding and sub-
tracting a term (fourth and last below) to form an extra δηδ/δu, and rear-
ranging the indices, we find
d
du
(
dηα
du
+
{ α
βγ
}
ηβ
dxγ
du
)
+
{
α
δǫ
}(dηδ
du
+
{
δ
βγ
}
ηβ
dxγ
du
)
dxǫ
du
+({ α
γδ
}
,β
− { αβγ },δ + { ǫγδ }{ αβǫ}− { ǫβγ }{ αδǫ}) ηβ dxγdu dxδdu = 0. (10.142)
In the first two parenthesized expressions, we recognize the absolute deriva-
tive of the geodesic separation and, in the last one, the Riemann tensor.
The equation satisfied by the geodesic separation, which connects spacetime
curvature with the way the two geodesics deviate from one another, can
then be expressed in simpler terms as
δ2ηα
δu2
+Rαγβδη
β dx
γ
du
dxδ
du
= 0. (10.143)
The solution is completely determined when we know ηα and dηα/du for
some value of the parameter u. In flat spacetime, where the curvature
tensor is identically null, the equation reduces to
d2ηα
du2
= 0. (10.144)
Its solutions are ηα(u) = Aαu+Bα, which means that in flat spacetime the
separation vector between two geodesics changes linearly with u—the two
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geodesics are straight lines in spacetime and, therefore, converge or diverge
linearly.
The separation between timelike spacetime geodesics gives us now the
possibility to recover the concept of rod distance η from chronometric foun-
dations. In relativity theory, the concept of length between two particles is
not straightforward because, in Riemann-Einstein spacetime, the present—
that is, when the length measurement should be made—is tied to each ob-
server’s worldline; in classical physics, on the other hand, the present is an
absolute notion. This difficulty notwithstanding, the rod length between
two particles can be determined for special cases in relativity theory too, as
follows.
The geodesic separation ηα(s) is a spacelike vector, whose size
η(s) =: dsη(s) =
√
gαβ [x(s)]ηα(s)ηβ(s) (10.145)
depends on the value of the geodesic parameter s. This size, indicating
the separation between two neighbouring free massive particles, is measured
with a clock and a photon; showing the dependence on s explicitly, it is
η(s) = dssP sAdssAsQ , (10.146)
where P and Q are the events of photon emission and reception and A marks
the tail of ηα(s) (cf. Figure 10.3 on page 143). If η(s) does not depend on
s, the spacelike separation must be constant,
dη
ds
= 0. (10.147)
In that case, we can identify the two particles joined by ηα with the end-
points of an idealized rigid measuring rod and η with its length. In practice,
this condition is obtained when all the photons sent out from the first particle
and bouncing back from the second particle arrive at constant clock intervals.
In this roundabout manner, the concept of rod length arises as a particular
case of measurements of spacetime intervals with clocks and photons.
10.4 The sources of gravitation
10.4.1 The vacuum
We start the search for the different instances of Einstein’s field equation,
which connects spacetime curvature with sources in spacetime, in each case
looking for guidance in Newton’s classical theory of gravitation. At the out-
set with the case of the vacuum, Newtonian theory helps us realize that there
is no straightforward general-relativistic counterpart of the classical gravi-
tational potential Φ(~r), but it also provides a useful analogical picture on
which to base the search for the different instances of the general-relativistic
field equation.
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In the vacuum outside a spherically symmetric mass distribution, the
Newtonian gravitational potential Φ(~r), connected with the universal force
of gravitation according to ~∇Φ(~r) = −~g(~r), satisfies Laplace’s equation
∇2Φ(~r) = 0. (10.148)
This follows from the fact that ~g(~r) is divergence-free, ~∇ · ~g(~r) = 0, where
~g(~r) = −GMrˆ/r2. In Cartesian coordinates, Laplace’s equation becomes
3∑
i=1
∂2Φ(~r)
(∂xi)2
= 0. (10.149)
In special relativity, an equation corresponding to the classical Laplace
equation is
φ(x) =: ηαβφ,αβ(x) = 0. (10.150)
This equation has the form of the Klein-Gordon equation for a scalar field
associated with a massless particle; expressed in the form of a wave equation,
it is
3∑
i=1
∂2φ(x)
(∂xi)2
− ∂
2φ(x)
(∂x4)2
= 0. (10.151)
Could we now generalize Laplace’s equation for the general-relativistic
case to find the equation of gravitation in the vacuum? Should we per-
haps, in analogy, take our equation to be gαβφ;αβ(x) = 0? But what is
now the meaning of field φ(x)? Having come this far in the formulation
of general relativity, we know it for a fact that its foundation is given by
the quadratic form ds2 = ǫgαβ(x)dx
αdxβ, so why should all of a sudden an
extraneous field like φ(x) be needed? How about gαβgγδ;αβ(x) = 0 then?
Not really, because the covariant derivative of the metric tensor is identically
null, gγδ;α(x) ≡ 0, and so no real information can be extracted from such an
equation. Once again, it seems that simply gαβ(x) is not enough to serve as
the “new gravitational field.”
As we suspected earlier, gravitation should instead be related to space-
time curvature, and we know that curvature is characterized by the Riemann
tensor. But how should one take advantage of this knowledge to build the
field equation in vacuum? If we say that “spacetime curvature is null in
vacuum,” would this mean that spacetime is flat, and thus gravitation-free,
in vacuum even when there is matter elsewhere and not necessarily very far
away? Such an interpretation goes against our intuition, because gravita-
tional effects exist in the vacuum near massive objects; spacetime cannot
therefore be flat there.
When we say, as we will, that spacetime curvature is null in vacuum, we
take the meaning of this assertion in direct analogy with Newtonian the-
ory, by identifying a null curvature tensor with the null Laplacian of the
Newtonian potential. And so, just like in classical physics the null Lapla-
cian can give the solution to the non-null gravitational potential outside
a material distribution, so can a null curvature tensor give the non-null
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curvature solution outside a material distribution. Only when the vacuum
extends thoroughly everywhere are gravitational effects nonexistent and, in
relativistic physics, we can say that spacetime is flat.
So far we have developed several versions of the curvature tensor. Which
of the following five alternative field equations: (i) Rαβγδ(x) = 0, (ii)
Rδαβγ(x) = 0, (iii) Rαβ(x) = 0, (iv) R(x) = 0, and (v) Gαβ(x) = 0 should
we now choose as the analogue of ∇2Φ(~r) = 0? The field equation we search
should be capable of unequivocally determining the 10 independent compo-
nents gαβ of the metric tensor, and so we can narrow down the possibilities
to expressions (iii) and (v)—a null Ricci or Einstein tensor, respectively—
the only ones suitable from this perspective, because only they have no more
nor less than 10 independent components. But which of the two should we
choose?
For the purposes of this and the next two sections, that is, for the study
of the vacuum, which of the two tensors we choose is irrelevant, because in
the vacuum, as we see below, the Einstein tensor reduces to the Ricci tensor.
However, when we later on consider solutions inside a distribution of matter
(i.e. matter as an explicit source), only the choice of the Einstein tensor
will be suitable, because only it is capable of leading us to a law for the
local conservation of the momentum and energy of the matter source, i.e. to
the generalization of the classical law of continuity of matter. This is made
possible by the extra mathematical property of Eq. (10.136) seen earlier,
namely, that the Einstein tensor is divergence-free (in the covariant sense).
When, after establishing a connection between curvature and matter, we
demand that the matter source be divergence-free for conservation purposes,
this mathematical property of Gαβ becomes physically relevant.
In general, we should then choose the field equation in vacuum to be
Gαβ(x) = 0. (10.152)
In practice, however, the curvature scalar R is null in vacuum,35 and in that
case we can use Rαβ(x) = 0 for simplicity.
The simplest solution to the field equation in vacuum is obtained when
the vacuum extends everywhere. Then the curvature tensor is identically
null, Rαβ(x) ≡ 0, and coordinates can be found such that the solution to
the field equation is gαβ(x) = ηαβ , that is, flat spacetime.
Another exact solution to the spacetime metric can be found outside a
spherically symmetric matter distribution of mass M . This solution was
found by Karl Schwarzschild in 1916. Considerations of spherical symmetry
lead to constraints in the possible form that the metric field can take. Using
spherical coordinates, the metric can only be of the form
gαβ(x) = diag
(
eλ(x
1), (x1)2, (x1)2 sin2(x2),−eν(x1)
)
, (10.153)
with asymptotic flatness at infinity, i.e. with boundary conditions λ(x1)→ 0
and ν(x1)→ 0 when x1 →∞.
35Express Gαβ(x) = 0 in explicit form and contract its indices with the metric tensor
to find −R = 0.
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The calculation of the 13 non-null Christoffel symbols gives{
1
11
}
=
1
2
λ′,
{
1
22
}
= −x1e−λ,{
1
33
}
= −x1 sin2(x2)e−λ, { 144} = 12eν−λν ′,{
2
12
}
=
{
2
21
}
=
1
x1
,
{
2
33
}
= − sin(x2) cos(x2), (10.154){
3
13
}
=
{
3
31
}
=
1
x1
,
{
3
23
}
=
{
3
32
}
= cot(x2),{
4
14
}
=
{
4
41
}
=
1
2
ν ′.
As a result, the Ricci tensor is diagonal, with components given by
R11 =
1
2
(
ν ′′ − 1
2
λ′ν ′ +
1
2
ν ′2 − 2
x1
λ′
)
, (10.155)
R22 = −1 + e−λ
[
1 +
1
2
x1(ν ′ − λ′)
]
, (10.156)
R33 = sin
2(x2)R22, (10.157)
R44 = −1
2
eν−λ
(
ν ′′ − 1
2
λ′ν ′ +
1
2
ν ′2 +
2
x1
ν ′
)
. (10.158)
To solve the system of four equations Rαα = 0, we consider first R11 = 0
and R44 = 0 together with the condition of asymptotic flatness. We find
straightforwardly that ν(x1) = −λ(x1). Next we use this result to simplify
and solve R22 = 0. Grouping the variables x
1 and λ with their respective
differentials and integrating once, we find
eλ =
(
1− C
x1
)−1
(10.159)
and, therefore,
eν = 1− C
x1
. (10.160)
The value of the integration constant C is found by comparing with the
Newtonian limit (expressed in natural units). Because36
−
(
1− C
x1
)
= g44
c
= −(1 + 2Φ) = −
(
1− 2GM
c2r
)
, (10.161)
then C = 2GM/c2, where x1 can be identified with the Euclidean distance r
only when x1 →∞. The quadratic form in the vacuum outside a spherical
matter distribution then is
ds2 = ǫ
{(
1− 2GM
c2x1
)−1
(dx1)2 + (x1)2[(dx2)2 + sin2(x2)(dx3)2]−
(
1− 2GM
c2x1
)
(dx4)2
}
, (10.162)
36See next section, Eq. (10.185).
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where 0 ≤ x2 ≤ π, 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 2π, and −∞ < x4 < ∞. This solution is valid
either for (i) x1B < x
1 < ∞, where x1B is the radius of the material edge of
the matter distribution or (ii) x1S < x
1 < ∞, where x1S = 2GM/c2 is the
Schwarzschild radius of the matter distribution, depending on which of the
two values is reached first as we approach from infinity. If x1S = 2GM/c
2
is reached first, the spacetime region in question is called a (non-rotating)
black hole.
10.4.2 Tremors in the vacuum
If not in the general way described (and rejected) at the beginning of the pre-
vious section, do the classical gravitational potential Φ(~r) and the Laplace
equation ∇2Φ(~r) = 0 have some kind of relativistic counterpart in some
special case?
To find out, we consider physically weak tremors (from the spacetime
perspective) induced by a small deviation from metric flatness,
gαβ(x) = ηαβ + φαβ, (10.163)
where all φαβ and their derivatives are very small. In this case, it is accurate
enough to solve the equation Rαβ(x) = 0 to first order in φαβ . What kind
of weak “gravitational field” φαβ(x) results from this approximation?
To first order (∼) in φαβ , we have that the inverse metric tensor is
gαβ(x) = ηαβ − φαβ (10.164)
because
gαβgβγ ∼ (ηαβ − φαβ)(ηβγ − φβγ) = δαγ + φαγ − φαγ = δαγ . (10.165)
In the following, the metric tensor gαβ is the only tensor whose indices will be
raised and lowered with itself; for any other field, we use the flat-spacetime
metric ηαβ or η
αβ.
The next step is to find the first-order approximation to the Ricci tensor.
From expression (10.111) of the mixed Riemann tensor, we know that the
exact Ricci tensor is
Rαβ =
{ γ
αγ
}
,β
− { γαβ },γ + { ǫαγ }{ γǫβ }− { ǫαβ }{ γǫγ }. (10.166)
Because to first order the Christoffel symbol is{ γ
αβ
} ∼ 1
2
ηγδ(φαδ,β + φβδ,α − φαβ,δ), (10.167)
we then have { γ
αβ
}
,γ
∼ 1
2
(φ γα ,βγ + φ
γ
β ,αγ −φαβ) (10.168)
and { γ
αγ
}
,β
∼ 1
2
φ,αβ . (10.169)
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To first order, disregarding products of φαβ or its derivatives, the Ricci
tensor is
Rαβ ∼
{ γ
αγ
}
,β
− { γαβ },γ ∼ 12(φ,αβ − φ γα ,βγ − φ γβ ,αγ +φαβ). (10.170)
Because we find ourselves outside any material distribution, we set Rαβ = 0
to get
φαβ + φ,αβ − φ γα ,βγ − φ γβ ,αγ = 0.37 (10.171)
This is the linearized general-relativistic equation for a perturbation
φαβ(x) of the metric field. Its form coincides with the Bargmann-Wigner
equation for a field in flat spacetime associated with a massless spin-2 par-
ticle. On account of its formal correspondence with the linearized general-
relativistic equation for the metric perturbation φαβ(x), this particle is some-
times called a “graviton.” However, the correspondence appears to be only
formal, because the Bargmann-Wigner field equation was derived for a field
in Minkowski spacetime, which is flat and has therefore nothing to do with
gravitation. As hard as one might try to establish the resemblance between
a “graviton” and other quantum particles, a “graviton” does not stand on
the same conceptual footing as quantum particles, because the field associ-
ated with it is not an ordinary field on flat spacetime but is itself (part of)
the metric field of spacetime.
To see what φαβ(x) may have to do with the Newtonian potential Φ(~r),
we start by considering a “slow particle” such that the components V a
(a = 1, 2, 3) of its four-velocity V α = dxα/ds are very small and, therefore,
gαβV
αV β = −1 becomes
g44(V4)
2 ∼ −1, (10.172)
from where
V 4 ∼ 1√−g44 . (10.173)
When the slow-particle condition is applied to the geodesic equation for
α = a, we find
dV a
ds
∼ −{ a44}(V 4)2. (10.174)
But because
dV a
ds
=
dV a
dxα
V α ∼ dV
a
dx4
V 4, (10.175)
we get
dV a
dx4
∼ −{ a44}V 4. (10.176)
The left-hand side of this equation is comparable with the Newtonian accel-
eration dva/dt.
37Taking advantage of the gauge freedom of this equation, it can be recast simply as
φαβ = 0 using the gauge χ
γ
α ,γ = 0, where χαβ = φαβ−ηαβφ/2. In some more detail, the
linearized equation is invariant with respect to the gauge transformation φαβ → φ˜αβ =
φαβ + (λα,β + λβ,α)/2, where λα(x) is an arbitrary vector field. When λα = 2χ
β
α β , the
gauge condition is satisfied (i.e. χ˜ γα ,γ = 0) and the linearized equation simplified with
respect to the new field φ˜αβ. This is the starting point of the study of gravitational waves.
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Assuming next that the full spacetime metric is “quasistatic,” i.e. that
gαβ,4 is much smaller than gαβ,a, we get{
a
44
} ∼ −1
2
gaα
∂g44
∂xα
∼ −1
2
gab
∂g44
∂xb
. (10.177)
Using this result, we find
dV a
dx4
∼ 1
2
gab
∂g44
∂xb
V 4. (10.178)
Using Eq. (10.173), we come to the expression
dV a
dx4
∼ −gab ∂
√−g44
∂xb
. (10.179)
Finally, because we are dealing only with tremors in the vacuum,
g44 = 1− φ44 (10.180)
on account of Eq. (10.164). The counterpart of the Newtonian acceleration
thus becomes
dV a
dx4
∼ −(ηab − φab)∂(1 − φ44/2)
∂xb
∼ 1
2
ηab
∂φ44
∂xb
; (10.181)
that is
dVa
dx4
∼ 1
2
∂φ44
∂xa
. (10.182)
Comparing this expression with the Newtonian acceleration
dva
dt
= ga(~r) = −∂Φ(~r)
∂xa
, (10.183)
we discover the correspondences (valid only in the context of the approxi-
mations made)
Φ
c
= −1
2
φ44 (10.184)
and
g44
c
= −(1 + 2Φ). (10.185)
A rough estimate of how Φ compares with unity in Eq. (10.185) at the
surface of the earth, where Φ(r) = −GM/c2r,38 gives
Φ ∼ −10−9 and ∂Φ
∂xa
∼ 10−16 m−1. (10.186)
From this, the acceleration at the surface of the earth turns out to be the
familiar result
c2
∂Φ
∂xa
= 10 ms−2. (10.187)
38In natural units, as used so far, Φ is a dimensionless number. On the other hand,
−GM/r has SI units L2T−2. To convert a quantity from SI units to natural units (c = 1),
we must divide it by c2 as we just did; to convert a quantity from natural units to SI
units, we must multiply it by c2.
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The relative size of the gravitational tremors with respect to the flat-spacetime
background is comparable with ripples rising 1 centimetre above the surface
of an (unearthly) lake 10,000 kilometres in depth.
We find, moreover, that in this correspondence the Laplacian ∇2Φ of the
Newtonian potential is the 44-component of the Ricci tensor,
R44 ∼ 1
2
(φ,44 − 2φ γ4 ,4γ +φ44) ∼
1
2
ηαβφ44,αβ ∼ 1
2
ηabφ44,ab =
1
2
3∑
a=1
φ44,aa =
1
2
∇2φ44 c= −∇2Φ. (10.188)
Thus, the Laplace equation ∇2Φ = 0 for the Newtonian potential in vacuum
corresponds to R44 = 0.
The special role of coordinate x4 in the way the correspondence with
classical physics was established deserves special mention. Early on, x4
played a crucial part in the local characterization of the past, the present,
and the future in relativity theory. Now it seems that, in this approximation,
x4 has become the absolute time t of classical physics. The likelihood of this
conclusion is strengthened by a look at Einstein’s (1952a) original paper,
where, on making this approximation, he writes that “we have set ds =
dx4 = dt” (p. 158). But is this true to first order in Φ? It is not, because
we have ∆s = ∆t in the Newtonian case, but
dx4
ds
= V 4 ∼ 1√
1− φ44
∼ 1 + 1
2
φ44
c
= 1− Φ 6= 1. (10.189)
We conclude that the identification of the fourth coordinate x4 with absolute
time t is not possible even in the relativistic approximation to Newtonian
physics. If, in spite of this, the association x4 = ct still wants to be made,
one must remember that in this case t is just a notation—the misleading
name of a spacetime coordinate, not absolute time.
10.4.3 The cosmic vacuum
So far we have studied the field equations Gαβ = 0 or Rαβ = 0, where the
constant Λ is null. In neglecting this constant, we have assumed that |Λ| is
small enough, but now we would like to make sure that this is correct by
setting an upper bound for |Λ|.
We start by noting that, because
gαβGαβ = R− 2R + 4Λ = 0, (10.190)
then R = 4Λ, and the field equation reduces to
Rαβ − Λgαβ = 0. (10.191)
Using again the correspondence R44
c
= −∇2Φ in the context of the Newto-
nian approximation, to first order in Λ we have
Λg44
c
= −Λ(1 + 2Φ) ∼ −Λ. (10.192)
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If we now take Λg44 as if it was a source of curvature (instead of being a
curvature term itself), we can write the Poisson equation
∇2Φ = 4πGρ
c2
+ Λ (10.193)
for the Newtonian potential inside a medium of density ρ + Λc2/4πG (ex-
pressed in SI units). Here ρ stands for the ordinary density of matter, while
Λc2/4πG stands for the mass density of a new source of gravitation per-
vading all space in the manner of an ubiquitous ether, present also inside
matter.
We see from Eq. (10.193) that, if the classical dynamics inside a system
of density ρ is well described by Newtonian theory, then |Λ| ≪ 4πGρ/c2,
obtaining an upper bound for this new constant. The more dilute a system
inside of which Newtonian theory holds, the more stringent the upper bound
set on |Λ| is and, consequently, the smaller it must be.
For a conservative estimate, we take our galaxy as a system inside which
Newtonian mechanics can be applied successfully. Given that the average
density of the Milky Way is approximately ρ = 1.7 × 10−21 kg/m3,39 we
find, |Λ| ≪ 1.4 × 10−30 s−2. To express this bound in a more familiar way
in terms of natural units, we divide by c2 to get |Λ| ≪ 1.6× 10−47m−2.
It has been conjectured by other methods that a more accurate but
less conservative estimate is |Λ| ≤ 10−35 s−2 or, more commonly in natural
units, |Λ| ≤ 10−52 m−2. On account of Eq. (10.193), the gravitational effect
of a constant Λ of this magnitude would begin to be felt inside a material
medium of density ρ ≤ 1.7 × 10−26 kg/m3, i.e. 10 hydrogen-atom masses
per cubic metre. This value corresponds to the density of the intergalactic
medium. Thus, in order for Λ to have non-negligible effects, we must consider
cosmological distances—hence its name, the cosmological constant.
To see what kind of gravitational effects are caused by the cosmological
constant—whose so far enigmatic source, we recall, pervades all space—in
the absence of any other material medium (i.e. ρ = 0), we consider a point-
like40 mass M surrounded by a perfect vacuum in the ordinary sense of the
word. In the Newtonian approximation under consideration, we should then
solve Eq. (10.193).
Since Λ is constant and the central mass point-like (or spherical), we
solve for Φ(r) in a spherically symmetric context:
1
r2
d
dr
(
r2
dΦ
dr
)
= Λ. (10.194)
Integrating twice and absorbing one constant into the potential, we find
Φ(r) = −C
′
r
+
1
6
Λr2, (10.195)
39Expressed differently, ρ = 106×1.7×10−27 kg/m3, that is, 106 hydrogen-atom masses
per cubic meter. This is one million times the density of the intergalactic “vacuum.”
40Or spherical, in which case we are only interested to find the gravitational potential
in the vacuum outside it.
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which leads to a gravitational force on a particle of mass m of the type
~Fg = −mdΦ
dr
rˆ = −m
(
C ′
r2
+
1
3
Λr
)
rˆ, (10.196)
where C ′ = GM/c2. If Λ is positive, it generates an extra attractive gravi-
tational force between the central mass and a test mass. More interestingly,
if it is negative, it generates an extra repulsive gravitational force between
the two masses. In both cases, the extra force increases linearly as we recede
from the central mass. For negative Λ, there exists then a distance at which
the attraction from the centre is balanced by the repulsion caused by the so
far enigmatic source of the cosmological constant. Given the upper bound
|Λ| ≤ 10−52 m−2, we can get a feel for the distance involved when the central
mass is the sun (M ≈ 2 × 1030 kg). We find that, in an otherwise perfect
universal vacuum, the cosmological constant is so small that its repulsive
force cancels out the attraction of the sun at a distance
r =
3
√
3GM
Λc2
≈ 3.5 × 1018 m ≈ 375 ly. (10.197)
The value of this result is only pedagogical. Nothing near the perfect univer-
sal vacuum here assumed exists either in the solar system or in the galaxy.
We should go as far out as intergalactic space to find a medium of low enough
density that the cosmological constant can exert its influence at all. This is
a distance of millions or tens of millions of light-years—four to five orders
of magnitude greater than the mere 375 light-years just obtained.
Leaving classical theory behind, we can now consider Λ and find an exact
solution to the generalized Einstein field equation Gαβ = 0, which, outside
an ordinary material distribution, we saw reduces to Eq. (10.191). Following
essentially the same method as for the Schwarzschild solution with the added
extra source terms,41 we get
eν = e−λ =
[
1− C
x1
+
1
3
Λ(x1)2
]
. (10.198)
To consider a cosmos everywhere void of matter, we set C = 0, since the
origin of this constant is a localized matter distribution. As a result, we get
ds2 = ǫ
{[
1 +
1
3
Λ(x1)2
]−1
(dx1)2 + (x1)2[(dx2)2 + sin2(x2)(dx3)2]−
[
1 +
1
3
Λ(x1)2
]
(dx4)2
}
. (10.199)
This solution was found by Willem de Sitter in 1917. For Λ < 0, the value
x1H =
√
−3/Λ characterizes the radius of the event horizon of the spacetime
in question, beyond which no information can reach an observer.
41To solve the resulting differential equation by integration, rewrite (1 + x1ν′)eν as the
derivative of a product.
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When all is said and done, what are we to make of the cosmological con-
stant? What physical meaning are we to attach to it? When the generalized
field equation is written in the form Rαβ = Λgαβ , one gets the impression
that the cosmological constant is a material source of spacetime curvature.
But since it certainly is not related to matter, we appear to be confronted
by a mysterious kind of stuff that is all-pervading and whose origin we know
nothing of, but which has active physical effects—a demiether. Evoking
this sense of wonder, the presumed physical stuff behind the cosmological
constant has been named “dark energy.” But is in question here a physical
mystery or only a mysterious physical interpretation? The power of psy-
chological inducement perhaps deserves more attention that is usually paid
to it. If the generalized field equation is instead simply written in the form
Rαβ − Λgαβ = 0, the impression vanishes, and one is free to see the cos-
mological constant simply as an extra term of spacetime curvature possibly
relevant in a cosmic near-vacuum.
In the context of present theories, consideration of a negative cosmo-
logical constant is deemed justified by the observed cosmological redshift
of distant galaxies. If this interpretation of the cosmological redshift stood
the test of time in the light of hypothetical better cosmological theories to
come, and the need for a cosmological constant became thus better secured,
we could then, in the light of the previous paragraph, regard it as nothing
more than a new fundamental constant related to the curvature of space-
time. If we do not worry and try to explain the origin of the gravitational
constant G, the speed of light c, and Planck’s constant h, why should we
any more worry about the origin of the curvature constant Λ?
10.4.4 The dust-filled cosmos
The next and final step is to generalize the field equation for the case
of a non-empty cosmos. Now, instead of the homogeneous field equation
Gαβ(x) = 0 in vacuum, we expect an inhomogeneous equation with a source
term characterizing the matter distribution in analogy with the classical
Poisson equation
∇2Φ = 4πGρ. (10.200)
The source term is usually expressed as κTαβ , where κ is a constant. Fur-
ther, because Gαβ is symmetric and divergence-free (a choice based on a
mathematical property so far without physical relevance), Tαβ should be so
too.
A simple case is that of a cosmos filled with matter resembling an ideal
fluid whose pressure is null (or approximately null) and its constituent par-
ticles are free, interacting with each other only gravitationally. This kind
of fluid is usually called dust. When we identify the fluid particles with
galaxies, we obtain a useful application of this idea for the study of the
cosmos as a whole. Since we are dealing with a continuous material dis-
tribution, instead of considering its four-momentum Pα(x) = mV α(x), it is
more appropriate to characterize this fluid by means of its invariant matter
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density ρ(x) and four-velocity V α(x). Together they form a field ρ(x)V α(x),
called the four-momentum-density field, the natural counterpart of the four-
momentum field mV α(x).
However, ρV α is not yet a viable choice for the source term Tαβ we seek,
because this should be a second-order tensor. Since we are looking for a
symmetric second-order tensor and the only fields characterizing the ideal
pressureless fluid are its density and its four-velocity, we do not seem to have
any other options but to propose that
Tαβ = ρV αV β (10.201)
is the source term we are looking for. If it is a bad choice, it should next
lead us to physically unpleasant results.
Because Tαβ should be divergence-free, we have
Tαβ;β = (ρV
β);βV
α + ρV βV α;β = 0. (10.202)
Multiplying by Vα on both sides, we get
(ρV β);βVαV
α + ρV βVαV
α
;β = 0. (10.203)
The second term is null42 and, because V αVα = −1, the equation reduces
to
(ρV β);β = 0. (10.204)
This is a conservation equation for the four-momentum density, and it is the
general-relativistic generalization of the classical continuity equation
~∇ · (ρ~v) + ∂ρ
∂t
= 0, (10.205)
expressing the local conservation of matter. This is a physically pleasant
result. Furthermore, it justifies the choice of Gαβ over Rαβ from a physical
point of view.
Returning to Eq. (10.202), since the first term is null, it follows that so
must be the second term. Because neither ρ nor V β are in general null, then
V α;β = 0. (10.206)
In words, the free particles composing the ideal pressureless fluid follow
spacetime geodesics. And this is as it should be—another physically pleasant
result. Our presumption about the form of Tαβ is now confirmed.
In this ideal-fluid picture, the field equation is then
Rαβ − 1
2
gαβR = κρV αV β. (10.207)
42Writing VαV
α
;β = (VαV
α);β − V αVα;β, we find that the first term is null because
V αVα = −1 and that the second is −gαγVγVα;β = −VγV γ;β. Therefore, VαV α;β = 0.
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Contracting the indices with gαβ , we find that R = κρ. The field equation
is thus simplified to
Rαβ = κρ
[
V αV β +
1
2
gαβ
]
. (10.208)
To determine κ we resort again to the correspondence with Newtonian the-
ory. The 44-component of the Ricci tensor gives
−∇2Φ c= R44 = κρ
[
(V 4)2 +
1
2
g44
]
. (10.209)
To the lowest non-trivial order in κρ, (V 4)2 ∼ 1 and g44 ∼ −1, and so
∇2Φ = −1
2
κρ. (10.210)
Comparison with Poisson’s equation ∇2Φ = 4πGρ leads finally to the re-
sult43
κ = −8πG. (10.211)
In the pressureless-fluid picture here considered, the field equation finally
becomes
Gαβ = −8πGρV αV β. (10.212)
In his original paper, Einstein (1952a) holds that the general expression
of this equation, namely,
Gαβ = −8πGTαβ (10.213)
is indeed the field equation describing “the influence of the gravitational
field on all processes, without our having to introduce any new hypothesis
whatever” (pp. 151–152). This is to say that the equation describes the
gravitational interaction of all fields related to matter and radiation (velocity
field, mass-density field, pressure field, electromagnetic field, etc.), so long
as they are described by a matter-radiation tensor Tαβ that is divergence-
free. Finally, when we consider the cosmological constant as well, the most
general field equation for gravitational interactions is
G
αβ = −8πGTαβ . (10.214)
The curvature of spacetime becomes in this way connected to the distribu-
tion of matter and radiation in it.
10.4.5 The problem of cosmology
“The problem of cosmology,” said Einstein (1982) in his Kyoto lecture, “is
related to the geometry of the universe and to time” (p. 47). We finish
this chapter with a brief analysis of the insight contained in this deceptively
simple statement.
43In SI units, the constant of proportionality is κ = −8πG/c4.
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In order for the study of the cosmos as a whole to be practically possi-
ble, standard cosmology is forced to make several assumptions. Firstly, the
assumption is made that galaxies, conceived as material particles, are in free
fall, interacting with each other only gravitationally (cf. previous section).
Next follows a much less innocuous supposition, according to which cosmic
space is locally isotropic, i.e. looks the same in all directions from anywhere
at any one time. Against this supposition, it might be argued that an ap-
proximation in which the cosmos is materially smooth is too unrealistic, and
that, moreover, the cosmos may only look approximately smooth from our
own vantage point, which is both severely restricted spatially to the Milky
Way and temporally to a few thousand years of astronomical observations.
Martin (1996), for example, readily admits that “we have no way of telling
that the Universe is at all homogeneous and isotropic when seen from other
places or at other times” (p. 143).
Indeed, all this and more could be argued against the cosmological
premise of local isotropy. But it is the unspoken presumption lying be-
neath this cosmological premise that must be regarded with a much higher
degree of suspicion. For what is “cosmic space at one time” supposed to
mean in general relativity? How shall we separate the whole universal four-
dimensional spacetime into universal spaces at a given time, when this can-
not even be done for smaller spacetime regions? What kind of time is it
that the existence of cosmic space implies?
In cosmology, the separation of spacetime into a spatial part and a tem-
poral part is translated into geometric language by expressing the line ele-
ment in the form
ds2 = ǫ
[
gab(x)dx
adxb − (dx4)2
]
. (10.215)
Once this split is made, the local isotropy of cosmic space is expressed geo-
metrically by recasting the (non-invariant) spatial part Qs =: gab(x)dx
adxb
of this equation in spherical coordinates as
Qs = e
A(x4,x1)
[
(dx1)2 + (x1)2(dx2)2 + (x1)2 sin2(x2)(dx3)2
]
. (10.216)
How are the coordinates interpreted in this space-time setting? Coor-
dinate x4 is taken to represent “cosmic time” and denoted x4 = cτ . “Cos-
mic time” τ works as a “universal time,” equal for all “cosmic observers”
travelling along galactic worldlines. This means that “cosmic observers”
throughout the cosmos measure the same absolute “cosmic separation”
ds2 = c2dτ2. (10.217)
Cosmic space is then nothing but the three-dimensional hypersurfaces or-
thogonal to the galactic worldlines at τ = τnow; i.e. cosmic space is an
instantaneous slice of spacetime at absolute “cosmic time” τnow. But is the
assumption of “cosmic time” realistic in a general-relativistic world?
As for x1, it is interpreted as the radial distance to an event from a
cosmic observer and denoted x1 = ρ. The supposition is then made that
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the function A(τ, ρ) can be separated into a part B(τ) connected only with
“cosmic time” and to be related to the expansion of cosmic space, and a
part C(ρ) connected only with matter and to be related to the curvature of
cosmic space, i.e.
A(τ, ρ) = B(τ) + C(ρ). (10.218)
Since the cosmos is spatially homogeneous at a given “cosmic instant,” the
spatial part of the tensor describing its matter and radiation content must
be of the form T ab = constant δ
a
b.
On all these assumptions and with suitable integration constants, the
field equation leads to the solution
ds2 = ǫ
[
eB(τ)
(
1 +
kρ2
4ρ20
)−2
(dρ2 + ρ2dθ2 + ρ2 sin2(θ)dφ2)− c2dτ2
]
,
(10.219)
where k = 0, 1 or −1. An equivalent solution was found by Howard Robert-
son in 1935 and by Arthur Walker in 1936, and it is the geometric foundation
of relativistic cosmology. It is interpreted to picture a flat, positively, or neg-
atively curved locally isotropic space—pictured by exp[C(ρ)]—“expanding”
in “cosmic time”—pictured by exp[B(τ)].
A similar interpretation is usually made of the de Sitter solution (10.199)
for the cosmic vacuum we saw earlier. By means of a change of coordinates,{
x1 = ρecτ
√
−Λ/3
x4 = cτ + 12
√−3/Λ ln [1 + (Λ/3)ρ2e2cτ√−Λ/3] , (10.220)
the de Sitter line element can be expressed as a spatially isotropic part that,
for Λ < 0, “expands” in “cosmic time” τ :
ds2 = ǫ
{
e2cτ
√
−Λ/3[dρ2 + ρ2dθ2 + ρ2 sin2(θ)dφ2]− c2dτ2
}
. (10.221)
This pictures, as it were, an expanding empty cosmos or “motion without
matter.” It stands in contrast to Einstein’s proposed solution of a matter-
filled static universe or “matter without motion.”
We can now see that when Einstein deemed the problem of cosmology
to be tied to the geometry of the universe (i.e. of space) and to time, he
was dead right. Moreover, realizing now that the former problem depends
on the latter, we recognize that the problem of cosmology really boils down
to its presumptions about the nature of time.
The problem of space refers to the question of the spatial curvature of the
locally isotropic cosmos. But, as we just saw, in order to be able to even talk
about spatial properties, spacetime should be separable into a spatial part
gab(x)dx
adxb and a temporal part g44(x
1, x2, x3)(dx4)2. This is feasible, for
example, for flat spacetime or for the spacetime around an isolated spherical
mass distribution, but it is not a general property of spacetime. In fact,
it seems least circumspect to assume the validity of the space-time split
in the cosmological setting, since we are here dealing with the totality of
spatiotemporal events, which is therefore the most general case there is.
10.4 The sources of gravitation 183
This unwarranted space-time split of cosmology signals a regress to a
Newtonian worldview: an absolute cosmic space whose existence requires
that of absolute time. Through “cosmic time,” the universe becomes en-
dowed with an absolute present (absolute space) and a history. The validity
of the space-time split in cosmology, however, runs counter to the basic
lessons of general relativity, and it is a presumption whose truth can only be
hoped for and guessed at. The psychologically suggestive notation x4 = cτ
does not by itself turn τ into a physically meaningful absolute time.
What motivates this cosmological regress to the classical view of time?
Ultimately, only our human quest for understanding. The problem of cos-
mology lies essentially in the suppositions it must make about the nature of
time in order to create a theoretical picture of something as vast, complex,
and remote as the cosmos simple enough to be humanly manageable and
understandable. It lies in the reversed logic of a situation in which we fit
the great wild cosmos to our existing, familiar tools of thought instead of
trying to develop new tools of thought that suit and do justice to the cosmos.
It seems ironic—although on second thoughts only natural—that the
more we have learnt, the deeper and farther we have probed the natural
world in pursuit of the disclosure of one more of its secrets, the closer we
have come to experience the deficiencies of our own cognitive tools. As if
the deeper we sink in an oceanic expedition, the more the dimming light
and building pressure interfere with our intended objective study of the
ocean’s fauna—until, in the utmost darkness of the inhospitable depths,
we become oblivious to all fauna, only remaining aware of the feeble light
our torch dispenses and the low oxygen supply in our tank. Dimming light
leads to virtual blindness and oxygen deficiency to brain damage. The first
symptoms of these conditions are easy for a diver to self-diagnose. The same,
regrettably, cannot be said of their counterparts in the human expedition to
the intellectually inhospitable depths of the cosmos.
In an often-quoted passage, Eddington captured, with rare insight, this
human dilemma. Concluding his book on spacetime and gravitation, he
wrote:
[W]e have found that where science has progressed the farthest,
the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has
put into nature.
We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the un-
known. We have devised profound theories, one after another,
to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in recon-
structing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is
our own. (Eddington, 1920, pp. 200–201)
The geometric analysis of clock time, leading us to the classical and
relativistic worldviews, is now complete.
What next?
Chapter 11
Interlude: Shall we
quantize time?
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it,
for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it
to us inexorably.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations
The main lesson to be drawn from the previous chapter is the identifica-
tion of clock time as the key physical concept in relativity theory. Our goal
being a “quantum theory of gravity,” this seems an excellent opportunity to
find it. Having uncovered the confusion that holds the metric field gαβ(x)
as the physical essence of relativity, and having identified the worldline sep-
aration ds in its stead as the rightful holder of this place, what else is there
left for us to do than quantize not gαβ(x) but ds? What else is there left for
us to do than quantize time?
Right at the outset, we can consider two alternatives. If we believe that
the smooth background of Riemann-Einstein spacetime is a suitable starting
point, we may quantize ds and introduce a quantum field of the form d̂s.
However, if for some reason we prefer to give up the comfort of differential
geometry and return to finite Euclidean geometry, we may quantize ∆s and
introduce a quantum field of the form ∆̂s. In the following, we use the
differential version d̂s; which version we choose, however, is irrelevant to
our ulterior aim.
Is d̂s an observable? We know that clock readings ds are positive real
numbers; they are the results of the experiments made with clocks as we
measure the interval between two events, A and B. It is then natural to
assume that ds are the eigenvalues of d̂s. On this condition, d̂s is indeed an
observable, i.e. Hermitian. In effect, introducing a Hilbert space of quantum-
mechanical eigenvectors |ψi〉, we have that{
d̂s|ψi〉 = ds|ψi〉|ψi〉
〈ψi|d̂s
†
= ds|ψi〉〈ψi|
. (11.1)
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The second equation is obtained as the dual correspondent of the first on
account of ds∗ = ds. Multiplying the first equation by 〈ψi| on the left and
the second by |ψi〉 on the right, we find
〈ψi|d̂s|ψi〉 = 〈ψi|d̂s
†|ψi〉. (11.2)
Since |ψi〉 is an arbitrary eigenvector of d̂s, it follows that d̂s is Hermitian,
d̂s = d̂s
†
. (11.3)
For a general state vector |ψ〉, we also find that the expression 〈ψ|d̂s|ψ〉
can be attributed a special meaning. Rewriting it in terms of the orthonor-
mal eigenstates |ψi〉 of d̂s, we find
〈ψ|d̂s|ψ〉 =
∑
i,j
〈ψ|ψi〉〈ψi|d̂s|ψj〉〈ψj |ψ〉 =
∑
i
|〈ψi|ψ〉|2ds|ψi〉, (11.4)
which suggests that |〈ψi|ψ〉|2 can be interpreted as the probability that,
upon measuring with a clock the spacetime interval between events A and
B, the value ds|ψi〉 will be obtained. The measurement of this value is, at the
same time, linked with an underlying quantum-mechanical transition from
spacetime state |ψ〉 to spacetime state |ψi〉. Thus, 〈ψ|d̂s|ψ〉 is the average
obtained after a series of measurements of the separation operator d̂s in
state |ψ〉; in other words, the expected value.
These ideas could be developed further, but even at this early stage it
is appropriate to stop, think, and ask : is this the physical foundation of a
quantum theory of gravity? Or perhaps the foundation of a quantum theory
of time? Hardly. At best, the above only teaches us a lesson about how one
should not go about doing new physics, and about how easy it is to be held
captive of the conventional pictures of a preestablished physical tradition.
Let us see why.
The only positive thing to be said about the quantization of the space-
time interval is that ds is indeed a real number resulting from a simple
physical measurement that we know how to perform: stand at event A, take
a clock, read its dial, record the displayed number, travel to event B, read
the dial, and record the displayed number. But as soon as we enquire into
the operational meaning of the quantum-theoretical framework introduced
around ds, we are in deep trouble.
Essential to the quantum-theoretical picture developed is the state vector
|ψ〉. When we introduced it, we did so non-committally; when we later on
referred to it, we called it a quantum-mechanical spacetime state. This is
indeed what |ψ〉 must denote in theory, because the intervals ds between
spacetime events are determined by the geometric structure of spacetime,
but is there in practice a denotation behind the words “spacetime state”
and its mathematical symbol “|ψ〉”?
Talk about the expected value 〈ψ|d̂s|ψ〉 of observable d̂s in state |ψ〉
implies that we can make a (large enough) set of measurements of d̂s starting
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each time with a system in the same “spacetime state” |ψ〉, and then proceed
to calculate the average of the results. But what is here the system to be
prepared into state |ψ〉? The quantum-mechanical system must surely be
spacetime, but how are we supposed to prepare it into state |ψ〉? What are
the humanly feasible operations involved? What is a spacetime state, after
all? How do we gain access to it, affect it, modify it?
The same problem affects the concept of probability. What operational
meaning do we attribute to the probability of obtaining value ds|ψi〉 upon
a measurement of ds when spacetime is in state |ψ〉, when we do not know
what a spacetime state means physically? And, further, how plausible is
it for a clock measurement to exert an influence and modify the state of
spacetime, inducing the transition of |ψ〉 into |ψi〉?
In this light, the quantization of the spacetime interval appears as a
mimicry—a caricature—of the quantum mechanics of material systems. The
operationally well-determined notion of quantum-mechanical state1 of a ma-
terial system (such as a particle shower) is uncritically transferred to space-
time, arriving at the idea of a quantum-mechanical state of spacetime. But
just because we know how to prepare material particles into states, it does
not follow by the magic of analogy that we know how, or even what it means,
to prepare spacetime into states. In the context of the quantum mechanics
of material systems, the state of a particle is induced to change by the di-
rect action of an external device upon the particle, e.g. by the magnetic field
which in a Stern-Gerlach device changes the spin state of a particle shower.
If this were to translate to the quantum mechanics of spacetime, the making
of a clock measurement should have the capacity to directly modify the state
of spacetime. Unlikely? Far-fetched?
The same criticism applies to the uncritical importation of other opera-
tionally well-determined key concepts of the quantum mechanics of material
particles, such as expected values and probabilities, that rely on the idea
of an accessible, modifiable, and reproducible quantum-mechanical state of a
system to have physical meaning.
Some of these and other similar problems beset an attempt along these
lines carried out by Isham, Kubyshin, and Renteln (1991). A noteworthy
remark by these authors deserves comment. Regarding how their proposal
should be interpreted, they wrote:
Since the metric [distance function d(x, y); cf. ∆s]. . . is non-
negative it is not clear how the pseudo-Riemannian structure
of spacetime of general relativity and the notion of time could
emerge in quantum metric topology. Thus the approach can be
considered either as a generalization of the Euclidean version of
gravity, or as a description of the spatial part of physical space-
time. In the latter case time remains an additional parameter
labelling the metric in the quantum metric topology approach.
(Isham et al., 1991, p. 163)
1But not state vector ; see next chapter.
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First of all, there is, in fact, no problem here—only a long-standing confu-
sion. As we saw in the previous chapter, the non-negativity of ∆s is perfectly
compatible with the positive, negative, or null quadratic form gαβ(x)dx
αdxβ,
because their connection takes place via the ǫ indicator,
∆s =
∫ sB
sA
√
ǫgαβ(x)
dxα
ds
dxβ
ds
ds, (11.5)
where ǫ = ±1. For timelike displacements, ǫ = −1 and ∆s remains positive,
as it should. But what is here remarkable is not the confusion—which is
common—but the attitude taken in the face of seeming difficulties. If the
framework chosen will not describe spacetime and gravitation as intended,
then it might as well describe something else. In the face of adversity, even
the essential sacrifice is made to leave the description of time out of the
originally intended quantum-theoretical picture of spacetime, so as to thus
rescue and continue to cling to an idea that started off with the wrong foot.
This is only an allegorical example of the widespread working philosophy
of frontier theoretical physics. If the mathematics we come up with will not
conform to the physical world, then the physical world had better conform
to the mathematics we come up with. Is this the path of physical discovery?
Is this the road to quantum gravity?
What spacetime may be quantum-mechanically—if anything at all be-
neath the classical geometric structure so far uncovered—we do not know.
But our ignorance in this regard should not justify the desperate invention of
quantum-theoretical frameworks without a shred of physical meaning. One
may play with the transmuted mathematical symbols borrowed from a suc-
cessful physical tradition, but to presume that this, too, is physics because
of mere resemblance is to presume too much.
Physics must be done from the bottom up, building upon nature’s raw
material, explicitly, in terms of things that human beings have access to and
can affect. In the context of the quantum mechanics of particles, we turn to
such things next.
Chapter 12
The metageometric nature of
quantum-mechanical things
and the rise of time
Groping, uncertain, I at last found my identity, and after
seeing my thoughts and feelings repeated in others, I gradu-
ally constructed my world of men and God. As I read and
study, I find that this is what the rest of the race has done.
Man looks within himself and in time finds the measure and
the meaning of the universe.
Helen Keller, The world I live in
Passages from famous physicists about the difficulties involved in under-
standing quantum mechanics abound. Speaking of it, Erwin Schro¨dinger is
reported to have said, “I do not like it, and I am sorry I ever had anything
to do with it.” Niels Bohr, for his part, stated that “those who are not
shocked when they first come across quantum mechanics cannot possibly
have understood it.” Murray Gell-Mann described quantum mechanics as
“that mysterious, confusing discipline which none of us really understands
but which we know how to use.” And Richard Feynman decreed, “I think
it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics.”
Although these views were sometimes expressed only lightheartedly, one
can yet grasp the gist of these physicists’ complaints—and the seriousness
thereof. It is not only that quantum-theoretical descriptions cannot be me-
chanically visualized; more worrying is the fact that the foundational con-
cepts of quantum theory have physically unexplained origins. In other words,
it is not just the mechanical-how but, more importantly, the physical-why
of quantum mechanics that remains elusive. On the other hand, the the-
ory affords us a geometric visualization of the processes it describes; its
geometric-how is readily available—but may this be more of a hindrance
than a help?
Among quantum theory’s long-standing enigmas are the following: what
is the physical meaning of the arrow state vector |ψ〉? Why are vectors
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|pi〉 |ui〉
|uj〉 |ψ〉
〈pi|pi〉
Figure 12.1: Quantum-mechanical probability as the squared length of the pro-
jection |pi〉 of |ψ〉 on |ui〉.
needed at all to formulate quantum mechanics? How and why do they col-
lapse when a measurement or state preparation occurs? Why is it possible to
picture such a collapse through a projection by means of an inner product?
Why is the probability of an outcome the squared length |〈ui|ψ〉|2 = 〈pi|pi〉
of the complex-valued projection vector (cf. collapse) |pi〉 = 〈ui|ψ〉|ui〉 of an
initial state vector |ψ〉 onto another |ui〉 (Figure 12.1)? Why do probabil-
ities arise geometrically from Pythagoras’ theorem? What is the physical
meaning of complex numbers and complex conjugation? Why is it always
possible to find Hermitian operators (with real eigenvalues) for any observ-
able? And why is it always possible to attach orthogonal eigenvectors to an
observable?
These enigmas, some more pressing and disquieting than others, are
directly related to the postulates of quantum theory; and all of them are, in
turn, founded on the geometric rendering of the theory (cf. italized words
above), which we analysed in Section 4.2. Further thought, however, reveals
that it is precisely in these unquestioned (and unquestionable) geometry-
ridden postulates that our problems comprehending the physical roots of
quantum mechanics lie.
Indeed, geometry resembles a double-edge sword. Whereas it greatly
aids at first our comprehension of the world, it eventually brings up prob-
lems of its own, i.e. problems stemming from the particular way in which it
forces us to view the states of affairs it describes. On the one hand, it allows
for a geometrically intuitive formulation of quantum theory that is consis-
tent with observations but, on the other, its very geometric formulation
turns out to be the bearer of its least understood concepts. In other words,
although we only seem to be able to formulate and understand quantum
mechanics geometrically, it is precisely its geometric notions whose physical
underpinnings are elusive.
The need to understand the physical origin of the basic, yet controver-
sial, geometric concepts of quantummechanics, and thereby clarify the above
enigmas, suggests itself as the immediate motivation to go beyond geometry
in the formulation of this theory. But the motivation of the metageometric
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analysis that follows does not end at this, as it also has a less immediate
goal. This is to lay the foundation for a metageometric quantum-mechanical
picture of time, which we intend to connect with the clock-based formulation
of general relativity of Chapter 10. To achieve this goal, we will seek inspira-
tion for the present analysis of quantum mechanics in so far unaccounted-for
aspects of time as a conscious experience.
12.1 Quasigeometry and metageometry
As explained in Chapter 3, we equate geometry, not with geometric exis-
tence, but with geometric thought and language. Neither geometric objects
(shape) nor geometric magnitudes (size) are present in nature, but are a
conceptual tool by means of which humans picture nature. In this chapter,
we introduce the notion of quasigeometry and, by example, elucidate the
meaning of the anticipated notion of metageometry.
By quasigeometry we refer to a realm between metageometry and ge-
ometry that helps bridge the gap between these two in connection with the
foundations of quantum theory. The word “quasigeometry”1 means “hav-
ing some resemblance to geometry but not being really geometric,” and is
attributed to this realm due to its similarity and connection with geome-
try. We shall find the main quasigeometric entities to be the familiar real
and complex numbers. How they appear and help bridge the gap between
metageometric quantum-mechanical things and the usual geometric repre-
sentations will be one of the issues of this chapter.
Real numbers can be thought as extended arrows laid along a graduated
one-dimensional line. In spite of this, they are neither genuine geometric
objects nor magnitudes for the elementary reason that they are themselves
the very carriers of geometric size. As we saw in Chapter 3, real numbers
act, in a geometric setting, as the go-betweens between geometric quality
and geometric quantity. In other words, a real number is not size but gives
size. If thought of as arrows, they can, in particular, give size to themselves
(that which they inherit from their moduli |a|), in which case they become
degenerate2 geometric concepts. Due to their degenerate geometric nature,
we give the name quasigeometry to the realm they characterize.
Complex numbers, too, can be thought of as arrows with a definite length
only now laid on the (Argand) plane. In this case, however, the situation
is different. Now it is the real modulus |c| of a complex number that rep-
resents its length, while the complex number c itself can be viewed as a
non-degenerate geometric object (arrow). For this reason, if we want to
use complex numbers as quasigeometric concepts—concepts truly devoid of
1Quasi, from Latin quam “as much as” + si “if”: as if.
2Degenerate, from Latin degenerare, de- “down from, off” + genus “birth, race, kind”:
to depart from one’s kind, fall from ancestral quality (Online Etymology Dictionary,
http://www.etymonline.com); having declined or become less specialized from an ances-
tral or former state; having sunk to a condition below that which is normal to a type
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com).
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Figure 12.2: Geometric visualization of real and complex numbers. When real
numbers a, originally the carriers of size, are thought of as arrows of length |a|, they
become degenerate geometric concepts. Complex numbers c, on the other hand,
have a genuine geometric interpretation as arrows of length |c|, but to conserve our
chances of a deeper understanding of quantum ontology, it is essential to stay clear
of this geometrization of the complex number.
geometric meaning—we must be careful never to regard them as extended
arrows. We must eschew all geometric visualization of complex numbers
and, instead, seek their physical meaning other than as merely conducive
to probability as the size (|c|2) of a geometric object (arrow c): we must
strive to find the physical meaning of c itself, which does not as such refer
to the shape or length of anything. To conserve our chances of a deeper
understanding of quantum ontology, it is essential to stay clear of this ge-
ometrization of the complex number. As we progress in this chapter, so far
the only known role of complex numbers as descriptive of something phys-
ical will be uncovered, namely, the characterization of the physical process
of a directional quantum-mechanical transition. This will give us a different
reason to call complex numbers quasigeometric (Figure 12.2).
By metageometry3 we mean “beyond geometry,” and therefore refer to a
theoretical picture—a human scientific language—that does not use geomet-
ric concepts of any sort. This is the sense in which one should understand
the reference to the “metageometric nature of quantum-mechanical things”
in the title of this chapter. That is, not as hinting at the metageometric
essence of the physical world, as if to say that “God is a metageometrician”
in neo-Platonic fashion, or that “the Book of Nature is written in the lan-
3Meta, from Greek preposition meta: in the midst of, among, with, after; from Proto-
Indo-European *me-: in the middle. The original sense of the Greek word is “after”
rather than “beyond,” but it was misinterpreted when Aristotle’s treatises were discussed
by Latin writers. From the reference below, we learn that, originally, metaphysika meant
“ ‘the (works) after the Physics’ [in the] title of the 13 treatises which traditionally were
arranged after those on physics and natural sciences in Aristotle’s writings. The name
was given circa 70 B.C.E. by Andronicus of Rhodes, and was a reference to the customary
ordering of the books, but it was misinterpreted by Latin writers as meaning ‘the science
of what is beyond the physical.’ ” (See “meta” and “metaphysics” in Online Etymology
Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com)
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guage of metageometry” in neo-Galilean fashion, but rather meaning that
some aspects of nature—quantum-mechanical ones, in this case—may not
be open to human understanding through geometric tools of thought. We
see that geometric modes of thinking and talking have not only been capable
of leading to myriad physical triumphs ranging from Newton to Einstein,
but also to possible philosophical and physical blind alleys; for example,
spacetime ontology, quantum ontology, and the geometric roads to quantum
gravity.
We suggest that, if progress concerning the conceptual difficulties of
quantum theory wants to be made, the theory should be written after a
metageometric fashion, i.e. in terms of metageometric things. Now this
may seem like a long shot indeed. Given that humans by nature think
geometrically, and that thus all physical theories so far speak the language
of geometry, what chance is there that any metageometric theory could
be understood—even less developed—by us? Would not a metageometric
theory be hopelessly abstruse? Would not metageometric things, devoid of
all shape and size, be hopelessly unimaginable, meaningless, and abstract?
Not so. We shall see that metageometric things can be found such that,
far from abstruse, are actually based on physical experiments and are rather
close to human experience. Indeed, we shall find that, besides the well-
established, unquestionably geometric aspects of our practical thinking, a
deeper realm of human conscious experience—closely connected with the
feeling of time—is naturally captured metageometrically. By identifying its
constituents and their mutual relations, and by having these be inspirational
sources of the experiment-based physical things of a metageometric quantum
theory, we will lay the foundation for a theory that is transparent to human
cognition, is open to human access and control, and provides a setting for a
new understanding of time.
12.2 Towards metageometric quantum-mechanical
things
Our search for a metageometric, but at the same time familiar and com-
prehensible, foundation of quantum mechanics is guided by the following
working principle:
A profound and trustworthy knowledge of the ontology of quan-
tum mechanics can only be obtained from the results of the ac-
tivities of Man, from such things whose origins Man can under-
stand, have access to, and affect. Our description of quantum
mechanics must be expressible with the help of simple physical
things because, otherwise, the workings of quantum mechanics
are not knowable or understandable. These things must be such
that we know the physical methods through which they arise.
This means that we do not start the search for metageometric quantum-
mechanical things in an implicit way, e.g. with wave functions as in wave
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mechanics, with canonical matrix pairs as in matrix mechanics, or with
state vectors as in Dirac’s algebra. On the contrary, if quantum theory is
to be laid plain before our eyes and its enigmatic features comprehended,
we should start the metageometric search explicitly, with concepts close to
both human psychological and physical experience.
The pursuit of the psychological connection means that we would like
quantum-mechanical things to be closely connected with the realm of expe-
rienced thoughts and feelings. This is not to say that the intention here is to
develop a new theory of consciousness; this requirement rather aims to start
with a setting closely connected with the raw feeling of time, in which the
present moment is paramount, because in this way the quantum-mechanical
theory will afford the possibility to picture time in a physically new way.
In turn, the pursuit of the physical connection means that we require that
quantum-mechanical things be based upon an experimentally explicit basis,
because this is the only way to make sure that the elemental ontological con-
stituents of the resulting theory will be observationally concrete, i.e. wide
open to human manipulation and control.
The discovery, within a metageometric theoretical setting, of quantum-
mechanical things that are related to consciousness and are experimentally
explicit is the task of what may be called psychophysics. In the rest of
this section, we pursue the path of psychophysics along two complementary
directions. The first involves the investigation of possible phenomenologi-
cal similarities between conscious and quantum-mechanical phenomena in
search for an experimental link between psychology and physics, whereas
the second involves the investigation of the metageometric quality of con-
scious phenomena and their relations in search for an extra metageometric
link between psychology and physics. In Section 12.3, these two paths con-
verge on the sought-for metageometric psychophysical thing,4 on which to
build the foundations of an experimentally overt metageometric formulation
of quantum theory that can throw new light on quantum ontology and the
notion of time.
12.2.1 Experimental facet of psychophysics
Do quantum-mechanical phenomena share any similarities with phenomena
related to consciousness that may serve as inspiration in this physical search?
4In his book, Isham (1995, pp. 63–67) ponders the question, “What is a thing?” from a
perspective that takes into account ontology and epistemology—the existence of things and
our knowledge of things—and the degree to which ontology may be the projection of our
own epistemological shadows. For us, a thing will be essentially a simple psychological
abstraction of a physical experiment; insofar as this is so, the ontology of things is as
uncontroversial (or controversial, according to philosophical taste) as the physical existence
of our minds and the experiment itself, while the epistemology of things becomes conflated
with their ontology, for our knowledge of things is tantamount to our first-hand experience
of things themselves. As for the metageometric language in which we shall picture physical
things, into it go, naturally and unavoidably, our methodological biases and prejudices.
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Dennett’s (1991)5 theory of consciousness, with its unorthodox approach to
conscious phenomena, can help us give a positive answer to this question.
A paradigmatic experiment that is apt to reveal several peculiar features
of human consciousness is the colour-phi phenomenon studied by Kolers and
von Gru¨nau (1976), but originally studied by Wertheimer (1912) nearly a
hundred years ago in its single-colour version. A red spot of light is flashed
on a screen and 200 milliseconds later a green one is flashed within 4 degrees
of angle from the first spot. Subjects report not only that the original red
spot follows a continuous trajectory6 but also that it changes colour (from
red to green) midway between the endpoints of the continuous trajectory.
How should we make sense of this phenomenological observation, and what
does it reveal about the mechanisms of consciousness?
The explanation that comes most readily to mind is that, since in order
for the red spot to change colour seemingly before the green spot has even
been flashed, there must be an intrinsic delay in consciousness itself of at
least 200 milliseconds. However, there is enough evidence to the effect that
conscious responses (e.g. button pressing) to stimuli are not as sluggish as
this hypothesis requires (pp. 121–122, 150). If conscious experience is not
being put temporarily on hold (certainly not an evolutionary advantage), is
the colour-phi phenomenon, then, an indication that conscious events violate
causality in time and space? This alternative seems even less palatable.
We seem to be trapped, here as in frontier physics, in a deep conceptual
confusion.
To help disentangle it, Dennett urges us to rid ourselves of the natural
idea that to become conscious of something is tantamount to certain (e.g.
electrochemical) processes occurring at some specific point in the brain; to
reject the notion that what we experience as the stream of consciousness
has an exact analogue at some singular location in the brain. Dennett asks,
“Where does it all come together?” and replies, “Nowhere. . . [T]here is no
place in the brain through which all these causal trains must pass in order to
deposit their content ‘in consciousness’ ” (pp. 134–135). On the assumption
of a brain singularity—and without the benefit of long delays or violations
of causality—the colour-phi phenomenon defies explanation.
It seems remarkable that, in a field of science as removed from cosmol-
ogy and spacetime physics as can be, one should also be forced to come
to terms with a singularity—a point at which our understanding becomes
feeble and powerless—if unable to refrain from the application of geometric
thinking beyond its ostensible capabilities. On second thoughts, however,
there is nothing remarkable about hitting upon a new singularity, as both
psychological and cosmological theories are made by humans with the same
geometric tools of thought. Dennett, also noticing the reminiscence with
singularities in physics, criticized the seemingly natural geometric method
5Consult this reference (especially, pp. 101–137, 209–226, 275–282) for more details
on the consciousness-related topics discussed below. Page numbers in parentheses in this
section and the next refer to this reference unless otherwise stated.
6This is the result of Wertheimer’s experiment with a single-colour spot and is the
working principle behind motion pictures.
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by which one arrives at the belief in a singularity in the brain:
Doesn’t it follow as a matter of geometric necessity that our
conscious minds are located at the termination of all the inbound
processes, just before the initiation of all the outbound processes
that implement our actions? (Dennett, 1991, p. 108)
He subsequently argued that the geometric force of this contention is mis-
leading: inbound processes need not end at, and outbound processes need
not leave from, a physiological point: the brain works largely as a unit.
The neuronal activity giving rise to consciousness is extended over the
brain as a whole. Dennett suggests that, as a result, we cannot say where
or when a conscious experience occurs (p. 107); that although
Every event in your brain has a definite spatio-temporal loca-
tion. . . asking “Exactly when do you become conscious of the
stimulus?” assumes that some one of these events is, or amounts
to, your becoming conscious of the stimulus. [. . . ] Since cogni-
tion and control—and hence consciousness—is distributed around
in the brain, no moment [or place] can count as the precise mo-
ment [or place] at which each conscious event happens. (Dennett,
1991, pp. 168–169)
Thus, the colour-phi phenomenon (and other tests to the same effect)
leads to the need to differentiate between a representation—consciousness—
and the medium of the representation—the spatiotemporal brain events:
the brain does not represent space (e.g. the image of a house) with space in
the brain, and, to a limited extent, neither does it represent time (e.g. the
sequential motion in the colour-phi test) with time in the brain. Viewed in
this way, consciousness is a representational abstraction of the internal and
external world, whose conveying medium is the spatiotemporal events in the
brain. It is, among other things, a representation of space and time, but it
is not itself located anywhere in the space and operating time of the brain in
any literal sense. Consciousness is, in this sense, a spatially and temporally
delocalized, global, and locally irreducible property of the brain. How come,
then, that conscious experience resembles so closely a linear sequence of
spatiotemporal events?
Dennett elaborates as follows. Neurons work together multifunctionally
and globally within the space and time of the brain to produce numer-
ous, parallel, undecanted streams of consciousness, which he calls “multiple
drafts.” It is parts of these drafts that can project themselves as a single
serial sequence of narrative. This is achieved by means of probes such as
self-examination and external questioning, which act to decant certain draft
contents of consciousness to a different level. These probes are as essential
to the determination of what one is conscious of as are the external stimuli
themselves (pp. 113, 135–136, 169). This loosely suggests also an indeter-
ministic picture of consciousness, since there is no single, actual stream of
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consciousness unequivocally determined by external stimuli independently
of the random probes that originate it.
According to Dennett, it is the decanted stream of consciousness that we
experience as a serial chain of events and readily associate with conscious
experience. It is this stream that provides a subjective worldline of events
as reported by the conscious subject. This worldline can be subsequently
compared with other worldlines of objective events as elements of the exter-
nal world (p. 136). The comparison of two such worldlines gives meaning to
the idea of the projection of consciousness, as a sequential stream outside
spacetime, onto the spatiotemporal world.
A better understanding of the colour-phi phenomenon is now closer at
hand. If the phenomenon is thought of as occurring in consciousness in a
mirror-like, linear sequence as the light stimuli occur in spacetime, it leads
to the mistaken belief that the brain must house a consciousness singularity
capable of projecting certain events (green flash) backwards to times earlier
than their actual occurrence in the brain (p. 127). However, if, as Dennett
proposes, the colour-phi phenomenon is thought of as occurring in conscious-
ness as a multifaceted, higher-order representation of stimuli-in-spacetime
that does not nevertheless use space in the brain to picture space nor time
in the brain to picture time (p. 131), a new conception arises. Because
consciousness only projects itself onto spacetime in the way just explained,
there is no question of the later appearance of the green spot being projected
backwards in time or anything of the sort, but rather of a multitude of brain
events working in parallel to yield a biased representation of the outer world.
The projection of this representation onto spacetime is fuzzy within the time
scale (of the order of half a second) of the said brain workings.
The phenomenological properties of consciousness just revealed display
some similarity with quantum-mechanical ideas—in particular, with the
preparation of physical systems into quantum-mechanical “states.” But be-
fore proceeding, a warning must be sounded. So far as we can see, the
resemblances to be uncovered between the two phenomenological realms are
superficial; or to use the precisely suited words of Klaus Gottstein (2003) in
a letter to Carl Weizsa¨cker dealing with a different issue, “It appears to me
that this is not a real connection, but rather a kind of parallelism” (p. 2,
online ref.) What is then the value of the parallelism we intend to draw? If
nothing else, it is its heuristic power, as it is apt to guide thought towards
physically useful concepts. Ideas, after all, must come from somewhere. As
such, the following parallelism stakes no claim other than to be part of our
private train of thought; the reader might as well ignore it if personally
unconcerned with the private aspect of public science.7
We start by noting a reminiscence of the first, erroneous interpretation of
7In particular, the parallelism to be drawn does not mean to suggest any microscopic
role for quantum mechanics in the brain, nor any connections between the mechanisms of
consciousness and state-vector collapse. In fact, the concepts of state vector and collapse
will occupy no place at all in the metageometric formulation. This should have been
already clear—but, in an atmosphere as prone to misunderstanding as is that of science,
better safe than sorry.
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the colour-phi phenomenon with equally misleading interpretations of quan-
tum phenomena. For example, like the phenomenon of consciousness, so has
the phenomenon of quantum correlations (or quantum entanglement) global,
non-causal, non-reductionistic, and indeterministic characteristics, leading
sometimes to talk about particles or information travelling backwards in
time.
The first to propose this idea was Costa de Beauregard (1977), originally
in 1953; talking of a correlated, widely-separated system of two photons, he
wrote: “Einstein’s prohibition to ‘telegraph into the past’ does not hold at
the level of the quantal stochastic event (the wave collapse)” (p. 43). Davi-
don (1976) also expressed similar views: “In this formulation of quantum
physics, effects of interactions with a previously closed system ‘propagate
backwards in time’ ” (p. 39); and so did Stapp (1975): “This information
flows from an event both forward to its potential successors and backward
to its antecedents. . . ” (p. 275). These interpretations were devised on the
erroneous assumption that the quantum-mechanical preparation of systems
is a spatiotemporal process and that, therefore, it gainsays spacetime causal
structure. These interpretations, then, stem from a desire not to relinquish
this local, causal spacetime structure, and so trade it for a new, anomalous
way in which causal connections can still be achieved locally. As Stapp put
it:
Bohr has insistently maintained that quantum phenomena are
incompatible with causal space-time description. The model of
reality proposed here conforms to Bohr’s dicta, in so far as classi-
cal causal space-time description is concerned, but circumvents
it by introducing a nonclassical space-time structure of causal
connection. (Stapp, 1975, p. 276)
How do the colour-phi phenomenon and that of quantum correlations
measure up to each other within the troubled framework of this local space-
time picture? On the one hand, the consciousness singularity in the brain
needs to know that a green flash has occurred before it has had time to ac-
quire it (before the green flash has had time to travel past the singularity).
This is solved by thinking that the green flash travels backwards in time
and inserts itself at an earlier time of the stream of consciousness. On the
other hand, a quantum-mechanical subsystem S2 needs to know the result
of an experiment E1 performed on subsystem S1 before it has had time to
acquire it. This is solved by thinking that information about the result of E1
travels backwards in time to a time when S1 and S2 were together and gets
transferred to S2. Both problems are created by thinking locally about con-
sciousness and quantum-mechanical information, namely, (i) consciousness
is a local process, and (ii) the transfer of quantum-mechanical information
is a local process. However, by regarding consciousness and the transfer
of quantum-mechanical information as intrinsically global phenomena that
are ontologically prior to spacetime, neither needs to challenge the notion of
causal spacetime structure and thus lead to far-fetched explanations.
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Finally, when we picture the transfer of quantum-mechanical informa-
tion in the usual way, namely, as the preparation of a quantum-mechanical
system into a certain “state” (not a state vector), the parallelism can be
brought even further. We find that preparation, a global and spatiotempo-
rally delocalized phenomenon, has, like consciousness, the ability to impress
itself onto particular physical systems (i.e. matter). It can thus create events
that are localized in spacetime, providing a worldline in analogy with the
stream of consciousness.
The experimental approach to psychophysics, understood as a heuristic
discipline, has led to the physical notion of quantum-mechanical preparation.
Is this an adequate or useful starting point for a metageometric quantum
theory?
12.2.2 Metageometric facet of psychophysics
Despite our first-hand acquaintance with the subjective quality of our con-
scious experience, a systematic account of this realm—a theory of conscious-
ness—is lacking. Not only does conscious experience presently elude quan-
titative but even qualitative scientific description; in other words, not only
do we fail to grasp the size of thoughts and feelings, but also fail to pic-
ture their forms, shapes, outlines, or structures in any sensible way. On
the other hand, however, thoughts and feelings can be about objects with
shape and size. In particular, as we just learnt, conscious events have no
proper spatial location, but they can be about spatial objects. In this light,
Pylyshyn (1979) has made the further point that it should strike us as curi-
ous to “speak so freely of the duration of a mental event,” when we “would
not properly say of a thought (or image) that it was large or red” (p. 278).
Thus, in the same token, conscious events have no temporal location either,
although they can be about temporal happenings.
While this failure to picture conscious events geometrically need not be
a problem in itself, it is nevertheless perceived as a problem in the context of
our typically geometric ways of thinking—scientifically or otherwise. To us,
the fact that the readily available ideas of geometric objects and geometric
magnitudes are inapplicable to conscious events, instead of suggesting that
consciousness is a dead-end problem, points to a world of possibilities: may
the phenomena of consciousness be properly captured in a metageometric
theoretical picture?
Remarkably, in a scientific context in which geometry is taken for granted
as the God-given essence of the physical world, Foss (2000) held the geo-
metric non-representability of conscious experience responsible for the fact
that consciousness has remained a scientific mystery up until now. “Since
science deals only with geometric properties,” he wrote, “and the sensual
qualities are not geometric, they cannot even be expressed, let alone ex-
plained, in scientific terms. . . Flavors have no edges, tingles have no curva-
ture” (p. 59). Foss furthermore made an enlightening historical analysis of
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the process that, through what he called the Pythagorean Intuition8 that
“reality is geometrical at its heart” and the Galilean Intuition that “the
sensuous qualities are essentially non-geometric”9 (pp. 40, 66), banned con-
sciousness from a paradigmatically geometric-minded science. Foss argued
that this way of thinking stems from a confusion between the geometric vs.
the non-geometric essence of things—which, understood in a metaphysical
sense, science does not concern itself with—and the geometric pictures that
science makes of the phenomena it studies.
Foss’s insight about the geometric nature of scientific description simply
as a successful tool is a true gem, valuable as it is rare, but did he manage to
stare at the taboo on thought about geometry being a limited tool straight in
the eye? Not quite, because his assessment of the “riddle of consciousness”
comes down to this:
Science does not require that the things it models be geometric,
but only that they can be modeled geometrically. And there
is no reason to think, no immovable intuition indicating, that
consciousness, including its many-colored qualia, cannot be just
as successfully modeled by science as any other natural phe-
nomenon. (Foss, 2000, pp. 94–95)
Pictured by science—how? Geometrically?
We do not see any reason why the study of consciousness in the bosom of
a geometric theory, as implied by Foss, should not be possible. But having
looked throughout this work at the reigning thought-taboo on geometric
limitations in the eye, we are interested in a different line of thought. May
these facts be saying that consciousness also has ontological aspects that can
only be captured by going beyond geometry as a tool of thought in science?
Based on the heuristic parallelism with quantum-mechanical phenomena
drawn earlier, we should be inclined to at least consider the possibility.
Why? Because it is on the other hand the case with quantum phenomena
that geometric methods succeed in capturing their superficial features, but
that a description of their heart and nature continues to elude such methods;
because the heart and nature of quantum phenomena, as we see in this
chapter, can in fact be disclosed beyond the bounds of geometric thought.
Understood from this metageometric point of view, Foss’s description
of the current climate of thought that “it is intuitively obvious that the
8As noted in Chapter 7, “Platonic Intuition” may be more accurate.
9For example, Galilei (1957) wrote: “Now I say that whenever I conceive any material
or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think of it as bounded, and as
having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some
specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching
some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I
cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it must be
white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or silent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not
feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments. [. . . ] Hence I think that tastes,
odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we
place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness” (p. 274).
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sensuous qualities cannot be conceived in geometric terms, hence cannot
be convincingly modeled by science, therefore cannot find a place in its
ontology” (p. 66) demands what seems to be an unforeseen qualification:
the sensuous qualities cannot find a place in the ontology of science unless
this ontology was expanded beyond the geometric realm. Understood thus,
the following words from Dennett could be given unsuspected meaning:
[We should not be dissuaded] from asking. . . whether mind stuff
might indeed be something above and beyond the atoms and
molecules that compose the brain, but still a scientifically investi-
gatable kind of matter. . . Perhaps some basic enlargement of the
ontology of the physical sciences is called for in order to account
for the phenomena of consciousness. (Dennett, 1991, p. 36)
If we take the geometric non-representability of conscious phenomena in
earnest, how can it help to develop a metageometric formulation of quan-
tum theory and time based on the previously arrived-at experimental no-
tion of quantum-mechanical preparation? Perhaps we should leave the de-
tails of that myriad of sensations, perceptions, emotions, thoughts, and
general mental activities that we call conscious feelings alone. Perhaps,
instead of nearsightedly enquiring into their inner structure (even worse,
into their inner geometric structure) after the prevailing winds of a science
that progresses through dissection into smaller (but not necessarily simpler)
constituents, one should take conscious feelings as primitive notions, and
enquire then into their mutual relationships.
At this point, part of Clifford’s words, quoted and analysed in Chapter 8,
on the role of the relations between feelings in science strike a resonant chord:
These elements of feeling have relations of nextness or contigu-
ity in space, which are exemplified by the sight-perceptions of
contiguous points; and relations of succession in time which are
exemplified by all perceptions. Out of these two relations the fu-
ture theorist has to build up the world as best he may. (Clifford,
1886b, p. 173)
Given our purposes, we do not wish to take Clifford’s account in a literal
sense; that is, we do not want to concern ourselves with relations between
feelings (i.e. between metageometric things) in space and time. But we do
nevertheless relate to Clifford’s general exhortation to the future theorist,
namely, to build up the world as best he may out of the two relations between
feelings, nextness and succession, when the two relations are understood
outside a geometric context.
We interpret nextness between conscious feelings to picture the capacity
to recognize, distinguish, or discriminate among the contents of conscious-
ness, to the degree that it is possible to tell one conscious feeling from
another. According to Dennett (pp. 173–175), the ulterior reason behind
this is evolutionary: our unicellular ancestors, in order to survive, had to
12.2 Towards metageometric quantum-mechanical things 201
distinguish their own bodies from the rest of the world, developing a prim-
itive form of selfishness. Nextness, then, does not picture the geometric
idea of how close (in space or elsewhere) two conscious feelings are, but tells
whether or not they are distinct from each other.
In turn, we take succession between conscious feelings to picture the
stream of consciousness, which we experience as a linear, narrative-like se-
quence of conscious feelings. The inspirational role of the stream of con-
sciousness in the search for knowledge and understanding is not unprece-
dented. Famously, Turing (1950) inspired himself in his own stream of con-
sciousness to understand how a machine could solve a mathematical prob-
lem. In Dennett’s words, Turing
took the important step of trying to break down the sequence of
hismental acts into their primitive components. “What do I do,”
he must have asked himself, “when I perform a computation?
Well, first I ask myself which rule applies, and then I apply the
rule, and then write down the result, and then I ask myself what
to do next, and. . . ” (Dennett, 1991, p. 212)
Succession, then, does not picture the geometric idea of how close (in time
or elsewhere) two conscious feelings are, but tells whether or not one follows
the other.
These two relations between conscious feelings are by nature metageo-
metric. Neither nextness nor succession involve any geometric objects or
magnitudes in their depiction; the attribution of shapes and sizes is utterly
foreign to these ideas, and we should not hesitate to eschew their intro-
duction if an ill-advised future theorist were to attempt it—such geometric
tampering would undoubtedly result in his psychological satisfaction, but
most likely not in any gain in physical understanding.
Nextness and succession of feelings form the essence of the psychological
conception of time. Time is linked to the sensitivity of consciousness to
changes; it arises as the serial chaining (succession) of similar feelings that
are yet distinct enough to be discriminated (nextness) from each other. This
serial chaining of discriminated feelings—psychological time—constitutes
the permanent content of our consciousness, i.e. the permanent present.
Has psychophysics as heuristics served its purpose? It has. By first
bringing to our attention some basic features of our psychological experi-
ence, it led to the physical idea of quantum-mechanical preparation; and by
alerting us now to the metageometric nature and mutual relations between
feelings, it suggests the physical notion of preparation as a metageometric
physical concept. It even gives us a clue about what useful metageometric
relations may hold among such physical things, and gives us hope that a
new quantum-mechanical picture of time may be achievable on their basis.
The development of quantum theory along these lines begins in the next
main section.
Incidentally, we now see that if, as we suggested in Chapter 6, Riemann
is the father of discrete spacetime and Wheeler is the father of pregeometry,
202 The metageometric nature of quantum-mechanical things
then Clifford is the father of psychophysics.
12.2.3 Appraisal
How necessary is, in general, a psychological approach to physics? At the
end of Chapter 10, we criticized cosmology for falling victim to the earthly
necessities of human cognitive tools, evidenced especially in its treatment of
the concept of time. But we are who we are, the makers of our own tools of
thought, so how could the essential limitation imposed by human cognitive
tools be overcome? Strictly speaking, it cannot; the “objective study of the
ocean’s fauna” referred to in that chapter is practically unattainable. A
theory, any one theory, is (and must necessarily be) a biased filter.10 But
the exploration of our cognitive tools, not in search for absolute ones but
better ones, is open to enquiry, and it is in it that the chance of progress in
science lies.
The cliche´ that “to know the world we must first know ourselves” be-
comes especially relevant at the edge of our theoretical picturing abilities.
A sign of arrival at this limit can be recognized by the endless, repetitive
application of the same traditional concepts to the fields of human enquiry
regardless of the results obtained, i.e. by the onset of what Lem has called
an age of epigonism (see Epilogue). If, as is our contention, science has
reached today such a state with its geometric worldview, to overcome it we
should look within ourselves in search for better tools of the mind. As we
do so, and furthering the previous parable, we may discover, in the utmost
darkness and pressure of the inhospitable oceanic depths, that we have a
budding ability for photoluminescence, the vestiges of a swim bladder, or
even the traces of gills.
No-one has been forced to first look within herself before she could make
sense of her surroundings more than the extraordinary deaf-blind woman,
Helen Keller. If we heed her remarkable words, perhaps then we shall con-
serve a greater-than-nil chance to grow humanly wiser:
Groping, uncertain, I at last found my identity, and after seeing
my thoughts and feelings repeated in others, I gradually con-
structed my world of men and God. As I read and study, I find
that this is what the rest of the race has done. Man looks within
himself and in time finds the measure and the meaning of the
universe. (Keller, 1933, pp. 88–89)
12.3 Metageometric realm
12.3.1 Premeasurement things
We take preparation or premeasurement as the physical basis of a metageo-
metric thing.
10Cf. comments about a “theory of everything” in Chapter 1.
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Figure 12.3: Schematic setup of the Stern-Gerlach experiment. Side view (top).
Front view (bottom). For a non-null premeasurement, at least one of the screens
(upper or lower) must be removed.
We picture a quantum-mechanical, measurable magnitude by means of
an observable A (not an operator). The possible results of measuring A are
a1, a2, a3, . . ., such that ai is a real number; these constitute the spectrum
{ai} of A. Likewise for other observables B, C, etc.11 Now a premeasurement
refers to a selective process which consists of preparation and filtering of
parts of a physical system, such that, after it, only certain measurement
results are possible.
The basic idea of a premeasurement is exemplified by (but not limited to)
a Stern-Gerlach experimental setup, shown in Figure 12.3. If a (lower) screen
is placed blocking only those silver atoms with spin value s2 = −~/2, while
those silver atoms with spin value s1 = ~/2 are allowed to pass through, then
this constitutes a premeasurement of spin magnitude s1 (normally referred to
as “spin up”). Another example of a quantum-mechanical premeasurement
is the following. If a beam of light is made to pass through a polarizer,
the photons of the outgoing beam will all be polarized perpendicular to the
polarizer’s optical axis, while all others will be blocked.
Premeasurement is here taken as a primitive and irreducible—but under-
standable—concept in quantum ontology on which to build the metageomet-
11In this investigation, the spectrum of observables need not be discriminated into dis-
crete and continuous; all that matters is that the measurement result ai exist. Both
possibilities will be taken into account simultaneously by the metageometric formalism,
although the traditional distinction can, if so wished, be made once we have proceeded to
the geometric realm later on.
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Figure 12.4: Schematic representation of a quantum-mechanical premeasurement
thing P(ai).
ric edifice of quantum theory. In analogy with a conscious feeling, we picture
the basic physical idea in question by means of a metageometric premea-
surement thing P(a), characterizing a premeasurement associated with an
observable A. This consists in the filtering of all parts of a physical system
(e.g. a beam of particles) except those that succeed in being prepared into
a-systems, i.e. systems on which the result of a possible, later measurement
of A gives the real value a (Figure 12.4).
A quantum-mechanical thing is inherently global; in resemblance with
conscious events produced by the brain, it is inadequate to ask where and
when within the premeasurement device the premeasurement takes place.
The global ontology in question here does not respect the spatiotemporal
laws of causal processes. Premeasurement things, however, can create pre-
pared physical systems (matter) that are localized in spacetime.
Furthermore, like a conscious feeling, a premeasurement thing calls for a
metageometric depiction. The reason why we should regard a premeasure-
ment thing P(a) as a metageometric concept is, quite simply, that it is not
a geometric object of any sort—it really has no shape for our mind’s eye to
grab onto—and has no geometric magnitudes attached, such as length or
area or volume; neither do premeasurement things have mutual geometric
relationships such as overlaps or distances defined between them; expres-
sions such as “is P(a) round or square?”, as well as ‖P(a)‖, 〈P(a)|P(b)〉,
and dist[P(a),P(b)] are meaningless and utterly foreign to them. There is
nothing in the idea of premeasurement that requires any form of geometric
portrayal; and we should, in fact, reject its geometrization if anyone were to
attempt it to satiate his geometric instinct.
Now, what relationships hold among different premeasurement things,
and what meaning should we attach to them? Clifford’s ideas of nextness
and succession from the previous section can now help us uncover these re-
lationships, leading to the mathematical algebra obeyed by premeasurement
things, while at the same time pointing at the explicit physical meaning of
the operations of this algebra.12
12The experimental foundation behind what we have called a premeasurement (and
later also a transition) thing has been discussed by Schwinger (1959) under the name of
measurement symbols, including the algebraic relationships holding between them. The
metageometric interpretation of premeasurement things, their relationships to conscious
experience and psychological time, the elucidation of the need for complex numbers, the
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Figure 12.5: Schematic representation of the sum P(ai)+P(aj) of two premea-
surement things.
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Figure 12.6: Schematic representation of the product P(aj)P(ai) of two pre-
measurement things.
First, we centre our attention on the relation of nextness between feel-
ings. If we take the different premeasurement things, P(ai), P(aj), etc.,
associated with the same observable A to be related by the metageomet-
ric relation of nextness, we are led to the idea of adjustable discrimination
(within a single and indivisible premeasurement process) among the differ-
ent measurement values ai, aj , etc. We embody such a discrimination in the
mathematical operation of a sum of premeasurement things as follows. The
sum P(ai)+P(aj) of two premeasurement things describes a selective pre-
measurement process that discriminates ai- and aj-systems (taken together)
from the totality of all possible systems associated with A. It works by al-
lowing only ai- or
13 aj-systems to pass through as prepared systems, while
blocking all other ak-systems, k 6= i, j (Figure 12.5). Therefore, the more
terms in the sum, the less discriminatory the indivisible premeasurement
pictured by the whole sum is.
Second, we focus on the relation of succession between feelings. It serves
as straightforward inspiration for the idea of linear succession or consecu-
tiveness of premeasurement things, which we embody in the mathematical
operation of a product of premeasurement things as follows. The product
P(aj)P(ai) of two premeasurement things describes the succession of two
premeasurements, such that some fraction of physical systems is first pre-
pared into ai-systems, and these are consecutively fed into premeasurement
P(aj) (Figure 12.6).
Having established this physical foundation, we proceed to develop the
differentiation between meta-, quasi-, and geometric realms, the origin of the state vector,
and the rise of metageometric and preparation time, however, are our original contribu-
tions. This chapter, then, may be seen as a fresh, physically and psychologically inspired
conceptual elaboration on Schwinger’s previous ideas.
13Understood as the logical operation OR.
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Figure 12.7: Schematic representation of the identity premeasurement thing I .
metageometric theory. We start by uncovering the properties of the sum
and the product of premeasurement things.
It is straightforward to see that the sum of two premeasurement things
is commutative,
P(ai) +P(aj) = P(aj) +P(ai), (12.1)
because in the premeasurement P(ai) + P(aj), ai- or aj-systems pass
through together irrespective of the order in which they appear. Further,
the sum of three premeasurement things is associative,
[P(ai) +P(aj)] +P(ak) = P(ai) + [P(aj) +P(ak)], (12.2)
for similar reasons.
The identity thing I appears now naturally as the premeasurement
which allows all (prepared) systems to pass through (Figure 12.7). There-
fore, the identity thing must be physically equal to the sum of all possible
premeasurement things for a given observable:∑
i
P(ai) = I . (12.3)
We call this the (metageometric) completeness relation. By “all possible
premeasurement things,” we mean as many as there are different measure-
ment results ai. Thus, the above sum
∑
i includes as many terms P(ai),
with as closely spaced values ai, as made necessary by observations. It is of
no consequence here whether the possible values resulting from a measure-
ment are believed to form a continuous spectrum or not, i.e. whether they
must be real or may only be rational. It is enough for us to be assured that,
no matter what value ai results from a measurement, its premeasurement
appears expressed via P(ai).
Similarly, the null thing O describes the situation in which all systems
are filtered and none pass through (Figure 12.8).
In the product P(aj)P(ai) of two premeasurement things associated
with the single observable A, the latter premeasurement P(aj) takes in ai-
systems and filters all except aj-systems, and so all systems will be filtered
unless i = j. This product can then be understood as allowing the passage
of ai- and
14 aj-systems. Thus, we obtain the results
P(aj)P(ai) = O for i 6= j (12.4)
14Understood as the logical operation AND.
12.3 Metageometric realm 207
A
a1, a2, a3, . . .
Figure 12.8: Schematic representation of the null premeasurement thing O.
and
P(aj)P(ai) = P(ai) for i = j, (12.5)
representing the fact that the repeated succession of the same premeasure-
ment is physically (and therefore mathematically) equivalent to itself, i.e.
P(ai) is an idempotent thing. The two results (12.4) and (12.5) can be
connected with the help of the delta thing Dij :
P(aj)P(ai) = DijP(ai), (12.6)
where
Dij =
{
O for i 6= j
I for i = j
. (12.7)
From this result follows (now even without recourse to physical thinking)
that the product of premeasurement things associated with the same ob-
servable is both commutative and associative:15
P(aj)P(ai) = P(ai)P(aj), (12.8)
[P(ak)P(aj)]P(ai) = P(ak)[P(aj)P(ai)]. (12.9)
We note finally that I and O behave as if they were numbers with
respect to the sum and the product:
I + O = I ,
P(a) + O = P(a),
I I = I ,
OO = O, (12.10)
I P(a) = P(a) = P(a)I ,
OP(a) = O = P(a)O,
I O = O = OI .
Could, under appropriate circumstances, the things O and I be replaced
by the numbers 0 and 1?
15The product is associative in general, i.e. [P(c)P(b)]P(a) = P(c)[P(b)P(a)]. To
show this, the further results (12.15) and (12.20) are needed.
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Figure 12.9: Schematic representation of a quantum-mechanical transition thing
P(b|a) for the case of different observables A and B. The transition thing is
represented by the region enclosed by the dashed line (the whole of transition box
B is included but not its filtering action).
12.3.2 Transition things
We examine next the products P(b)P(a) and P(a)P(b) associated with
two different observables A and B. In general,
P(b)P(a) 6= P(a)P(b) (12.11)
because the first product prepares a-systems into b-systems, while the second
product prepares b-systems into a-systems. Both situations are equivalent
only if A and B are compatible observables (see Section 12.5.2 for details
on compatibility).
The product of premeasurement things gives motivation for a new type
of metageometric thing, namely, transition things. A transition thing P(b|a)
represents a pure quantum-mechanical transition from a-systems to b-systems
(Figure 12.9). We notice that P(b|a) is not equal to P(b)P(a) but a part
of it; a transition thing P(b|a) makes reference to a pure transition in which
every a-system becomes a b-system without any filtering loss, while a prod-
uct P(b)P(a) of premeasurements involves (i) the preparation of some raw
systems into a-systems with the loss of some, (ii) the transformation of some
a-systems into b-systems, and (iii) the filtering of a-systems that failed to
become b-systems. What we identify as a pure transition (and mark off in
dashed lines in the pictures), then, is item (ii) within the three-part process
constituting a product of premeasurements.16
The first feature to notice about a transition thing is that it is in general
asymmetric,
P(a|b) 6= P(b|a), (12.12)
since a transition from b-systems to a-systems is physically different from
a transition from a-systems to b-systems. (When A and B are compatible
observables, we shall see that P(a|b) and P(b|a) commute.) Asymmetry
holds in particular for transition things associated with a single observable,
P(ai|aj) 6= P(aj |ai), (12.13)
since ai- and aj-systems are necessarily mutually exclusive (for i 6= j) (Fig-
ure 12.10).
16The exact correspondence between the pictorial representation of a transition as part
of the product of premeasurements and its physico-mathematical representation will be-
come clearer as we move along; see Eq. (12.21).
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Figure 12.10: Schematic representation of a quantum-mechanical transition thing
P(aj |ai) for the case of a single observable A. The double box represents the fact
that such a transition thing cannot be implemented with a single premeasurement
device (see p. 211). The transition thing is represented by the dashed-off region
(the whole double box A is included); the filtering action of the box is not a proper
part of it.
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Figure 12.11: Schematic representation of the product P(al|ak)P(aj |ai) of two
quantum-mechanical transition things for the case of a single observable A. The
filtering action not belonging to the transition proper has not been drawn.
More detailed knowledge about the nature of transition things can be
obtained by analysing the product P(al|ak)P(aj |ai) for the case of a single
observable A (Figure 12.11). After Schwinger (1959, p. 1544), since a prod-
uct describes the outcome of the first process being fed into the second, and
the systems associated with a single observable are mutually exclusive, the
only way for the above product to be non-null is to have the outcome of the
first transition match the input of the second:
P(al|ak)P(aj |ai) = DjkP(al|ai). (12.14)
From this result follows that the product of transition things associated with
a single observable is not commutative except in the mathematically trivial
cases j 6= k and i 6= l (products reduce to the null thing), and i = j = k = l
(products reduce to the same transition thing).
Physical reasoning can also convince us at this early stage that the prod-
uct P(d|c)P(b|a) of transition things associated with different observables
is not commutative either. Despite a lack of proper tools at the moment,
one might wish to speculate on the nature of this product. In principle, it
should work akin to P(d|a), although in general P(d|c)P(b|a) 6= P(d|a).
To find the manner in which they are connected, we must know to what
degree b- and c-systems are compatible (cf. the case of a single observable
A, where different systems are totally incompatible).
Finally, reasoning on the basis of a schematic picture is apt to lead us
to a noteworthy connection between a premeasurement thing P(a) and a
transition thing P(a|a), namely,
P(a) = P(a|a). (12.15)
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Figure 12.12: Schematic representation of the product P(a)P(a) of the same
premeasurement thing in succession for observable A. The overall process is pre-
sented as the succession of two parts: (i) the premeasurement of a-systems and (ii)
the superfluous transition of a-systems into a-systems.
In effect, consider the representation of the product P(a)P(a) (Figure
12.12), and analyse it in two parts: (i) the premeasurement of raw sys-
tems into a-systems implemented via preparation and filtering, and (ii) the
subsequent preparation of a-systems into a-systems. We can see that the
first part acts as a regular premeasurement P(a), while the second part—
implemented with an identical device as the first—acts as a superfluous
transition P(a|a) that outputs its full input; its implementation requires no
filtering action, although the filter is present. From this we learn intuitively
that
P(a)P(a) = P(a|a)P(a) (12.16)
holds, i.e. that once a-systems are given, P(a) and P(a|a) are equivalent.
On the other hand, a similar reasoning starting from the representation of
P(b)P(a) (see Figure 12.9) does not lead to a similar conclusion. From the
picture, we have P(b)P(a) 6= P(b|a)P(a), because in the implementation
of P(b|a) (second box) an extra filtering mechanism is needed to get rid of
some a-systems.
What about then those situations in which we do not enjoy the benefit
of having a-systems as given? Can P(a) and P(a|a) be equivalent also
then? The equivalence continues to seem plausible. A premeasurement
thing P(a) prepares some raw systems into a-systems, while the rest of raw
systems are filtered out. On the other hand, the special transition thing
P(a|a) implements a superfluous transition from a-systems to a-systems.
The physical processes represented by these two things are not now identical,
but they appear to be equivalent: to prepare a-systems from raw ones with
filtering loss is equivalent to having a-systems and superfluously preparing
them into a-systems without any filtering loss. Both processes amount to
the same thing: they have the same output and are implemented with the
same device—with respect to P(a|a), the filtering action of P(a) balances
or neutralizes what is in excess in its raw input.
The meaning of “the same output with the same device” can be illus-
trated as follows. Imagine we want to perform P(s1) and P(s1|s1) with a
Stern-Gerlach setup. Both can be performed using one single Stern-Gerlach
device set to filter out all s2-systems by means of an appropriately placed
screen; further, although the input systems of the premeasurement and tran-
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Figure 12.13: Realistic representation of the Stern-Gerlach setup for the per-
formance of a transition P(s1|s2) corresponding to a single spin observable S.
Symbolized as a double box in schematic diagrams such as Figure 12.10.
sition things are different (a raw beam vs. a prepared beam), the output pro-
duced by the same device is the same. On the other hand, it is impossible
to perform P(s1|s2) with a single same device because s1- and s2-systems
are mutually incompatible: given an input of s2-systems, the above device
would output no systems at all, i.e. it would act as the null thing O. What
is required to perform P(s1|s2) is a compound device (drawn as a double
box); for example, a succession of two Stern-Gerlach devices, with the first
one oriented along an axis perpendicular to that of the second such that it
will output, say, s1x- and s2x-systems in equal quantities. Subsequently, ei-
ther of these, say, s1x-systems, can be filtered and the output of s2x-systems
transformed into s1- and s2-systems by a second device (oriented perpen-
dicularly to the first), which could filter out the unwanted s2-systems and
output only s1-systems
17 (Figure 12.13). Therefore, P(s1|s1) is the only
single-observable18 transition that can be performed with the same device
used for P(s1).
We decide to trust this physical intuition and accept Eq. (12.15) as an
equivalence valid in general for any situation. We remain alert, however, to
the possibility that it may lead to inconsistencies later on in the development
of the theory. What we shall find is that, after the introduction of the
transition postulate in the next section, the origin of a-systems becomes in
each and every case irrelevant, and that any situation can be recast in the
spirit of Eq. (12.16).
With this, the metageometric foundation of quantum theory is ready.
Ahead lies the task of showing how a description of quantum phenomena
arises from it, thereby revealing the metageometric origin of their charac-
teristic features. However, quantum theory cannot be derived on the basis
17Because transition things represent pure transitions, all systems filtered out in their
implementation should not be considered part of the transition thing itself.
18Transitions involving different observables can be performed with the same devices
used for premeasurements since, in this case, the degree of compatibility is not either all
or nothing.
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of metageometric things and their sums and products alone: where would
numbers come from given that quantum-mechanical things have nothing
to do with them? The introduction of a main postulate will therefore be
needed, but its being a postulate does not mean that its physical meaning
must remain unclear.
12.4 Quasigeometric realm
12.4.1 The transition postulate and the transition function
We take as a starting point relation (12.14), since it appears that the only
way in which numbers could be introduced in a physically reasonable way is
via the delta thing. Let us replace the delta thing Djk by Kronecker’s delta
δjk to get
P(al|ak)P(aj |ai) = δjkP(al|ai), (12.17)
thus starting with the two most natural numbers there can be, 0 and 1. The
former number represents the complete absence of an overall transition (to-
tal incompatibility between different systems associated with A), while the
latter represents the existence of an overall transition in which no systems
are lost.19
This replacement is quite significant since here a thing is being replaced
by a number, which is an object of a totally different nature. However, the
replacement is acceptable and does not lead to inconsistencies because the
delta thing always appears multiplying other things; therefore, the nature of
all equations is preserved when we consider that, in all cases, things continue
to be equated to things:
0P(al|ai) = O, (12.18)
1P(al|ai) = P(al|ai). (12.19)
A question, however, remains. Where could all other numbers come from?
This is a critical stage of this investigation.
Generalizing the idea behind Eq. (12.17), we postulate after Schwinger
(1959, p. 1545) that
P(d|c)P(b|a) = 〈c|b〉P(d|a), (12.20)
19As we saw in Chapter 8, Eddington’s (1920, p. 188) own quest for the nature of
things led him to an analysis of spacetime point-events and the intervals between them.
He argued that the intervals might have non-quantitative aspects; that the individual
intervals probably cannot be captured by rulers and clocks, but that they could simply
exist (1) or not (0). Thus, Eddington’s manner of introducing numbers into an outspokenly
non-quantitative framework is, at least superficially, akin to the present one. Eddington’s
either existent or non-existent primitive intervals are analogous to the transition functions
〈aj |ai〉 = δij (to be introduced) for the case of a single observable A. These transition
functions tell whether something occurs or not—in a premeasurement of A, its own systems
are accepted completely (1) or not at all (0).
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where the notation 〈c|b〉 represents a number. We call this the transition
postulate and name 〈c|b〉 the transition function (or transformation func-
tion).20 If we are to throw new light on quantum ontology, we must not
interpret the notation 〈c|b〉 as an inner product—not just yet and without
further qualification—but simply as a manner of marking a physical action
involving b- and c-systems. The transition function 〈c|b〉 is a number that is
taken to commute with premeasurement and transition things, since these
are objects of completely different natures.
But what kind of number is the transition function? Natural, rational,
real, complex, hypercomplex? This is not something that we can postulate
without a reason; to say what kind of number the transition function may
be, we must let the physics involved naturally lead to an answer. We make
and justify this choice in Section 12.4.3.
Physically, the transition postulate describes what part of the group of
b-systems associated with observable B is accepted in the premeasurement
associated with observable C, succeeding to become c-systems. This fraction
of systems, described by a number, is the share of systems that premeasure-
ments P(b) and P(c) have in common. One can see from this more general
perspective that the earlier result that ai- and aj-systems are either fully
compatible or fully incompatible follows now as the special case of a single
observable in the form 〈aj |ai〉 = δij .
We remark that the characterization in question here is qualitative—
“part” is a number. We would only be forced to call this characterization
quantitative if the transition function turned out to be a non-negative real
(or natural or rational) number but not otherwise, because other kinds of
numbers, e.g. complex numbers, do not picture size—only their moduli do.
The above wording “have in common” suggests the possibility of estab-
lishing a connection—if so we wished to do—between the transition function
and the inner product of two arrow-like vectors. The way in which this geo-
metric interpretation of the transition function arises will teach us how state
vectors are born—and reveal them as physically insubstantial concepts. At
this point, however, we have not yet introduced any geometric concepts,
and the transition function must be understood simply as a concept—a
number—in the quasigeometric realm that serves to bridge the chasm be-
tween a genuinely metageometric realm and a genuinely geometric one.
Is now the transition postulate in harmony with the equality we in-
troduced in the previous section, namely, P(a) = P(a|a)? It is indeed,
because, on the basis of the transition postulate, the method by which a-
systems are first obtained becomes now irrelevant for any situation. In effect,
using both Eq. (12.15) and Eq. (12.20), we have P(b|a) = P(b|a)P(a) be-
cause P(a) = P(a|a) and 〈a|a〉 = 1. As a result, we can now write
P(b)P(a) = 〈b|a〉P(b|a)P(a), (12.21)
20Function, from Latin fungi : to perform, to execute an action. The transition function
is a function in this etymological sense; it is not to be interpreted as an explicit function
f(b, c) of the real numbers b and c.
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whereby we obtain a complete correspondence, element by element, between
the pictorial and the physico-mathematical representation of the product of
two different premeasurements. Comparing with Figure 12.9, we see that
each element on the right-hand side of Eq. (12.21) is pictured in it: (i) a
premeasurement P(a) of a-systems including filtering, (ii) a pure transition
P(b|a) from a-systems to b-systems, and (iii) a qualification 〈b|a〉 of the part
of a-systems that manage to become b-systems symbolized by the second
filtering action. The pictorial-algebraic parallelism is now complete.
Before concluding this section, we mention two noteworthy properties of
the transition function. The first one results as follows. On the one hand,
P(b)P(a) = P(b|b)P(a|a) = 〈b|a〉P(b|a); (12.22)
on the other hand, introducing the identity thing
∑
i P(ci), we get
P(b)
[∑
i
P(ci)
]
P(a) = P(b|b)
[∑
i
P(ci|ci)
]
P(a|a)
=
∑
i
〈b|ci〉〈ci|a〉P(b|a). (12.23)
Therefore,
〈b|a〉 =
∑
i
〈b|ci〉〈ci|a〉. (12.24)
We call this the (quasigeometric) decomposition relation. It tells us that the
part of a-systems that succeeds in being transformed into b-systems can be
expressed via transitions to and from all possible ci-systems.
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A similar procedure yields a second property, namely,
P(b|a) =
∑
i,j
〈dj |b〉〈a|ci〉P(dj |ci), (12.25)
which tells that a transition from b-systems to a-systems can be built out
of transitions from ci-systems to dj-systems, so long as we know what part
of ci-systems is compatible with a-systems and what part of b-systems is
compatible with dj-systems. We see, then, how the transition functions
have the role of building a linear combination of transition things; transition
functions tell what qualitative weight each transition thing possesses in its
combination with other such things, depending on what part every pair of
physical systems have in common.
21This proof assumes that the sum of things is distributive with respect to the product.
Since the expression P(ci)+P(cj) is irreducible, this result cannot be proved mathemati-
cally ; however, we do no find this problematic at all. That the sum is distributive with the
product can be seen to hold by considering the meaning of the expression physically. We
should not demand anything else from a physical theory. Alternatively, one may choose
to impose this as a mathematical axiom, but we consider this to be a pointless procedure
in the present physical context.
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12.4.2 A lead on probability
We found previously that, in the special case of a single observable, 〈aj |ai〉
is either 0 or 1. One may be tempted by this fact and simple-mindedly
interpret the transition function to be the probability for the occurrence
of a quantum-mechanical transition, with each 〈bi|a〉 assumed to be a real
number between 0 and 1, and
∑
i〈bi|a〉 = 1. This interpretation, however, is
not based on any physical reasoning and is, in fact, completely misguided.
In order to obtain a sensible interpretation of the transition function,
and one that is also in harmony with property (12.24), we must not blindly
assume a physical meaning for it, but rather find it as it naturally arises from
a further analysis of premeasurement things—especially, of a succession of
them after Schwinger (1959, p. 1547).
In the physical situation described by the product P(b)P(a), premea-
surement P(b) in general destroys a part of the information obtained from
premeasurement P(a) because all those a-systems that fail to perform a
transition into b-systems are lost. The part of systems that is not lost, or
the degree of compatibility between a- and b-systems, is described by the
transition function 〈b|a〉. The expression
P(b)P(a) = 〈b|a〉P(b|a) (12.26)
tells us precisely this, namely, that the succession of the two premeasure-
ments P(a) and P(b) is equivalent to a (pure) transition P(b|a) from a-
systems to b-systems qualified by 〈b|a〉, the degree of compatibility between
the systems in question.
If now we perform premeasurement P(a) again in order to regain a-
systems (Figure 12.14), we can see what kind of disturbance premeasurement
P(b) has caused; we find
P(a)P(b)P(a) = 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉P(a). (12.27)
If 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 was a non-negative real number, this result could be physically
interpreted to quantify the disturbance caused by P(b), i.e. to be telling
us what the chances are that a given, individual a-system will survive its
becoming a b-system and be recovered again as an a-system. In other words,
〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 could quantify the equivalence between a premeasurement of a-
systems having passed through b-systems, and a single premeasurement of
a-systems. These two different situations are physically the same only in
those cases when the disturbance introduced by P(b) is cleared successfully.
In the special case of a single observable, the results obtained are in
harmony with this possible interpretation. In effect,
P(ai)P(aj)P(ai) = 〈ai|aj〉〈aj |ai〉P(ai) = δijP(ai) (12.28)
would tell us that the chances of an ai-system surviving a disturbance intro-
duced by P(aj) is null unless i = j, in which case the chances of survival
are guaranteed.
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Figure 12.14: Schematic representation of the succession P(a)P(b)P(a) of pre-
measurement things suggesting the concept of quantum-mechanical probability.
The role of the product of metageometric things as a lead on transi-
tion probabilities cannot be overemphasized. It is our intuitive grasp of the
situation represented by P(a)P(b)P(a) as a recovery operation, and our
intuition that the recovery of an a-system will sometimes fail and some-
times succeed, that gives us reason to think that, perhaps, 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 can be
interpreted as a probability.
The analysis of the role of the sum of premeasurement things in the
possible birth of probability adds more justification to this interpretation.
What results would we obtain if we allowed for the possibility of a-systems
being disturbed through all possible (mutually exclusive) bk-systems? We
find that the supposed probability of an a-system surviving this least se-
lective disturbance introduced by
∑
k P(bk) adds up to unity. In effect,
because we have
∑
k P(bk) = I and P(a) is idempotent, we find
P(a) = P(a)
[∑
k
P(bk)
]
P(a) =
∑
k
〈a|bk〉〈bk|a〉P(a), (12.29)
so that ∑
k
〈a|bk〉〈bk|a〉 = 1. (12.30)
This result is consistent with property (12.24). In this manner, the product
of metageometric things is compatible with the idea of probability for single
transitions, and the sum of products with the idea of probability for a set
of mutually exclusive transitions. Unexpectedly, the interpretation of the
product and sum of things agrees with the interpretation of the product
and sum of numbers in probability theory.
If this interpretation is workable and its lead on probability correct, then
there is no need to postulate controversial state vectors—with their mysteri-
ous collapses—here. Probability would arise not mysteriously but naturally,
from the very physical meaning of the situation under examination.
12.4.3 The transition-function postulate
The hurdles that must still be overcome on the way to probability are (i) to
reveal and justify the nature of the number representing the transition func-
tion 〈b|a〉 guided not only by the picture of the recovery of an a-system and
its lead on probability, but also by the physical meaning of the transition
function and a deeper insight into the significance and utility of numbers
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in physics; and (ii) to make sure that the product 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 we have hy-
pothetically identified with a probability is indeed a real number between
0 and 1.
To move forwards, we ask whether any kind of relation could exist be-
tween the two numbers 〈b|a〉 and 〈a|b〉. In other words, considering that
they both picture related processes, namely, a transition from a-systems to
b-systems and viceversa, could one be obtained from the other? And if so,
on what grounds?
Consider the following reasoning within the realm of real numbers. Let r
be a real number, and let r⋆ = −r denote the dual counterpart of r. Next we
ask (i) what is the physical meaning of operation “⋆”? and (ii) what special
properties does it inherit from its physical meaning? The first question is
straightforward to answer. Operation “⋆” describes the reversal of a simple
physical process. For example, if r represents gaining r apples, r⋆ represents
losing or owing r apples; if r symbolizes a force of intensity r pulling in a
certain direction, r⋆ symbolizes a force of the same intensity acting in the
opposite direction; etc. As we can see, the physical meaning of operation
“⋆” is very close to everyday experience.
Since “⋆” represents the reversal of a physical process, and since to re-
verse a physical process twice brings us back to the starting point, this
operation must be its own inverse, r⋆⋆ = r (recovery of original transac-
tion). Moreover, the conflation of a process in one direction with another
in the opposite direction must produce no physical process at all; this finds
expression in the property r⋆r = 0 (null net transaction),22 where 0 is a
special real number with the property 0⋆ = 0 because, roughly speaking, 0
points in no direction.
The previously unearthed physical meaning of 〈b|a〉 as giving the direc-
tion of a quantum-mechanical transition from a- to b-systems gives us now
an essential clue, because the transition function, through its explicit expres-
sion, likewise tells us that 〈a|b〉 represents a quantum-mechanical transition
in a direction opposite to that of 〈b|a〉.
This fits the meaning of the ⋆ operation, and so we ask: could the
transition function, then, be a real number and “⋆” the relation we are look-
ing for? We see immediately that it cannot, because we would then have
that 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 = −r + r ≡ 0, i.e. always null.23 Returning to the product
P(a)P(b)P(a), this would mean that the original a-system is always ir-
recoverable for arbitrary observables A and B. But this runs counter to our
intuition of the original physical situation. And so would a similar use of
natural and rational numbers. We must try harder.
A clue to this problem comes from realizing that the kind of physical
process represented by the transition function is farther removed from ev-
eryday experience than those characterized by real numbers. The quantum-
mechanical process in question simply cannot be grasped by real numbers,
which have been designed and introduced into physics to picture classical
22Expression r⋆r is to be read −r + r.
23We read 〈b|a〉⋆〈b|a〉 as −〈b|a〉+ 〈b|a〉 according to the meaning of the ⋆-operation.
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phenomena, phenomena whose physical nature is more intuitive than that
of the quantum world. Real numbers have been designed to picture gaining
and losing, coming and going, pulling and pushing, and other such classical
transactions. Quantum transitions have nothing to do with these actions;
they are transactions of a different kind, which must, accordingly, be grasped
in terms of a different kind of numbers. If simpler numbers also fall short of
the task at hand, then how about the next kind of number in line, complex
numbers?
Save for an increment in the complexity of the picturing number, let us
conjecture that the underlying logic of quantum-mechanical transactions is
nonetheless the same as that of classical ones and see where it leads. Let then
the transition function be a complex number, and let each pair of complex
numbers representing opposite transitions be dual counterparts, linked by a
new operation of dual correspondence “∗,” 〈a|b〉 = 〈b|a〉∗. Operation “∗,”
as before, must symbolize the reversal of the physical process in question,
and must therefore share its properties with “⋆.” A double reversal of a
quantum-mechanical transition must bring us back to the original transition,
〈b|a〉∗∗ = 〈b|a〉, i.e. “∗” is its own inverse; and the conflation of a quantum-
mechanical transition from a- to b-systems with another from b- to a-systems
must produce no transition at all, 〈b|a〉∗〈b|a〉 = r ∈ R.
Why a real number? Because, like 0 satisfies 0⋆ = 0 and fails to picture
a classical transaction, real numbers have the property r∗ = r, as they
fail to represent any quantum-mechanical transition. We know this fact
from two separate sources. We just learnt heuristically that real numbers
are inadequate to represent quantum-mechanical transactions; and we also
know from the earlier result 〈aj |ai〉 = δij ∈ R that transition functions that
reduce to real numbers represent no proper transition: in those cases, ai-
systems either remained ai-systems (1) or they failed to become aj-systems
(0) (Figure 12.15). Moreover, because 〈aj |ai〉∗〈aj |ai〉 = 0 (cf. Eq. (12.28))
represents the extreme case in which the systems involved in the recovery
operation have nothing in common (i 6= j), we conjecture that this is the
lower bound of the more general real number 〈b|a〉∗〈b|a〉, characterizing a
recovery operation where the systems involved are partially compatible; in
symbols, 〈b|a〉∗〈b|a〉 ≥ 0.
With their underlying physical meaning clarified, complex numbers and
complex conjugation lose their aura of mystery, while at the same time a
new dimension is added to the concept of isolated complex numbers, namely,
that every meaningful complex number has an equally physically meaning-
ful dual counterpart characterizing an opposite quantum-mechanical tran-
sition.24 Furthermore, with this, the quasigeometric realm of the transition
function re-earns its name, since it introduces the notion of direction—a
look-alike of geometric thought—without yet, however, introducing any no-
24We saw in Section 4.2 that Penrose understood complex conjugation as reversing the
direction in time of the flow of quantum-mechanical information. The present findings go
deeper into the nature of complex conjugation, as they do not rely on any idea of time, nor
on the inessential geometric decomposition—and ensuing geometrization as an element of
Argand’s plane—of a complex number 〈b|a〉 into x+ iy.
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Figure 12.15: The operation “⋆” generates the dual counterpart r⋆ of a real
number r (left). The operation “∗” generates the dual counterpart 〈b|a〉∗ of a
complex number 〈b|a〉 (right). The meaning of both is to reverse a physical action;
the former a classical, the latter a quantum action. Both are, as they should, their
own inverses, and the conflation of a physical action with its reverse results in no
action at all.
tions of shape or size.
Now how about numbers more complicated than complex ones? Could
these be suitable or even more suitable? Taking 〈b|a〉 to be a more com-
plicated number such as a quaternion,25 would not lead to difficulties as
far as the rise of probability is concerned, because quaternions behave like
complex numbers with respect to complex conjugation: qq∗ = q∗q ≥ 0.
However, their adoption leads to difficulties in other areas. At the meta-
and quasigeometric level, the product of three premeasurement things fails
to be associative,26 contrary to the results established in Section 12.3.1.
And, although inessential to our main concerns, quaternions do not work
at the traditional geometric level either because, their product being non-
commutative, they do not form a field and cannot therefore act as the scalars
of a (Hilbert) vector space. The choice of other hypercomplex numbers, such
as biquaternions, octonions, hypercomplex numbers proper, etc., is equally
troublesome.
However, this is not say that the need for complex numbers, to the ex-
clusion of any other types of more general number, remains thus proved.
25A quaternion is a number q of the form x0+ ix1+jx2+kx3, where i
2 = j2 = k2 = −1,
ij = −ji = k, jk = −kj = i, and ki = −ik = j.
26Taking the commutation of transition functions (in this case, quaternions) and things
to be a reasonable assumption, we find:
[P(c)P(b)]P(a) = 〈c|b〉P(c|b)P(a) = 〈c|b〉〈b|a〉P(c|a) 6=
P(c)[P(b)P(a)] = P(c)〈b|a〉P(b|a) = 〈b|a〉〈c|b〉P(c|a),
since quaternions do not commute. At this point, one might want to invent an extra
“chaining rule” stating that the only correct order of multiplication for transition functions
is one in which the left-hand system on the right matches the right-hand system on the
left (cf. b in first product). This fix appears artificial and, although it does not conflict
with most of the forthcoming calculations at the meta- and quasigeometric level, it does
make the findings of Section 12.5.3 impossible to obtain.
220 The metageometric nature of quantum-mechanical things
These findings rather suggest that only complex numbers are adequate for
the simple framework of this metageometric formulation of quantum theory,
as well as for that of the traditional formulation. One suspects that if ei-
ther of these formulations could be modified into more complex alternatives,
quaternions (or other hypercomplex numbers) might be suitable for a quan-
tum theory just as well. The difficulty lies in fathoming out such a theory;
and the question remains as to why attempt this feat when a simpler theory
that uses complex numbers already achieves the desired explanatory goals.
Postulates and hypotheses should not be feared in physics—so long as
we understand their physical origin and meaning (cf. Einstein’s geodesic
hypothesis). Resting assured that we now understand the underlying reason
of being of complex numbers, we postulate that the transition function is a
complex number, and that the relation between 〈a|b〉 and 〈b|a〉 is
〈b|a〉∗ = 〈a|b〉. (12.31)
We call this the transition-function postulate. It attributes to complex con-
jugation (later on: dual correspondence in general) the role of reversing the
direction of a quantum-mechanical transition.27
The interpretation of 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 as a probability is now fully justified. We
have that
Pr(b|a) = 〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 = 〈b|a〉∗〈b|a〉 =: |〈b|a〉|2 ≥ 0, 28 (12.32)
where the probability of each individual transition is symmetric:
Pr(b|a) = Pr(a|b), (12.33)
i.e. the probability of an a-system becoming a b-system is equal to that of a
b-system becoming an a-system. Moreover, for an exhaustive set of mutually
27Dr. Jaroszkiewicz has brought up the issue of the role of the observer; in particular,
in relation to reversals of quantum processes: if the observer is an inalienable part of a
quantum system (involving also systems under observation and apparatuses), how could he
(or his state), too, be said to be reversed? From the metageometric standpoint, however,
the role of human beings is of an epistemological rather than ontological nature. Human
beings are essential to quantum physics because quantum theory must be tailored to do
justice to both quantum phenomena and human cognition and methodological capabilities.
Quantum theory is then to be an explicit explanation of quantum phenomena by humans
for humans but, in the metageometric setting, their role does not extend to an essential
modification of microscopic systems via “acts of observation.” Here humans do not act as
observers in the usual quantum-mechanical sense of the word; that is, a human looking or
not looking has no effect upon outcomes—only their preparing microscopic systems with
macroscopic devices does.
28We have now identified the real product of a transition function and its dual coun-
terpart with the squared modulus of a complex number, turning it into an arrow. This
is done at this late stage partly for notational convenience, and partly to give a familiar
look to the traditional probability results. So far as this section is concerned, nothing else
should be read into this mere notation: we initially set out to avoid the geometrization
of complex numbers—and so we did, with positive new results. This geometric-ridden
notation, however, becomes essential in the next section, because it is it that inspires the
rise of the geometric state vector.
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Figure 12.16: Schematic representation of the succession P(c)P(b)P(a)
of premeasurement things transforming a-systems into c-systems passing
through a certain b-system.
exclusive outcomes—a single a-system can transform into any of all possible
bi-systems—we recover from Eq. (12.30) the usual result∑
i
Pr(bi|a) =
∑
i
|〈bi|a〉|2 = 1. (12.34)
This, together with Eq. (12.32), finally implies
0 ≤ Pr(b|a) ≤ 1. (12.35)
Before closing this section and moving onto the geometric realm, it is
worthwhile to analyse some properties of probabilities, seen as direct conse-
quences of the product of premeasurement things. We study three different
cases:
1. The series of premeasurements P(c)P(b)P(a) (here the filter associ-
ated with P(b) is on) involves a transformation of a-systems into c-
systems going through a determined b-system (Figure 12.16). Because
the transition from a-systems to b-systems is independent of the sec-
ond transition from b-systems to c-systems, the probability Pr(c|b|a)
of the whole event can be expressed as Pr(c|b)Pr(b|a). This gives
Pr(c|b|a) = 〈b|c〉〈c|b〉〈a|b〉〈b|a〉 = |〈c|b〉〈b|a〉|2. (12.36)
2. The series of premeasurements P(c)I P(a) (here the filter associated
with I is off) involves a transformation of a-systems into c-systems
going through either one of all possible bi-systems (Figure 12.17). Be-
cause the different possibilities of passing through each bi-system are
mutually exclusive, we find∑
i
Pr(c|bi|a) =
∑
i
〈bi|c〉〈c|bi〉〈a|bi〉〈bi|a〉
=
∑
i
|〈c|bi〉〈bi|a〉|2. (12.37)
3. The series of premeasurements P(a)P(c) (here the premeasurement
associated with B is totally absent) involves a straight transformation
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Figure 12.17: Schematic representation of the succession P(c)I P(a)
of premeasurement things transforming a-systems into c-systems passing
through all possible bi-systems.
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Figure 12.18: Schematic representation of the succession P(a)P(c) of pre-
measurement things transforming a-systems into c-systems without passing
through any bi-system.
of a-systems into c-systems, apparently without going through any
bi-system (Figure 12.18). However, using the quasigeometric decom-
position relation (12.24), we find that the probability
Pr(c|a) = 〈a|c〉〈c|a〉 (12.38)
is also equal to
Pr(c|a) =
∑
i
∑
j
〈a|bi〉〈bi|c〉〈c|bj〉〈bj |a〉
=
∑
i
〈a|bi〉〈bi|c〉〈c|bi〉〈bi|a〉+
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
〈a|bi〉〈bi|c〉〈c|bj〉〈bj |a〉
=
∑
i
Pr(c|bi|a) + interference terms. (12.39)
The extra cross terms that appear with respect to situation (2.) represent
the interference of all possible ways of passing through bi-systems taken in
pairs. This is as if the systems, besides being able to pass through any
bi-system separately, were also able to pass through all of them at once
when no premeasurement associated with observable B is present. This is
a phenomenon that is classically forbidden. This comparison tells us that
even the identity premeasurement thing I (which has the weakest action
as far as premeasurement is concerned) has physical consequences, since the
mediation of I associated with B in case (2.) leads to different probabilistic
predictions for the measurement of c-systems than in case (3.), where no
premeasurement associated with B is present at all. This is a positive result
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as far as the experimental concreteness of quantum-mechanical things is
concerned.
This concludes the characterization of the quasigeometric realm made
possible by the introduction of numbers, midway between the metageomet-
ric and geometric realms. How do the traditional geometric concepts of
quantum theory arise from the meta- and quasigeometric foundations we
have just laid?
12.5 Geometric realm
12.5.1 State vectors from geometric decomposition
Whereas traditionally state vectors constitute the starting point of quantum
theory, they arise here as derived—and physically insubstantial—objects.
The quasigeometric probability relation
∑
i |〈bi|a〉|2 = 1 is the key to un-
derstand how the introduction of state vectors and the geometrization of
quantum theory takes place.29
Let us use an analogy and examine a real n-dimensional Euclidean space
to which belong the general unit vector ~a and the vectors ~bi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n),
which form an orthonormal basis of this space: ~bi ·~bj = δij (Figure 12.19).
Thus, if θi is the angle between ~a and ~bi, by virtue of Pythagoras’ theorem
in n dimensions, we have∑
i
cos2(θi) =
∑
i
(~bi · ~a)2 = 1, (12.40)
an analogical geometric version of quasigeometric property (12.30). This
result tells us that the transition function 〈b|a〉 can be geometrically decom-
posed and thought as the inner product, or overlap, 〈b| · |a〉 of two differ-
ent arrow “state vectors” to yield now the quantum-mechanical geometric
version of property (12.30) (Figure 12.20). Because, as we have seen, the
physically more primitive concept is that of the transition function, and
because its geometric decomposition is only a human prerogative—only a
connotation30—state vectors need not be associated with any concrete, gen-
uinely physical entities. In this light, state vectors appear as the artificial
constructions of our minds—which cling to the intuitive picture given by
arrow-like vectors out of their built-in habit to seek visualization in terms of
familiar geometric concepts. In the lecture course on which this chapter is
based, Dr. Lehto described the predicament in which we have put ourselves
as a result of this habit in this way:
29See Schwinger’s (1960) follow-up article for his way of introducing state vectors. He
then suggests that “the geometry of states” thus introduced is more fundamental than
“the measurement algebra,” which “can be derived” from the former (p. 260). This is
true from a mathematical but not physical point of view, where observations always come
first; we keep metageometry as ontologically primary.
30Connotation: something suggested (two overlapping arrows, 〈b|·|a〉) by a word or thing
(“〈b|a〉”) apart from the thing it explicitly names or describes (common part between the
players in a quantum-mechanical transition). (Adapted from Merriam-Webster Online
Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com)
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Figure 12.19: Two-dimensional representation of an n-dimensional real Euclidean
vector space, in which a unit arrow vector ~a can be decomposed into projections
along orthonormal axes ~bi with components ~bi · ~a satisfying
∑
i(
~bi · ~a)2 = |~a|2 = 1
by virtue of Pythagoras’ theorem in n dimensions.
Philosophical problems in quantum physics arise from our sim-
plifying mental pictures, which we create out of our habit to use
familiar concepts and words. These problems cannot be solved
by increasing our knowledge—we have imprisoned ourselves in a
labyrinth of our own making, and we cannot find the way out.31
This finding about the origin of the state vector is reminiscent of Auyang’s
(2001) view regarding what we might call the connotative decomposition of
physical fields f(P ) into a local aspect (“spacetime” P ) and a qualitative
aspect (“quality” f). Auyang argued, in a manner similar to the present
one regarding the transition function, that fields are physically indivisible
entities, and that it is only our prerogative to decompose them into two con-
stituent parts. However, she maintained, spacetime (points) need not have
any independent physical meaning just because we can abstract them from
the field—“our thinking does not create things of independent existence;”
she wrote, “we are not God” (p. 214). We notice then that, also in the
quantum-mechanical case, our mental activities work towards the creation
of originally absent geometric concepts with unclear physical meaning.
It is also noteworthy that the result about the transition function sug-
gests, contrary to common belief, that from a physical (not logical) point
of view the metric (probability) comes first and vectors arise only after the
metric, when this is split up in order to satisfy the human need for geometric
visualization.32 This idea can be related to similar concepts in spacetime
31Physical, mathematical, and philosophical foundations of quantum theory (2005), Lec-
ture notes.
32In Article I (see Related publications), we presented an idea concerning the possible
metageometric foundations of quantum theory which is contradicted by the present find-
ings. We speculated then that the geometric formulation of quantum theory could arise
12.5 Geometric realm 225
〈b1|a〉|b1〉
〈b2|a〉|b2〉
|a〉
θ2
θ1
|〈b1|a〉|
2
= cos2(θ1)
|〈b2|a〉|
2
= cos2(θ2)
〈a|a〉 = 1
Figure 12.20: Rise of quantum-mechanical arrow state vectors from the geometric
decomposition of quasigeometric property
∑
i |〈bi|a〉|2 = 1.
physics. May it be the case that, from a physical standpoint, the worldline
separation ds comes first and that spacetime points follow only as mentally
helpful appendages?
From their role as geometric parts of the transition function, we gather
that kets |a〉 could be associated with incoming systems, and bras 〈a| with
outgoing systems. By analogy with the transition-function postulate, we
can say that state vectors are linked by some form of dual correspondence,
|a〉 ∼ 〈a|. This is, however, only a transmogrification of the physical dual
correspondence between complex numbers (transition functions), and need
not carry with it an autonomous physical meaning.
From the metageometric perspective, the following two geometric prop-
erties follow automatically. Interpreting 〈b|a〉∗ = 〈a|b〉 geometrically, and as-
sociating ket |a〉 with ~a and bra 〈a| with ~a∗, we recover a well-known property
of complex vectors, namely, that their inner product satisfies (~b∗ · ~a)∗ = ~a∗ ·~b.
Also the orthonormality condition 〈aj |ai〉 = δij for vectors follows now auto-
matically from earlier considerations of compatibility of ai- and aj-systems.
12.5.2 Derivative geometric connotations
If the geometric counterpart of the transition function 〈b|a〉 is the inner prod-
uct of arrow vectors 〈b| · |a〉, what may be the geometric counterparts of the
from the “overlap of geometry-free things |ψ〉 and their dual counterparts 〈ψ|” (p. 437). By
this we meant that, if metric-free vectors could be found to be physically meaningful, the
geometric concepts of projection and probability would come second as a consequence.
Here the sense of vectors as non-geometric concepts is the following. Vectors are not
geometric concepts in general, but become geometric objects with associated geometric
magnitudes after being endowed with a metric structure. In the light of the present find-
ings, state vectors are geometric concepts from the start because they arise from geometric
decomposition of the transition function; at no time are there vectors without a metric.
For this reason, we now leave the older idea behind.
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|a〉
B
〈b| or 〈a|
︸︷︷︸
〈b|a〉
|b〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
|b〉〈a|
Figure 12.21: Geometric representation of the premeasurement process in terms
of the inner and outer products, 〈b|a〉 and |b〉〈a|, of arrow vectors |a〉 and |b〉.
metageometric premeasurement and transition things P(a) and P(b|a)?
To answer this question, we proceed as we did with the transition func-
tion, namely, by finding a correspondence with the geometric realm through
geometric decomposition.
A transition thing P(b|a) has the capacity to cleanly turn incoming
a-systems into b-systems. We notice that, geometrically, this action is dis-
played by the operator |b〉·〈a|, which takes in “a-systems” |a〉 and turns them
into “b-systems” |b〉, thus: (|b〉 · 〈a|)|a〉 = |b〉. The outer product, then, arises
from the geometric decomposition of a transition thing into the product of
two separate state vectors, a bra and a ket. We denote this correspondence
as follows:
P(b|a) g= |b〉〈a|. (12.41)
In particular and in agreement with earlier remarks,
P(a)
g
= |a〉〈a| (12.42)
represents no transition at all, since (|a〉〈a|)|a〉 = |a〉.
When the transition function is interpreted as an inner product of arrow
vectors, and premeasurement and transition things as an outer product of
arrow vectors, the whole premeasurement process can be reinterpreted geo-
metrically in two parts: an incoming one related to the inner product and
an outgoing one related to the outer product. It is not essential to do so,
but it is comforting to be able to recover the traditional geometric results
from metageometric foundations.
In the incoming part, we start with systems in state |a〉 before their
preparation into b-systems, and with no systems in the preparation box it-
self. Some systems are then “absorbed” in the preparation box into state
〈b|. In the outgoing part, we have systems in the preparation box “emitted”
from state 〈a| into state |b〉, which leave the preparation box—now empty
of systems—behind. In this geometric setting, it is then natural to con-
nect the inner product 〈b|a〉 with the internal rearrangement (“absorbtion”)
of systems at preparation, and the outer product |b〉〈a| with the external
rearrangement (“emission”) of systems at preparation (Figure 12.21).
At this point of the geometric development, and if so wished, the cor-
respondence between premeasurement and transition things and the hypo-
thetical continuum of measurement results a can be introduced. This can
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be done by assuming that an infinitesimally small variation δa of a mea-
surement result a is physically meaningful, and thus that it is significant to
write
P(a)
g
=
∫ a+δa
a−δa
|a′〉〈a′|da′, (12.43)
as well as
P(b|a) g=
∫ a+δa
a−δa
∫ b+δb
b−δb
|b′〉〈a′|db′da′. (12.44)
However, geometric expressions such as
∫ a2
a1
|a〉〈a|da have no metageometric
counterparts at all.
As expected, the transition postulate (12.20) also holds in geometric
form:
P(d|c)P(b|a) g= (|d〉〈c|)(|b〉〈a|) = 〈c|b〉|d〉〈a| g= 〈c|b〉P(d|a). (12.45)
The outer products |a〉〈a| and |b〉〈a|, geometric connotations of the pre-
measurement and transition things P(a) and P(b|a), transform a vector
into another vector. Therefore, they are (linear) operators. All other oper-
ators come from these basic operators, which are, in turn, connected with
measurement values.
We notice next that Hermitian conjugation generalizes the concept of
complex conjugation in a genuinely physical way because, unlike the case
of dual correspondence between state vectors, it retains the previous phys-
ical meaning. In effect, if we compare the relation 〈b|a〉∗ = 〈a|b〉 for the
inner product with the relation (|b〉〈a|)† = |a〉〈b| for the outer product (op-
erator), we see that in both cases the action of “∗” and “†,” respectively,
consists in inverting the direction of the quantum-mechanical transition:
(|b〉〈a|)|a〉 = |b〉 and (|b〉〈a|)†|b〉 = |a〉. Further, if we accept the notation
P(b|a)† g= (|b〉〈a|)†, (12.46)
we then have the metageometric relation
P(b|a)† = P(a|b), (12.47)
and, in particular,
P(a)† = P(a). (12.48)
Also this latter result is physically reasonable, considering that there is no
transition involved in a premeasurement. If we take Hermitian conjugation
(including complex conjugation) as a form of dual correspondence, then
the physical meaning of dual correspondence is to invert the direction of
a quantum-mechanical transition. This interpretation applies to metageo-
metric things, quasigeometric complex numbers (transition function), and
geometric operators, but not to isolated state vectors.
We now have enough knowledge to analyse the compatibility of observ-
ables. So far little has been said about the possibility of P(a) and P(b)
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commuting; what physical results do we obtain in such a case? Using the
transition postulate, we find
P(b)P(a) = P(a)P(b)
P(b|b)P(a|a) = P(a|a)P(b|b)
〈b|a〉P(b|a) = 〈a|b〉P(a|b) (12.49)
Using Eq. (12.47) to obtain the Hermitian conjugate of Eq. (12.49), and
multiplying term by term, the transition functions vanish to get
P(b|a)P(a|b) = P(a|b)P(b|a), (12.50)
or equivalently
P(b) = P(a). (12.51)
Furthermore, we can now use Eq. (12.51) to find
P(a)P(b)P(a) = P(a) = |〈b|a〉|2P(a), (12.52)
so that
Pr(b|a) = Pr(a|b) = |〈b|a〉|2 = 1. (12.53)
To sum up, if P(a) and P(b) commute, transition things P(b|a) and
P(a|b) also commute, P(a) and P(b) are themselves equal to each other,
and in transitions involving observables A and B, any b-system becomes
with certainty an a-system and viceversa. In other words, A and B are
compatible observables.
Finally, since the geometric counterpart of the identity thing I must
be the identity operator 1ˆ, I
g
= 1ˆ, and since
∑
i P(ai)
g
=
∑
i |ai〉〈ai|, we
recover the geometric completeness relation∑
i
|ai〉〈ai| = 1ˆ. (12.54)
With its help, a general vector |ψ〉 and a general operator Xˆ can be built in
terms of a vector basis {|ai〉} or operator basis {|ai〉〈ai|}, respectively.
12.5.3 Geometric traces
The next noteworthy concept is that of the trace. For an operator, the trace
consists of the sum of its diagonal elements,
Tr(Xˆ) =
∑
i
〈ai|Xˆ|ai〉, (12.55)
which is in general a complex number. The trace, together with the decom-
position relation (12.24) and the commutativity of complex numbers,33 now
allows us to find enlightening connections between the metageometric and
geometric realms:
33Cf. non-commutativity of quaternions.
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1. The geometric trace left behind by the metageometric transition thing
P(b|a) is the inner product (geometrized transition function) 〈a|b〉:
Tr[P(b|a)] g= Tr(|b〉〈a|) =
∑
i
〈ci|b〉〈a|ci〉 = 〈a|b〉. (12.56)
2. In particular,
Tr[P(aj |ai)] g= Tr(|aj〉〈ai|) = 〈ai|aj〉 = δij . (12.57)
3. The geometric trace left behind by the metageometric premeasurement
thing P(a) is
Tr[P(a)]
g
= Tr(|a〉〈a|) = 〈a|a〉 = 1. (12.58)
4. The geometric trace left behind by the product of metageometric tran-
sition things P(d|c) and P(b|a) is
Tr[P(b|a)P(d|c)] = Tr[P(d|c)P(b|a)]
g
= Tr[(|d〉〈c|)(|b〉〈a|)] = 〈c|b〉〈a|d〉. (12.59)
From this follows a noteworthy result:
5. The geometric trace left behind by the product of premeasurement
things P(b) and P(a) is the probability of a transition from a-systems
to b-systems or viceversa:
Tr[P(a)P(b)] = Tr[P(b)P(a)]
g
= 〈b|a〉〈a|b〉 = Pr(b|a). (12.60)
In other words, the geometric fingerprint left by metageometric things
is quantum-mechanical probability.
12.5.4 Observables
We finish this section—and complete the geometrization of the theory—
with the geometric and metageometric interpretation of observables. We
start with the weighted average of measurement results {bi},
∑
i
Pr(bi|a)bi =
∑
i
〈a|bi〉〈bi|a〉bi = 〈a|
(∑
i
bi|bi〉〈bi|
)
|a〉, (12.61)
where we geometrically identify observable B with an operator Bˆ such that
B
g
= Bˆ =
∑
i
bi|bi〉〈bi|. (12.62)
Then
〈a|Bˆ|a〉 =: 〈Bˆ〉|a〉 (12.63)
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is the expected value of operator Bˆ in state |a〉 (i.e. when measurements are
performed on a sample of a-systems), and 〈(∆Bˆ)2〉|a〉 is its variance, where
∆Bˆ = Bˆ − 〈Bˆ〉1ˆ.
From the geometric representation (12.62) of an observable, the eigen-
value equation follows automatically :
Bˆ|bi〉 =
∑
j
bj|bj〉〈bj |
 |bi〉 =∑
j
bj|bj〉δij = bi|bi〉. (12.64)
In contrast, for a general operator Xˆ =
∑
ij xij |bj〉〈bi| which is not an observ-
able, the eigenvalue equation does not follow. The Hermiticity of observables
also follows automatically from Eq. (12.62):
Bˆ† =
∑
i
b∗i (|bi〉〈bi|)† = Bˆ. (12.65)
Thus, an observable B is always represented geometrically by a Hermitian
operator, and we do not need to postulate this separately. Particularly,
the eigenvalues of operators associated with observables, coming from mea-
surement results bi, are automatically real; and different eigenvalues auto-
matically have orthogonal eigenvectors associated with them (〈bj |bi〉 = 0,
i 6= j) since bi-systems and bj-systems are mutually incompatible unless
i = j. These are the benefits of basing physics on observations instead of
disembodied mathematics.
It is now only a small step to find that a pure observable, i.e. the meta-
geometric counterpart of Bˆ, is
B =
∑
i
biP(bi). (12.66)
How does it differ from Bˆ? When we began building the theory, we in-
troduced observables A,B,C, etc., which we assumed to represent phys-
ical magnitudes. But we saw in Chapter 4 that all physical magnitudes
are underlain by geometric associations to become geometric magnitudes.
These are now pictured by geometric operator Bˆ.34 Observable B, on the
other hand, is a linear combination of metageometric things. It involves
not measurements—activities producing physical values—but premeasure-
ments—activities producing prepared systems. In fact, this is a helpful
34We may complement the geometric picture underlying Bˆ, and discover some more
connections, by finding out what geometric object represents this operator and how size
is attached to it. Operator Bˆ is associated with a matrix related to a linear combination
of outer products of arrow vectors. In general, if the matrix operator Xˆ = |Z〉〈Y | comes
from the outer product of |Y 〉 =Pi yi|yi〉 and |Z〉 =Pj zj |zj〉, Xˆ is taken as an arrow
vector with components xij = yiz
∗
j and length
‖Xˆ‖ =
sX
ij
|xij |2 =
q
Tr(Xˆ†Xˆ). (12.67)
A geometric observable Bˆ is then pictured as an arrow vector with one component bi|bi〉
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distinction to visualize how the starting points of a geometric and a meta-
geometric theory differ.
We call the geometry-free measurable observable represented by B a
quantum-mechanical, pure physical property. We can then say that a quan-
tum-mechanical observable is by nature metageometric. In other words, pure
metageometric physical properties lie at the ontological root of the geometric
physical magnitudes we are used to dealing with in everyday physics.
Finally, what geometric traces do metageometric observables, i.e. pure
physical properties, leave behind? The trace of the product of B and P(a)
is
Tr[BP(a)]
g
= 〈Bˆ〉|a〉, (12.69)
which tells us that the geometric fingerprint left by a metageometric observ-
able is the quantum-mechanical expected value, i.e. statistics.
12.6 Time
Do metageometric things and the constructions derived therefrom also have
something to tell us about time as a concept inherent in quantum-mechanical
systems? Or is time, after all, just an external parameter also according to
quantum mechanics? And how can the original psychophysical parallelism
between quantum-mechanical things and conscious feelings guide the an-
swers to these questions?
In this section, we study the rise of metageometric time—itself not a
coordinate or parameter of any kind—purely from metageometric quantum-
mechanical things. Metageometric time, in turn, can lead to the rise of
coordinate time intervals δt and coordinate time t appearing in the equations
of motion of classical physics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics, thus
revealing its metageometric origin.
Besides metageometric time, we have also found another intrinsically
quantum-mechanical concept of time but now at the geometric level. This
time is liked to the preparation of quantum-mechanical systems and called
preparation time. We introduce it separately in Appendix B because it has
no direct application in this thesis but may nonetheless prove useful for
future research.
for each measurable value bi, and its length is given by
‖Bˆ‖ =
sX
i
b2i =
q
Tr(Bˆ2). (12.68)
We now notice how the trace plays the role of an inner product in order to produce the size
of Bˆ. We also learn that the geometric traces of the previous section are generalizations
(because they do not necessarily produce a non-negative or even real number) of the
norm of matrix operators. Cases (3.) and (5.), however, can be reinterpreted as squared
operator norms if rewritten as Tr[P(a)†P(a)] and Tr{[P(b)P(a)]†P(b)P(a)}.
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12.6.1 Metageometric time
We are interested in a description of time that is connected to physics
through quantum mechanics but that, at the same time, captures so far
disregarded aspects of conscious experience—most notably, the permanent
present. Quantum-mechanical things were introduced with this goal in
mind. They are global and belong outside conventional time and space;
their product pictures succession (yet not conventional temporal evolution)
and their sum pictures discrimination, both in analogy with the succession
and discrimination of conscious feelings forming the basis of psychological
time as an experience in a permanent now.
Quantum-mechanical things have the potential for the new description
of time we seek, but not simply as such. Instead of a premeasurement or a
transition thing alone, we would like a simple construction out of them that
evokes some properties of the time of conscious experience somewhat more
closely. For example, we would like, first and foremost, a metageometric
time that does not evolve in the conventional sense of physics, that deter-
mines no past or future nor, therefore, a present in the customary sense of
a time instant. We would also like a metageometric time in which the event
of no (quantum-mechanical) change translates into an empty, or better, in-
effectual “element of time,” in analogy with the lack of feeling of time when
consciousness is insensitive to change (e.g. during a dreamless sleep). In ad-
dition, metageometric time should also allow for a succession of its elements
to be reversed and thus recover its beginning, in analogy with the exact
repetition of a conscious feeling. And finally, a metageometric time whose
building blocks succeed each other smoothly, in analogy with the continuity
of conscious experience.
We arrive at a metageometric concept of time having all these properties
by searching for an arrangement of quantum-mechanical things such that
(i) only a pure transition be involved and thus leave no place for any filtering
action (cf. preparation time), and such that (ii) each and every ai-system
associated with an observable A be transformed into a bi-system associated
with another observable B in a one-to-one correspondence.
The transition thing P(bi|ai) is almost what we want. It satisfies the first
requirement because, as we saw earlier on, it involves only a pure transition
and does not contain any filtering action. However, the following geometric
test shows that the said one-to-one correspondence does not hold. In effect,
(|bi〉〈ai|)|aj〉 = δij |bi〉 6= |bj〉, (12.70)
which means that any aj-system where j 6= i is left without a counterpart
into which to undergo a transition. Now a small modification gives us what
we seek, as the sum
∑
i P(bi|ai) of transition things satisfies both the said
requirements. It does not contain any filtering action, and it attaches a coun-
terpart to each and every ai-system, as guaranteed by the same geometric
test as before: (∑
i
|bi〉〈ai|
)
|aj〉 =
∑
i
δij |bi〉 = |bj〉. (12.71)
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a1, a2, a3, . . .
B
b1, b2, b3, . . .
Figure 12.22: Schematic representation of a metageometric time element∑
i P(bi|ai).
We call
∑
i P(bi|ai) a metageometric time element35 (Figure 12.22).
We can justify this provocative name from two different perspectives.
From a psychological point of view, we can do so through the consciousness-
related properties it displays, shown immediately below. From a physical
point of view, we can retrospectively justify
∑
i P(bi|ai) as metageometric
time by noticing that it can explain the origin of time as an absolute para-
metric (coordinate) interval δt as used in physics. However, we would still
like to justify it as an expression of quantum-mechanical time by linking
it to the relativistic separation ds, directly connected with clock time as a
genuinely measurable magnitude (absolute time intervals δt are not). Find-
ing the link between clock time ds and metageometric time
∑
i P(bi|ai) is
nevertheless a task demanding enough to fall outside the scope of this thesis;
we must, for that reason, leave it for the future, and rest content with giving
an outlook on how to approach this problem at the end of the next and last
chapter.
A metageometric time element satisfies four essential properties:
1. Two successive metageometric time elements lead to one metageomet-
ric time element (Figure 12.23):
∑
j
P(bj |cj)
∑
i
P(ci|ai) =
∑
ij
〈cj |ci〉P(bj |ai) =
∑
i
P(bi|ai).
(12.72)
This says that, in the evolution of metageometric time, the succession
of two time elements is one time element. In other words, from the
perspective of coordinate time, metageometric time does not evolve—
it happens, so to speak, always and never. (Cf. permanent present of
conscious experience.)
35Here “metageometric time element” is favoured over “metageometric time instant”
because the latter refers to an infinitesimal interval of time, whereas the former is free
from any geometric connotations. A metageometric time element is a metageometric
concept, to which it is meaningless to apply the geometric concepts of point or length (be
it null, infinitesimal, or finite).
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a1, a2, a3, . . .
C
c1, c2, c3, . . . c1, c2, c3, . . .
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b1, b2, b3, . . .
a1, a2, a3, . . .
B
b1, b2, b3, . . .
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Figure 12.23: Schematic representation of a physically possible succession∑
i P(bj |cj)
∑
i P(ci|ai) of two metageometric time elements resulting in one time
element
∑
i P(bi|ai).
2. The succession of three metageometric time elements is associative:
∑
k
P(bk|dk)
∑
j
P(dj |cj)
∑
i
P(ci|ai)
 =
∑
k
P(bk|dk)
∑
j
P(dj |cj)
∑
i
P(ci|ai) =
∑
i
P(bi|ai). (12.73)
3. There exists a metageometric time element I =
∑
i P(xi|xi), with
xi associated with any suitable observable, which does not change any
preceding or succeeding metageometric time element:∑
j
P(bj |bj)
∑
i
P(bi|ai) =
∑
i
P(bi|ai) =
∑
i
P(bi|ai)
∑
j
P(aj |aj).
(12.74)
(Cf. insensitivity of consciousness to change.)
4. Any metageometric time element can be turned backwards, cancelled,
or undone with another preceding or succeeding metageometric time
element:∑
j
P(bj |aj)
∑
i
P(ai|bi) = I =
∑
i
P(ai|bi)
∑
j
P(bj |aj). (12.75)
(Cf. repetition of conscious feeling or experience.)
We can immediately see that the above four properties constitute the
four axioms that define a group G with the product as the group operation.
The four group axioms are:
1. Closure: if A,B belong to G, AB belongs to G;
2. Associativity: if A,B,C belong to G, A(BC) = (AB)C;
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B
b1, b2, b3, . . .
≀
a1, a2, a3, . . .
C
c1, c2, c3, . . .
Figure 12.24: Schematic representation of a physically impossible succession∑
i P(ci|ai)
∑
j P(bj|cj) of two metageometric time elements.
3. Existence of an identity: if A belongs to G, there exists I such that
AI = A = IA;
4. Existence of an inverse: if A belongs to G, there exists A−1 such that
AA−1 = I = A−1A.
However, we notice that there exists one significant difference between this
traditional group structure and that of the metageometric time elements
when it comes to the group operation. On the one hand, the elements of
the traditional group are, so to speak, structureless, while, on the other,
the group of metageometric time elements possesses internal constitution: a
metageometric time element consists of a sum of transitions P(bi|ai) from
certain ai-systems to certain bi-systems (cf. element A). As a result, the
group operation consisting of the product of successive time elements is not
free but instead physically restricted : from a physical standpoint, it is only
possible to have products in which the outgoing system in the factor on
the right is associated with the same observable as the incoming system in
the factor on the left. We call the group of metageometric time elements a
physically restricted group.36
In particular, as a consequence of its inner structure, the question of
whether the physically restricted group of metageometric time elements is
Abelian or non-Abelian is now not a reasonable question to ask. In general,
whenever a succession of two elements is physically possible, e.g.∑
j
P(bj |cj)
∑
i
P(ci|ai), (12.76)
the succession determined by the inverse order,∑
i
P(ci|ai)
∑
j
P(bj |cj), (12.77)
does not make physical sense as a metageometric time element, as shown in
Figure 12.24. (Cf. continuity of conscious experience.)
36In a conventional group, the identity is unique. Assuming I1 and I2 are two different
identities, we find I1I2 = I1 and I1I2 = I2, and therefore I1 = I2, which contradicts the
hypothesis. In this respect, the existence of myriads of different identities in the group
of metageometric time elements does not lead to any inconsistencies because the physical
restriction on what is a possible product only allows the same identity to be multiplied
by itself.
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Far from finding these incongruities with the traditional concept of group
distressing, we believe that the distinctiveness displayed by the group of
metageometric time elements makes them even more appealing from a physi-
cal point of view. Here we witness yet another example of physics giving rise,
for its own independent reasons, to a new bit of mathematics—mathematics
does not rule physics but is only its compliant tool.
Next we pursue the geometric interpretation of metageometric time,
leading to an understanding of time intervals δt and, in general, time t. The
key to this pursuit will lie in the physical restriction imposed on the group
structure of the metageometric time elements and in the circumstances of
its disappearance.
12.6.2 The rise of coordinate time
Coordinate time intervals δt and coordinate time t can be understood as a
particular outgrowth of metageometric time. To achieve this, we start by
finding the geometric counterpart of a metageometric time element, namely,∑
i
P(bi|ai) g=
∑
i
|bi〉〈ai| =: Tˆba. (12.78)
We call operator Tˆba the time-element operator. The well-known claim that
in quantum mechanics there exists no universal time operator37 is therefore
true for infinitesimal intervals, or instants, δt of coordinate time, but not
for time elements. Operator Tˆba, however, is not Hermitian in any case. In
fact, we find
Tˆ †ba =
∑
i
(|bi〉〈ai|)† =
∑
i
|ai〉〈bi| = Tˆab. (12.79)
By interpreting geometrically all earlier results applying to metageomet-
ric time, we find that what holds for metageometric time elements also holds
for geometric time-element operators. The geometric evolution of time ele-
ments is given by the product TˆbcTˆca. Based on this, we can now see that
the properties (1.)–(4.) above for metageometric time elements hold for
time-element operators:
1. Closure: TˆbcTˆca = Tˆba;
2. Associativity: Tˆbd(TˆdcTˆca) = (TˆbdTˆdc)Tˆca;
3. Existence of an identity Tˆxx: TˆbbTˆba = Tˆba = TˆbaTˆaa;
37The widespread belief that the time coordinate constitutes a special kind of problem
in quantum mechanics, after Pauli’s famous argument, has been uprooted, for example, by
Hilgevoord (2002). He accounts for this false impression as a confusion between spacetime
coordinates x, t and the dynamic variables qˆ, θˆ of systems: whereas in quantum mechanics
coordinate time t is a parameter exactly as in Newtonian mechanics—and should there-
fore not be attempted to turn into an operator—particular systems (clocks) may admit
particular dynamic time variables θˆ, in analogy with position qˆ. The properties of θˆ, or
whether it exists at all, are not universal but dependent on the system of which θˆ is a
variable.
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4. Existence of an inverse: TˆabTˆba = 1ˆ = TˆbaTˆab.
Therefore, time-element operators also form a physically restricted group.
Moreover, from property (4.) and Eq. (12.79) follows the new result that
time-element operators Tˆba are unitary :
Tˆ †baTˆba = 1ˆ = TˆbaTˆ
†
ba. (12.80)
Knowing, as we do, that the physical meaning of Hermitian conjugation is to
reverse the direction of a transition, this result is telling us something that
is perfectly reasonable, namely, that to undo a time element (Tˆ−1ba ) is to
reverse the transitions it involves (Tˆ †ba). Here, then, are the seeds of unitary
time evolution in coordinate time t in quantum mechanics.
How should we proceed to recover coordinate time from metageomet-
ric time? The first thing to note is that this recovery, leading to all the
usual equations of quantum mechanics, is not a necessary but a possible
consequence. This is enough and all that we require.
Coordinate time can be recovered if the physically restricted group of
unitary time-element operators Tˆba is replaced by a new group of likewise
unitary operators Uˆ , in which the discrete inner structure (ba) of the time el-
ements is lost and replaced by some set of continuous coordinate parameters
x1, x2, x3, . . . on which Uˆ depends, Uˆ(x1, x2, x3, . . .). How many coordinate
parameters should we choose, and on what physical grounds? Nothing pre-
vents us from choosing, for example, x1, x2, and x3 and associating them
with the three spatial coordinates. But on what grounds would we do this?
Why choose three coordinate parameters and not four, five, or just one?
The only physical idea behind the operators Uˆ left to guide us is that
they originate from the operators Tˆba, which are connected with quantum-
mechanical transitions. We proposed that these do not belong in spacetime,
but that at preparation they project themselves onto spacetime as a linear
sequence of events in analogy with the projection of the stream of conscious-
ness. The heuristic value of this psychophysical parallelism is now as follows.
As a geometric spatiotemporal concept (as we now examine), a transition
takes place instantaneously in an infinitesimal instant of (unidimensional)
time. This suggests that we should choose Uˆ to depend only on one coordi-
nate parameter, call it an infinitesimal (cf. instantaneity) coordinate interval
δt, and associate it with the usual physical concept of time instant.
We call the unitary continuous one-parameter operators Uˆ(δt) time-
instant operators, also known as time-evolution operators. The replacement
leading from time-element operators to time-instant operators, schematized
in Figure 12.25, is seemingly small, but in fact it is dramatic. Seemingly
small because a time instant (as small as we wish yet non-null) has substi-
tuted an extensionless time element; in fact dramatic because in question
is not the difference between an infinitesimal interval and an extensionless
point, but between the attribute of temporal extension (be it null, infinites-
imal, or finite) and the meaninglessness of the application of this attribute
to time elements. In this dramatic passage, the inner structure of the time
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Tˆba Uˆ(δt)
time element time instant
Figure 12.25: Replacement leading to the obtention of evolution in coordinate
time from time-element operators, in turn originating from metageometric time
elements.
elements is lost. As a result, the operators Uˆ(δti) become free of physical
restrictions concerning multiplication and form now an unrestricted group.
To recover from this basis the equations of motion of non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, we start by noting that the closure property of the
unrestricted group of unitary operators Uˆ(δti) demands that
Uˆ(δt1)Uˆ(δt2) = Uˆ(δt1 + δt2). (12.81)
Furthermore, assuming evolution in coordinate time to be continuous, we
have
Uˆ(δt) = 1ˆ + δUˆ(δt). (12.82)
What is now the form of δUˆ(δt)? Because Uˆ is unitary, then
1ˆ = Uˆ †Uˆ = (1ˆ + δUˆ †)(1ˆ + δUˆ) = 1ˆ + δUˆ † + δUˆ +O[(δUˆ)2], (12.83)
which implies
δUˆ † = −δUˆ. (12.84)
Therefore, δUˆ is anti-Hermitian and we can write δUˆ = −iδVˆ , where δVˆ is
Hermitian. We obtain
Uˆ(δt) = 1ˆ− iδVˆ (δt). (12.85)
The fact that the group property (12.81) holds for time-evolution oper-
ators Uˆ(δt), together with (12.82), now requires that
δVˆ (δt1) + δVˆ (δt2) = δVˆ (δt1 + δt2). (12.86)
This means that it is possible for us to take δVˆ (δt) to be of the form δtωˆ,
where ωˆ is Hermitian, does not depend on δt anymore, and is not itself an
infinitesimal, although it can depend on t. We obtain
Uˆ(δt) = 1ˆ− iδtωˆ. (12.87)
In view that our context is purely quantum-mechanical, we can justifiably38
use dimensional analysis to find that [ωˆ] = [time]−1 = [energy][~]−1, so that
we can take ω = Hˆ/~, where the Hamiltonian operator Hˆ works as the
generator of time translations. Finally, we obtain
Uˆ(δt) = 1ˆ− i
~
δtHˆ, (12.88)
38What cannot be justified without previous knowledge of quantum theory is the choice
of ~ over h.
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where Hˆ is Hermitian and can depend on t.
All the equations of motion of quantummechanics follow from Eq. (12.88).
Because
Uˆ(t+ δt)− Uˆ(t) = [Uˆ(δt) − 1ˆ]Uˆ(t) = − i
~
δtHˆUˆ(t), (12.89)
we get
Uˆ(t+ δt)− Uˆ(t)
δt
=:
dUˆ(t)
dt
= − i
~
HˆUˆ(t), (12.90)
which is Schro¨dinger’s equation of motion for the time evolution operator:
i~
dUˆ(t)
dt
= HˆUˆ(t). (12.91)
Notice that the linearity of this differential equation need not be assumed,
but follows directly from the continuous group structure and unitarity of
the evolution operators Uˆ(δti).
Schro¨dinger’s equation for a geometric state vector results as follows.
Since |a; t+ δt〉 = Uˆ(δt)|a; t〉, we have
|a; t+ δt〉 − |a; t〉 = [Uˆ(δt) − 1ˆ]|a; t〉 = − i
~
δtHˆ|a; t〉. (12.92)
Dividing on both sides by the infinitesimal δt, we find Schro¨dinger’s equation
of motion for a state vector, namely,
i~
d|a; t〉
dt
= Hˆ|a; t〉. (12.93)
Finally, we obtain Heisengberg’s equation of motion for a time-indepen-
dent operator Aˆ (in the Schro¨dinger picture). Because we can use Uˆ(t) to
make a ket evolve in coordinate time, and therefore Uˆ †(t) to make a bra
evolve in coordinate time, we have
〈b; t|AˆS |b; t〉 = 〈b; 0|Uˆ †(t)AˆSUˆ(t)|b; 0〉, (12.94)
where we identify
Uˆ †(t)AˆSUˆ(t) =: AˆH(t) (12.95)
with the Heisenberg operator AˆH(t), where AˆS = AˆH(0). Using Eq. (12.91)
to differentiate Eq. (12.95), we find Heisenberg’s equation of motion for
AˆH(t):
i~
dAˆH(t)
dt
= −[Hˆ, AˆH(t)]. (12.96)
Thus, all major traditional equations of motion in coordinate time can be
explained on the basis of metageometric time elements which, in turn, rest
solely on metageometric things.
Several layers of the veil obscuring the physical origin and meaning of
quantum physics have now been lifted from in front our eyes. We can now
see more clearly into the heart of quantum physics—and as we stare the old
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quantum mysteries in the eye with the fresh vision metageometry affords
us, we see complexity and philosophical confusion turn to simplicity and
physical understanding.
For a conceptual appraisal of the metageometric picture of time pre-
sented here, we turn to the next and final chapter.
Chapter 13
Time, the last taboo
El tiempo es la sustancia de que estoy hecho. El tiempo
es un r´ıo que me arrebata, pero yo soy el r´ıo; es un tigre
que me destroza, pero yo soy el tigre; es un fuego que me
consume, pero yo soy el fuego.1
Jorge Luis Borges, Nueva refutacio´n del tiempo
13.1 The enigma of time
The metageometric idea of time as the succession of complexes of quantum-
mechanical things outside conventional spacetime that we arrived at in the
previous chapter is inspired in an essential aspect of raw conscious experi-
ence. At the same time, however, it runs counter to both our belief of what
time is, could be, or should be, as well as what physics tells us that time is.
We came to a metageometric quantum-mechanical time that does not
flow, that “happens always and never”—the physical correspondent of the
permanent present of human experience. And yet, we cannot let go of
the feeling that also the past, which we remember, and the future, which
we anticipate, are as real and basic as the present. This belief is partly
innate, stemming from the fact that we have memory and the ability to
plan and anticipate, and partly imbibed, stemming from the complementary
fact that we are educated (perhaps against experience) to regard time as an
equipartition past-present-future. Moreover, as we look to the higher court
of physics for an answer, we only get from it an indifferent reply: time is only
a parameter, t, and all three, past, present, and future, are mere illusions.
Like Dennett said, the mind is not an epistemic engine. This is clearly
true. What is not so clear is what practical value to attach to this truth.
Shall we let it guide us negatively, by distrusting all our intuitions, or shall
1“Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river that grabs me, but I am the
river; a tiger that tears me apart, but I am the tiger; a fire that consumes me, but I am
the fire.” (Jorge Luis Borges, A new refutation of time)
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we let it guide us positively, by distrusting only some of our intuitions but
not all of them?
The first alternative is unfeasible. To doubt the reality of everything in
our conscious experience and dismiss it all,2 like a Descartes reborn, can lead
us nowhere useful. On what basis would we then build and test scientific
theories? The second is a more reasonable and measured option. It tells us
that the mind is not built to grasp the ontological essence of the world, but
that neither must it be constantly misleading us for that reason.
Now, what conscious intuitions should we take seriously as we attempt
to picture the world, and which should we cast aside? Our perceptions of
colour and of hot and cold, for example, belong to the latter group; these
are primitive and simple human notions evolved to keep us alive, but they
are complicated constructions viewed in terms of basic physical constituents:
combinations of wavelength, surface reflectivity, lighting conditions, etc. in
the former case; combinations of temperature, conductivity, specific heat,
heat flow, etc. in the latter.3
On the other hand, our perceptions of shape, of depth (close and far),
and of light and heavy match more closely, under normal circumstances,
the scientific concepts of geometric object, distance, and weight inspired in
them. That is, science has not yet seen any need to relegate these human
feelings to secondary roles—as it has done with red, hot, and the sound of
violins. What we perceive as straight, the straight-edges of physics verify
(save for specially framed optical illusions); what we perceive as close, the
measuring rods of physics tell us is a short distance away; what we perceive
as heavy, the scales of physics tell us possesses considerable weight. In these
cases, the mind does a good job as an epistemic engine.
What about time? Is it a conscious experience that we should dismiss in
the formulation of a physical theory because it is ostensibly without a simple
counterpart in the world, or is it an intuition of something basic enough to
be physically relevant and useful? With this we come back full circle to the
early question of the Preface: does time have an own structure, or it is only
a human sensation like the feelings “happy,” “red,” and “hot”?
We do not know. But at least this much can be said for psychological
time. As mentioned in Chapter 10, this form of experience is so ingrained in
human thought that, since its beginnings, physics has described the changing
world guided by it. The feeling of serial change is pictured—albeit poorly—
by a background mathematical parameter t along which we imagine things
to flow; a parameter in terms of which we write equations of things in
change, but for which physics has no equation describing its own properties
and behaviour. We see, then, that in a sense physics takes psychological
time in earnest but, unable to picture it in any depth, remains content with
a minimalistic account of it as “t.” As a result of this mixture of close
acquaintanceship and impotence for further elucidation, rare is the theory
2Excepting, that is, that “there is a thought.” Not much help in that, though.
3See (Dennett, 1991, pp. 375–383) for colour and (Foss, 2000, pp. 80–82) for hot and
cold.
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in which the innocent-looking symbol “t” does not appear, but just as rare
is encounter with a questioner who demands, “What does ‘t’ stand for?”
We are left to gather its meaning from our psychological experience and,
physics being unable to say more, we are kindly asked to refrain from asking
awkward questions.
Besides this scientific denial of any substance to any aspect of time as
psychologically experienced, there exists another sense in which even our
common-sense belief of what time is differs from our feeling of it. Perhaps as
a result of the physical worldview, we are educated to regard time as an equal
division into past, present, and future, but the conscious feeling of time is
not precisely along these lines. We certainly remember the past, we certainly
anticipate the future, but does not the present—this conspicuous “now” in
which we exist—at any rate feel infinitely more especial and distinct than
the past we remember (in the present) and the future we anticipate (in the
present)? Why is the “now” a special time? Is this a sign of something
physically essential or just a psychological accident?
Natural science is silent on these mysteries—on the enigma of time. Is
that because physics does not need to explain time? Because, perhaps, time
is only a human illusion without any bearing on the foundations of physics?
Baffled by the elusive nature of this psychological concept, some have opted
to outright deny the relevance of time to elemental physics, telling us that
“In quantum gravity, [they] see no reason to expect a fundamental notion of
time to play any role” despite the fact that “the nostalgia for time is hard
to resist;” they tell us that “At the fundamental level, we should, simply,
forget time” (Rovelli, 2000, p. 114).4 If all there is to time is nostalgia but no
physics, then physics should at least be capable of telling us that the “now,”
the past, and the future are such and such complicated constructions of such
and such elemental entities, like it tells us that “hot” is a combination of
temperature, conductivity, specific heat, and heat flow. One way or another,
the enigma of time remains.
Other physicists, however, far from dismissing time so lightly, have taken
human psychological experience in earnest as a path towards better physics.
Buccheri, Jaroszkiewicz, Saniga, and others have vowed for an endophysical
perspective—i.e. taking into account human experience—on what has so
far been an exophysics—i.e. physics built solely upon an “objective reality”
outside and independent of human experience (Buccheri & Buccheri, 2005).
They, too, have deemed the dichotomy between psychological and physical
time not a failure of psychology but of physics, and have expected that, if
time as an experiential product is not an illusion, then physics should be
able to account for it (Buccheri & Saniga, 2003, p. 3, online ref.).
In particular, and indirectly making a connection with the idea of meta-
geometry, Buccheri and Saniga (2003) criticized normal physics for striving
exclusively towards a quantitative account of nature, and deemed it “nec-
essary to go beyond quantifying” (p. 4) to grasp the qualitative aspects of
4See also (Rovelli, 2004, p. 84) and (Rovelli, 2006, p. 4).
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psychological time.5 This point had been previously brought up by Shallis
(1982, pp. 153–154), who wrote that
the fact that the experience of time is not quantifiable puts it into
an arena of human perceptions that are at once richer and more
meaningful than those things that are merely quantifiable. . . The
lack of quantification of temporal experiences is not something
that should stand them in low stead, to be dismissed as nothing
more than fleeting perceptions or as merely anecdotal; rather
that lack should be seen as their strength. It is because the
experience of time is not quantifiable and not subject to numer-
ical comparison that makes it something of quality, something
containing the essence of being . . . (italics added)6
To get an edge on this problem and break free from the restricted con-
ception of time only as a background parameter, we took the permanent-
now aspect of psychological experience in earnest. Metageometric quantum-
mechanical time is a step in this direction. Coming to grips with a new view
of time, however, is a tall order, because the current view of time is deeply
ingrained in the scientific and common-sense views of the world. A look at
an abnormal mind, however, may help us see time in this new light.7
Tulving (1989) reports on the case of a man called K.C., who, upon suf-
fering brain damage in a motorcycle accident, became amnesiac in a rather
unique way: K.C. knows the past but does not remember it. What does this
mean? K.C. has impersonal knowledge about himself and the world, but he
does not remember any episode from his past. K.C. can drive a car and
play chess, but has no memory of ever driving a car or playing chess with
anyone. What is more, K.C. not only lacks conception of the past but also
of the future; as far as he is concerned, there is only the present. Tulving
writes:
He cannot conjure up images about his future in his mind’s eye
any more than he can do so about his past. Without the ability
to remember what he has done or to contemplate what the future
might bring, K.C. is destined to spend the remainder of his life
in a permanent present. (Tulving, 1989, p. 364)
This sounds tragic, but is it not there—in the permanent present—where in
a less dramatic sense we all spend our lives after all?
5Echoing J. Sanfey, Buccheri (2002, pp. 2–3, online ref.) expressed that the physical
problem of psychological time may even be related to a so far elusive understanding of
consciousness. Extending this idea, closing the 2002 NATO Workshop, Jaroszkiewicz
pondered the future of physics in historical perspective with these thought-provoking
words: “If the eighteenth century may be called the century of the classical particle, the
nineteenth century the century of the classical field, the twentieth century the century of
the quantum, then the twenty-first century may turn out to be the century of the mind”
(http://www.pa.itd.cnr.it/buccheri).
6Quoted from (Buccheri & Saniga, 2003, pp. 5–6).
7For a review of anomalous psychological experiences concerning time (and space),
though not necessarily arising from brain damage, see (Saniga, 2005).
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In the context of the physical enigma of time, K.C.’s case raises an
intriguing question: what would physics look like if normal human beings
knew the past but did not remember it and neither had conception of the
future? In principle, since we would know the past as a set of recorded
facts, physics could continue to work in the same local and causal way as we
know it. But would we, in practice, without the suggestive encouragement
of our episodic memory and our anticipation of the future, have come to
develop the same theories? Would then any roles be attributed to locality
and causality? Would “t” be a part of physics? Would there be differential
equations for things changing in time? If we were all like K.C., how would
we have managed? One can only wonder.
All this is not to say that the past and future of common sense are
nothing but insubstantial delusions. The purpose of this probing is rather
to find a clue, an edge we can grab onto, for a deeper understanding of time.
The question we intend, the seed of doubt we mean to plant, is this: is the
present more basic than the past and future from a physical point of view?
And is this hypothetical physical fact actually being mirrored by aspects
of the way our brains capture the world? Pondering K.C.’s case, Tulving
hazards a promising interpretation in this regard. He writes: “Remembering
one’s past is a different and perhaps more advanced achievement of the
brain than simply knowing about it” (p. 361, italics added). If this were so,
the psychological present would be more elemental than the psychological
past and future. And if the mind has any role in informing physics in this
connection, then perhaps a kind of permanent present is what physical time
is made of.
13.2 The taboo of time
As we presented the enigma of time, we remarked that a conception of time
other than as a featureless parameter runs counter to physical custom, and
that a conception of time other than as an equipartition past-present-future
runs counter to our partly innate, partly imbibed belief of what time is. In
the former case, we violate scientific custom; in the latter, we provoke the
emotional aversion of common sense.
We remarked that the question, “What is time?” is not posed in physics,
as if the tools of science were helpless to answer it; we behave as if only
speculative philosophers had anything (useless) to say about it. To ask
the question of a professional physicist, it is most likely to be met with
annoyance. “Well, time is time, of course!” replies the scholar, “a parameter
along which things flow. What else could it be?”
An annoyed reaction to the probing question, “What is time?” is a sign
that we have trodden upon a taboo. Of the varying definitions of taboo, in
this context a taboo is best described by the first reference in the footnote
below as “a ban or an inhibition resulting from social custom or emotional
aversion.”8
8Taboo, from Tongan adjective tabu: under prohibition. The English word first ap-
246 Time, the last taboo
Hardin (1973, pp. xi–xiii), a self-professed stalker of taboos, noted that,
while we like to believe that only primitive cultures have taboos, we too
in sophisticated societies have our own taboos. He explains that taboos on
objects and actions, although present, do not offer any intellectual challenges
because, although we observe them, we can see right through them—they
are rules of good taste, not sacred cultural elements. Word- and thought-
taboos, however, are quite a different matter.
A word-taboo makes reference to a subject that is outside the range of
topics we are ready or willing to discuss. Two excellent, complementary
examples of word-taboos in current society are “overpopulation” and “the
desirability of economical growth.” These are tabooed topics whose mere
mention is off-bounds. They lie at the root of mankind’s mounting ecological
woes (e.g. poverty; land, air, water, and sound pollution; traffic congestion;
deforestation; nuclear waste; species extinction; global warming; etc.), but
nowhere besides in ignored publications are these words dared to be uttered.
Instead, we dodge taboo by believing that technology will solve our ecologi-
cal problems too, but in a finite world with unrestrained population growth,
this hope can only be illusive.9
From a taboo on expression to a taboo on thought, i.e. from word- to
thought-taboo, it is only a small step. The less we hear a word or question
uttered, the less capable we become to think about the problem, falling
victim of a thought-taboo: “A word-taboo held inviolate for a long time
becomes a taboo on thinking itself (for how can we think of things we hear
no words for?)” (p. xi).
In physics, the question about the nature of time, in the sense that
it could be anything else than an unexplainable background parameter, is
taboo. But, we believe, the nature of this thought-taboo on time is special
and unlike any other we may be victims of. As the provocative title of this
chapter declares, time is the last taboo we must deal with—last because of
being rooted deepest, to different degrees, in both scientific and common-
sense thought and language; last because the received view of time is knit
into the fabric of science and society, and to change it is to change both the
scientific and common-sense views of the world.10
peared in Captain James Cook’s logbook “A voyage to the Pacific ocean” from 1777.
During his stay in the Polynesian island of Tonga, he wrote that the word “has a very
comprehensive meaning; but, in general, signifies that a thing is forbidden. . .When any
thing is forbidden to be eat, or made use of, they say, that it is taboo.” (The Free Dictio-
nary, http://www.tfd.com) In this sense, the Western word originates from Tongan tabu,
but similar words also exist in other Pacific languages: “[L]inguists in the Pacific have
reconstructed an irreducible Proto-Polynesian *tapu, from Proto-Oceanic *tabu ‘sacred,
forbidden’ (cf. Hawaiian kapu ‘taboo, prohibition, sacred, holy, consecrated;’ Tahitian
tapu ‘restriction, sacred;’ Maori tapu ‘be under ritual restriction, prohibited’). The noun
and verb are English innovations first recorded in Cook’s book.” (Online Etymology
Dictionary, http://www.etymonline.com)
9See (Hardin, 1968, 1972).
10Time as last taboo in the sense of one coming at the end of a series of recognizable
taboos we may be in need of confronting, but not, however, in any way implying that
with its overthrow “the series [of taboos] is completed or stopped” (Cf. “last” in Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com). What new taboos the scientific and
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How shall one proceed to being to break the spell of taboo? Not without
a hint of humour, Hardin suggests as follows:
Violating a word-taboo is bad taste, but he who is an eccentric—
i.e., one who is out of the center of things—may ultimately hear a
call to break the taboo lest his silence permit the final metamor-
phosis of word-taboo into thought-taboo—of repressed state into
non-existence. When the vocation of the eccentric reaches this
painfully insistent point, he shouts the word from the rooftops.
This is a dangerous moment; the time must be chosen carefully.
(Hardin, 1973, pp. xi–xii)
We do not know how well we may have chosen the moment and place to
put forth this unorthodox view of what time could be—the serial chaining
of metageometric quantum-mechanical things outside spacetime mirrored in
the permanent now of human consciousness. But while we do not know how
well we may have observed this rule, in the course of this work we have with
certainty infringed upon another tactics of Hardin’s never to “be forgotten
by the ambitious stalker of taboos: Never tackle more than one taboo at a
time” (p. 30). For, together with the assumed nature of time, we have also
questioned the minor taboo on the relevance of the Planck scale to quantum
gravity and, more significantly, the taboo on the nature and relevance in
physical science of the sacred discipline of geometry. We believe that at
least the thought-taboo on time simply had to be tackled together with
the one on geometry—but then again, perhaps we have been too ambitious
stalkers of the taboos of physics.
The deeply felt human dichotomy between the life-as-irretrievable-flow
and permanent-present aspects of conscious experience has been captured
masterfully and with rare insight by the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis
Borges. He concludes his essay “A new refutation of time” in an attempt to
come to terms with this seeming contradiction, thus:
Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river that grabs
me, but I am the river; a tiger that tears me apart, but I am the
tiger; a fire that consumes me, but I am the fire. (Borges, 1976,
p. 187)
Which of the two feelings shall we hang on to?
13.3 Overview and outlook
Physics misrepresents time and fails to picture it because it views it as a
property superimposed on the existence of things—for physics, things exist
in time. But time is not a property of the existence of things; it is instead
an experiential product related to consciousness. This is to say that there
common-sense worldviews of the more distant future may have in store for us, there is no
way of telling now.
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is no actual “observation of time” or “perception of time,” but only the
observation or perception of phenomena or events. How does time enter
the picture, then? These events—psychologically, complexes of elementary
feelings—are chained serially into the stream of consciousness. It is this flow
of events in the permanent present that we call time.
To give a physical explanation of time, we need to know what plays the
part of these three key concepts of things, events, and the flow of events just
mentioned in general relativity and in quantum mechanics, as well as find
the way the theoretical pictures from both sides are interconnected.
In general relativity, the role of things is so far vacant, and we cannot
say whether the players of this part should be first recognized in order to
progress, or whether this is inessential. Neither can we say whether these
missing general-relativistic things are to be metageometric, nor what a meta-
geometric formulation of general relativity may look like.
At any rate, we intuitively seek for relativity theory a foundation similar
to the metageometric one we gave to quantum theory. In the latter, we
explained the appearance of state vectors, |a〉 and |b〉, and the full geometric
background traditionally built upon them out of the decomposition of the
physically more essential probability measurement values |〈b|a〉|2; and the
rise of these values were, in turn, explained in terms of physically yet more
elemental metageometric things, P(a) and P(b), associated with physical
activities of premeasurements. Likewise, in relativity theory, we explained
the appearance of the metric field gαβ(x), differential arrow vectors dx
α, and
the full geometric background built upon them out of the decomposition of
the physically more essential clock measurement ds =
√−gαβ(x)dxαdxβ.
But from what metageometric, physically yet more elemental foundation do
these clock-measurement values arise?
The role of events, on the other hand, is crystal-clear: it is taken up by
spacetime events, understood not as spacetime points but as phenomena.
Better still, to bring forth the connection with time, events can be pictured
by clock readings sA at the event A in question. Finally, the flow of events
also finds a natural characterization in terms of the clock separation ∆s =
sB − sA, correlating the pair of events A and B. Central to this idea of
classical event correlations ∆s is that the focus is placed on the shared
connection between events instead of on the events themselves.
In quantum mechanics, we identified things as metageometric things, for
example, P(b|a). The role of events is now naturally filled by the meta-
geometric time elements
∑
i P(bi|ai), which we can view as complexes of
metageometric things. How can we then give a still missing characteriza-
tion of the flow of these events? What shall be the metageometric tool of
thought that allows us to move forward on this flank? A tool well-suited
to the task of describing metageometric quantum-mechanical correlations
associated with time elements is category theory (Table 13.1).
The basic components of a category are objects and relations between
them. Denoting objects as Ω, Ω′, and a relation r between them as Ω
r−→ Ω′,
a category is determined as follows:
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Psychology Quantum mechanics General relativity
things feelings metageometric
things P(b|a)
?
events complexes
of feelings
metageometric
time elements∑
i P(bi|ai)
spacetime events A;
clock readings sA
flow of events stream of
conscious-
ness
category-theoretical
relations r between
groups of time
elements
correlations ∆s be-
tween events
Table 13.1: Comparison between the three key concepts of things, events, and the
flow of events for a physical description of time from the point of view of psychol-
ogy, quantum mechanics, and general relativity. The task remains to provide the
missing links between the three fields; in particular, to fathom a metageometric for-
mulation of general relativity and characterize metageometric quantum-mechanical
correlations with the help of category theory.
1. Closure: if Ω
r−→ Ω′ and Ω′ s−→ Ω′′ are relations, their composition
Ω
s◦r−→ Ω′′ is also a relation;
2. Associativity: if Ω
r−→ Ω′, Ω′ s−→ Ω′′, and Ω′′ t−→ Ω′′′ are relations,
Ω
s◦r−→ Ω′′ t−→ Ω′′′ = Ω r−→ Ω′ t◦s−→ Ω′′′;
3. Existence of an identity: if r is a relation, there exists relation i such
that Ω
r◦i−→ Ω′ = Ω r−→ Ω′ = Ω i◦r−→ Ω′;
4. Existence of an inverse: if r is a relation, there exists relation r∗ such
that Ω
r∗◦r−→ Ω = Ω i−→ Ω = Ω r◦r∗−→ Ω.11
These four properties look conspicuously familiar. They are precisely the
same ones satisfied by a group, but with a difference. Now the emphasis
has shifted from the objects to the relations between the objects. Indeed,
in a category, the inner structure of the objects is not a concern; on the
contrary, in a category it is the existence of relations that carries essen-
tial significance. What is more, a category—unlike its natural geometric
counterpart, a graph—is abstract enough to be naturally free of geometric
denotation: its objects are not points, nor are its relations extended arrows.
We mentioned in passing on pages 115 and 225 that a key to the prob-
lem of the geometric ether could be to look not into the inner structure or
physical reality of the spacetime points themselves but instead at the clas-
sical correlations given by the intervals ∆s between them; in non-geometric
language, to look at the classical temporal correlations ∆s between events
11The existence of an inverse relation is not an axiom of category theory.
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as phenomena for a physical description of the flow of events from the point
of view of general relativity.
Could now category theory, with its shift of focus from objects to re-
lations, be meaningfully used as a suitable setting for a similar study of
corelations between metageometric time elements
∑
i P(bi|ai)? Not really;
the connection need not be so straightforward. For a physical description of
metageometric flow from the point of view of quantum mechanics, instead
of simply taking isolated objects (cf. time elements) or sets of them, the
most natural choice of category is the category of groups: its objects are the
groups formed by metageometric time elements and its relations are group
homomorphisms.
So far, regarding a connection between “spacetime and the quantum,”
this is what we have achieved. After reducing the clock time of relativistic
physics to the absolute time of classical physics, we found a link between
the latter and metageometric quantum-mechanical time:
∆s = ∆t −→ Uˆ(δt) −→ Tˆba −→
∑
i
P(bi|ai).
The challenge that remains is to find the link between the full-fledged
general-relativistic clock time element and the quantum-mechanical meta-
geometric time element for a combined understanding of time.
We believe that it is through the concept of time that quantum me-
chanics and general relativity are connected—that it is the concept of time
that has the potential to give physical meaning to the presently disoriented
field of quantum gravity. But rather than ask what time is, we should ask
why time is .
Epilogue
If you pay a man a salary for doing research, he and you will
want to have something to point to at the end of the year
to show that the money has not been wasted. In promising
work of the highest class, however, results do no come in this
regular fashion, in fact years may pass without any tangible
result being obtained, and the position of the paid worker
would be very embarrassing and he would naturally take to
work on a lower, or at any rate a different plane where he
could be sure of getting year by year tangible results which
would justify his salary. The position is this: You want this
kind of research, but, if you pay a man to do it, it will drive
him to research of a different kind. The only thing to do is
to pay him for doing something else and give him enough
leisure to do research for the love of it.
Sir Joseph J. Thomson, The life of Sir J. J. Thomson
In this thesis, we brought to attention the tight relationship existing be-
tween geometric thought and the human mind. Resembling the remarkable
gift given King Midas by Dionysus, the mind has greatly profited from its
Midas touch of turning into geometry everything it beholds, as a world of
understanding opened up through it; but like King Midas’ gift, geometry
too turned from gift to curse by enslaving us. Our exclusive use of geometry
is to blame for the vicious perpetuation of several mysteries in our physi-
cal worldviews, as well as for restricting thought towards new and better
physics. As King Midas discovered upon his first meal, turning everything
we touch into gold—gold though it is—is not as desirable as we might have
thought. But where shall we find our river Pactolus to divest the mind of its
King-Midas touch, of this superlative gift turned like a curse upon ourselves?
Although far from finding river Pactolus, at least partly through meta-
geometric thinking and theorizing, and based on existing observations, we
managed to clarify the experimental, mathematical, and psychological foun-
dations of relativity and quantum theories. We founded the former geomet-
rically on clock-reading separations ds, and the latter metageometrically
on the experiment-based concepts of premeasurement and transition things.
Metageometric things were inspired in the physically unexplored aspect of
time as a consciousness-related product, which allowed us to develop the
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concept of metageometric time. We deemed it necessary to discover the
connection between quantum-mechanical metageometric time elements and
general-relativistic clock time elements ds (classical correlations) in order
to attain a combined understanding of time in the form of metageometric
correlations of quantum-mechanical origin.
In both cases, clarification was achieved through the identification of
suitable experiments and measurements that Man has access to and can af-
fect. Physics must, after all, be based not on mathematics or professional
philosophy but on physics—a triviality that seems to have been largely for-
gotten. Experiment is, in this light, both the beginning and the end of
physical theorizing. In the field of quantum gravity, however, the physical
referent—that which it is about—has not been identified. The present quest
of frontier physics, an orphan without a model in the world, is then a search
for its own identity. For this reason, the identification of observables remains
a central goal.
The kind of metageometric endeavours contemplated here, however, are
no easy task. Human geometric compulsions are significant, and our imag-
ination easily succumbs to its geometric overlords. Consider the following
analogy. Imagine, as part of the normal universe we know, an accidentally
static world populated by motionless inhabitants, who are nonetheless en-
dowed with a good understanding of length. What kind of toiling against
mental barriers might they experience, not naturally able to conceive of
motion (for no evolutionary advantage attached to this ability), in order to
discover and formulate the special-relativistic effect of length contraction?
Length contraction itself would be perfectly comprehensible and measurable
for these beings, but its discovery could be impossible and its cause would
remain an enigma without an understanding of motion. In our case, the
discovery of quantum-mechanical effects related to empty spacetime may be
impossible, and an understanding of their cause an enigma, without previous
comprehension of the metageometric things from which they arise.
In spite of the evident difficulties to forgo geometric thinking in human
theorizing, the situation is not hopeless. Geometric thinking is a deep-rooted
human habit, but a habit nonetheless; an extrinsic limitation forced on the
plastic structure of the human brain by evolutionary processes, but not an
intrinsic one impossible to overcome. A clue supporting this view is found in
human language—itself a more recent evolutionary product—which, as we
showed with this thesis, is capable of supporting geometric thought as well
as metageometric ruminations. Language, as it were, succeeds in aiding our
metageometric thought processes right where our picturing abilities leave us
high and dry. Whether, in the space of eons, the brain of Homo sapiens
could evolve to naturally support metageometric thought in full depends
on whether or not, as the needs imposed by the environments in which we
live gradually change, any evolutionary advantage would attach itself to this
unexplored manner of psychological portrayal. At such a time, “describing
the physical laws without reference to geometry” (like Einstein said) would
be much more effortless and natural than it has been for me to describe
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the metageometric thoughts poured in these pages with these words. It is
preeminently the possibility of human change—coupled with the recognition
that the human mind is not, neither now nor ever, a universal cognitive
tool—that makes the pronouncement of ultimate anthropic principles on
physical cognition an unwise activity indeed.
But leaving behind possibilities that can only be guessed at, and con-
centrating on the immediate here and now, what are the psychological re-
quirements for the successful advancement in the physical sciences of the
metageometric endeavour we have here but glimpsed upon or, for that mat-
ter, of any other piece of genuinely new physics? Or to put differently, what
does it take for human scientists to be capable of highly innovative thought?
What kind of mortals are up to such a cyclopean task?
In sketching an answer to this question (and just when we thought we had
left evolutionary thoughts behind), a parallel can be drawn with evolutionary
theory as suggested by Hardin (1960, pp. 258–346). The key to the successful
perpetuation of any species is for its members to differentiate themselves into
races, each inhabiting a reproductively isolated ecological niche, for then the
species as a species enjoys high genetic diversity and is apt to spread into
and exploit virgin niches of opportunity (in particular, when confronted with
changes of their ecosystems). Species all of whose conservative members are
finely adapted only to the peak of “Mount Tory” (p. 293) lack the capacity
to stray away into virgin land: undiscovered “Mount Opportunity” is only
available to some of the less finely adapted races of “Mount Risky,” where
each race of the species evolves in isolation.
The same is the case in the sphere of science. The development of truly
original ideas requires unorthodox, heretical thought. This kind of highly
original thought needed to reach the peak of Mount Opportunity, however,
presupposes detachment from the ubiquitous influence of orthodox ideas,
from the ebbs and flows of scientific fashions. At some point, the creative
spirit must draw his gaze away from his peers and look within himself,
making the scientific affair with the natural world a personal matter.12 High
creativity, and the promise of Mount Opportunity, require thoughts and
ideas to evolve in isolation. And just like the blind opportunism of evolution
can, through the discarding of unfit, wasteful products, create life forms
undreamt-of in the drawing board of the most intelligent designer, so can,
by the same method, the independent conceptions of myriads of genuinely
autonomous men lead to the discovery of “more things in heaven and earth,”
as Shakespeare’s Hamlet would say to today’s team-working Horatios, “than
are dreamt of in your philosophy.”
A look at frontier physics reveals that the figure of the intellectually
independent man of science is regrettably far from holding court today;
creative thought on the basis of collective ideas is not the exception but the
rule. Before the approving gaze of the scientific community and of society as
a whole, legions of scientists and professional philosophers single-mindedly
12Charles Darwin, who secluded himself with his family in the English village of Down
is, coincidentally, a paradigmatic example of this way of proceeding.
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toil today, among other trends, in the digging of a bottomless hole argument,
in the exploration of hidden bends and corners of this universe and the
conjuring up of myriads of others, in the knitting of the world out of strings
or loops, and—the most irresistible, compelling, and widespread trend of
all—in the exploration of the secluded depths of the Planck scale. On the
other hand, not to follow such trends and go one’s own way is severely looked
down upon: not one of the official roads to quantum gravity. But if scientific
breakthroughs (as in Kuhnian revolutions) is what we are after—and so it
would seem from the grand visions of quantum gravity—these have never
been known to arise from the teamwork of hundreds but from the intellect of
one creative spirit. Seeing the same old world in a new light is largely a one-
man affair. Echoing these thoughts, and even the evolutionary parallelism,
we hear the reverberation of Richard Feynman’s words:
The only thing that is dangerous is that everybody does the same
thing! [. . . ] There are enormous numbers of possibilities. . . And
we have to explore. So we ought to be running around in as
many directions as possible.13
Yet, as Hardin (1960) observed, this independent attitude does not come
easy to those already “breathing an atmosphere of fellowship and togeth-
erness” (p. 343), i.e. to those accustomed to what Smolin (2001) described
as “the comfort of travelling with a crowd of like-minded seekers” (p. 10).
After all, Man is by nature a gregarious animal.
We recognize in the formulaic, repetitious, and unoriginal character of
frontier physics, to borrow Lem’s (1984b, pp. 173–177) words, an “age of
epigonism”14 or “repetitive fulfillment” of the geometric physical tradition.
Any creative tradition—whether artistic, scientific, or even natural—is based
on an underlying space of possibilities determined by its own methods. A
painter who only uses a straight-edge will only produce straight-line paint-
ings, just like a physicist who only uses geometric methods will only produce
geometric theories of nature. Creation within an budding creative tradition
is difficult because, although the field of opportunity is vast, its possibilities
have not yet even been mapped out, its scholars resembling more explorers
than inventors (cf. metageometry). Original creation is easiest when the
tradition has been sufficiently explored but its possibilities not even nearly
exhausted (cf. geometric classical mechanics and the geometric differential
calculus). However, when a creative tradition has been nearly thoroughly
exploited, the production of new original work within it becomes extremely
difficult (cf. geometric general relativity), leads sometimes to viable yet mal-
formed new specimens (cf. geometric quantum theory), and most of the time
reduces to the repetition of older products (cf. geometric quantum gravity).
Returning once more to the evolutionary picture, the best exemplifica-
tion of repetitive fulfillment within a creative tradition is found in nature
13In (Davies & Brown, 1988, p. 196).
14Epigone, from Greek epi “after” + gonos “seed”: to be born after; an inferior or
undistinguished imitator, follower, or successor.
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itself. When a new taxonomic class of organism (e.g. Insecta, Mammalia)
appears, the possible successful species allowed within the creative principle
of this class is immense (for Insecta of the order of millions). As ecological
niches become occupied, however, speciation stops and nature contents itself
with an incessant repetition of its earlier successful products. The creative
tradition has become full. The geometric physical tradition seems now to
have reached a similar fulfillment—its fateful age of epigonism.
If forward necessarily means different, how come our present social frame-
work, in which science is cherished so highly, does not encourage the creative
development of this discipline? What is the source of this state of affairs?
The paradoxical predicament in which science administrators have placed
the scientific enterprise is nothing new, as it was noticed by J. J. Thomson
over 65 years ago (opening quote), but it is correct to say that the situation
has only worsened in time. No better analysis of the present predicament of
science—and no better thoughts on which to end this dissertation—than in
the lucid and uncompromising words of Garrett Hardin:
As it became generally realized that an important fraction of
the world’s research in pure science was done by academic men,
administrators defined research as part of the job, and made
productivity in research a criterion for advancement. The con-
sequences of this meddling have been about what one would ex-
pect. There is now a tendency to choose projects that are pretty
sure to give quick results, and to avoid questions on tabooed sub-
jects. . . As research has become more expensive, the academic
man has had to develop a talent for begging. He gets a subsidy
from foundations by telling committees what he hopes to accom-
plish with their money if he gets it. The successful beggar often
gives more attention to the committee than he does to the scien-
tific problem. The result: other-directedness is introduced into a
realm where it has no business being, the realm of inner-directed
science. Orthodoxy is encouraged. This may not be too bad for
what we call “science,” for its fields are almost all freed now of
conflict with tradition, and its methods systematized to the point
where innumerable and immensely important discoveries can be
made by men who are not in the first rank of the heretics. But
there is need for the spirit of science to move into fields not now
called science, into fields where tradition still holds court. We
can hardly expect a committee to acquiesce in the dethronement
of tradition. Only an individual can do that, an individual who
is not responsible to the mob. Now that the truly independent
man of wealth has disappeared, now that the independence of
the academic man is fast disappearing, where are we to find the
conditions of partial alienation and irresponsibility needed for
the highest creativity? (Hardin, 1960, pp. 344–345)
May the last survivors of these endangered races of men conquer the
taboos necessary to unlock the enigmas of the cosmos!
Geometry! You have accompanied mankind
For longer than it can remember;
Well-entrenched within the chambers of its mind,
You glow as though relentless ember.
Anciently, your shapes enticed the Babylonians;
On clay they would record inscriptions
Reverenced in all our worldviews: from Newtonian
To quantum-world ornate descriptions.
Theories have been presented in your honour;
Correctness based upon your clarity;
Ignorance is predicated on the goner
To do without your familiarity.
Presently, despite your triumphs (which are ours),
Farewell we bid you, alter ego,
Fearing that you have run out of your powers,
Disorienting us all, as we go!
Appendix A:
To picture or to model?
Throughout this work, the verb “to picture” is used instead of the more usual
“to model,” and likewise “theoretical picture” is used instead of “theoretical
model.” This is because the former usage makes the subjective, theorist-
ridden nature of theoretical portrayal in science more explicit by putting it
on a par with the equally subjective, artistic renderings of a painter; the
meaning of “to model,” on the other hand, is ambiguous.
Moster´ın (1984, pp. 131–146) captured the relationship between the key
notions surrounding a representational activity in the canonical expression
“x paints y which represents z.” An application to everyday usage gives “the
painter (x) paints the painting (y) which represents the model (z).” Here the
model—that which is to be subjectively mimicked, emulated, replicated—
is the thing (e.g. a landscape) or person (e.g. a human model) which the
painter captures—according to his own biases and tools—through and in
his painting. Thus, the counterpart of this expression in scientific usage
is “the scientist (x) devises the theory (y) which represents the section of
reality (z).” As a result, Moster´ın noted that the use of the word “model”
made by natural scientists—to denote a theoretical construct that attempts
to explain a section of reality—is diametrically opposed to that of everyday
usage, where by “model” we rather denote that section of reality which we
“copy,” i.e. that section of reality theorized upon by the scientist or artist.
In everyday usage “to model” can also refer to the making of a material
object (e.g. a maquette of a building or a wooden plane built to scale). Is
this meaning opposed to the one just mentioned? Does it make the meaning
of “model” as “theory”—both something we make—more plausible? Not
at all. When we make a material model, we do not use it as a theoretical
tool to study something else, but as a scaled-down version of that section
of reality we are interested in, and which we thus find more manageable
to study. It, the model, is again the object of our theoretical study, not
the theoretical tool itself. For example, we now apply the laws about the
strength of materials to the maquette of the building, or we place the wooden
plane in a wind tunnel to study its aerodynamics. This is what Moster´ın
called “to serve as a model.”
Incidentally, the scientific use of “model” is also opposed to the meaning
given it in the theory of models, which again coincides with that of everyday
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language. This theory formally studies sections of reality which it calls sys-
tems; for every system, it considers a theory that will explain its functioning.
If and only if a system works as the theory states, it is called a model of the
theory.
Ultimately, one can attribute meaning to words in any way one wishes,
and the scientist is free to continue to call his theories models if that is his
inclination. But, at least from the perspective explained here, the widely
used expression “theoretical model” is natural scientists’ favourite, unwitting
oxymoron.
Appendix B:
Preparation time
Is there any quantum-mechanical concept of time—or, more precisely, time
instant—at the geometric level? Could such a concept be connected with
the transition function 〈b|a〉 (geometrically, the inner product)? The idea
appears promising because the transition function represents the inner re-
arrangement of physical systems at preparation, and change is at the heart
of what we understand by time. The concept of time to be derived here,
leading to a primitive form of Schro¨dinger’s equation, is called preparation
time after this association.
We start by examining an infinitesimally small change δ〈b|a〉 of 〈b|a〉 in
terms of the interaction between ket and bra vectors |a〉 and 〈b|.15 In order to
work with δ〈b|a〉, we need to express it in terms of concepts whose properties
and behaviour we know. To this end, we introduce the first geometric time
postulate,
δ〈b|a〉 = i〈b|δFˆba|a〉, (B.1)
which gives a geometric representation to the infinitesimal change of the
transition function as a mediated transition between arrow state vectors.
The mediation is performed by operator δFˆba, which works as the inter-
mediary of the interaction between any state vector |a〉 (in general, |ai〉)
associated with observable A and any state vector |b〉 (in general, |bi〉) asso-
ciated with observable B. We call δFˆba the infinitesimal action operator.
Assuming the change of the transition function to be continuous, we find
that δ satisfies the chain rule for a product of transition functions:
δ(〈d|c〉〈b|a〉) = (〈d|c〉 + δ〈d|c〉)(〈b|a〉 + δ〈b|a〉) − 〈d|c〉〈b|a〉
= 〈d|c〉δ〈b|a〉 + δ〈d|c〉〈b|a〉 + δ〈d|c〉δ〈b|a〉
= 〈d|c〉δ〈b|a〉 + δ〈d|c〉〈b|a〉 +O[(δ〈b|a〉)2]. (B.2)
Thus, δ works mathematically like a differential insofar as the chain rule is
concerned, but it must not be confused with a regular differential, since in
general δ〈b|a〉 6= 0, where 〈b|a〉 is a complex number. As it will turn out, and
as we could expect, there is no infinitesimal change only for 〈aj |ai〉 = δij ∈ R,
i.e. when no transition actually occurs.
15See (Schwinger, 1959, pp. 1550–1551) for most of the mathematical formalism below
but without relation to time.
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Postulate (B.1), decomposition relation (12.24), and chain rule (B.2)
give us enough information about the physical properties of δFˆba. In effect,
because
δ〈b|a〉 =
∑
i
[
(δ〈b|ci〉)〈ci|a〉+ 〈b|ci〉(δ〈ci|a〉)
]
, (B.3)
we find
i〈b|δFˆba|a〉 =
∑
i
[
i〈b|δFˆbc|ci〉〈ci|a〉+ 〈b|ci〉i〈ci|δFˆca|a〉
]
= i〈b|
(
δFˆbc
∑
i
|ci〉〈ci|+ δFˆca
∑
i
|ci〉〈ci|
)
|a〉, (B.4)
where we have now interpreted the quasigeometric decomposition relation
geometrically. This leads to the result
δFˆba = δFˆbc + δFˆca for all a, b, c. (B.5)
This tells us that the interaction between two (geometrically represented)
states of a system can be mediated by a third such state in a serial manner.
From Eq. (B.5) we obtain two special results. Setting c = a, we find
δFˆba = δFˆba + δFˆaa, (B.6)
which implies
δFˆaa = 0ˆ for all a. (B.7)
This means that the infinitesimal action operator is null in the absence of
change; i.e. in the absence of a transition, as in 〈aj |ai〉 = δij , no instant of
preparation time is created by its infinitesimal change. On the other hand,
the change of a genuine quantum-mechanical transition 〈b|a〉 does determine
an instant of preparation time.
Now, setting b = a in Eq. (B.5) and using Eq. (B.7), we find
0ˆ = δFˆaa = δFˆac + δFˆca, (B.8)
which implies
δFˆac = −δFˆca for all a, c. (B.9)
This tells us that a change of sign of the action operator indicates a reversal
of the direction in which it mediates the transition.
Finally, using Eq. (B.9), the transition-function postulate (12.31), and an
extension to it in the sense that complex conjugation must reverse not only
the direction of the transition but also that of a change in the transition—
δ〈b|a〉 = (δ〈a|b〉)∗—we obtain that the action operator is Hermitian. In
effect, because
i〈b|δFˆba|a〉 = [i〈a|δFˆab|b〉]∗ = −i〈b|δFˆ †ab|a〉, (B.10)
we find
δFˆba = −δFˆ †ab = δFˆ †ba. (B.11)
261
|a〉
B
〈b|
︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ|a〉
︷ ︸︸ ︷
δ〈b|
|b〉
︸ ︷︷ ︸
〈b|a〉
Figure B.1: Schematic representation of preparation time in terms of a transition
box and arrow vectors.
The introduction of a second geometric time postulate, indicating the
simplest possible dependence of δFˆba on b and a, allows us next to recover a
primitive form of Schro¨dinger’s equation linking infinitesimal changes of |a〉
and 〈b| with |a〉 and 〈b| themselves. The second geometric time postulate is
δFˆba = Gˆ(b)− Gˆ(a). (B.12)
Here the Hermitian operator Gˆ works as generator of infinitesimal transfor-
mations of |a〉 and 〈b|. Using this postulate, we find, on the one hand,
δ〈b|a〉 = i〈b|Gˆ(b)|a〉 − i〈b|Gˆ(a)|a〉. (B.13)
This is an equation for the infinitesimal change of the transition function
in terms of ket and bra vectors. On the other hand, using the geometric
decomposition of the transition function16 and the chain rule, we can find
another equation for the infinitesimal change of the transition function:
δ〈b|a〉 = (δ〈b|)|a〉 + 〈b|(δ|a〉) (B.14)
(Figure B.1). The two equations together imply
iδ|a〉 = Gˆ(a)|a〉 (B.15)
and
−iδ〈b| = 〈b|Gˆ(b), (B.16)
where we dismiss the alternative implication on a physical basis.
Results (B.16) and (B.15) are primitive Schro¨dinger equations, respec-
tively, for the bra vector 〈b| at preparation and for the ket vector |a〉 just
outside preparation. Thus, Hermitian operator Gˆ, generator of infinitesi-
mal change of |a〉 and 〈b|, can be considered a primitive ancestor of the
Hamiltonian Hˆ, itself the generator of translations of a system in time t.
In this geometric analysis, then, the rise of a quantum-mechanical time
instant comes about in two parts, namely, the infinitesimal change δ〈b| of a
bra vector at preparation and the infinitesimal change δ|a〉 of a ket vector
16This is perfectly reasonable because this particular analysis of time is carried out at
the geometric level.
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−iGˆ(a)|a〉 = δ|a〉
|a〉
i〈b|Gˆ(b) = δ〈b|
〈b|
δ〈b|a〉
Figure B.2: Birth of preparation time, i.e. of a quantum-mechanical geometric
time instant, at the borderline of a quantum-mechanical premeasurement process
as the combination of the infinitesimal change δ〈b| of a bra vector at preparation
and the infinitesimal change δ|a〉 of a ket vector just outside preparation.
just outside preparation. Preparation time is by nature inherent in prepa-
ration, and it is born at the preparation borderline (Figure B.2).
A quantum-mechanical concept of time inspired in a similar idea is that
of a q-tick proposed by Jaroszkiewicz (2001). This time arises qualitatively
from the “irreversible acquisition of information” that occurrs after a mea-
surement is made on a quantum-mechanical system. In contrast to a q-
tick, preparation time arises here from quantum-mechanical transitions (in
general, premeasurements) rather than from measurements. Further, the
infinitesimal changes of the transition function giving rise to a geometric
time instant are governed by the primitive Schro¨dinger equations (B.15)
and (B.16).
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